Would the Senator from California yield for a unanimous consent request? I ask unanimous consent that I be permitted to speak immediately following the Senator from California. Mr. President, for the last 6 months I have come to the floor…
Would the Senator from California yield for a unanimous consent request?
I ask unanimous consent that I be permitted to speak immediately following the Senator from California.
Mr. President, for the last 6 months I have come to the floor on numerous occasions to offer my support of the limited immunity provisions in the Rockefeller-Bond bill.
In addition to my views on this subject, there are countless Americans who have expressed their support for the immunity provision.
In fact, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record a letter sent to the Senate leadership last month, which is signed by 21 State attorneys general, which expresses their strong support for the immunity provision included in this bill.
Mr. President, here is the list of the attorneys general who signed this letter endorsing the immunity provision in the original Rockefeller-Bond bill. They are attorneys general from the States of Wisconsin, Rhode Island, Oklahoma, Colorado, Florida, Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Kansas, Utah, Texas, New Hampshire, Virginia, North Dakota, North Carolina, South Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Nebraska, West Virginia, and Washington.
In addition, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record four letters sent from law enforcement organizations, all in support of the immunity provision of the bill.
Mr. President, The first letter is from the National Sheriffs Association on behalf of 20,000 nationwide sheriffs. It states in part:
The Nation's sheriffs recognize the critical role that
electronic communication service providers play in assisting
intelligence officials on national security activities. We
are gravely concerned that, without retroactive immunity, the
private sector might be unwilling to cooperate with lawful
Government requests in the future. The possible reduction in
intelligence that might result from protracted litigation is
unacceptable to the security of our citizens. We strongly
urge you to help preserve the cooperative relationship
between law enforcement and the private sector by supporting
the immunity provision of this bill.
The other letters include one from the National Troopers Coalition, on behalf of its 40,000 members, one from the International Association of Chiefs of Police, on behalf of its 21,000 members, and one from the National Narcotics Officers' Association's Coalition on behalf of its 69,000 members. All of these letters support the retroactive immunity provision.
I have to tell you, when 150,000 law enforcement personnel with tremendous experience and expertise say they support telecom retroactive immunity, we should be listening and we should be giving this great weight. They know firsthand the dangers we face and they know what is at stake.
Let me talk a little about the Feinstein amendment No. 3910 on exclusive means. S. 2248 already has an exclusive means provision that is identical to the first part of the distinguished Senator's amendment. That provision simply restates Congress's intent back in 1978, when FISA was enacted, to place the President at his lowest ebb of authority in conducting warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance.
The current provision in S. 2248 was acceptable to all sides in the Intelligence Committee because it maintains the status quo with respect to the dispute over the President's constitutional authority to authorize warrantless surveillance.
Unfortunately, the amendment of the distinguished Senator from California is a significant expansion of the bipartisan provision that we enacted in the Intelligence Committee bill. Her amendment goes further by stating that only an express statutory authorization for electronic surveillance, other than FISA or the criminal wiretap statutes, shall constitute additional exclusive means.
This attempts to prohibit the President's exercise of his judicially recognized article II authority to issue warrantless electronic surveillance directives.
During the next attack on our country or in the face of an imminent threat, the Congress may not be in a position to legislate an express authorization of additional means. We may get intelligence information about an imminent threat during a lengthy recess, over a holiday. Air travel may be inhibited.
The bottom line is, we don't know what tomorrow will bring. Yet this
provision of the distinguished Senator from California would raise unnecessary legal concerns that might impede effective action by the executive branch to protect this country.
This amendment would also make members of the intelligence community who conduct electronic surveillance at the direction of the President subject to the FISA criminal penalty provisions of a $10,000 fine and imprisonment for not more than 5 years.
Virtually all of these people are not partisan people. They are people who continue on regardless of what administration is involved. They are there to do the job to protect us. They are not partisans. We should not treat them as such, and certainly we should not be saying that if they make a mistake, they are subject to a criminal provision of a $10,000 fine or imprisonment of not more than 5 years. Also, it is likely these criminal penalties would apply to any service provider who assisted the Government in conducting such electronic surveillance. That makes it even tougher to get their cooperation. Up until now they have been willing to cooperate because they realize how important this work is, and they have the request of high-level officials in the Government. That should be enough to protect them. They are doing it patriotically, to protect our country. They should not be hampered nor should their general counsels have to make a decision that the U.S. Government will have to go to court, with all of the delays involved in that, in order to do what it takes to protect the people in this country.
Regardless of what the skeptics and critics have said about the President's Terrorist Surveillance Program, the Constitution trumps the FISA statute. If a Government employee acts under the color of the President's lawful exercise of his constitutional authority, that employee should not be subject to a criminal penalty.
In my opinion, the current restatement of exclusive means is fair and keeps the playing field level, and it is enough. Ultimately, the Supreme Court may decide whether Congress has the authority to limit the President's authority to intercept enemy communications. Until then, it is my hope that we don't try to tilt the balance in a way that we may someday come to regret.
I urge my colleagues to vote against this exclusive means amendment.
The next Feinstein amendment is No. 3919. This amendment alters the immunity provision of the Rockefeller-Bond bill. I will oppose this amendment.
As has been said countless times, the immunity provision in this legislation was created after months of extensive debate and negotiation between the Congress and the intelligence community.
I cannot emphasize enough the painstaking work that the Intelligence Committee undertook in order to create this immunity provision. The chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence stated the following in the Intelligence Committee report:
The [Intelligence] Committee did not endorse the immunity
provision lightly. It was the informed judgment of the
Committee after months in which we carefully reviewed the
facts in the matter. The Committee reached the conclusion
that the immunity remedy was appropriate in this case after
holding numerous hearings and briefings on the subject and
conducting a thorough examination of the letters sent by the
U.S. Government to the telecommunications companies.
The administration wanted more than what is in this bill, and they did not get it. In a bipartisan way, we came together to come up with this bill, and it should not be tampered with now on the floor.
Let's look at what this means in relation to ongoing litigation. Since this immunity compromise provides no immunity for Government agencies or officials, the following seven cases will continue to be unaffected by this legislation. The immunity provision of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence bill still allows TSP challenges in the al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. v. George W. Bush case, the ACLU v. National Security Agency case, the Center for Constitutional Rights v. George W. Bush case, the Guzzi v. George W. Bush case, the Henderson v. Keith Alexander case, the Shubert v. George W. Bush case, and the Tooley v. George W. Bush case.
I wish to draw attention to the first case. The al-Haramain Islamic Foundation has been designated by the Department of the Treasury as a ``specially designated global terrorist'' for providing support to al- Qaida and was similarly designated by the United Nations Security Council. If there ever was a case that should be dismissed, this is it--a terrorist organization providing support to al-Qaida sues the President for listening to their terrorist conversations. Unbelievable. And yet since the immunity provision in this bill is silent on the issue, the case will go on.
I highlight this case to remind people the provision in the bill already represents a compromise. The provision in the original bill passed by a 13-to-2 bipartisan vote out of the Intelligence Committee on which I serve. Despite repeated attempts to tweak this compromise, it remains the most appropriate and just mechanism for the resolution of this issue.
Just like the faulty ideas of Government indemnification and Government substitution, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court review of certifications is yet another alternative that fails to improve on the original bipartisan immunity compromise we have in the bill before us.
I will oppose any provisions which weaken the immunity compromise. This amendment we are debating will do exactly that. Rather than rely on the carefully crafted language, this amendment introduces radically new ideas which completely change the dynamics of the immunity provision of the bipartisan bill. Rather than allowing the presiding district judge to review the Attorney's General certification called for in this bill, this amendment unnecessarily expands the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court jurisdiction into areas unheard of when this court was created nearly 30 years ago and equally unheard of in the year 2008.
Let's remember what it is that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court was created to do:
A court which shall have jurisdiction to hear applications
for and grant orders approving electronic surveillance.
That is the mission of the FISC. So the FISC hears applications for and grants orders approving electronic surveillance. That is it. That is all they were created to do and rightly so. These are judges from all over the country who serve on the FISC at special times and do read these briefs, do read these legal matters that come before them, and then do exactly that, ``a court which shall have jurisdiction to hear applications for and grant orders approving electronic surveillance.''
Yet this legislation will completely alter the nature of this court by transforming it into a trial court for adversarial litigation. This completely alters the intention of FISA from 1978 which carefully created this court. The role of the FISC, or Federal Intelligence Surveillance Court, has been greatly misunderstood during this debate.
I suggest we pay close attention to the recent opinion from the FISC, which is only the third public opinion in the history of the FISC, and that is over a 30-year period. The importance of this quote has been emphasized many times by Senator Bond, and this is what the FISC said:
Although the FISC handles a great deal of classified
material, FISC judges do not make classification decisions
and are not intended to become national security experts.
Furthermore, even if a typical FISC judge had more expertise
in national security matters than a typical district court
judge, that expertise would not be equal to that of the
executive branch which is constitutionally entrusted with
protecting the national security.
I understand there are certain Senators in this body who dislike President Bush. That is their right. But on the other hand, there may come a time when a President of their party may have to protect our country. They ought to think it through because they are taking away the tools that are necessary to protect our country in a zeal to go beyond what the FISC was ever designated to do.
Going beyond the fact this amendment would turn the role of the FISA Court on its head, let's look at what the FISC is asked to do in this amendment. According to the language, liability protection would only occur in three limited instances: One, the statutory defense in 18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(a)(ii)
has been met. Two, the assistance of electronic surveillance service providers was undertaken on good faith and pursuant to an ``objectively reasonable belief'' that compliance with the Government's directive was lawful. And three, assistance was not provided.
Regarding the first instance in which litigation would be dismissed, we need to realize 18 U.S.C. 2511 is not the only statute that allows the Government to receive information from telecommunications companies. There are numerous statutes which authorize the Government to receive information from private businesses. Here is a list not meant to include all such statutes. Look at this list:
18 U.S.C. 2516; 18 U.S.C. 2518, 18 U.S.C. 2512(2)(a)(ii), 18 U.S.C. 2511(3)(b)(iv), 50 U.S.C. 1802(a), 50 U.S.C. 1804, 50 U.S.C. 1805, 50 U.S.C. 1811, 50 U.S.C. 1861, 18 U.S.C. 2702(b)(5), 18 U.S.C. 2702(c)(5), 18 U.S.C. 2702(b)(8), 18 U.S.C. 2702(c)(4), 18 U.S.C. 2703(a), 18 U.S.C. 2709, 50 U.S.C. 1842, 18 U.S.C. 3127, 50 U.S.C. 1843, and 50 U.S.C. 1844, to mention a few.
Regarding the second narrow instance of dismissal of litigation, the phrase ``objectively reasonable belief'' is not defined in the legislation. What does this mean? How can it not be given a definition if the court is supposed to rely on it? Are we going to turn it over to the court to define it? Again, that is not the mission of the court. The court is not skilled in intelligence matters, except to the extent they have to know about it to be able to approve the various requests that are made of them, and there is no way it is going to be as skilled as the intelligence community.
So this amendment would grant the FISC new jurisdiction to review past conduct of private businesses utilizing a standard which did not exist at the time of the supposed activity and a standard which is not even defined in the legislation which creates it. Wow.
In addition, this amendment would allow plaintiffs and defendants to appear before the Federal Intelligence Surveillance Court. But we should know the FISC is not a trial court. It has never had plaintiffs in ongoing civil litigation appear before it in its nearly 30 years of existence.
There are approximately 40 civil cases which are ongoing out of this matter. Would all these plaintiffs appear before FISC? How would classified information, therefore, be protected? This amendment would create an entirely new role for the FISC, thus abandoning the very formula by which the FISC was created in the first place. Remember, the FISC was created to be a specialized court. Yet the expansion of FISC jurisdiction and duty required by this amendment brings us down a road where the FISC could be transformed from a specialized court to an appendage of the Federal district court. That precedent set by this amendment could forever alter the role of the FISC.
Quite simply, the FISC is not a trial court, nor should it be. Quite simply, the FISC is not a forum for adversarial litigation, nor should it be.
This amendment extends the rationale that the answer to any question during this debate is ``have the FISC look at it.'' The role of the FISC is vitally important, but the FISC is not the answer to every question during this debate. Misguided attempts to expand the FISC to be the purported solution to any alleged problem with terrorist tracking are impractical, imperceptive, and inappropriate.
We are long past the time for guesswork, and we need to support the tried-and-true bipartisan immunity provision as appropriate remedy to a critical problem. I reiterate my strenuous objection to this amendment, and I urge my colleagues not to support an amendment which introduces far too many unanswered questions into a debate which needs none.
Amendment No. 3912
With regard to amendment No. 3912 regarding bulk collection, this amendment did pass out of the Judiciary Committee, but it passed on a 10-to-9 party-line vote after only four minutes of discussion. This Judiciary substitute was tabled by the full Senate by a 60-to-36 vote, and this amendment is one of the reasons it was.
There is confusion about the need for this amendment. Does it preclude bulk collection or not? The text of the amendment seems to indicate that no bulk collection is permitted. Yet the author of the amendment states there is an exception for military operations. I have read the amendment, and I don't see any exception listed. Perhaps he is referencing comments in the Judiciary Committee report. But committee reports are not law.
The Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence have carefully reviewed this amendment, and they have stated that if this amendment is in a bill which is presented to the President, they will recommend that the President veto the bill, and I agree with that recommendation.
Amendment No. 3979
With regard to the Feingold amendment No. 3979 on sequestration of U.S. person communications, I am very concerned about the substance of this amendment, as are many of my colleagues. In addition, the Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence have thoroughly reviewed this amendment, and they recently sent a letter to the Senate stating:
This amendment would eviscerate critical core authorities
of the Protect America Act and S. 2248. Our prior letter and
Statement of Administration Policy explained how this type of
amendment increases the danger to the Nation and returns the
intelligence community to a pre-September 11th posture that
was heavily criticized in congressional reviews. It would
have a devastating impact on foreign intelligence
surveillance operations. It has never been the case that the
mere fact that a person overseas happens to communicate with
an American triggers a need for court approval. Indeed, if
court approval were mandated in such circumstances, there
would be grave consequences for the intelligence communities'
efforts to collect foreign intelligence.
The last part of this has been underlined.
Accordingly, if this amendment is part of a bill that is
presented to the President, we, as well as the President's
other senior advisors, will recommend that he veto the bill.
Unlike many of the amendments we have debated here on the Senate floor, this amendment did not receive a vote in either the Intelligence or Judiciary Committees. Not that that is limiting, but the amendment itself is not a healthy one on its face. Yet this amendment is among the most drastic in terms of affecting the efficiency and effectiveness of our intelligence collection processes. This amendment imposes tremendous restrictions in which the intelligence community is limited in what information they can receive and how this information can be shared.
That is what I think we were shocked to find when 9/11 occurred, that our various intelligence community organizations--FBI, CIA, et cetera-- were not sharing information. Now that we have solved that problem, why go back?
The massive reorganization of our collection techniques which would be required by this amendment is certainly obvious. The author of the amendment has recognized this as well, previously stating:
I do understand this amendment imposes a new framework that
may take some time to implement.
We need to remember the purpose of this bill is, and always has been, to enable the intelligence community to target foreign terrorists and spies overseas. But in order to make sure we are not missing valuable intelligence, we need to get all of a target's communications, not only when that target is talking with other people overseas, and that may mean intercepting calls with people inside the United States. In fact, those may be the most important calls to try to prevent an attack in the United States.
I understand there is concern about the impact of foreign targeting on U.S. persons. But we have a lot of protections built into this new bill that came out of the Intelligence Committee on a 13-to-2 bipartisan vote. I have been to this floor on numerous occasions and highlighted how the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court's role in all aspects of foreign intelligence collection is being greatly expanded by this bill, far beyond the 1978 FISA statute.
In addition, the Senate agreed to an amendment by Senator Kennedy that would make it clear you cannot use authorities in this bill to require communications where the sender and all intended recipients are known to be in the United States. We shouldn't go any farther.
The intelligence community must use minimization procedures. Our analysts are familiar with these procedures. They have used them for a long
time without any known abuses. Yet the scope of this amendment seems to represent no confidence in the minimization procedures used by the U.S. Government. Keep in mind, these minimization procedures were enacted over 30 years ago, and this bill will authorize the FISC to review and approve them for the first time.
This bill goes farther than ever before in our history in striking a balance between intelligence collection and protection of civil liberties. Personally, I am proud of this bill. I think all in the Intelligence Committee should have stuck with it, and we should not be trying to amend it at this point, especially with amendments that aren't going to work and will diminish our ability to get the intelligence we need to protect our citizens. Now I believe that in this bill we are protecting the civil liberties of ordinary Americans, but we also need to make sure our intelligence community isn't blind to information which may ultimately prove to be critical.
Section (a)(1) of this amendment would not allow the collection of certain communications if the Government knows before acquisition a communication is to or from a person reasonably believed to be in the United States. The Government knows when it targets foreign citizens in foreign countries that they might call or be called by U.S. persons. These are called ``incidental communications.'' Under the limitations in this amendment, the Government could not initiate the collection in the first place under many circumstances. This essentially undoes the authority granted in section 703 of this bill and will cause us to go deaf to our enemies.
The Director of National Intelligence has told us before that speed and agility are essential in tracking terrorists and preventing terrorist attacks. Yet even if collection could somehow begin under the dangerous restrictions in this amendment, analysts would have to go through hoop after hoop after hoop to use information that has foreign intelligence value. Remember, if it doesn't have foreign intelligence value, any U.S. person information would already have been minimized.
I do not understand why we would set up unnecessary roadblocks and slow this process down when we already have so many substantial protections in place. The Director of National Intelligence has stated this amendment would cause significant operational problems for the intelligence community that could lead to intelligence gaps. I affirm this statement. Knowing this, it would be irresponsible to handcuff our intelligence community with these additional restrictions.
I urge my colleagues to join me in opposing this dangerous amendment.
I emphasize again: We have brilliant, knowledgeable, well-trained, decent, honorable people who are here, no matter who is President, in the business of protecting our citizens from terrorist acts. And this bill, which passed 13 to 2 on a bipartisan vote out of the Intelligence Committee, provides more checks on these good people than the FISA Act of 1978 did, and that act has worked very well through all those years. The reason we are doing this bill is because we are in a new age, with new methods of communication that simply were not covered by the 1978 act, to put it in simple terms.
This is a complex thing, and I think we have to be very careful if we go beyond what the Intelligence Committee bill has said we should do. It was a bill worked out after months of hearings and work by the Intelligence Committee. I believe, in the Senate, I have probably been on the Intelligence Committee longer than anybody else, and I want to protect our people too. I want to protect them in a multiplicity of ways. But one of the most important ways we can protect them in this day of Islamic fascism is to give them the tools to do it and not restrict and hamper them from doing it--keeping in mind that they are honest, non-partisan citizens who are more interested in protecting Americans and getting the information we need to protect everybody than the partisans and sometimes uninformed people make them out to be.
Yes, any administration can put the top-level people in, but it is those who collect this information on a daily basis, minimize this information when it needs to be minimized, and work to do it in an honorable fashion who do the work. We should not be tying their hands and hampering them from getting the work done in this day and age when we have so many problems, and it looks to me as if we are going to have them for many years to come.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.