Mr. President, I have listened very closely to the remarks of my dear friend from Connecticut. I have a lot of respect for him. However, it was an easy thing for 13 members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence to vote to grant…
Mr. President, I have listened very closely to the remarks of my dear friend from Connecticut. I have a lot of respect for him. However, it was an easy thing for 13 members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence to vote to grant retroactive immunity to companies that patriotically
adhered to legal letters to provide the means whereby we might be able to protect citizens in this country and perhaps all over the world.
Because of that work, we have been able to protect this country in ways that most people will never know because this area is one of the areas that we don't talk about. It is, this whole area, highly classified. We can talk about the law here.
Close inspection of the lawsuits against the telecoms reveals dubious claims. The plaintiffs have confused speculation for established facts. This is dangerous and the continuation of these lawsuits could lead to serious consequences for our national security.
It is very simple--Congress should not condone oversight through litigation.
A quick scan of what plaintiffs seek in many of these cases should send a chill down our spine. They are not, as many are suggesting, simply saying: ``You went along with the President's Terrorist Surveillance Program, now give us money.'' Rather, the lawsuits seize on the President's brief comments about the existence of a limited program to go on a fishing expedition of NSA activities. But this is really worse than a fishing expedition; this is draining the Loch Ness to find a monster. Sometimes what you are looking for just doesn't exist.
The lawsuits represent irrational fears of Government conspiracy, and seek to expose classified information, regardless of who is harmed in the process.
We all realize that the sources and methods our intelligence community utilizes to conduct surveillance are highly classified. The risks that classified details could be revealed through these lawsuits are severe. Remember, the very point of these lawsuits is to prove plaintiffs' claims by disclosing classified information.
Our enemies have tough decisions to make regarding how they communicate. They can't stay silent forever, and they have to weigh the need to communicate against the chance that their communications are intercepted. Given this, they are carefully watching us and reading every proceeding to see how our government collects information. If they think they see a weakness in our collection capabilities, they will certainly try and take advantage of it.
Given the legitimate problems that these lawsuits pose, the Senate Intelligence Committee adopted a bill which will alleviate them. The committee worked in a bipartisan manner to craft an immunity provision that met the needs of Congress, the Government, and the American people.
In an overwhelmingly bipartisan tally, the committee voted to include retroactive immunity for service providers that were alleged to have cooperated with the intelligence community following 9/11. Senators from both sides of the aisle, after careful consideration, came to this conclusion. Make no mistake, this was the right conclusion.
It was the right conclusion for the Intelligence Committee, and it should be the right conclusion for the full Senate today.
Our Senate Intelligence Committee has already noted that the intelligence community cannot obtain the intelligence it needs without the assistance of these companies. It goes without saying, companies in the future will certainly be less willing to assist the Government if they face the threat of extremely costly lawsuits each time they are alleged to have provided assistance.
The companies will shy away. Their attorneys will scour future Government requests, feverishly looking for any technicality to avoid compliance. And even if these private attorneys approve future participation, the company will have to listen to cautious stockholders, whose financial interests will undoubtedly make them adamantly opposed to situations which could lead to any financial risk or exposure.
But let's be clear: The telecoms are not threatening anyone. They are not saying ``do this, or we will never help you again.'' But, they don't need to say these things for us to understand the obvious. If the financial foundations of these companies crumble due to frivolous litigation, they will rebuild it to withstand future Government requests that may again lead to their collapse.
Now some have asked a valid question: If the companies did not break the law, why do they need immunity? Quite simply, the Government's assertion of the state secrets privilege prevents these companies from defending themselves.
This assertion by the Government is absolutely essential, as the possible disclosure of classified materials from ongoing court proceedings is a grave threat to national security. Simply put, you don't tell your enemies how you track them. This is why the NSA and other Government agencies won't say what they do, how they do it, or who they watch. Nor should they! To confirm or deny any of these activities, which are at the heart of the civil lawsuits, would harm national security. We should not discuss what our capabilities are.
Given the necessity for the state secrets privilege, the drawback is that the companies being sued are forbidden from making their case. In fact, the companies cannot even confirm or deny any involvement in the program whatsoever. They have no ability to defend themselves, and that is after patriotically doing what has to be done to protect each and every citizen in this country.
Ordinarily, these companies would be able to address allegations and make their case. However, the classified nature of the topic means the companies are not free to do so. They cannot even have discussions with shareholders or business partners.
But we need to remember, lawful silence does not equate to guilt. There is no guilt here. These are companies that cooperated with the Federal Government in helping us track terrorists to protect our citizens.
The identities of any company that assisted the Government following the attacks of September 11 are highly classified. While there have been numerous allegations, they are nothing more than accusations. If the identities of these companies are revealed and officially confirmed through litigation, they will face irreversible harm: harm in their business relations with foreign governments and companies and possible harm to their employees both here and abroad, who are truly soft targets for terrorist attacks.
My admiration and respect for the companies that did their part to defend Americans is well known. As I have said in the past, any company that assisted us following the attacks of 9/11 deserves a round of applause and a helping hand, not a slap in the face and a kick to the gut.
When companies are asked to assist the intelligence community based on a program authorized by the President and based on assurances from the highest levels of Government that the program has been determined to be lawful and necessary, they should be able to rely on those representations. For those who argue we need a compromise, let me be clear: We already have a compromise. The Government certainly wanted more than what is represented in this Intelligence Committee bill. And they did not get all they wanted. I think they should have. The chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence stated the following in the Intelligence Committee report:
This immunity provision is not the broad and vague immunity
sought by the administration. The committee did not endorse
the immunity provision lightly. It was the informed judgment
of the Committee after months in which we carefully reviewed
the facts in this matter. The Committee reached the
conclusion that the immunity remedy was appropriate in this
case after holding numerous hearings and briefings on the
subject and conducting a thorough examination of the letters
sent by the U.S. Government to the telecommunications
companies.
That is after numerous top-secret Intelligence Committee hearings. The immunity provisions in this bill are limited in scope. Not everyone will be happy with them, and that is the whole point. I, for one, wanted to see more protections for companies and Government officials in this bill. But I am willing to accept a compromise. My colleagues should be willing to do the same.
We are not all getting what we want. We are getting what the public needs for its protection. I will continue to oppose any efforts to weaken the Rockefeller-Bond immunity provision.
For nearly 2 months, Congress and the public have had the ability to review the immunity provisions in this
bill. Today we are hearing a great deal about how the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees handled the immunity provision. So let's look at how they voted.
The Intelligence Committee rejected an amendment to strip immunity from the bill, 12 to 3, and the committee voted to favorably report the bill, including the immunity provision, 13 to 2.
In addition, the Judiciary Committee rejected an amendment to strike the immunity provision from the bill, 12 to 7. What do all those votes have in common? They supported immunity and they were bipartisan. How many times are we going to hear about alternatives to S. 2248 which simply do not address the problem? How many trial balloons are going to be released? The first alternative we heard was the Government should indemnify the companies following possible adverse rulings in the cases.
There are myriad reasons why this option was lacking. The idea of indemnification apparently was not well received, as we now hear very little discussion of it. So let us call indemnification the first trial balloon to pop.
The next alternative we heard was the Government should be substituted in place of the companies being sued. But this alternative was full of problems, given that there is no way to remove the companies from the litigation. Remember, it is their very conduct that is in question. In order to try to prove their claims, plaintiffs will continue to seek discovery, including: document requests, depositions, interrogatories, technical data, trade secrets, proprietary company information and confidential, secret and highly classified information and the list goes on and on.
Obviously, the companies would still face many burdens of litigation, even though they are not parties because the Government is substituted for them.
This idea has also been skeptically viewed and the Judiciary Committee on Thursday rejected an idea in a resounding 13 to 5 bipartisan vote. So let's call Government substitution the second trial balloon to pop.
Now we are hearing another alternative which would dramatically expand the jurisdiction of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, and utilizes ambiguous terms such as ``objectively reasonable belief.''
The FISA Court was not created to review classified programs or the conduct of private companies. This new proposed alternative would completely revise the mission of the FISA Court, putting them in a role they have not had in their nearly 30 years of existence. This judicial expansion should be the third trial balloon to pop.
How long are we going to entertain inadequate alternatives and appease fringe political groups? Is it not time that we embrace the bipartisan compromise that puts the interest and safety of Americans over political interests? How long will it take? Are we willing to take that stand?
Let me also take a few minutes to unequivocally state my opposition to the Judiciary substitute. One of the basic requirements of any FISA modernization proposal is we should not have any provisions which could be interpreted as requiring warrants to target foreign terrorists overseas.
Quite simply, foreign terrorists living overseas should never receive protections provided by the fourth amendment to the Constitution. The Constitution never contemplated that. One of the controversial provisions added in the Judiciary Committee relates to ``reverse targeting.'' Reverse targeting is the practice of targeting a foreign person when the real intention is to target a U.S. person, thus circumventing the need to get a warrant for the U.S. person.
Reverse targeting has always been unlawful, in order to protect the communications of U.S. persons. Now, contrary to what most people believe, the legal definition of ``U.S. person,'' is not limited to U.S. citizens. See this chart: What is a U.S. person?
An ``alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence,'' a
``corporation which is incorporated in the United States.''
Now, that is according to 50 U.S.C. 1801. The U.S. person definition includes aliens lawfully admitted, legal residence, legal permanent residence. A U.S. person is also defined as a business incorporated within the United States.
From an intelligence-gathering standpoint, reverse targeting makes no sense. From an efficiency standpoint, if the Government was interested in targeting an American, it would apply for a warrant to listen to all the American's conversations, not just his conversations with a terrorist overseas.
But let's not let logic get in the way of a good conspiracy theory. Even though reverse targeting is already considered unlawful, a provision is included in the Intelligence bill which makes it explicit. This provision is clearly written and universally supported. However, the Judiciary Committee passed an amendment by a 10-to-9 partisan party-line vote which altered the clear language of that provision.
Now, where before the provision said you cannot target a foreign person if the purpose is to target a U.S. person, the new language adds the ambiguous term ``significant purpose.''
Now, words have meaning and in this context have very serious meaning. If this amendment becomes law, an analyst would now have to ask himself this question when targeting a terrorist overseas: Is a ``significant purpose'' of why I am targeting this foreign terrorist overseas the fact that the terrorist may call an airline in America to make flight reservations or a terrorist with a green card living in the
To my distinguished colleagues, I urge you to support the bipartisan Rockefeller-Bond compromise bill, one that has been superbly debated within the Intelligence Committee and has been carefully thought out.
It provides protections to civil liberties and ensures that technological changes do not outpace our laws.
I wanted to personally pay tribute to the distinguished Chairman of the Intelligence Committee and the distinguished Vice Chairman. They know what they accomplished in the Intelligence Committee was very important, and it should be followed by us on the floor.
We cannot even begin to talk about some classified issues on this floor. We cannot even begin to talk about the dangers that will come from going beyond that bill that passed 13 to 2 in the Senate Intelligence Committee. I refuse to place our country at risk. I refuse to do anything that would make our country be at risk. I suggest to you that if we follow the Judiciary Committee bill, I think we would be doing exactly that.
Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time, and I yield the floor.
I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
Mr. President, on numerous occasions in the FISA debate, we have seen dramatic fear mongering. Many individuals, particularly on partisan blogs, are spreading misleading and malicious information in order to incite fear of alleged governmental activities. This bill should not include text which panders to people who believe in imaginary Government conspiracies. There is such a thing as irrational fear of Government.
Let's not forget, our Government did not kill thousands of innocent Americans on September 11. Our Government did not kill hundreds of people in car bombings in U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Our Government did not kill 191 people in the Madrid train bombings. Our Government did not kill 52 people in the London train bombings. Our Government did not kill 202 people in suicide bombings Bali, Indonesia. The indisputable fact is terrorists have committed heinous attacks on Americans and have pledged themselves to conduct more. It is not politics of fear to acknowledge this. If we bury our heads in the sand and pass legislation that ignores these risks, we make ourselves and all our people more vulnerable. I will not stand by and see Congress pass laws which could create vulnerabilities for our people, vulnerabilities which expose our families and our friends to danger.
Let me tell you what our Government does to protect us. It hires the finest men and women of this great country to utilize their skills to help prevent these types of attacks. Our job in Congress is to make sure these people who have sworn to defend us have the necessary tools to try and prevent terrorist attacks. What they don't need are laws with ambiguous language, as has been proposed, making their jobs more difficult.
One of my colleagues previously stated:
The authority in this bill greatly expands the Government's
ability to conduct surveillance of foreign targets.
How in the world he can make that statement, I don't understand. The only great expansion I see in this bill is judicial jurisdiction. In fact, I am amazed we don't rename the bill the unlimited expansion of judicial authority act. We have advocated so much new responsibility for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court that I wonder whether people realize that court is composed of only 11 judges. Where is this great expansion in surveillance authority that has been argued on the floor?
Since FISA was passed in 1978, the Government has been able to target terrorists overseas. This bill amends FISA so we can continue to target foreign terrorists when they utilize communications over a wire, not just communications over radio or satellite. This does not sound to me like a great expansion. Maybe that is why the Government has continued to say FISA needed to be ``modernized,'' not that it needed to be greatly expanded. There is, however, a key expansion in the bill. It is a statutory warrant requirement when targeting U.S. persons, regardless of who they are, what they have done or where they are located. Notice I said U.S. persons, not U.S. citizens. This idea may sound great to everyone, but we should realize, with eyes wide open, what this means. We have heard some individuals claim the Government could use the power of the Protect America Act to spy on innocent Americans. We have heard the fear
mongering that the Government can spy on innocent Americans when they travel overseas. We have heard all about American families on vacation overseas in the Caribbean or in Europe. We have even heard our Government could spy on American military members who are overseas defending our country.
I find these scare tactics not only ridiculous but extremely offensive. They walk a fine line in seemingly questioning the integrity and the judgment of these fine men and women who work for us and who don't have a political agenda, who have dedicated their professional lives to prevent catastrophic attacks on Americans. Do we think our intelligence analysts are sitting around waiting for the Smith family to go on their family vacation to Italy so they can tap their cell phones? Give me a break. To imply that our country's intelligence analysts are more concerned with random innocent Americans than foreign terrorists overseas is a slap in the face to the people who protect our Nation. Our Government is focusing their attention on terrorists who wish us death, not on innocent Americans.
When some decry the lack of statutory protection for Americans overseas in the Protect America Act, I wonder if they realize the 1978 FISA law itself provides no statutory protections for Americans overseas. Yet we have called that the gold standard all these years. I would, however, tell my colleagues that Americans overseas are protected by the most important document in the history of our great Nation, and that is the U.S. Constitution. The fourth amendment to the Constitution provides protection from unreasonable search and seizure. That is the question. Is it always unreasonable for the Government to target an American overseas without a court order? Of course not. I would suggest the process that has worked for 26 years is the best approach. It is Executive Order 12333. Since 1981, the Government could only target Americans overseas if the Attorney General determined via probable cause that the American was an agent of a foreign power. Do we think an intelligence analyst is going to disregard an executive order and wiretap innocent Americans overseas? Of course not.
Now, with the policy change included in both the Intelligence and Judiciary bills, I want to give an example of how this provision will apply in real life.
Adam Gadahn is an American citizen from Orange County, CA. He is also one of the FBI's most wanted terrorists now believed to be living overseas. He has been indicted for treason and providing material support to al-Qaida. Here is what he said:
The streets of America shall run red with blood . . .
casualties will be too many to count and the next wave of
attacks may come at any moment.
He has appeared on multiple al-Qaida propaganda tapes. Here is another quote:
The magnitude and ferocity of what is coming your way will
make you forget all about September 11.
Here is something that should make all Americans scratch their heads. Before September 11, the Government would not need a warrant to target this criminal. After September 11, the Government would not need a warrant to target Gadahn. But after this bill is signed, the Government will be required to get a warrant to target Gadahn. This bill does require that.
Let's explain that one to the American public.
Would a warrantless interception of Gadahn's communications be ``unreasonable'' under the fourth amendment? Of course not. But we are requiring something that even the Founding Fathers did not--a warrant for all electronic searches of U.S. persons.
Now I understand the administration is willing to accept a modified version of this amendment that does not include unintended consequences. It is yet another example of how far this proposal goes to satisfy determined detractors who never seem to be satisfied that we are doing enough to ``protect'' innocent Americans.
I am also amazed at the false descriptions floating around the Internet of the program which the President described on December 17, 2005, during a radio address. We have all heard the terms: ``warrantless wiretapping'' or ``domestic spying.'' But let's look at what the President actually said during his radio address on December 17, 2005. This is what he said:
In the weeks following the terrorist attacks on our Nation,
I authorized the National Security Agency, consistent with
U.S. law and the Constitution, to intercept the international
communications of people with known links to al Qaeda and
related terrorist organizations. Before we intercept these
communications, the government must have information that
establishes a clear link to these terrorist networks.
Now I do not see anything in this statement about domestic spying. I thought the definition of the word ``domestic'' was pretty clear. If the program intercepted communications in which at least one party was overseas, not to mention a member of al-Qaida, then it seems fairly obvious that the calls were not domestic.
Here, as shown on this chart, is a call from the United States of America to overseas; or a call from overseas to the United States of America. Is that a domestic call? I hardly think so. Is this such a hard concept to grasp? The last time I flew overseas, I did not fly on a domestic flight. I flew on an international flight. ``Domestic spying'' may sound catchy and mysterious, but it is a completely inaccurate way to describe the terrorist surveillance program. Why don't the partisan blogs describe it as ``international spying''? Isn't that a more accurate description? I guess accurate descriptions take a back seat to terms which incite fear and distrust in our Government.
Since so many are so interested in the opinion of the FISC, or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, on these matters, I wish to draw attention to a recent decision. On Tuesday, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court denied a motion by the ACLU for release of court records related to alleged NSA surveillance programs. This FISC opinion was publicly released, which is only the third time in the entire history of the FISC in which this has occurred.
Given the rarity of this event--this issued public opinion that denied a motion by the ACLU for the release of court records related to alleged NSA surveillance programs--I want to highlight a few sentences from that ruling:
[T]he identification of targets and methods of surveillance
would permit adversaries to evade surveillance, conceal their
activities, and possibly mislead investigators through false
information. Public identification of targets, and those in
communication with them, would also likely result in
harassment of, or more grievous injury to, persons who might
be exonerated after full investigation. Disclosures about
confidential sources of information would chill current and
potential sources from providing information, and might put
some in personal jeopardy. Disclosure of some forms of
intelligence gathering could harm national security in other
ways, such as damaging relations with foreign governments.
All these possible harms are real and significant, and, quite
frankly, beyond debate.
Now, that is in re: Motion for release of court records of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, December 7 of this year.
I think we can all agree this is a vitally important public opinion from the FISA, and I commend it to my colleagues.
Regardless of how we came to this moment, it is time to do what is right for our country. The time has come for us to work together. We all know it is going to take bipartisan support to get this legislation passed. Let's represent our constituents with our heads held high, knowing we are doing our very best to balance the necessity for protections of civil liberties with the need to keep American families safe from deadly attacks. We owe our people this much.
I hope we can continue to work, as the Intelligence Committee did, in a bipartisan way to resolve these very difficult problems. I have to say that the 13-to-2 bipartisan approach is one of the highlights of this year. It is probably the best example of bipartisanship we have this year. I have to tell you, to try to change that with some of the language from the Judiciary Committee--where it was a pure partisan vote on both sides--to try to change that is not the way to do it.
So I hope our colleagues will realize that in the Intelligence Committee, in a bipartisan way, we have worked together to come up with the ways of solving these very technical and difficult problems, and to do so in the best traditions of the intelligence community, in the best traditions of gathering intelligence information, and in the best traditions of protecting our
country that this country has ever known.
Frankly, I compliment the distinguished chairman of the Intelligence Committee, the distinguished vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee, and my fellow Senators on the committee, Democrats and Republicans, who were willing to put partisanship aside and pass that bill 13 to 2 out of that committee.
Mr. President, I notice my dear friend from Florida is desirous to speak on the floor, so I will withhold my further remarks and turn the time over to him.
I yield the floor.
Mr. President, will the Senator yield on that point?
Mr. President, I thank my colleague for his kind remarks. He was one of the Senators who helped to put this bill together, and a distinguished Senator at that.
Would the Senator agree with me that should this bill pass, it would be one of the best illustrations of bipartisanship in this whole Congress so far?