Mr. President, I rise today to support the conference report for the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005. That is a long title. We are talking about the PATRIOT Act. I am pleased to report to my colleagues and to the…
Mr. President, I rise today to support the conference report for the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005. That is a long title. We are talking about the PATRIOT Act.
I am pleased to report to my colleagues and to the President that the House just passed the PATRIOT Act with a very strong bipartisan vote. We need to do the same. I thank Chairman Specter for his hard work in getting this important legislation to the conference.
This conference report is one of the most important that we will pass this year. We must do it prior to leaving because it contains a number of provisions that are absolutely vital to our national security. I say that from my perspective as chairman of the Senate Committee on Intelligence.
Like the original PATRIOT Act, this legislation does contain a number of compromises that are not to my liking. But it is often said that the mark of a good compromise is that it leaves both sides unhappy. We have a great number, apparently, who are unhappy about this bill. I think we can safely say that no one is entirely happy with all of the provisions in the legislation. Simply put, this is not the best possible bill but the best bill possible under difficult circumstances. Again, it is absolutely needed on behalf of our national security.
My primary concern as a conferee was to ensure that the intelligence community retains its ability to effectively use the important tools that are provided by the PATRIOT Act, and I think we have accomplished that goal.
This act reauthorizes all of the PATRIOT Act provisions that are scheduled to sunset at the end of this year. It does, however, impose a 4-year sunset on the use of FISA court orders for business records and roving electronic surveillance and an additional sunset on the FISA-- what is called the lone wolf authority.
Personally, I am opposed to these extended PATRIOT Act sunsets. I know Congress has conducted extensive oversight of these provisions. I know the Intelligence Committee and other committees have, and we have yet to find any evidence--I know this is not the perception we read about in the newspapers or that we hear on the electronic media, but we have yet to find any evidence of abuse or overreaching with respect to these or any other provisions of the PATRIOT Act.
Moreover, this very legislation makes modifications to address the perceived problems with the FISA business records and roving wiretap provisions. I ask this simple question: If we fixed these provisions, why is there need for additional sunsets? It seems to me that Congress always retains the ability to amend the law that is enacted. We have a duty to conduct vigorous oversight with the use of these provisions. The Judiciary and Intelligence Committees certainly do that. We don't need and should not use sunsets to compel oversight of these important issues. That ought to be our reasonable obligation, and we do meet those obligations.
Having said that, I want to highlight the modifications made to two investigative tools that have been widely mischaracterized, in my view, by critics and some in the media--FISA business record court orders and national security letters.
With regard to the FISA business record court orders, one of the most contentious issues during this conference was whether a relevance-plus standard should be added to the FISA business record provisions. Critics argued this tool could be used for fishing expeditions. Our oversight did reveal that this was not the case, but we agreed that relevance was the proper standard for obtaining a business record court order.
Some are not satisfied with this approach and demand that we include not only a relevance standard but a requirement to specify facts that would tie the requested records to a foreign power or to an agent of a foreign power, a so-called relevance-plus standard. The problem with this is very easy to understand. It is a standard not used on any other subpoena, certainly not requiring the prior approval by a judge like these FISA orders. The standard would also leave gaps in the FBI's ability to use what is in reality a nonintrusive investigative tool. Under relevance-plus, by then the FBI would have lost the use of section 215 in important circumstances.
Ultimately, the conferees reached a compromise to address the misperceptions about section 215. Under the conference report, the standard remains relevance to an authorized investigation. Let me say that again. The standard remains simple relevance to an authorized investigation. There is no increased burden of proof. The standard remains the same as every
other subpoena that Congress has ever enacted.
If the FBI seeks records that are relevant to any authorized, full investigation or a preliminary investigation, it should be able to obtain those records. Under this conference report, it still can. But to address the allegations that the scope of lawful national security investigations is too broad, the conferees included language that does provide for a presumption of relevance if the FBI does provide a statement of facts explaining the link between the requested records and one of three statutory categories. Thus, the compromise language encourages the FBI to seek the protection of presumptive relevance by including a link to one of the three statutory categories in its application, but it also maintains the use of investigative technique in those limited circumstances that fall outside the three categories.
The conferees also placed additional restrictions on section 215 orders. Under the conference agreement, the records obtained with a FISA business record court order must be screened through minimization procedures adopted by the Attorney General. These procedures are not required for any other subpoena, grand jury, court order, administrative, or otherwise. In my opinion, minimization procedures should not be required for this low-level investigative activity, especially in light of the requirement for prior judicial approval of an order.
These procedures unfortunately were part of the price we paid to get this legislation passed--a price that I did reluctantly accept to preserve this investigative tool. I urged the Attorney General when this bill was passed to adopt flexible minimization procedures.
These procedures must maintain the ability of the intelligence community to analyze the important foreign intelligence information now obtained by FISA business record orders. That information must be made available over an extended period of time so that the intelligence community will not lose its ability to connect the so-called dots. One current phone number that would be connected to one 2-year-old credit card record that would be connected to one 10-year-old hotel receipt might be the information necessary to stop an attack. We should never forget that, especially in the age in which we live.
Severe retention or any rules of dissemination for these third-party business records will limit the FBI's ability to prevent attacks, and that is the standard we have demanded post-9/11. I can assure you that the Intelligence Committee will examine these procedures with great interest once they are issued.
Next, with regard to national security letters--and the acronym for that is NSL--this conference report makes three important modifications.
First, it will provide for express enforcement of national security letters by creating criminal penalties for noncompliance with the request.
Second, this bill clarifies the process by which the recipients of a national security letter may seek judicial review of requests that are either unreasonable, oppressive, or otherwise unlawful.
Third, this legislation does replace the current blanket nondisclosure rule with a process that requires a special certification by a high-level official to invoke the protection of the nondisclosure provision. If the official is sufficiently high level, the certification that the disclosure would endanger national security or interfere with foreign relations will not be overturned by a court without a showing of bad faith.
Some have questioned the need for nondisclosure provisions on these national security letters or complained that they can be invoked or defended much too easily. I have an opposite concern. I am concerned that the disclosure of the fact that the FBI has sought business records might hinder the investigation of a terrorist network or an espionage ring. Nondisclosure requirements on these national security letters are absolutely necessary for the protection of our national security. We must all keep in mind that these so-called NSLs are issued in the context of classified investigations of terrorists and spies.
Make no mistake, the national security letter that requests information in support of a classified investigation should also be classified. But because many phone companies, Internet service providers, financial institutions, or credit card companies don't have the facilities to handle classified information, these national security letters are submitted in unclassified form. The FBI relies on the nondisclosure provisions in the NSL statute to prevent the disclosure of classified investigations of terrorists and spies. Without the protection of a nondisclosure provision, the FBI would have to choose between not using a national security letter or taking the risk that its investigation will be disclosed to the spy or terrorist under investigation. We can't afford either option.
If a terrorist becomes aware of an FBI investigation that was directed at him based on the fact that a national security letter has been issued, he obviously can take actions to protect other members of his cell, ensure that the terrorist network does proceed with other planned attacks, or, in the worst-case scenario, speed up the time line of a planned attack.
We also cannot afford for the FBI to walk away from valuable intelligence information from fear the disclosure of a national security letter might undermine an ongoing investigation. These NSLs do provide access to limited categories of third-party business records that form the building blocks of national security investigations. They allow the FBI to identify the activities of a terrorist or spy and others who associate with them.
The conference report maintains the protections of the NSL nondisclosure provision. It does modify the nondisclosure provision so it is no longer automatic; it must be invoked. It provides the recipients with the avenue to challenge the nondisclosure not once, but every single year. Subsequent challenges also require the Government to reexamine the need for secrecy.
With these modifications, it seems to me the conference report strikes the balance needed on this issue. First, we protect the very legitimate rights of the recipients and ensure the sensitive investigations of terrorist and spies certainly are not compromised.
So as my colleagues can see, the protections that are provided in the conference report for privacy and civil liberties are extensive. In fact, I think the modifications to the FISA business record orders and the national security letters should address all concerns raised about these tools. I hope my colleagues who have concerns about this know what is in this bill as opposed to what the perception is.
The conferees did not stop there. In addition to the modifications I have mentioned, the conference report includes the provisions enhancing existing oversight of these tools. For example, the bill requires the Department of Justice Inspector General to conduct extensive audits of both the use by the FBI of the national security letters and FISA business record orders. The bill also expands public reporting on these investigative tools.
I cannot help but note at this point that many of the protections for privacy and civil liberties incorporated in this bill were derived from the protections that the intelligence committee would have applied to the national security administrative subpoena that we reported in June in our bill. This conference report has essentially taken all of the protections that were contained in the national security administrative subpoena provision, but it has failed to provide the FBI with the same ability to access records that now exist in 335 other contexts.
Far too often we legislate to the possible rogue FBI agent, one-tenth of 1 percent who might go beyond the law. When we take this step, we deprive the other 99.9 percent of FBI agents of a lawful investigative tool, and then if something is missed or we have an attack, why, of course, we blame the FBI. Our oversight reveals no abuses. Yet we deprive our national security investigators of these constitutional tools.
I challenge opponents of national security administrative subpoenas to provide one good reason the FBI should not have the authority. I have listened to their arguments. I still have not heard one good reason. Four years removed from 9/11, it is far too easy to put restrictions on the intelligence community that are not necessary or appropriate. It seems to me we must
continue to ensure that we provide lawful access to data with appropriate precautions. We must tear down the remaining walls that prevent access to lawfully collected intelligence information. One of the top priority goals of the intelligence committee is information access. That is the one thing that seems to me that we must reach out and accomplish, and obviously passing this act and not rebuilding walls to make this problem worse is a top goal.
When we needlessly restrict intelligence investigations, we increase the possibility that the next attack will succeed. I will oppose such restrictions and will continue to fight for new authorities for the intelligence community. I believe the national security administrative subpoena is an appropriate tool that would increase our security without sacrificing our civil liberties. I will continue to ask a simple question: Why are we withholding administrative subpoenas from those who investigate spies and terrorists when they are being used every day by those who investigate health care fraud, drug violations, and other similar matters.
As I have asked many times before, why can the Attorney General use an administrative subpoena to stop a dirty doctor or a dirty drug dealer but not a dirty bomber? That does not make sense. This is a tool that the President, the Attorney General, and the Director of the FBI have all asked Congress to provide in regard to our national security investigators. Once again, Congress has denied them.
Before concluding, I want to highlight one more important intelligence-related provision in this bill: section 506. That is the section that will establish a national security division within the Department of Justice that is consistent with the recommendations of the executive WMD Commission. The national security division will be headed by the Assistant Attorney General for National Security who will be appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate.
This process, in regard to confirmation, will be subject to the shared jurisdiction of the Senate Judiciary Committee and our Intelligence Committee.
The provision also requires the Attorney General to consult with the Director of National Intelligence before recommending a nominee to the President. I believe the creation of the national security division will help prevent the rebuilding of these walls that I keep talking about that once hindered access to foreign intelligence information. This new national security division will help ensure that law enforcement and intelligence are indistinguishable partners in the protection of our national security.
Finally, I strongly oppose passing a short-term continuing resolution, as some have suggested, to reauthorize existing authorities. The conferees have already worked extremely hard to reauthorize the existing authorities. I do not believe that any additional time or negotiations will close the gap between the opponents and the supporters in regard to this act.
In fact, on the one issue that prevented some conferees from across the aisle from signing onto the conference report, the so-called bad- faith certification provision, this conference report is actually more protective of national security letter recipients than the version previously passed by the Senate.
I hope the folks who are upset about this know that is in this bill and that this is actually more protective. As convinced as I am that an additional 3 months will not close the gap between opponents and supporters, for those who want a continuing resolution, I am equally convinced that further negotiations will only result in additional concessions that will make the PATRIOT Act tools virtually useless.
I remind my colleagues again that 4 years of oversight of the use of the authorities that are provided by the PATRIOT Act have not revealed one single substantiated--let me emphasize that, substantiated-- allegation of abuse. Yet despite this fact the conference report before us today contains numerous additional checks on the use of the PATRIOT Act tools.
The arguments for these additional checks and restrictions are not based on any factual allegations of abuse but, rather, on unsubstantiated allegations, hypotheticals, innuendo, and perception. I understand the concern, but facts are stubborn things, and there has been no abuse. Nonetheless, this conference report will place more burdens on national security investigators using these constitutional tools to defeat terrorists and spies. Further compromise will only serve to negotiate away these very crucial tools. I urge my colleagues to base their position on this important legislation on facts. Facts are stubborn things, as I said before: The fact that terrorists continue to seek to kill Americans, the fact that they continue to plot attacks against us, the fact that they are determined to continue their war against us, the fact that this conference report does provide significant increased protections for privacy and civil liberties, and the fact that our national security investigators have not abused authorities that are provided under the original act.
We have had plenty of time to oversee the use of authorities that are provided by the PATRIOT Act and plenty of time to separate fact from fiction or the wheat from the chaff.
I am deeply committed to the men and women of the intelligence community. The USA PATRIOT Act has provided them with important tools to keep us safe. We should continue to do that. I will vote for cloture if necessary--I hope it is not necessary--and in favor of this conference report. I, again, am very glad that the House has passed the reauthorization of the PATRIOT Act by a large bipartisan vote because this allows the intelligence community to retain these important PATRIOT Act tools and keep America safe. I urge my colleagues to do the same.
I yield the floor.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.