Thank you, Mr. President. I think the best face I could put on this--after this unfortunate situation which was totally unexpected by myself, or my staff, or the Republican members on the committee, for that matter, the Republican…
Thank you, Mr. President.
I think the best face I could put on this--after this unfortunate situation which was totally unexpected by myself, or my staff, or the Republican members on the committee, for that matter, the Republican leadership--is that we have agreed to do what we already agreed to do; that is, to complete as best we can phase II of the Intelligence Committee's review of prewar intelligence in reference to Iraq.
I think it is very important to point out that the Intelligence Committee has had an absolutely outstanding record working with Senator Rockefeller and my colleagues across the aisle to produce the original review in regard to the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate prior to the military activities into Iraq, and also as to whether Saddam Hussein had reconstituted his weapons of mass destruction. That was a 17-to-0 vote. We had some differences, but that report came out. It was a good report. It was a seminal report. As a matter of fact, I take pride in saying that it was a bipartisan effort that was agreed to by the 9/11 Commission, by the WMD Commission that was later formed, and made about 93 or 94 recommendations to the administration of which probably 93 to 94 out of 95 have already been implemented. So we worked in a bipartisan fashion to do that.
We also at the same time--and I am basically quoting from the statement the vice chairman and I made on February 12 of 2004--agreed we would go to something called phase II. There has been a lot of talk about phase II. What is phase II? Why is it that has been delayed, if in fact it has been delayed?
There was some talk on the floor that got a little personal, and I regret that. It seems to me it was rather convenient because it was only yesterday our staff was working with the staff of the minority indicating that not this week but next week we would spend as much time as possible, 5 or 6 days, to complete our work in regard to phase II. It isn't as though it has been delayed. As a matter of fact, it has been ongoing. As a matter of fact, we have been doing our work on phase II. It is difficult, as I will indicate in a minute, while I go through these provisions on what we agreed to do.
So it seems to be a little convenient all of a sudden to go into a closed session of the Senate and call for a full Senate investigation of phase II when the committee is already doing its work. I think that basically is an unfortunate stunt. I would call it something else, but I think probably I will simply leave it at that.
Let me tell you what phase II is all about. Again, let me point out that we took a look at whether Saddam Hussein did reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction. That took us a long time. It is a 511-page report. It is a seminal report. It is a good report, and it signifies what we can do in the committee when we at least let one another know what is going on and we work in a bipartisan fashion.
This is what phase II is all about. That is what we will begin as we have planned to do and what our staff has indicated to the other side's staff in regard to what we were going to do as of next week--that we will start next week, and we will hope to continue that effort. We will cancel all other hearings until we can reach some sort of an accommodation. Now, if we can do this on the WMD report, certainly we can do it in regard to phase II.
My good friends across the aisle are people of good faith. We had strong differences of opinion then. I suppose we will have it in regard to phase II as well. We have seen that happen time and time again. As a matter of fact, we brought up phase II on May 17 of this year.
The biggest issue is as follows. There are five things in phase II: Whether public statements and reports and testimony regarding Iraq by U.S. Government officials made between the gulf war period and the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom were substantiated by intelligence information. In other words, the public statements made in the administration and the public statements made by public officials, whether they be in Congress, whether they be in the administration, or whatever, Congress, because we voted for regime change and we voted to go to war. Obviously, the administration, because they looked at the intelligence and thought our national security was in danger, we went to war.
Were the public statements backed up by intelligence or were they backed up by flawed intelligence? We have that material. We were supplied about 300 to 400 names by my colleagues across the aisle from all sorts of statements made by people in the administration. We took a good look at what Members of Congress have said about the same intelligence. I must say, at this point, some of those statements are even more declarative and more aggressive than those made in the administration.
That is the big issue: the use of intelligence. Whether somebody in the administration or somebody in the Congress made a statement that they thought was based on intelligence that was later proved wrong and somehow we are suppose to get in their head and ask: Why did you make that statement? Is that credible?
On May 17, in the spring, we started down the list of statements. We took names off of the statements because I didn't want it to be a situation, in terms of naming who made the statement, because I thought it might perjure or affect how people would vote in the committee. We started down that road. We didn't get very far. We had requests on the total progress of phase II, other portions of phase II.
So we started again on the first statement. Does that first statement match up with the intelligence? We didn't get very far. We started phase II in May, and we went back to work to see what we could get done, where we would agree and come back to the ``use'' question, when that would be possible.
There are five issues to phase II. Let me read them. The postwar findings about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and their weapons programs and the links to terrorism and how they compare with prewar assessments. That was done by Charles Duelfer and David Kay. Those two paragraphs are already written. You can simply say that Charles Duelfer and David Kay did not find WMD. That was their conclusion. They made some statements
about it. It was commensurate, exactly, with what our WMD report said. There shouldn't be any problem with that. That should be adopted by the committee with hardly any dissent or any discussion.
The third issue is prewar intelligence about postwar Iraq. That is not necessarily true today. It is post-insurgency Iraq. That was my suggestion, saying if the intelligence community at least could figure out what we expected to find in Iraq postwar, post the military action. Where was the intelligence? That is ongoing. That is ongoing because we have what we think is a pretty good report, but we can make it more concise. I can say right off the bat that intelligence was as flawed as the intelligence in regard to the WMD report. We can agree with that. So there are two we can agree on.
Let me go to the next one. Any intelligence activities relating to Iraq conducted by the policy counterterrorism evaluation group and the Office of Special Plans within the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense. This involved a question as to whether Under Secretary Douglas Feith had a special intelligence group that had undue influence in the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate and whether or not that group and that intelligence had an undue influence on the administration's decision to go to war.
We had Under Secretary Feith before the committee. Then we were going to have him up again. And then my good friends across the aisle wanted more information. In the midst of that, there was a statement made by the vice chairman--I will not get into that because it tends to be personal, and I don't want any remarks of mine to be personal, especially after what happened on the Senate floor in regard to this issue. Basically, there was a statement made that what was going on in the Office of Special Plans could be illegal. When that happened, everyone down there at the Office of Special Plans got lawyered up or at least thought about seeking legal representation.
The cooperation between that particular department and our committee was not nearly as good as it was. We can clear that up because we have asked the Department of Defense inspector general to come back and tell us if there was anything wrong in regard to what the Office of Special Plans was doing. We will rely on that. We will put that in the report. We can believe the inspector general of the Department of Defense.
Finally, the use of the intelligence community of information provided by the Iraqi National Congress. Now, remember back when the Congress was talking to members of the Iraqi National Congress. Mr. Chalabi was the head of that group. I had Senator after Senator come to me and ask, Why don't you have Mr. Chalabi appear before the committee? The people supporting him wanted to vote and eventually did vote for regime change.
Then the pendulum swung the other way and people said, Wait a minute. We are not really sure about his position or, for that matter, what he has said in the past, what are you doing, and the question of the INC. The whole question again was, how much effect did the Iraqi National Congress and Mr. Chalabi have on the input to the administration as to whether or not they would go to war.
We have found, basically, as far as I am concerned, there is very little evidence, if any, that would take place.
I wouldn't think that would take too much time, as well.
So those are the five things we had to do in regard to phase II.
Let me repeat, again, yesterday our staff talked with my colleagues' staff across the aisle and their staff--not my colleagues across the aisle but their staff--and said the chairman wants to move on this next week. My conversation in regard to the distinguished vice chairman, I think it was last Wednesday, and let me say it was in the middle of a hearing and let me say it was not exactly clear in terms of any kind of a date, but I did talk to Senator Rockefeller and indicated we had to move, we had to get this done.
He will doubtlessly say they have written letters and they have tried to get me to move and this, that or the other, but we have been doing this all along. Staff has been working on this very diligently. Consequently, I think we are very close. I am very pleased to announce, on schedule, exactly what we planned to do, we will start next week. We will start on Tuesday, and I will announce the time in the morning. Members of the Intelligence Committee will know Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, how long it takes, working in good faith. We will look into phase II and see what we can do and finish that product.
I said a long time ago on the Intelligence Committee we had to work in a bipartisan fashion. I said a long time ago that whatever ended up on the fan, we were going to have to clean it up. I said a long time ago we will let the chips fall where they may, and that went for phase II as well as the WMD special inquiry.
I ought to say one other thing. There was a memo that was highly publicized back about a year and a half ago. That memo, which was not provided to Republicans--obviously, it was a Democratic memo--and paragraph four caused a big fuss. It caused us about a month to sort of walk gingerly around one another and smother each other with the milk of kindness and say, Well, let's see if we can't work things out. And we did. I credit a lot of that to Senator Rockefeller. He is not a partisan man.
Here is the paragraph:
Be prepared to launch an independent investigation when it
becomes clear we have exhausted the opportunity to usefully
collaborate with the majority. We can pull the trigger on an
independent investigation any time, but we can only do so
once. The best time to do so will probably be next year.
Well, the trigger has been pulled today with an executive session of the Senate that is not needed, not necessary, and, in my personal opinion, was a stunt. I plead with my colleagues across the aisle and my colleagues, all Republicans on the committee, next week when we start this, on Tuesday--we will go through Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday--I have no illusions, we will have differences, but I plead with you, as we have done in the past, for the good of our national security, and to finish the inquiry on whether or not Saddam Hussein had reconstituted his weapons of mass destruction, we were able to do that, and it became the seminal study for intelligence reform and where we are now with the Director of National Intelligence.
If we can get back to that mode instead of this surprising stunt on the floor to go into executive session, we will be better off.
Phase II, yes, you bet, we have been on phase II, and we will do it exactly as we planned to do it as of next week. I see from the expression of the distinguished President's face my time has expired.
I thank the President.