Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the use of calculators be permitted on the floor of the Senate during consideration of the budget resolution. Mr. President, I see the Senator from California on the floor, and I am about to…
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the use of calculators be permitted on the floor of the Senate during consideration of the budget resolution.
Mr. President, I see the Senator from California on the floor, and I am about to yield to her. Could I ask, Mr. President, how much time is available to the Senator from Vermont or his designees?
Mr. President, the Senator from Vermont has 8 minutes; the Senator from California has 5?
Thank you, Mr. President.
I yield the floor.
Mr. President, I thank the Senator from California for her statement and her leadership. She has been so forthright in her comments right from the beginning of this scandal, and I appreciate it. I will have more to say about her efforts at the end of my statement.
In a few minutes, the Senate will have an opportunity to begin restoring accountability and checks and balances to what is our Government, the Government that belongs to all Americans. We should pass the Preserving U.S. Attorneys Independence Act. We have to close a loophole that has been exploited by the Department of Justice and the White House--a loophole that led to the mass firings of U.S. attorneys.
When we roll back this excessive authority given the Attorney General by the PATRIOT Act reauthorization, we can restore--or at least take a step toward restoring--the independence of our Federal law enforcement system. We will be acting to reverse one more incident of overstepping by an earlier ``rubberstamp'' Congress, which was all too often willing to dance to the tune of a power-hungry White House.
The Attorney General--and I will agree with the Attorney General on this--he is right that mistakes were made. Mistakes were made, all right. It was a mistake to conduct the mass firings to send the message to our U.S. attorneys that they had better act like ``loyal Bushies''-- their words, the Administration's words--rather than act as objective law enforcement officers. Mistakes were made, absolutely.
It was a mistake to malign the reputations of these officials by contending that the firings were prompted by their badly performing their law enforcement responsibilities.
It was a mistake to mislead the Senate Judiciary Committee in hearings and Senators during phone calls and in meetings about the firings.
It was a mistake to give the Attorney General the unlimited authority to fill these critical posts with his selections or the selections of the White
House without the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate.
But most of all, it was a mistake to inject crassly partisan objectives into the selection, evaluation, firing, and replacement of the top Federal law enforcement officers in our country.
I still have no sense that the administration or the Attorney General understand the seriousness of this matter. The apparent effort to corrupt the Federal law enforcement function for partisan political purposes has cast a cloud over all U.S. attorneys. Now every U.S. attorney is under a cloud. People are asking about those who were retained as ``loyal Bushies.'' People are wondering what prosecutorial judgments were affected. These mass firings have served to undermine the confidence of the American people in the Department of Justice and the local U.S. attorneys.
In the same way that any employer has the power to hire, we understand that people cannot be fired because they are Catholic or because of their race or because they are a whistleblower. The power of employment is not without limit. It can be abused. When it is abused in connection with political influence over Federal law enforcement the American people and their representatives in Congress have a right to be concerned. We need to get to the bottom of this situation. We need the facts, not more spin, not another concocted cover story.
The U.S. Department of Justice must be above politics. The Attorney General of the United States has to ensure the independence of Federal law enforcement from political influence. The Department of Justice should serve the American people by making sure the law is enforced without fear or favor. It should not be a political arm of the White House.
The Attorney General is not the President's lawyer. The President has a lawyer. The Attorney General is the Attorney General for the people of the United States of America--all of us--Republicans, Democrats and Independents.
The advice and consent check on the appointment power is a critical function of the Senate. That is what this administration insisted be eliminated by the provision it had inserted in the reauthorization of the PATRIOT Act. That measure struck the time limit on the ability of the Attorney General to name a so-called interim U.S. attorney. And that is what this bill, the Preserving United States Attorney Independence Act of 2007, is intended to restore. It is vital that those holding these critical positions be free from any inappropriate influence.
We are finding out more and more abuses by this administration. We learned for the first time earlier this month in testimony by a Congressional Research Service attorney before the House Judiciary Committee about another loophole this administration has tried to create and exploit. In 2003, the Department's Office of Legal Counsel issued a secret legal opinion to try to create an end run around the Senate's role. This administration is the first I am aware that is employing the Vacancies Act in addition to the interim U.S. attorney appointment authority sequentially. The horror that Senator Kyl speaks about is one that this administration created and has apparently been employing. That is not what Congress intended.
With the passage of S. 214 today we should put an end to that untoward practice, too. As one of the authors of S. 214 and chairman of the Judiciary Committee, I say it is not our intent to allow such an abuse by having the Vacancies Act provisions and those of S. 214 used in sequence. We do not intend for the Attorney General to use such a misguided approach and seek to install a choice for 330 days without the advice and consent of the Senate. Nor do we intend for the Attorney General to make Senator Kyl's other suggestion a reality by seeking to use the 120-day appointment authority more than once. It is not designed or intended to be used repeatedly for the same vacancy. These double dipping approaches run afoul of congressional intent, the law and our bill. Our bill should put a stop to that, too. Instead, the President should fulfill his responsibilities, work with home State Senators and nominate qualified people to serve as U.S. attorneys so that they can be considered by the Senate and confirmed. If he does not the district court will be restored the stopgap authority they previously had.
I was pleased that Senator Feinstein worked so hard with Senator Specter to craft the consensus measure we consider today to reinstate vital limits on the Attorney General's authority and bring back incentives for the administration to fill vacancies with Senate- confirmed nominees. We reported out this measure with bipartisan support 13-6 after debating and voting down several amendments, including amendments similar to those offered today by Senators Kyl and Sessions. We should again vote down these amendments and pass the bipartisan bill without delay.
Senator Sessions' amendment would attach certain conditions to a district court's authority to appoint an interim U.S. attorney after 120 days, but none to the Attorney General's interim appointment authority. Our bill is meant to roll back a change in law that allowed an abuse of power by the administration and the Department of Justice. There is no record of problems with the appointment of interim appointments by the district court. In fact, for almost a hundred years until the law was changed in 1986 during the Reagan administration, district courts were the sole means of appointing interim U.S. attorneys. There are many criteria that we want U.S. attorneys to possess--chief among them the ability to enforce the laws independently without fear or favor. But both the prerogatives of the administration in putting in place the people it wants and the home State Senators in ensuring fairness and independence in their States are protected when the President nominates and the Senate considers and confirms U.S. attorneys.
Senator Kyl's amendment provides unjustified limitations on the Senate's role in confirming U.S. attorneys that could short-circuit the Senate's ability to undertake a thorough consideration of a nominee's qualifications and wholly disregards the role of the home State Senators.
It is true that this President has been slow in nominating U.S. attorneys. There are currently 22 vacancies and only three nominees. Building incentives for this President to fulfill his responsibilities and work with home State Senators would be a good thing. That is not what Senator Kyl's amendment does. Instead, in the guise of setting a time limit on the Senate, what it actually does is override the traditional deference paid to home State Senators and the Judiciary Committee itself. In fact, no time limit is needed to require the committee or the Senate to act on qualified nominees.
During this President's term, U.S. attorneys have been confirmed quickly, taking an average of 68 days from nomination to confirmation. Only three people nominated to be U.S. attorneys have not been confirmed and two of those withdrawn by the President. In fact, when I first chaired the Judiciary Committee during President Bush's first term, we confirmed 84 of President Bush's U.S. attorney nominations in a little more than a year.
Some critics of the district court's role in filling vacancies beyond 120 days claim it to be inconsistent with sound separation of powers principles. That is contrary to the Constitution, our history, our practices, and recent court rulings. In 2000, in United States v. Hilario, the First Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the prior law on interim appointments, including the district court's role. In fact, the practice of judicial officers appointing officers of the court is well established in our history and from the earliest days.
Morrison v. Olson should have laid to rest the so-called separation of powers concern now being trumpeted to justify these political maneuvers within the Justice Department. Certainly no Republicans now defending this administration voiced concern when a panel of judges appointed Ken Starr to spend millions in taxpayer dollars going after President Clinton as a court-appointed prosecutor.
During committee consideration we heard from some who had not read what the Constitution says. The Constitution provides congressional power to direct the appointment power. In article II, the part of the Constitution that this administration reads as if it says that all power resides with the President, the President's appointment power is limited by the power of Congress. Indeed, between its provisions
calling for appointments with the advice and consent of the Senate and for the President's limited power to make recess appointments, the Constitution provides:
But the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such
inferior officers, as they think proper, in the President
alone, in the courts of law, or in the Heads of Departments.
Just last week, the Eastern District of Arkansas joined at least two other courts addressing the interim appointment of U.S. attorneys, the First Circuit in Hilario, and the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Gantt, in concluding that U.S attorneys are ``inferior officers.'' Thus, the Constitution contemplates exactly what our statutes and practices had previously provided and what our bill will restore. Congress is well within its authority when it vests in the courts a share of the appointment power for those who appear before them.
One of the finest Attorneys General of the United States ever to serve was Robert H. Jackson. He also served as one of our most admired Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court. He was a principal prosecutor at the International Military Tribunal for German war criminals in Nuremberg after World War II.
The day after I was born, on April 1, 1940, as a new Attorney General, he spoke to the U.S. attorneys from across the country. They were assembled in the Great Hall at the Department of Justice in Washington. He told them about the responsibilities of being a Federal prosecutor. I think it is appropriate today to recall his guidance. His words serve to show the Senate and the American people how wrong this Administration's practices are and how far off the mark.
This is what then-Attorney General Jackson said and they are words that serve today. He said:
The prosecutor has more control over life, liberty, and
reputation than any other person in America. His discretion
is tremendous. While the prosecutor at his best is one of the
most beneficent forces in our society, when he acts from
malice or other base motives, he is one of the worst.
Because of this immense power to strike at citizens, not
with mere individual strength, but with all of the force of
government itself, the post of Federal District Attorney from
the very beginning has been safeguarded by presidential
appointment, requiring confirmation of the Senate of the
United States.
Your responsibility in your several districts for law
enforcement and for its methods cannot be wholly surrendered
to Washington.
Robert H. Jackson continued:
If the prosecutor is obliged to choose his cases, it
follows that he can choose his defendants. Therein is the
most dangerous power of the prosecutor: That he will pick
people that he thinks he should get, rather than pick cases
that need to be prosecuted.
It is in this realm in which the prosecutor picks some
person whom he dislikes or desires to embarrass, or selects
some group of unpopular persons and then looks for an
offense, that the greatest danger of abuse of prosecuting
power lies. It is here that law enforcement becomes personal,
and the real crime becomes that of being unpopular with the
predominant or governing group, being attached to the wrong
political views, or being personally obnoxious to or in the
way of the prosecutor himself.
In times of fear or hysteria political, racial, religious,
social, and economic groups, often for the best of motives,
cry for the scalps of individuals or groups because they do
not like their views. Those who are in office or apt to
regard as ``subversive'' the activities of any of those who
would bring about a change of administration.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a copy of Attorney General Jackson's full statement be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
Mr. President, I have said many times on this floor that one of the greatest opportunities I have ever had in my public life was to serve for 8 years as a prosecutor. Prosecutors have to be independent. Prosecutors have to prosecute without fear of favor. Prosecutors can never not prosecute someone because they are a Republican or Democrat; they have to do it because they have to uphold the law.
Let us restore the situation where our Federal prosecutors, whether we have a Democratic President or a Republican President, serve the law and not a political purpose. That is what prosecutors have to do. Many of us in this Chamber have served as prosecutors and know that is what we meant when we took our oath of office. Let's not have a system that at the outset subverts that oath of office.
I wish to commend Senator Feinstein for leading this effort and Senator Specter, the ranking Republican on our committee, for joining her. We have all cosponsored the substitute to restore the statutory checks that existed. I commend the many Senators who contributed to this debate, including the majority leader, Senator Kennedy, Senator Durbin, both Senators from Arkansas, Senator Whitehouse, Senator McCaskill, Senator Schumer, Senator Murray, Senator Cardin, and Senator Klobuchar.
Many speak from their own experiences as former prosecutors.
Let's pass this bill without amendments. We have a piece of legislation to protect the integrity of prosecutors and law enforcement. Let's pass it without amendment, pass it as it is, and strike a blow for the integrity of our Federal prosecutors and strike a blow for law enforcement. Because if you politicize a prosecutor, you politicize everybody in the whole chain of law enforcement. We should never do that. Let's pass this bill and restore integrity to Federal law enforcement.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Exhibit 1
The Federal Prosecutor
(By Robert H. Jackson, Attorney General of the United States, April 1,
1940)
It would probably be within the range of that exaggeration
permitted in Washington to say that assembled in this room is
one of the most powerful peace-time forces known to our
country. The prosecutor has more control over life, liberty,
and reputation than any other person in America. His
discretion is tremendous. He can have citizens investigated
and, if he is that kind of person, he can have this done to
the tune of public statements and veiled or unveiled
intimations. Or the prosecutor may choose a more subtle
course and simply have a citizen's friends interviewed. The
prosecutor can order arrests, present cases to the grand jury
in secret session, and on the basis of his one-sided
presentation of the facts, can cause the citizen to be
indicted and held for trial. He may dismiss the case before
trial, in which case the defense never has a chance to be
heard. Or he may go on with a public trial. If he obtains a
conviction, the prosecutor can still make recommendations as
to sentence, as to whether the prisoner should get probation
or a suspended sentence, and after he is put away, as to
whether he is a fit subject for parole. While the prosecutor
at his best is one of the most beneficent forces in our
society, when he acts from malice or other base motives, he
is one of the worst.
These powers have been granted to our law enforcement
agencies because it seems necessary that such a power to
prosecute be lodged somewhere. This authority has been
granted by people who really wanted the right thing done--
wanted crime eliminated--but also wanted the best in our
American traditions preserved.
Because of this immense power to strike at citizens, not
with mere individual strength, but with all the force of
government itself, the post of Federal District Attorney from
the very beginning has been safeguarded by presidential
appointment, requiring confirmation of the Senate of the
United States. You are thus required to win an expression of
confidence in your character by both the legislative and the
executive branches of the government before assuming the
responsibilities of a federal prosecutor.
Your responsibility in your several districts for law
enforcement and for its methods cannot be wholly surrendered
to Washington, and ought not to be assumed by a centralized
Department of Justice. It is an unusual and rare instance
in which the local District Attorney should be superseded
in the handling of litigation, except where he requests
help of Washington. It is also clear that with his
knowledge of local sentiment and opinion, his contact with
and intimate knowledge of the views of the court, and his
acquaintance with the feelings of the group from which
jurors are drawn, it is an unusual case in which his
judgment should be overruled.
Experience, however, has demonstrated that some measure of
centralized control is necessary. In the absence of it
different district attorneys were striving for different
interpretations or applications of an Act, or were pursuing
different conceptions of policy. Also, to put it mildly,
there were differences in the degree of diligence and zeal in
different districts. To promote uniformity of policy and
action, to establish some standards of performance, and to
make available specialized help, some degree of centralized
administration was found necessary.
Our problem, of course, is to balance these opposing
considerations. I desire to avoid any lessening of the
prestige and influence of the district attorneys in their
districts. At the same time we must proceed in all districts
with that uniformity of policy which is necessary to the
prestige of federal law.
Nothing better can come out of this meeting of law
enforcement officers than a rededication to the spirit of
fair play and decency that should animate the federal
prosecutor. Your positions are of such independence and
importance that while you are being diligent, strict, and
vigorous in law enforcement you can also afford to be just.
Although the government technically loses its case, it has
really won if justice has been done. The lawyer in public
office is justified in seeking to leave behind him a good
record. But he must remember that his most alert and severe,
but just, judges will be the members of his own profession,
and that lawyers rest their good opinion of each other not
merely on results accomplished but on the quality of the
performance. Reputation has been called ``the shadow cast by
one's daily life.'' Any prosecutor who risks his day-to-day
professional name for fair dealing to build up statistics of
success has a perverted sense of practical values, as well as
defects of character. Whether one seeks promotion to a
judgeship, as many prosecutors rightly do, or whether he
returns to private practice, he can have no better asset than
to have his profession recognize that his attitude toward
those who feel his power has been dispassionate, reasonable
and just.
The federal prosecutor has now been prohibited from
engaging in political activities. I am convinced that a good-
faith acceptance of the spirit and letter of that doctrine
will relieve many district attorneys from the embarrassment
of what have heretofore been regarded as legitimate
expectations of political service. There can also be no doubt
that to be closely identified with the intrigue, the money
raising, and the machinery of a particular party or faction
may present a prosecuting officer with embarrassing
alignments and associations. I think the Hatch Act should be
utilized by federal prosecutors as a protection against
demands on their time and their prestige to participate in
the operation of the machinery of practical politics.
There is a most important reason why the prosecutor should
have, as nearly as possible, a detached and impartial view of
all groups in his community. Law enforcement is not
automatic. It isn't blind. One of the greatest difficulties
of the position of prosecutor is that he must pick his cases,
because no prosecutor can even investigate all of the cases
in which he receives complaints. If the Department of Justice
were to make even a pretense of reaching every probable
violation of federal law, ten times its present staff would
be inadequate. We know that no local police force can
strictly enforce the traffic laws, or it would arrest half
the driving population on any given morning. What every
prosecutor is practically required to do it to select the
cases for prosecution and to select those in which the
offense is the most flagrant, the public harm the greatest,
and the proof the most certain.
If the prosecutor is obliged to choose his cases, it
follows that he can choose his defendants. Therein is the
most dangerous power of the prosecutor: that he will pick
people that he thinks he should get, rather than pick cases
that need to be prosecuted. With the law books filled with a
great assortment of crimes, a prosecutor stands a fair chance
of finding at least a technical violation of some act on the
part of almost anyone. In such a case, it is not a question
of discovering the commission of a crime and then looking for
the man who has committed it, it is a question of picking the
man and then searching the law books, or putting
investigators to work, to pin some offense on him. It is in
this realm--in which the prosecutor picks some person whom he
dislikes or desires to embarrass, or selects some group of
unpopular persons and then looks for an offense, that the
greatest danger of abuse of prosecuting power lies. It is
here that law enforcement becomes personal, and the real
crime becomes that of being unpopular with the predominant or
governing group, being attached to the wrong political views,
or being personally obnoxious to or in the way of the
prosecutor himself.
In times of fear or hysteria political, racial, religious,
social, and economic groups, often from the best of motives,
cry for the scalps of individuals or groups because they do
not like their views. Particularly do we need to be
dispassionate and courageous in those cases which deal with
so-called ``subversive activities.'' They are dangerous to
civil liberty because the prosecutor has no definite
standards to determine what constitutes a ``subversive
activity,'' such as we have for murder or larceny. Activities
which seem benevolent and helpful to wage earners, persons on
relief, or those who are disadvantaged in the struggle for
existence may be regarded as ``subversive'' by those whose
property interests might be burdened or affected thereby.
Those who are in office are apt to regard as ``subversive''
the activities of any of those who would bring about a change
of administration. Some of our soundest constitutional
doctrines were once punished as subversive. We must not
forget that it was not so long ago that both the term
``Republican'' and the term ``Democrat'' were epithets with
sinister meaning to denote persons of radical tendencies that
were ``subversive'' of the order of things then dominant.
In the enforcement of laws which protect our national
integrity and existence, we should prosecute any and every
act of violation, but only overt acts, not the expression of
opinion, or activities such as the holding of meetings,
petitioning of Congress, or dissemination of news or
opinions. Only by extreme care can we protect the spirit as
well as the letter of our civil liberties, and to do so is a
responsibility of the federal prosecutor.
Another delicate task is to distinguish between the federal
and the local in law enforcement activities. We must bear in
mind that we are concerned only with the prosecution of acts
which the Congress has made federal offenses. Those acts we
should prosecute regardless of local sentiment, regardless of
whether it exposes lax local enforcement, regardless of
whether it makes or breaks local politicians.
But outside of federal law each locality has the right
under our system of government to fix its own standards of
law enforcement and of morals. And the moral climate of the
United States is as varied as its physical climate. For
example, some states legalize and permit gambling, some
states prohibit it legislatively and protect it
administratively, and some try to prohibit it entirely.
The same variation of attitudes towards other law-
enforcement problems exists. The federal government could not
enforce one kind of law in one place and another kind
elsewhere. It could hardly adopt strict standards for loose
states or loose standards for strict states without doing
violence to local sentiment. In spite of the temptation to
divert our power to local conditions where they have become
offensive to our sense of decency, the only long-term policy
that will save federal justice from being discredited by
entanglements with local politics is that it confine itself
to strict and impartial enforcement of federal law, letting
the chips fall in the community where they may. Just as there
should be no permitting of local considerations to stop
federal enforcement, so there should be no striving to
enlarge our power over local affairs and no use of federal
prosecutions to exert an indirect influence that would be
unlawful if exerted directly.
The qualities of a good prosecutor are as elusive and as
impossible to define as those which mark a gentleman. And
those who need to be told would not understand it anyway. A
sensitiveness to fair play and sportsmanship is perhaps the
best protection against the abuse of power, and the citizen's
safety lies in the prosecutor who tempers zeal with human
kindness, who seeks truth and not victims, who serves the law
and not factional purposes, and who approaches his task with
humility.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that between the votes there be 2 minutes equally divided in the usual fashion.
Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the next two votes be 10 minutes in duration.
Mr. President, we are trying to put the law back to the way it was before this little amendment was slipped into the PATRIOT Act. We should oppose the amendment of the Senator from Alabama. It would not put it back the way it was. Actually, under this amendment, the Senator from Alabama could not have been appointed U.S. attorney, and former Attorney General Thornburg and former Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson could not have been.
The President should move quickly to appoint the U.S. attorney if there is a vacancy, but in the meantime, the judges are in the best position to appoint somebody. I hope a district court never has to make an appointment. But let's assume you have a case where there is widespread corruption. The judge has to be able to put in someone independent. It worked well for 100 years. It was changed by something slipped into the PATRIOT Act. Let's go back to the way we were, Mr. President.
I oppose this amendment and ask for the yeas and nays.
I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
Mr. President, I believe there are 2 minutes equally divided. I simply ask all Senators, send a very strong signal. We want to correct the mistake made in the PATRIOT Act, a mistake that has been utilized the wrong way. We want to go back to the appointment of U.S. attorneys the way they should be appointed. We want to have the advice and consent of the Senate. I urge all Senators to vote for the legislation Senator Feinstein and I and Senator Specter and others have introduced.