Wall Street Reform And Consumer Protection Act Of 2009
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the chairman of the full committee for recognizing me and to assert for the record in the full House that although today this huge bill of 1,300 pages or 1,200 pages will be difficult to describe and probably…
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the chairman of the full committee for recognizing me and to assert for the record in the full House that although today this huge bill of 1,300 pages or 1,200 pages will be difficult to describe and probably not well understood by either the people watching this proceeding nor all of the Members of the House, I want to say that I am proud to have worked under the tutelage of the chairman, Mr. Frank, and I think that in years to come, history will look back at this moment and say, when there was need in this country for reformation, it was had in the major part of this bill.
Mr. Chairman, I have had the pleasure of participating in major portions of the bill--Title V, Title VI, and then part of Title I.
What we tried to do, in essence, so that the viewing public can understand, is to recognize some of the problems, not all of the problems, but some of the problems that we were facing as a result of the actions of last year of the capital markets of the United States.
First and foremost, we had discovered that there were great irregularities in transparency and accountability in the rating agencies as they acted to evaluate various sets of securities in the world markets. And when we examined the rating agencies in great detail and through hearings and examination, we found that these entities were poorly--not really regulated at all but certainly poorly accounting for their own responsibilities in the system. We found they were enticing investors throughout the world to buy securities that were rated AAA when, in fact, some of those securities weren't even of B class quality. As a result, millions of people around the world and billions of dollars came in to the purchase of these securitized--or these securities, and as a result, when the market failed, they failed. And there was an impression around the world created that the American Government, the United States of America, stood behind these rating agencies when, in fact, we didn't, and that there was a great compromise.
Some of these rating agencies, because of the internal conflicts within the agencies, were taking great liberty in evaluating and analyzing the values of certain securities to the extent that, because they were paid by the individuals that were issuing the agency, there was an internal conflict. Whether that conflict caused, to a large extent, a scandal or caused failure in the system, one will probably never know, but certainly the aspects of the operations of the rating agencies have been called into question, were called into question at the time, and certainly have been since our examination.
So what have we done? We have developed a set of principles and rules to account for accountability and transparency in the rating agencies in the United States. Will that cure the problem? No. We're going to have to watch very closely, monitor very closely that these rating agencies do not stray from the straight path. If they do, we will have to come back and impose greater restrictions on them and take extraordinary actions in the future if necessary.
But we will have rating agencies now that can be sued when they could never be sued before. We will have rating agencies that will have the responsibility to provide disclosure, will have the responsibility of showing their methodologies and explanations to the buying public of the securities they rate and analyze. To that extent, we hope the public will be protected.
Next, we looked at who is accounted for in our system, and we found, as we've all known, that some 10, 12 years ago, hedge funds were denied the examination of the Securities and Exchange Commission. We have now formed what is known as the Private-Funded Investment Advisors Registration Act, which is Title V of this act, part A, and that provides that all advisers that want to play in the capital markets must register and must disclose certain information so that knowledge of what capital is doing, where it is and in what amounts will be known by our regulators. That is the first time in the history of the United States that that will prevail. It should go a long way of having inside information in the role of the regulators of the United States as to what is at risk.
Then, finally, we created an Investors Protection Act. The Investors Protection Act has done so many things it's almost impossible to enumerate, but the SEC gave recommendations which were incorporated in the bill.
Authorities that they lacked, they were given. With that inclusion, I think we have one of the finest investment protection acts that ever existed.
Finally, we have something new we created. We created the Federal insurance office that will, for the first time, will encompass information encompassing the insurance industry in the United States.
Finally, I'm proud to say I had a major part in putting together an amendment to the act, the first provision of the act, part one, that allows ``too big to fail'' protection in the United States. For the first time, the regulators in the United States will have the opportunity to analyze the structure of corporations and the financial service industry that either may be too large, interconnected, or too large in scope or too inexperienced in management or some other condition that may, in the future, cause them to be of systemic risk to the economic system of the United States. And we've empowered the regulators to move in and require changes, controls,
and regulations to prevent that occurrence so that never again, we hope, the ``too large to fail,'' in fact, will be, in fact, too large not to fail.
So with that, I recommend to all of my colleagues on both the Democrat side and the Republican side, stop for a moment and think what we've done.
May I call the attention of the Republican side, three of the eight bills that we passed through our committee went through with significant bipartisan support.
Mr. Chair, over the next few days this body will have the opportunity to consider sweeping, meaningful reforms to protect American investors, safeguard consumers on Main Street, and fundamentally change the way Wall Street and large financial institutions operate. For roughly two years, we have endured a severe crisis that exposed vulnerabilities in our system for overseeing the financial sector and demonstrated the perils of deregulation.
During this calamity, Americans have unfortunately lost trillions of dollars in personal wealth and retirement savings, millions of families have lost their homes, and far too many workers have lost their jobs. Last year, in order to save the financial system itself, we had to act courageously and pass the Troubled Asset Relief Program, despite considerable criticism. This law has worked to stabilize our system, but public faith in our financial markets has also nearly vanished. We therefore must now take bold steps to restore trust in the financial services industry by significantly modifying its regulation. H.R. 4173, the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, will do just that.
While this broad, comprehensive legislation encompasses substantial reforms in many areas--from the regulation of complex financial derivatives to the creation of a Consumer Financial Protection Agency-- I want to focus my comments on the proposals that I worked to develop and incorporate into this package. These reforms include investor protection improvements, the registration of hedge fund advisers, changes to credit rating agency oversight, and the creation of a Federal insurance office. I also want to discuss how this legislation will rein in ``too-big-to-fail'' financial institutions.
The failure to detect the massive $65 billion Madoff Ponzi scheme, the problematic securities lending program of American International Group, the freezing up of the auction-rate securities market, and the ``breaking of the buck'' by Reserve Primary Fund each demonstrated the need for comprehensive investor protection reform. In response, the Investor Protection Act of 2009--a key part of H.R. 4173--contains more than six dozen provisions aimed at strengthening the oversight of U.S. securities markets and closing regulatory loopholes.
For the first time, every professional who offers investment advice about a securities product will have a fiduciary duty to their customer. For the first time, we will create a bounty program to encourage tipsters to come forward with information about securities fraud. For the first time, we will regulate municipal financial advisers. Moreover, by doubling the budget of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and by requiring a comprehensive study to fundamentally reform the way the agency operates, this bill lays the foundation for us to put in place a superior securities regulatory system going forward.
We also need to regulate everyone who plays in our capital markets. By mandating the registration of hedge fund advisers and others who currently operate in the shadows of our markets and subjecting them to recordkeeping and disclosure requirements, for the first time regulators will have the information needed to better understand exactly how these entities operate and whether their actions pose a threat to the financial system as a whole.
Without question, the actions of Moody's, Standard and Poor's, and Fitch exacerbated this financial crisis. In response, H.R. 4173 takes strong steps to reduce conflicts of interest, stem market reliance on credit rating agencies, and impose accountability on rating agencies by increasing liability. As gatekeepers to our markets, credit rating agencies must be held to higher standards. We need to incentivize them to do their jobs correctly and effectively, and there must be repercussions if they fall short.
Insurance also plays a vital role in the smooth and efficient functioning of our economy, but the credit crisis highlighted the lack of expertise within the Federal Government on the industry, especially during the collapse of American International Group and last year's turmoil in the bond insurance industry. I have long championed the need to establish a place within the Federal Government to collect information and build expertise on this sizable industry. The Federal Government needs a fundamental knowledge base on these matters, and for the first time we will have such a repository because of this bill.
Finally, I am pleased that H.R. 4173 includes my amendment addressing companies that have become too big to fail. This bill will empower Federal regulators to rein in and dismantle financial firms that are so large, inter-connected, or risky that their collapse would put at risk the entire American economic system, even if those firms currently appear to be well-capitalized and healthy. By ensuring that financial companies cannot become so big that their failure would pose a threat to economic stability, we will protect American taxpayers from future bailouts. By outlining clear and objective standards for regulators to examine financial companies, we will also reduce the level of risk their activities pose to our financial stability and our economy.
In sum, I want to thank the Members of the Financial Services Committee for their hard work and their support of my efforts to better protect investors, advance credit rating agency accountability, register hedge fund advisers, establish a knowledge base on insurance, and curb too-big-to-fail companies. I especially want to congratulate the Chairman of our Committee, the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Frank), for his tireless efforts in pulling this comprehensive package together during the last year. I urge all of my colleagues to support this landmark bill.