Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry: How much time do we have in opposition to the amendment? Thirty minutes. I yield to the distinguished junior Senator from Tennessee 7 minutes to start our debate. I yield the floor. Mr. President, I…
Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry: How much time do we have in opposition to the amendment?
Thirty minutes. I yield to the distinguished junior Senator from Tennessee 7 minutes to start our debate.
I yield the floor.
Mr. President, I hope that Senators and those advising Senators listened carefully to the two arguments that have already been made. In particular, I commend both Senators. But let me say, if you listen carefully to the argument that Senator Bingaman, my colleague from New Mexico, just made, it should be clear that there is no intention in our legislation that local authorities be usurped. There is no intention that the environmental law of the land--NEPA--not be complied with. As a matter of fact, it is required.
There is nothing in this law that will take a myriad of State and local requirements and do anything other than say they must be complied with.
I have behind me a chart which summarizes that permit and certification approval that must take place before we get to the final stages. And you go through a myriad of activities. We are talking about California: Fish and Wildlife, the Department of Transportation, regional water quality, California State Historic Preservation, storm water discharge associated with construction--we can go on and on, all of these things, including a full analysis as required by the National Environmental Policy Act, NEPA.
As we wrote this bill, we were trying to write national energy policy. Our country has been accustomed to a myriad of regulatory constraints and litigation before issues that are significant to our Nation's energy come to an end. We decided that there was protection with reference to the citizens, the location, and the States in the existing law of our land, and we didn't touch it. We merely said, in the final analysis, the last step will be decided by FERC, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
This is a national energy issue. For anyone who thinks this is purely a simple issue of whether a Governor, when this process is all completed, ought to be able to say with a pen ``I veto this,'' that is not the case. Any Governor who wants to participate and have a meaningful decisionmaking involvement has ample opportunity to do so, and they will. They will be heard.
In the final analysis, this country cannot wait and sit around and say: We will wait until this matter is litigated. We will wait until we see how many Governors want to say no, until we find one that will say yes. When, as a matter of fact, out of a myriad of applications--one, two, three, or four--one will have been deemed by every single environmental, every single test, every zoning law to be safe and sound. The country is dependent upon natural gas and the price of it for our future well-being. That has been stated over and over. This is an issue about whether we have a fertilizer industry. This is an issue of whether we import what we need to grow our crops or whether we produce it here. This is an issue whether America produces the chemicals we need for our lifestyle.
Why is it that? Because natural gas is the primary ingredient to all those things and more. As the Senator from Tennessee said, we had the luxury of the lowest natural gas prices. Natural gas was not in abundance when it was the lowest. Sure, we have a lot more natural gas we are producing in America. But the Senator from Tennessee indicated that we are doing everything we can to maximize our production. I want to add to his litany of what we are doing, to assure those who produce natural gas in America, we are not forgetting about them in this legislation. We are trying to give them every opportunity to produce more. We have streamlined their permitting process. We want America to produce it. But the one chance we have to bring back that competition that comes, when you have enough so that demand does not totally set the price but supply has something to do with it, is to let it be imported.
I wish I wasn't here saying that. I wish I could say America is not going to have to import natural gas. I tried my best before I started this bill. The Senator from New Mexico looked at it. I found those who say we cannot survive the next 25 years without very large increases in the natural gas that we need to use. We have to add a huge amount to what we can produce to survive.
What happens if we have a bottleneck of significant proportions on getting that natural gas into the country? The $7 plus per unit will go to $8. It will to go $9. It will go to $10. One prediction is it will go to $13. On the way, America will be going out of business. As it goes up, we are going out. We are going to lose jobs everywhere. All we are suggesting is, don't add to it. I would imagine if you looked in the world and you looked inside and said analyze how safe can the siting of one of these ports in an inland location, how safe can you make the site, you probably would say we have done everything that you could imagine to make sure that happens.
The only thing we have said is, when it is all finished--months and months, maybe even years--you can't then say a Governor can come a long and say no.
Nobody should think this is a States rights issue. This is a reasonable approach to an American problem of significance. Any Governor who is worth his salt--and probably all of them are--you can rest assured will be involved in this process. They will be involved. They just are not going to be able to say: Well, I watched it all, I have looked at it all--or, as Senator Bingaman says, perhaps they will let it all go by--and when we are finished, I will make a decision. They could say that. But I don't think that is going to happen.
First of all, we are not going to let that happen. But nobody is going to do that. They are going to get involved in all of these things that are here. In California, on the local level, you have to go through the Port of Long Beach, a harbor development permit, a building permit, the Port of Long Beach Development, city of Long Beach Engineering and Public Works. All of these things have to be done. We are not going to roll anybody over.
But in the final analysis, the States should be involved in that. If a Governor is concerned about his people, he should be involved. And, frankly, there is no doubt in my mind that if some mistakes are being made, they are going to get caught. Senator Bingaman just cited one. They aren't even close to a permit in one application. What has FERC said? They sent their people out to look at it. They said: Forget about it. It flunks the test. They didn't only fail their test, they would fail anybody's test. It would fail the test of any one of these entities. So it wouldn't be built.
But let me suggest, we have gone through making mistake after mistake by piling regulatory authority upon regulatory authority, to the extent that we have ended up saying:
OK, give up. We are just not going to do that.
The best example is nuclear power. I don't mean to have a big debate on it. But we decided that we should take care of that by litigation. We said: We will purify the shortcomings by going to court. We found out, if you to go court enough times, you kill anything because you can't get the money invested. It is a business. It must be done on the basis of financial returns, probability and risk.
I also want to say that something has been said here today about the risks involved in LNG. I don't want to get into a debate of risks involving LNG ports.
I suggest the Sandia National Laboratory report that was alluded to earlier by the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts. But rather than pick one section from it and reading it, it concludes that the chances anything serious will happen are minuscule. Everything you do of significance has a risk. If you don't want to risk your legs wearing out, don't get out of bed in the morning. Lay in bed your whole life. You sure won't hurt your knees. You may not be able to do anything, but you sure won't hurt your knees. Don't worry about that risk. There is a risk in everything involved in energy, but a minor risk when it comes to LNG ports. That is throughout this Sandia report.
That is an aside, just to say nobody is trying to take a risk-laden act for the location of a site and escape scrutiny. Nobody is suggesting that in this bipartisan bill that passed the committee 22 to 1. Nobody is suggesting that. Nobody is suggesting we are enhancing the risk of doing something we must do. Not at all.
I will close by saying something I believe everybody should understand. It is consensus interpretation that right now, today, without this bipartisan bill, the Federal Government has a say-so about location. I can cite various commissions, various legal opinions. But understand that when such an issue is contentious, imagine how long it could take to get a decision made about something important to a country--how many years.
I note the presence on the floor of a distinguished lawyer, the Senator from Alabama. I don't know where he is on this issue. As a States rights Senator, he probably thinks this is a States right issue. I am a States rights Senator, too, but I don't think it is. He knows how many years of litigation it would take. Would it take one? It could take four or maybe more. It would go through district court, Federal court, an appeal, they would redo it, and then somebody files an injunction and they take another appeal--while FERC says, why don't we locate a port and bring this LNG in here.
I close by saying that we are dependent upon crude oil from overseas for our very survival. I wish I could tell you we are not going to become dependent upon natural gas from overseas, but that is not the case. We are going to be. You know, those countries are going to spend so much money making sure they develop the kinds of boats needed to bring it over here that
are safe. I heard from one country that they are going to invest billions of dollars for the safety of the hulls of those ships that are going to bring it over here because they, too, know they cannot have accidents. All of this means this is profitable to somebody who produces it. We hope we don't make it such that it is more profitable because the supply is limited because we cannot act.
So this is a provision in our bill which says: Act with extreme prudence. Act only after you go through every hoop you could go through. But don't, at the end of it all, say: Governor, after all, it is a national problem studied by everybody, with environmental impact statements completed, local zoning ordinances, and the Governor could get involved and argue and send his people, and when it is finished, he can take out his pen and say I veto it. I don't think that is the way to do it.
I have not made my argument with as much legal precision as my friend Senator Bingaman, but I do believe I have stated the case--not the case for California, but the case for America. Let me say there is no better advocate than Senator Feinstein. But I must admit there is no State that makes more decisions against producing energy in their State for their people than California.
My time is expired. I yield the floor.
Reserving the right to object, I have no objection if we add to that that we have the same amount of time added to our side.
We are adding 3 minutes to the Senator's time, so we should get 3 minutes. The Senator's doesn't count because she has it anyway.
Mr. President, I ask the Senator from California if she would be interested in having an additional minute. You know there is something in this question.
The Senator from California will have one minute, and we will have one minute.
It is the Senator's right.
Mr. President, I yield my minute to Senator Craig.
Mr. President, I move to table the Feinstein amendment and ask for the yeas and nays.
Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. President, obviously there is no time agreement, but I understand Senator Byrd is ready to go, to proceed with his amendment. I understand that is going to be accepted. We will have somebody take my place here to manage our side.
I yield the floor.
Madam President, I say to the Senator, could we try, in that arrangement, to give me 5 minutes, even if we go over a minute or 2 beyond 12:10?
The other amendment, have we seen it or know anything about it?
Madam President, first, might I say to my good friend from New York, I respect his continuous efforts in this regard. But I would say, do not misunderstand that to mean I think his amendment will do any good.
I think, first of all, the Senate should know the Strategic Petroleum Reserve is not a reserve to supply the United States with oil on a day- by-day basis. It is a reserve in the event we have a crisis.
We had a crisis that started this. That is why we started the Reserve. We had a crisis because Iran, years ago, decided to cut us off. They did not cut us off by a huge amount, but just enough to send a turmoil into the market. Our prices skyrocketed, and the United States said: Well, let's find a place to put some oil that we can retrieve if we have a crisis.
Now, everybody should know a crisis does not mean the price is too high or the price is too low. It means America has suffered an untoward shock, a war that all of a sudden happened, and we started drawing down, not an ongoing, everyday event that we just play and have to work in the marketplace.
Now, how much do we have? Years ago we thought we had a very big reserve. In 1985, we said: We want to have 118 days of supply; that is, if we needed it, and needed it every day, continually, to supplement what we had domestically, we had 118 days. Because of our growing dependence and other things, we now have 59 days. The Reserve is 59 days of import protection.
I ask the Senate, is 59 days too much? I wish we could tell the American people we had 259 days. But we have 59. It will soon be filled. So anybody worrying about amendments saying, Don't put in any more; it will soon reach its capacity, I say, Good. That is what it ought to be.
Now, the Senator says: Let's start taking it out now, a million barrels a day for 30 days, with another possibility of a million barrels a day for 30 more days. To what end? Do you think those who control the price by controlling production would sit by and say, ``The United States is going to use its reserve. We don't think they should. It is kind of dumb. But they are going to put it on the market''? In a minute, they could cut production, and any impact using up this important reserve would have on the market would go away. So we would be doing a unilateral act and endangering our security because we would be minimizing the security potential of SPR, and we would not get any good out of it. There
is no assurance doing what is suggested will have any significant impact on the price of oil.
I know the Senator has said it will bring the price down, but it just does not make sense. A million barrels a day, when we use 20 million barrels--just think of that--how could it have an impact, when the OPEC cartel is a player, and they could make their adjustments?
So what I see this as is no insurance at all of anything positive and an absolute assurance of something very, very bad for America-- negative--because we will have increased our risk of not having oil when we need it from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve that we put in in order to take it out when we had an untoward, sort of an attack on the flow of oil by some activity outside our control.
Mr. President, while I compliment the Senator for wanting to say to Americans, We want to get the price of oil down, I want to say we worked hard in this Energy Committee. We did everything humanly possible. And if it was as easy as saying, Let's just sell the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, we would have done that, I say to the occupant of the chair, who was a very active participant.
Anybody could have made a motion: Let's start selling the petroleum reserve. Nobody did that because we understand it as an activity that is self-defeating. As a matter of fact, Madam President and fellow Senators, instead of doing some good--and I say this in all deference to my friend from New York--it would probably do us some harm. Whatever you take out for this purpose probably adds to the security risk of this great Nation.
Again I repeat, we have 59 days of supply. We wish we had 118, as we started out shooting for. And now we would start diminishing that--and I cannot tell you how much; a pretty good chunk--a million barrels a day for 30 days, plus 30 more million barrels.
So having said that, I do not think we should do this.
Madam President, the time has expired, as I understand it.
Indeed.
Amendment No. 805, as Modified
I say to the Senator you have the right to modify your amendment. Go ahead.
You do not need consent.
Madam President, he has a right to modify it; is that not right?
Sure.
Madam President, I need no additional time. I move to table the Schumer amendment and ask for the yeas and nays.
Mr. President, I hope I can say what I want to say in 6 minutes. If not, I will ask the Senator for a couple more minutes.
I note Senator Bingaman is in the Senate. About a week ago, 6 days ago, there was a comment that Senator Bingaman had a proposal that would move in the direction of mandatory cleanup for carbon. I was intrigued by the group that made the study and suggested a way to do it. They had testified before a committee hearing in the Energy and Natural Resources Committee. We were intrigued when they talked about their idea. Senator Bingaman had taken it upon himself to put those preliminaries into the format of a bill.
It was said, and I was quite surprised at how much notoriety ensued, that I might be joining my New Mexico partner in this proposal. And that was true, I was considering. And, in fact, we did consider it.
The Senate should know, at least from this Senator's standpoint, what I found out. I found out it is very easy to say we ought to have some mandatory reductions. It is very easy to say what percent reduction there should be. As a matter of fact, the proposal we were looking at sounded rather achievable. Certainly, when compared with the Kyoto accords and when compared with the McCain-Lieberman proposals, quantitatively in many areas--effect on growth, what it will do to the use of coal, how many jobs might it cause, what will it do from the standpoint of real reduction in carbon--compare the NCEP, which was the group that put this study together that Senator Bingaman brought to the surface that I just said I was considering, when compared with McCain and Kyoto, the effect on GDP loss used in the same consistent way, and using the same way the President has been talking about it, impact on units of growth, the effect was--get this--0.02. The effect of Kyoto was 0.36. That is a huge difference because one is two-tenths of a percent and the other is 3.6 percent. That was the impact.
That attracted my attention because it seemed to me if we were going to start this process, we ought to start at something achievable. We had pretty good evidence it would not have any great big effect on the economy.
All the others are similar, emphasizing that the very notorious Kyoto agreement was, on every single one, at the very extreme other end compared to the high end, compared to the NCEP. I regret to say, other than to report the facts I know, McCain-Lieberman was not in the middle of the two but very much toward the very high end Kyoto reductions.
I had come to the conclusion we ought to look at the NCEP. This is my first time to say in the Senate why I cannot do it. I hope those who are so excited about mandatory impositions will look carefully at what I found and what--although I do not want to speak for him--I think Senator Bingaman found.
To go from the generation that we will reduce in a mandatory manner the carbon emissions, the 2.4 percent--the McCain-Lieberman is much bigger--this was going to start 8 years from now. I said maybe we should start it 10 years from now. But the next thing was how to implement it. How do you allocate the winners and the losers? Under that approach someone has to ratchet down more, somebody has to ratchet down less, somebody has to ratchet down none, and somebody has to get credit because they are so good. And some have to pay penalties because they are not so good.
I don't think you can change that mix no matter what you call the bill. I think McCain-Lieberman finds an American environment with utility companies--some of which have to reduce a lot, some of which do not have to reduce any, some of which are so good they have to get compensated for being so good--so that when we add it up, you get reduction across the Nation.
There is another way, and that is to say you cut down an even amount across the board. I guarantee if we have an even cut across the board, everybody gets cut 2.4, or maybe under McCain-Lieberman you get cut 5 or 6, nobody can live with that because then there is no benefit from having very clean utility companies. What if you had all nuclear powerplants and there was no carbon; would you still have to reduce whatever the amount is?
The reason, I said to my friend, Senator Bingaman, there is not enough time to implement a plan under the NCEP proposal is because we do not know how to draft a set of rules that will carry out our process that would be fair and that would achieve the goal. When we looked at possibilities, it was in my way of thinking impossible in 3, 4, or 5 days to write such a proposal.
Senator Bingaman might have suggested--and he still may sometime if we cannot finish it out--that we do it differently. We assign somebody the job of doing that detail. That could have been an approach. But it was not what we were talking about. We were trying to write it in.
I submit to the Senate I do not see how there can be a mandatory reduction program that does not have a very
detailed approach to who gets allocated what--who wins, who loses, who reduces, and who gets compensated because they already reduced. And all of that across an American universe of production facilities that goes from all of the nuclear powerplants. Maybe all the nuclear powerplants are old, but they are very clean. Then we have very old powerplants, still in production, but they are very dirty in terms of carbon.
How we go about doing that in statute without causing extreme, hard unfairness, inequities, is beyond me.
Having said that, the Kyoto agreement still is being bantered around as if it is viable.
I will ask unanimous consent to have printed a chart showing how big the reductions would be compared with the Lieberman-McCain and how big they would be compared to the NCEP. People ought to look at that. Kyoto is unachievable. We still keep talking about it. It is a pipe dream.
When you look at the numbers and what has to be done, we can understand why the Senate voted 95 to 0 that we would never approve a treaty under Kyoto. They blamed the President, but we said that in this Senate. Nobody here voted to implement Kyoto. I will tell you why. When you look at what you have to do compared to any other program, including the McCain program, but including the one that Senator Bingaman and I were going to do which we could not find a way to allocate the winners and losers, you will understand this is a tough job. I don't think we should do that, whether we call it Kyoto, whether we call it McCain. We should not do anything that risky and that uncertain unless there is somebody magical that has a way of putting this formula together--who wins, who loses, who gets money, who cuts, et cetera.
I ask unanimous consent the chart be printed in the Record at the end of my remarks.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I have 2 minutes to answer the Senator from Arizona.
Well, I had 30 minutes a while ago. Did we use it all up?
Mr. President, I do not mind the Senator from Arizona saying whatever he likes on the floor. I do not mind him getting red in the face and pointing at me and talking to me like I don't know what I am talking about. But he did not listen. I did not say global warming is not a problem. He might be talking about somebody else. I did say it was. Instead of saying what he said, he should have said: I am glad Senator Domenici is finally recognizing there is a problem.
To recognize there is a problem does not mean that his way of solving it is the only solution. In fact, I am telling the Senate what he is suggesting will not work. That is all I am saying. I have the right to do that, and it does not have to be said that I am going to hurt the young generation. I am not hurting the younger generation.
The reason this amendment cannot pass is because it cannot be implemented. It is that simple. Nobody knows how to do that because nobody knows the results. You could just as well introduce a bill and say: I want to do twice as much as Senator McCain. And that would be wonderful. You could then say: I am really for the young people. I am doing twice as much.
The problem is, you do not know how to do it. You cannot do it. And everybody who has looked at it, except those
who want to set a goal, know that is not so. That is why it will lose.
I thank the Senator for yielding me 2 minutes.
Just a moment.
Senator Bingaman is trying his best to get something called up we have agreed on. He is not in a position to agree. I am trying to put it together, and he is agreeing I should do that.
Would the Senator from Tennessee and you have an amendment with reference to windmills?
I don't want to do that. I would rather wait a while.
There are 100 amendments. You want to go in the middle of the 100? Do you want to go first?
I will take one at a time, sit down and organize at the table with you.
We are willing to try hard. Our leaders told us to stay here tonight and try to agree to some amendments. We will put you right there.
Let Senator Bingaman----
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
A vote on or in relation to the amendment. He wants to table it.
That is part of the consent request.
Mr. President, first I remind everybody that 2 years ago the President of the United States gave a speech on this subject. It was a very lengthy speech, but there are two provisions, which I do not have in front of me--so forgive me, I am not quoting, I am just stating to the best of my recollection.
In the second part of the speech, which I want to mention, the President said that we should proceed to reduce carbon greenhouse gases by 18 percent through 2012 on a voluntary basis, and thereafter we should use incentives and other ways to accomplish further reduction.
First, I think that means the President of the United States is saying we should reduce carbon greenhouse gases. In fact, he, in a sense, is saying that is a good thing. In fact, he said recently we are doing it. ``We are going to meet the goal,'' said the President.
When I was trying to put together a package, I was recognizing everything the President said, and I was recognizing that voluntary is the best way. Then I was saying: What if we do not get there when the voluntary time arrives?
So anybody who suggests there is nobody around who thinks this is a problem, why is the President saying we ought to reduce them if there is no problem? Are we just doing it because it is the flavor of the times? I don't think so. I think the President is saying we ought to get on with doing it. He thinks there is a way to do it, and he thinks voluntary is doing it, and I do not argue with him.
As a matter of fact, I think anybody who tries to start capping in any way one chooses to call capping early is mistaken because the United States of America is doing many things with many dollars on many fronts to reduce greenhouse gases.
The question is, Do we do anything if we are unsuccessful in achieving some goal? As I read what I have agreed to help Senator Bingaman with, it says there is a problem. It says we ought to do something to reduce the problem, and it is says precisely that ``it is the sense of the Senate that Congress''--it does not even say when-- ``that Congress,'' not next year, ``that Congress should enact a comprehensive and effective national program of mandatory, market-based limits.'' Then it says, ``and incentives on emissions of greenhouse gases,'' that do what? `` . . . that slow, stop, and reverse the growth of such emissions,'' and then it says--these are the goals, the concerns--that it will not significantly harm the economy.
One could say you should not put ``significantly'' in there because is some OK? What does ``significant'' mean? I say it means what we want it to mean. It just says something. Should we put in ``no more than one-half of 1 percent''? Then we would be prejudging what can be done. ``Significantly'' means to me something with which we can live and still have a very viable American growing economy but make some achievements in terms of diminution of carbon.
Then it says this will also encourage a comparable action by other nations that are trading partners of the United States. That is what we are trying to do.
Frankly, I know some will read more into this than is here, and I understand. I am not critical of anybody. Everybody has views on this issue.
I also hope those who understand what we voted on a little while ago--I spoke in opposition to it--I think I understand it as well as anybody. It received 38 votes. I did not vote for it.
Likewise, I am on this amendment because it is making a statement with reference to this issue. I, frankly, believe the time has come for some of us to make a statement regarding this issue, and I choose this one. Some others would say we want to be purely voluntary, and they could put in a sense of the Senate that we will remove as much carbon as we can, as soon as we can using all voluntary means, and that is a sense of a Senate. I would not be against that. I would say that is probably something good.
That is all I wanted to say. I thank the Senator for yielding me whatever time I have used. I yield the floor.
Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote and to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Change of Vote
I move to reconsider the vote.
On behalf of the leader, I wish to read a unanimous consent request regarding the lineup that we will follow henceforth.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate now proceed to the consideration of the following amendments: Senator Alexander's amendment, which is at the desk and relates to wind, 30 minutes equally divided in the usual form; second, Senator Kerry's amendment, sense of the Senate on climate change, 30 minutes equally divided in the usual form.
I further ask unanimous consent that there be no second-degree amendments in order to the Alexander or Kerry amendments prior to the votes in relation to those amendments and that votes in relation to those amendments occur in a stacked fashion following the debate on both amendments.
Finally, I ask unanimous consent that following those votes, Senator Warner be recognized in order to offer an amendment relating to OCS, with his part of the agreement subject to the approval of both leaders; further, there be 15 minutes for Senator Lautenberg and 15 minutes for Senator Domenici or his designee during the aforementioned debate.
There is another Senator who wants to be recognized.
I thank the Chair and Senator Warner and all others who participated.
I yield such time as he may consume to the Senator from Idaho.
Mr. President, how much time remains on each side?
Mr. President, I yield myself 5 minutes.
Mr. President, I have read through the 6-page document that the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts has submitted as his proposal before the Senate.
I was wondering, as I read through--if you skip the first few paragraphs, you begin seeing the word ``Convention'' with a capital letter. I went back to see what that is. That is the Kyoto Convention.
Senator, would you like to address the Chair, please? Would you like to ask a question?
I was not. I was looking here. I said: What is he asking us to do? I finally got down to where the Senator's amendment says: It is the sense of the Senate that we shall do these things, work first by participating in intergovernmental negotiations under the convention with the objective of securing United States participation, et cetera, et cetera.
I said: What is the convention? It is the U.N. Framework Convention. It says here. It produced Kyoto. That is what it says here. So I just want to remind the Senate, the Senator is suggesting that we ought to go back and join that convention and do something with the world so we can achieve something positive in global warming, the control of global warming gases.
Frankly, everybody here should know, if they did not, the Senator from New Mexico voted for the Bingaman amendment, which many on my side did not, because I believe we have a problem. I said that. I thought that at sometime the Congress should address it. But I surely do not support this resolution which, in a sense, says now the Senate ought to be talking about going back into negotiations with the world under an architecture that has failed us. As a matter of fact, it yielded a very big, powerful what I would call pompous ceremonial proposal called Kyoto, which nobody is going to follow that has any industrial capacity.
Now, maybe I should not say ``nobody,'' but very few nations. Most are trying to say: We would like to do it.
This Senate has said, 99 to 0, do not send us the treaty, Mr. President, because we are not going to do it. So I think the Senator-- this is a good idea. It is a very excellent speech. His remarks are very admirable. But I do not believe we should today ask, through a sense of the Senate, that we go back to a convention architecture and enter into international agreements under its architecture, which yielded Kyoto, which I do not believe was very successful.
I do not think I want to debate it particularly. I have just seen charts as to what it would require of the United States, and we could never do it. How much the other proposals do that is far less, and we can hardly do those. But that is another case. Is Kyoto achievable? No. Did that convention architecture achieve anything significant? I do not think so. We had a great debate, talked a lot about some good things. Maybe some great scientists attended. But I do not think we really want to say it is the sense of the Senate that we should go back to that format. I hope we do not. As far as I am concerned, I will not vote for it.
I compliment the Senator again for the ideas expressed and the goals. But I do not think we should do this as a sense of the Senate.
I yield the floor and reserve whatever time I have.
Mr. President, how much time remains on both sides?
I say to the Senator, would you yield back your time if I yield back mine?
Mr. President, I will reserve 53 seconds.
Mr. President, let me say to my fellow Senators, you have already as an institution, whether you voted for it or not, the Bingaman sense of the Senate. It said the Senate recognizes greenhouse gases are a problem. There is a scientific consensus that it is a problem, that we ought to do something about it through incentives and/ or mandatory caps. So we are on record on that. This is not just an amendment saying we should have a bipartisan congressional group to observe international participation in some agreements. It is much broader than that. It talks about joining in a convention architecture with the world. I don't know what else it could be other than the architecture that was established under Kyoto because that is what it refers to. I don't think we need to do that.
I yield back time I might have. I guess we want the yeas and nays.
As I understand it--did the Senator use all his time?
I ask the Senator from New Jersey, would he be disposed to yielding back his time if this Senator would yield all of my time now?
I yield back whatever time we have on our side. I ask the question so I understand carefully. The Senator did not ask for any consent that we take any action. He just delivered a speech. I didn't miss anything by way of a request, did I?
I yield back my time.
Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Amendment No. 844
I yield to the majority leader.
Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
I understand the Senators from Wisconsin and from Kansas have concerns about the potential for regulated utilities to cross-subsidize the business ventures of some of their affiliate companies.
Let me assure the Senators from Wisconsin and Kansas that I appreciate their concerns, and I agree that utility customers should not be forced to unfairly bear the costs of business ventures by unregulated companies affiliated with their local utility. Neither should competition be undermined by unfair competition caused
by shifting costs from an unregulated utility-owned business to the public utility. We can agree to disagree on whether FERC needs new authority or simply needs to exercise its existing authority. I anticipate that FERC will use its existing and new authority to address the problems described by small businesses and financial groups, but I agree that if there are problem areas, we should take a look at them.
I commit to the Senators from Wisconsin and Kansas that I will work with them through conference to ensure that the final version of this bill does not undermine consumer protections or the financial integrity of utilities, or harm America's small businesses by undermining competition. I will also work with them to hold a hearing in the committee about transactions by holding companies and affiliate businesses of public utility companies. Finally, I suggest a General Accounting Office report on affiliate transactions by holding companies and affiliate businesses of public utility companies, as such a report could be a useful resource for us in the future.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.