National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 2005
Mr. President, I thank Senator Inhofe for the opportunity to speak. The Feinstein-Kennedy amendment would prevent the NNSA from studying alternative technologies for our nuclear stockpile. It would also prevent the NNSA and DOD from…
Mr. President, I thank Senator Inhofe for the opportunity to speak.
The Feinstein-Kennedy amendment would prevent the NNSA from studying alternative technologies for our nuclear stockpile. It would also prevent the NNSA and DOD from studying earth-penetrating capability, which many military experts believe is an area where our existing arsenal does not provide sufficient deterrence.
The robust nuclear earth penetrator is a study to determine how or if the existing B-61 and existing B-83--those are the names of nuclear weapons--might be modified to provide an added capability of underground penetration. At present, our military is unable to provide credible deterrence against deeply buried targets.
Included in the President's fiscal year 2005 budget is $27.6 million in funding to undertake a feasibility study for the RNEP. With this research--and I stress research--we may be able to solve the complex engineering challenges and identify capabilities for both nuclear and conventional weapons to address the evolving tactical challenges. This is research not intended to replace any conventional weapon. It would only serve to transition from relying on large megaton city busters with more precise weapons, also providing funding for the NNSA to evaluate modification to existing weapons. It does not imply a commitment to build these weapons. Section 3117 of the Defense Authorization Act of 2004 requires that specific congressional authorization be obtained to move beyond a feasibility study. That has not been repealed and has not been changed.
Last year, the Energy and Water appropriations bill contained language that prevents the NNSA and the Department of Defense from moving beyond a feasibility study without congressional approval. I am the chairman of that committee, and I intend to include similar language again this year.
The Advanced Concepts Initiative will examine emerging or alternative technologies that could provide this country with an improved nuclear deterrence.
In 2001, the Nuclear Posture Review suggested that we should keep our nuclear scientists engaged and thinking about what the nuclear stockpile of the future should look like. By denying our scientists the opportunity to investigate this technology and the options for our stockpile, we will also neglect critical research into improving the safety, reliability, and security of the existing aging stockpile. It makes absolutely no sense to ignore technology and innovation when it comes to nuclear security and deterrence. I guarantee other countries are not limiting themselves to what they know today but are focusing on new possibilities for tomorrow.
This is not an attempt to build brand-new weapons and add to the stockpile. I am very supportive of reducing the number of weapons we have deployed, and I support the President's recently announced efforts to take a dramatic step in that direction. I support a much smaller, more flexible stockpile that can respond to a variety of threats in the post-cold-war era.
Last year, the Appropriations Energy and Water Development Subcommittee included a requirement that the President send to Congress a nuclear stockpile report that underlines the size of the stockpile of the future. This classified report is complete and defines the size and mission of our future stockpile. It goes beyond reductions contemplated by the Clinton administration. The plan proposed by the President would reduce the number of deployed weapons to levels consistent with the Moscow Treaty and its lowest level in several decades.
But even with these reductions, we must constantly adapt to provide a credible deterrence to the post-cold-war era. It is not realistic to think we can put the nuclear genie back into the bottle. We cannot hope that if we ignore the evolving nuclear threat that it will go away. History tells us a different story.
Despite the U.S. adopting a testing moratorium, several countries, including France, India, and Pakistan have tested weapons. Countries such as Libya, Iran, and North Korea have ignored international pressure to stop the development of a nuclear capability.
The fact is, countries will pursue what is in their sovereign best interests, and the U.S. should not believe
that we are in any different position. It is in our Nation's best interest to ensure that our weapons serve as a credible deterrent to a wide range of threats.
I remain hopeful that we will only use our stockpile as a deterrent to other nuclear states. However, to be an effective deterrent, it must evolve to address the changing threats. We also must maintain a group of experts at our national labs that understand the complex science to support the engineering and physics to ensure our stockpile is a viable deterrent and is safely stored at home.
To ensure we have an effective deterrent, we are doing the following:
We are maintaining our nuclear deterrent. That sends a clear and convincing signal to our allies and our enemies that our nuclear capability is sufficient to deter most threats.
We are maintaining our test readiness that allows us to hedge against the possibility that we may someday need to conduct a test to confirm a problem or verify that we resolved a problem within the stockpile.
We are using the RNEP study to examine whether or not existing weapons could be adapted to improve our ability to hold at risk deeply buried facilities that our enemies occupy.
We are challenging our scientists to think of a wide variety of options and face challenges to ensure that our nuclear deterrent is flexible and responsive to evolving threats. Failure to challenge our physicists and engineers will limit our capabilities in the future.
It is disingenuous of our opponents to argue that these policies put us on an irreversible course of new weapons development. Nothing could be further from the truth. Congress has the ultimate responsibility in determining whether or not to proceed with full-scale development.
I urge my colleagues to oppose this shortsighted amendment that would prevent our weapons scientists from investigating the best available options. This research is critical to ensuring this country has an effective and safe stockpile that will serve as a credible deterrent to all existing and potential threats.
I hope that in the process of discussing this issue, we will arrive at a conclusion that makes it eminently clear that the statement I have made regarding the 1-year feasibility study will be what we are talking about and what we will adopt.
I thank the Senator. I yield the floor.