I thank the gentlewoman for yielding. I want to commend our colleagues on the other side of the aisle from Florida as good advocates for their districts in recognizing that Florida has a serious problem. I think that if everybody had that…
I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.
I want to commend our colleagues on the other side of the aisle from Florida as good advocates for their districts in recognizing that Florida has a serious problem. I think that if everybody had that same confidence that Federal taxpayers weren't going to be involved and that this ultimately was an insurance program that was going to be completely clearly funded, the money was going to come in, it was actuarially sound, and it was going to go out, a lot of us would say ``no harm, no foul, great.''
But a lot of us have a real sense of concern because what we have done is we have looked at Florida, and my conclusion is that part of the problem of Florida and the difficulty that they are facing is because of governmental intervention in the insurance marketplace. It seems to me that the State of Florida came in and began to manipulate the marketplace insofar as other companies then ultimately made decisions, ``look, this is too high maintenance, this is too complicated, we are not able to price this appropriately, we are out of here.''
We heard testimony during the Financial Services Committee from folks who said the depth and breadth of building in Florida, in many cases, is simply inappropriate, building in very risky areas. Now, the bill speaks to some to mitigation, but I think we can do much better. And over the course of this afternoon, in a series of amendments that we intend to offer, some of them on the manager's amendment and some of them specific roll calls that we will be seeking, we are going to try and drive the conversation toward market solutions to this problem.
We are told time and again, I have heard both speakers this afternoon on the other side talk about an opt-in, talk as if this is a voluntary program. Well, I will tell you what; it is not a voluntary program for the Federal taxpayers that I represent. Federal taxpayers that I represent, I believe, are ultimately going to be on the hook for the liabilities and the commitments that are made either explicitly or implicitly through the language of this bill.
I urge a great sense of caution not to get caught up in the emotion of this, but to be clear-eyed and clear-thinking in how we debate this, and ultimately to oppose this bill in its current form.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment and to engage in a colloquy.
Mr. Chairman, I had previously presented or put at the desk 11 amendments to the manager's amendment that I am not going to be offering this afternoon. Instead, and in the interest of time, since I wasn't seeking roll calls on them, anyway, I just raise a series of questions that I am putting forward in good faith. They have been brought to my attention by our staff. Some you may have answers for; some you may have contemplated. Others you may say, let's think through that a little further, because my sense is, while the House is about to act, this is still very much a work in progress on Capitol Hill when it goes to the other Chamber.
The first question I had is the term ``capital liquidity shortage.'' It is a term that is used exclusively in the text of the bill itself, but it is not defined anywhere else. It is not a legal term of art that I am aware of. We have done some Google searches on the Internet, and it is a phrase that is unique to this bill. It is not defined.
My concern is that it could create, really, the maximum liability that could be incurred at any time. I am wondering if the gentleman from Florida is open to further defining ``capital liquidity shortage''?
And I will be happy to yield.
I yield to the chairman.
I thank the gentleman.
Another term is the term ``commercially reasonable rate.'' It is also not defined anywhere, and I would just submit that is another area that we ought to be looking at.
The other notion is that State programs should be required to charge actuarially sound rates and build up reserves based on a 1-in-200 year standard used elsewhere in the manager's amendment. My concern is we run into a situation like we have with the flood insurance program. We should learn from that mistake.
The weakness of the flood insurance program was that it contemplated simply anticipating the actual output, as it were, the actual claims, rather than thinking from an actuarial point of view where you contemplate the unanticipated. The way we have to do this, the way this process has to be set up, is it has to literally anticipate the unanticipated. And the way the manager's amendment is currently crafted, it doesn't do that. In other words, it doesn't allow the building up of reserves over a period of time so that the fund itself is actuarially sound and that it can sustain an unexpected loss, the massive storm, the unbelievable event that is literally not contemplated.
There are two things that are inconsistent within the bill, it seems to me. There is this lower view of contemplation of what you can build up. But it also says you have to pass on the savings to the consumer. So, literally, the fund is not able to build up the reserves that are necessary in anticipation of what can't be anticipated.
With that, I yield to the gentleman.
Reclaiming my time, I thank you. I just submit that the language, as I understand it in the manager's amendment, doesn't achieve the goal that you and I are seeking.
Finally, I would also like to draw attention to the notion of, sort of what I am characterizing in my fear as that repayment is a myth fear.
Under the manager's amendment, if a State program is somehow going to incur losses that exceeds its maximum liabilities, shouldn't it have to show how it is going to prevent that in the future? And there is no point in the manager's amendment where there is that reporting requirement. Again, I don't think that is onerous. I don't think it is difficult, but I think it would be a good idea to require a State before they make a claim or before they default to come forward and say, look, this is how we are going to avoid this in the future. I think it is a de minimis reporting requirement.
I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
I thank the gentleman.
Another observation is that States should pay the cost of the consortium. Now, as drafted, the cost of the consortium is by Federal taxpayers. There is no payment mechanism in the manager's amendment for the consortium to be funded by the States. I think that is an oversight and it should be revisited.
The manager's amendment sets up $120 million over 6 years, I think, but I think there should be a way for the States to pony up. At least theoretically you can contemplate where the Federal Government would create this consortium, and maybe nobody's in. At that point it would be a foolish enterprise. I think there has to be a way.
I yield to the gentleman.
Finally, on the basis of time, and I will be happy to continue the conversation with you and the chairman, in my view, I think the grace period for States is too long for their mitigation efforts. For those States currently with a program in place, the manager's amendment says all of these mitigation components are excellent, but we are going to give you 5 years to get your act together.
My suggestion would be let's shorten that up. Let's make it 2 years, and I think that is still very gracious, to follow on the word of grace. But 5 years is almost the length of the entire program that is being proposed. That is a suggestion regarding a way that I think the bill can be improve.
I yield to the gentleman.
I yield to the chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Today I offer an amendment essential to stopping this Congress from running down a road that I've expressed caution about earlier today, and that is causing further government involvement in self-sufficient, available, and reliable private markets.
Congress recently passed the National Flood Insurance Reform; and while I didn't agree with the wind provision inclusion, it made crucial strides in reducing damage from flooding and storms, especially in areas suffering repeat events. However, H.R. 3355 does not specifically prescribe mitigation guidelines. In title II, it merely alludes to Treasury providing a general directive; and, in my view, that's not good enough.
Currently, H.R. 3355 only requires the reinsurance fund receiving the loan to provide coverage for properties that adhere to applicable State building codes, leaving open the possibility that States with substandard codes, or even lacking codes, can still access the loans.
Instead, Treasury should be required to certify that the State has implemented best practices building codes for the applicable exposures, taking into account the State's geography, catastrophe risk and building patterns, which is what my amendment does here today.
This would not be a national building code, but rather, a regionally specific criteria for program participation.
The language in my amendment also gives broad flexibility to the Treasury to certify whether State building codes are appropriate for the types of risks they face. It doesn't apply specific, bureaucratic and unreachable one-size-fits-all standards for the Treasury to abide by.
The language is necessary because the current language in the bill would create an implicit guarantee that would result in an inequitable Federal subsidy for certain State insurance programs and policyholders, thus creating no need for local municipalities and developers to stop development in risk-prone areas. This was made very clear during the testimony that we heard in the hearings several weeks ago.
The further subsidization of rates would undermine economic incentives to mitigate risks. Individuals facing subsidized rates would be encouraged to take on risks that are inappropriate, specifically putting themselves in harm's way because they don't bear the full weight of the potential damages.
Now, I represent citizens from Illinois, and we would never choose to participate in this program. And let me tell you, the view from Lombard, Illinois, is very different from Key West, and God bless the folks that live in Key West, but I don't think that the residents I represent should be in a position to subsidize someone else's view.
Why should Illinois bail out States that can't address their own problems? While I'm sensitive and I admire my colleagues from Florida, I do believe that some of this is simply an exacerbation of government programs that have completely failed. Many other States have taken into account and addressed market issues based on increasing private market participation.
South Carolina introduced policyholder or catastrophe savings accounts to assist consumers and address cost issues. Louisiana and South Carolina addressed rating and regulatory matters by encouraging greater competition among insurers rather than rate controls that discourage private market competition. Louisiana has committed financial incentives for insurers to underwrite or take policies from the residual market and write-in coastal areas. Several States have also improved building codes and their enforcement as part of the long- term solution to catastrophic risk.
Floods are the majority of disasters that my congressional district faces, and we haven't sat by and waited for the government to help. The State of Illinois has one of the strongest floodplain management programs in the country. Illinois leads all Midwest States for the number of NFIP-participating communities, flood insurance policies, and flood insurance claims. Illinois outpaces the other States in local floodplain assistance, mitigation activities, and flood control projects.
Specifically, two cities in my district, Des Plaines and Mt. Prospect, were badly hurt by floods in August of this year. But they didn't suffer as much as they could have, because they are moving forward on major flood mitigation efforts by building levees on the Des Plaines River. This project will move hundreds of homes and businesses out of the floodplain, thus reducing the amount of damage during flood season and lowering insurance rates for homeowners.
There's been an unprecedented population growth and significant development in coastal and disaster-prone areas in recent decades, and total property exposures have increased dramatically.
We certainly cannot anticipate what storms will be like in the future, but we can and should take steps to reduce and lessen these risks.
I urge my colleagues to support this important amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
Mr. Chairman, this is what I characterize as the skin-in- the-game amendment.
The bill currently has no retained loss requirement for participating State reinsurance funds before they can get a catastrophic loan from the Treasury. Once the trigger is met, a fund may qualify for a loan without having any skin in the game.
To improve fiscal accountability, States should be required to first sustain a loss before receiving a loan from Treasury, similar to paying deductible in an insurance policy. The loans could be better put to use helping States manage their losses above the retained loss requirement.
This amendment says that before a State insurance fund can access one of the loans created in the bill, it must first retain sufficient losses amounting to a 1-in-100-year event with respect to State catastrophe perils. This amendment will encourage State funds to handle a predictable level of loss before putting Federal taxpayers on the hook for billions of dollars in catastrophic loans.
With no retained loss requirements, State insurance funds will have no incentives to price their risk with a catastrophe factor but, instead, rely on post-event debt financing from the Federal Government and Federal taxpayers. Adding the retained loss requirement in this bill will also encourage States to utilize the global reinsurance market instead of turning directly to the Federal Government to capitalize their funds.
Currently, Florida is the only State with a reinsurance fund that would qualify under this bill. The bill would undoubtedly spur the creation of other State funds, and requiring States to have skin in the game will encourage these new funds to properly capitalize instead of taking out a huge loan from the Feds after every natural catastrophe.
Without loss requirements, State insurance funds will have no incentives to actuarially price their risk since they will be getting cheap loans to assist them in paying their claims.
I urge the adoption of the amendment and yield to the gentleman from Louisiana.
The gentleman has an incredible gift of clarity and insight, and that is exactly it.
Reclaiming my time, I think part of the reason we are in this state today and one of the reasons we are having this conversation is because of, really, a lack of some of those commonsense approaches towards their problem in the past, which is now why Representative Klein and Representative Mahoney feel in good faith that they have got to come here on behalf of their constituents, and I understand that.
I would submit that this amendment brings some clarity, brings a little bit of pause, brings some reality to this so that over a period of time a future Congress doesn't have to come in and request an abundance from the Federal Treasury due to mismanagement and squander.
Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.