Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. Mr. President, I rise today in opposition to the motion to invoke cloture on the nomination of Richard Cordray to be the Director of the Bureau of…
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
Mr. President, I rise today in opposition to the motion to invoke cloture on the nomination of Richard Cordray to be the Director of the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection.
Earlier this year, I and 44 of my colleagues sent a letter to the President expressing our concerns with the unaccountable structure of the Bureau. It is now 7 months later and the President has yet to respond.
The majority has called for a vote they know will fail today. It is evident the White House and the majority have decided to place politics ahead of good policy. They have chosen to fabricate a political issue rather than do what is in the best interests of consumers. Nonetheless, they claim this debate is about consumer protection.
There is no disagreement, however, that consumer protection, as the Acting President pro tempore knows, needs to be enhanced. The only real point of contention is whether the new Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection will be accountable to the American people.
If we believe regulators never fail, then the current structure of the Bureau is just fine. Yet we all know regulators do fail and their failures harm consumers.
Members of the majority, I believe, have repeatedly made this point with their criticism of the Fed's failure to regulate subprime mortgages and the OCC's preemption of State consumer protection laws.
I strongly agree with the majority that our regulators failed to do their jobs in the lead-up to the financial crisis. But the lesson we should learn from the financial crisis is not that we need more unaccountable regulators. Instead, all of our financial regulators need to be held more accountable.
Just as banks should be held accountable for their failures, regulators should also be held accountable for theirs. After all, if regulators know Congress can hold them accountable, they will have a far stronger incentive to do their jobs. That will be good, as we all know, for consumers. That is why, if the Bureau is reformed, the biggest winners will be the American consumers.
Today, however, the majority will show that they are now more concerned with insulating bureaucrats from accountability and rewarding political allies than looking out for consumers. The administration and the majority will try to argue that the Bureau already is accountable. Indeed, they will say it is more accountable than any other financial regulator. But let's look at the facts. The facts tell a different story.
First, it is necessary to appreciate the amount of power placed in the hands of the Director of this Bureau. No bureaucrat will have more power over the daily economic lives of Americans than this Director. The Director, in effect, will decide which Americans can access credit to buy homes, purchase cars, and pay for college. The Director will regulate not only financial companies but also tens of thousands of Main Street businesses. Also, the Director will unilaterally decide how the Bureau spends its up to $600 million budget.
Despite the vast power vested in the hands of the Director, there are no effective checks on the Director's authority. To truly understand just how unusual the structure of the Bureau is, one need only compare it to other independent agencies.
Unlike the Chairman of the SEC, the CFTC, and the Federal Reserve, the Director of the Bureau does not have to obtain the agreement of other board members or other government officials before acting. Unlike other consumer protection agencies, the Bureau is not subject to the congressional appropriations process. Indeed, other consumer
protection agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission, are both subject to appropriations and are governed by five-member boards.
To further ensure against one party domination, the FTC and the SEC can have no more than three members from the same political party. Another important comparison is with the Consumer Product Safety Commission. This agency actually served as the template for Professor Warren when she first advocated for the creation of a consumer protection agency in an article several years ago. How is the Consumer Product Safety Commission structured? It is, first, funded through appropriations, and there is a five-member commission.
Opponents of accountability have sought to justify the structure of this Bureau by pointing to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Housing Finance Agency. Once again, the facts refute their argument.
First, the Comptroller can be removed at any time by the President for any reason. In contrast, the President can remove the Director of the Bureau only for limited grounds of ``inefficiency, neglect of duty or malfeasance.'' This means the Director of the Bureau cannot be removed even if the Director pursues policies that are harmful to the American people. How is that good for consumers?
As for the Federal Housing Finance Agency, its Director is far less powerful than the Director of the Bureau. The Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency oversees the regulation of only 14 financial institutions. He does not have sweeping powers over all consumers and tens of thousands of Main Street businesses like the Director of the Bureau would have.
It should be common sense that the more power an agency has, the more accountable it needs to be. Moreover, rather than attempting to point to other regulators to justify the structure of the Bureau, a more responsible approach would be to make all of our financial regulators more accountable. And we should begin right here with the Bureau.
To make the Bureau more accountable, we have proposed three commonsense reforms.
First, the Bureau should be led by a board of directors, as I have said. This is such a commonsense measure that the President and the Democratic-controlled House originally called for the consumer agency to be structured as a commission.
Second, the Bureau's funding should be subject to congressional appropriations.
Currently, the Federal Reserve is required to transfer up to $600 million to the Bureau each year. These are funds that could otherwise be remitted to the Treasury and used for deficit reduction or other things. Diverting this money to fund an unaccountable Federal agency sets a dangerous precedent of using the Federal Reserve as an off- budget mechanism for funding programs. It had not happened before.
In addition, funding the Bureau through the Fed removes any check on runaway spending. I believe the fiscally responsible way to fund the Bureau is through the congressional appropriations process just as every other consumer protection agency is funded.
Our third reform proposal is to create an effective safety and soundness check for the prudential bank regulators.
Some have said the Bureau already has a check under the so-called Financial Stability Oversight Council veto. But this veto was designed so it would never actually constrain the Bureau. The council can only overturn a rule in an extremely rare case: The rule must put at risk the safety and soundness of the entire U.S. banking system or the stability of the U.S. financial system.
Under this construct, a rule could cause the failure of multiple banks, but the council still would not have standing to alter the rule. Additionally, the procedure is rigged to prevent the council from acting. It takes an affirmative vote of at least two-thirds of the council's members to set aside one of the Bureau's rules, and the Bureau's Director is a voting member of the council.
In addition, only 3 of the council's 10 members are actually bank prudential regulators. This veto is not a check on the powers of the Bureau. It is a sham that they have today. We need to change that.
Recent history shows that taxpayers are ultimately on the hook for bank failures. For this reason, consumer protection needs to be carefully coordinated with bank regulation to prevent against unnecessary bank failures.
As presently structured, the Bureau can ignore any advice offered by banking regulators, even if it undermines the safety and soundness of banks. Unless this structural flaw is remedied, a real possibility exists that the consumer bureau will one day cause bank failures that end up harming consumers, taxpayers, and our economy.
In light of the reasonableness of the reform proposals we have requested, the question remains: Why are the administration and the majority so insistent that the Bureau be unaccountable?
Clearly, they want to use the Bureau as a political issue. A second reason is that they believe nonbank financial institutions are not currently regulated. But this is false. The Federal Trade Commission, the State attorneys general, and State financial regulators all have authority over nonbanks. A more likely reason for today's vote is that the Bureau will provide funding to key liberal activists, such as
I yield back my time.
Cloture Motion