Recognition of the Minority Leader (Executive Session)
Mr. President, how much time do I have? I wonder how much time the minority will give to me? I shall proceed. Mr. President, today I wish to speak about the history of freedom of speech in the Senate, about the cloture rule which, when…
Mr. President, how much time do I have?
I wonder how much time the minority will give to me?
I shall proceed.
Mr. President, today I wish to speak about the history of freedom of speech in the Senate, about the cloture rule which, when invoked, limits debate, a bit about the background here that might help all Senators if they care to read or listen, and the people out there who are listening, help them to understand a little more about what this is all about.
It is a matter of very great interest to the country and to the Republicans and to Democrats and to independents, to people from all walks of life. It is in that spirit that I seek to talk just a little while about this subject which is of great concern. I hope to have more to say on another day, but today I will limit myself to talking about the background, what this is all about, and the history that brings us to where we are today.
In recognition that the duty imposed on the President faithfully to execute the law requires persons sympathetic to his program, the Senate traditionally has given the President great leeway in choosing his policymaking subordinates, especially those in his Cabinet and those in sub-Cabinet positions. The Senate has more or less uniformly followed this practice, as a matter of grace and in the spirit of cooperation, to ensure that the executive branch functions as a team in implementing and enforcing the laws.
What has been the fairly general practice with respect to the appointment of executive branch policymakers, however, has not always applied to judicial nominations, and the arguments to the contrary are at odds with the separation of powers doctrine, common sense and history.
The Constitution establishes a Supreme Court and gives Congress the power, in its discretion, to constitute inferior tribunals; nowhere in the blueprint of our Government is it hinted--is it even hinted; nowhere is it even hinted--that the high Court or any other Federal court is the President's court.
Some may say, well, the President should have his own Cabinet. He should have his Cabinet. He should be able to choose his Cabinet. And there is considerable weight to be given to that point of view. But I do not think that any of us should maintain that the President is entitled to have his own court. That is the point.
So nothing in the Constitution suggests that either the Justices or the judges should be the President's men. Let me say that again. Nothing in the Constitution suggests that either the Justices or judges should be the President's men or women, as it were. In fact, the Constitution refutes this notion by granting Federal judges lifetime tenure and by making their compensation inviolable.
The men who met in Philadelphia in that hot summer of 1787 were practical statesmen. They were experienced in politics, statesmen who viewed the principle of separation of powers as a vital check against tyranny. And so I ask, can a rubber stamp be ``a vital check against tyranny''? If the Framers had intended the Senate simply to endorse the President's selections, the Senate could have been left out of the process altogether. Clearly, the men who met at Philadelphia, nearly 219 years ago, had in mind a more substantive role for the Senate.
The Senate has more than once flexed its political muscles to reject a Presidential nominee, including the rejection or withdrawal of 15 Cabinet nominations and 26 Supreme Court nominations. Confirmation power is one of the major constitutional provisions that separates the Senate from
the other body, the House of Representatives. It has been the subject of numerous articles, books, novels, and even motion pictures.
As early as Henry IV, who reigned from 1399 to 1413, English Parliaments effectively controlled the King's royal council and household. Several officials of Henry IV's household were dismissed at the insistence of the House of Commons. Both the household officials and the members of ``the great and continual council'' were named in Parliament.
So I say to the distinguished Senator from Tennessee, who presently presides over the Senate, with a degree of aplomb and grace and dignity that is so rare as a day in June, that the Senate routinely debated nominations in closed session in the beginning.
John Tyler was the first Vice President to become President on the death of the incumbent. Early in the Tyler administration, President Tyler broke with the Whig majority in the Senate, which thereafter frustrated his efforts to appoint his own supporters to office. Nothing in the Senate's history has ever, ever matched the spectacle that occurred on March 3, 1843, the last day of the Senate's session, when President Tyler came to the Capitol, just down the hall, to sign legislation and to submit last-minute nominations.
Tyler nominated Caleb Cushing to be Secretary of the Treasury, not once, not twice, but three times that night. Are you listening? Three times. And each time, the Senate rejected Cushing by an even larger margin than before, the votes being, as recorded in the Senate Executive Journal, 19 for to 27 against, then 10 for to 27 against, and on the third time, 2 for Caleb Cushing and 29 against.
Three times President Tyler named Henry A. Wise to be Minister to France--that same evening--and Wise, too, was thrice rejected.
Senator Thomas Hart Benton reported that ``nominations and rejections flew backwards and forwards in a game of shuttlecock.'' In all--in all--the Senate turned down four of President Tyler's Cabinet nominees: in addition to Cushing, David Henshaw as Secretary of the Navy, James M. Porter as Secretary of War, and James S. Green as Secretary of the Treasury. And that ain't all. The Senate turned down four of President Tyler's nominees to the Supreme Court: John C. Spencer, Reuben H. Walworth, Edward King, and John M. Read. It is a record of rejection unmatched--unmatched--by any other President. What a spectacle.
``History,'' wrote the poet Byron, ``with all her volumes vast, hath but one page.'' Byron was saying there that history does repeat itself, so it only needs one page.
We should do well, then, Mr. President, to look backward into the past where we shall find that due diligence by the Senate in fulfilling its ``advice and consent'' responsibility in the appointment process has been, in Hamilton's words, ``an efficacious source of stability'' in the Government of the Republic.
Mr. President, in his Manual of Parliamentary Practice, Thomas Jefferson quoted ``Mr. Onslow, the ablest among the Speakers of the House of Commons,'' as follows. Here is what Mr. Onslow had to say:
It was a maxim he had often heard when he was a young man,
from old and experienced Members-- like myself--
that nothing tended more to throw power into the hands of
administration, and [into the hands of] those who acted with
the majority of the House of Commons, than a neglect of, or
departure from, the rules--
``the rules''--
of proceeding; that these forms, as instituted by our
ancestors--
yours and mine--
operated as a check and control on the actions of the
majority, and that they were, in many instances, a shelter
and protection to the minority, against the attempts of
power.
Now, Thomas Jefferson himself wrote that whether the rules of a legislative body:
. . . be in all cases the most rational or not is really not
of so great importance. It is much more material that there
should be a rule to go by than what that rule is; that there
may be a uniformity of proceeding in business not subject to
the caprice of the Speaker or captiousness of the members. It
is very material that order, decency and regularity be
preserved in a dignified public body.
Therefore, Mr. President, all legislative bodies need rules to follow if they are to transact business in an orderly fashion, and if they are to operate fairly--I have heard that word used a good bit here-- efficiently, and expeditiously.
On April 7, 1789, the day after a quorum of Senators had appeared--so you see the Senate just goes back to April 6, 1789--a special committee was created to ``prepare a system of rules for conducting business.'' The committee consisted of Senators Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut, Richard Henry Lee of Virginia, Caleb Strong of Massachusetts, William Maclay of Pennsylvania, and Richard Bassett of Delaware. All five of these committee members were lawyers. Each had served in his State legislature, the procedures of which were indebted to colonial and English experience. Two had served in the Continental Congress, which was also indebted to colonial and English precedents, and three had participated in the Constitutional Convention, whose members had created the Senate.
Obstructive tactics--we have heard a lot about that lately--in a legislative forum, although not always known as filibusters, are of ancient origin. Plutarch reported that when Caesar returned to Rome after his sojourn in Spain, his arrival happened at the time of the election of consuls. ``He applied to the Senate for permission to stand candidate,'' but Cato--Cato the Younger--strongly opposed his request and ``attempted to prevent his success by gaining time; with which view he spun out the debate till it was too late to conclude anything that day.''
The sun went down. That ended the debate.
Filibusters were also a problem in the British Parliament. In 19th century England, even the members of the Cabinet accepted the tactics of obstruction as an appropriate weapon to defeat House of Commons initiatives that were not acceptable to the government.
Now, in this country, I say to the Presiding Officer and the distinguished Senator from Tennessee and my other colleagues, experience with protracted debate began early. In the first session of the First Congress--that is going back quite a ways. I have only lived one-fourth of all the time that has transpired since that First Congress convened. But in the first session of the First Congress, for example, there was a lengthy discussion regarding the permanent site for the location for the capital. How about that. Fisher Ames, a Member of the House from Massachusetts, complained that ``the minority . . . make every exertion to . . . delay the business.'' That is what we are talking about. That sounds like a filibuster, doesn't it? Senator William Maclay of Pennsylvania complained that ``every endeavor was used to waste time.''
That sounds like a filibuster, doesn't it? Well, long speeches and other obstructionist tactics were more characteristic of the House than of the Senate in the early years. So it started over there. But the House, on February 27, 1811, ``decided . . . that after previous question was decided in the affirmative, the main question should not be debated.'' So there you have it. They moved the previous question. That still is done in the other body. The practice of limiting debate dates back to 1604--my, that is over 400 years; that is 401 years--when Sir Henry Vane first introduced the idea in the British Parliament. Known in parliamentary procedure as the ``previous question,'' it is described in section XXXIV of Jefferson's Manual of Parliamentary Practice, as follows. Here is the way Thomas Jefferson explained the previous question:
When any question is before the House, any Member may move
a previous question . . . --
That is the way it is done over in the House, Mr. President: Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question--
whether that question (called the main question) shall now be
put.
Mr. Speaker, they say in the House: I move the previous question.
Jefferson went on to say:
If it pass in the affirmative, then the main question to be
put immediately, and no man may speak anything further to it,
either to add or alter.
That is Thomas Jefferson speaking through his writing. The journals of the Continental Congress record that the previous question was used in 1778. Get that. This is the Continental Congress. When did it first meet? It first
met in 1774, the First Continental Congress. So the journals of the Continental Congress record that the previous question was used in 1778. Section 10 of the rules of the Continental Congress read:
While a question is before the House, no motion shall be
received, unless for an amendment, for the previous question,
to postpone the consideration of the main question, or to
commit to.
The rules adopted by the Senate in April 1789 included a motion for the previous question. According to historian George H. Haynes, when Vice President Aaron Burr delivered his farewell address to the Senate in March 1805--200 years ago--he, Aaron Burr, the Vice President of the United States, ``recommended the discarding of the previous question,'' because in the preceding 4 years during which he had presided over the Senate, it had ``been taken but once, and then upon an amendment.''
So, Mr. President, I say to the Senator from Tennessee, who is presiding, and other Senators, when the rules of the Senate were codified in 1806--that was the first revision of the rules, in 1806-- reference to the previous question was omitted. The previous question allowed the Senate to terminate debate: Mr. President, I move the previous question. Or in the House: Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question. If that gained a majority, no further debate. The previous question will be voted on.
In 1806, when the rules of the Senate were first codified, reference to the previous question was omitted. Since then it had only been used 10 times from the years 1789 to 1806, and it has never--it has never, it has never--been restored.
Henry Clay, in 1841, proposed the introduction of the previous question. Here we have Henry Clay proposing that they bring back the previous question. But he abandoned the idea in the face of opposition. Those Senators did not want the previous question. They did not want to terminate debate. They wanted freedom of speech.
When the Oregon bill was being considered in 1846, a unanimous consent agreement was used as a way to limit debate by setting a date for a vote.
When Senator Stephen Douglas proposed permitting the use of the previous question in 1850, the idea encountered substantial opposition and was dropped--dropped, dropped. They did not want the previous question. They did not want to terminate debate. They wanted to be able to speak on and on and on. A filibuster? Well, perhaps.
An effort to reinstitute the previous question on March 19, 1873, failed by a vote of 25 for to 30 against.
The final impetus for a cloture rule came as a result of a 1917 filibuster, one of the most famous in the Senate annals--against an administration measure permitting the arming of American merchant vessels for the duration of the World War. I believe that was 1915.
On February 26, President Wilson--I was born during one of the administrations of Woodrow Wilson--President Wilson appeared before a joint session of Congress to request legislation authorizing the arming of merchant ships. The President announced that the rules of the Senate would have to be revised--now get this--the rules of the Senate would have to be revised before he would call a special session of the entire Congress to deal with the war emergency. And so, Mr. President, the fate of the unlimited debate was sealed.
The principal responsibility for the cloture resolution rested with the new Democratic majority leader, Thomas Martin of Virginia. Under his guidance, a bipartisan committee of the Senate's leaders drew up a proposal providing that a vote--get this--by two-thirds of those present and voting could invoke cloture on a pending measure. Two- thirds of those present and voting.
By a vote of 76 to 3 on March 8, 1917, after only 6 hours of debate, the Senate adopted its first cloture rule. Mr. President, 1917, that was the year in which I was born.
In 1949 now, President Harry S. Truman sought to clear the way for a broad civil rights program, and his first step was to push for liberalization of the cloture rule. His efforts produced a bitter battle at the beginning of the 81st Congress.
The Senate adopted a compromise measure that proved to be less usable than the one it replaced. It required that two-thirds of this entire Senate vote for cloture rather than two-thirds of those present and voting. That was 1949. The new rule differed from the old in that it allowed cloture to operate on any pending business or motion, with the exception of debate on rules change. This meant that future efforts to change the cloture rule would themselves be subject to extended debate without benefit of the cloture provision.
Now we are getting down into my time. At the beginning of the 86th Congress--I came to Congress during the 83rd Congress when Harry Truman was getting close to the end of his tenure--at the beginning of the 86th Congress, Senate majority leader, Lyndon B. Johnson, offered and the Senate adopted by a 72-to-22 rollcall vote, a resolution to amend Senate rule XXII. Approved on January 12, 1959, after 4 days of debate, the resolution permitted two-thirds of the Senators present and voting--going back to the very beginning of the cloture rule--two- thirds of the Senators present and voting to close debate, even on proposals for rules change. It also added to rule XXII:
The rules of the Senate shall continue from one Congress to
the next Congress unless they are changed and provided in
these rules.
These rules, these rules in this book, the ``Senate Manual.''
On February 28, 1975, I submitted a resolution providing that debate in the Senate be closed by a vote of three-fifths of the Senators duly chosen and sworn, except in the case of a measure or motion to change the rules of the Senate, when a two-thirds vote of Senators present and voting would be required to close debate.
On March 7, 1975, the Senate adopted my substitute providing that three-fifths of all Senators chosen and sworn could invoke cloture. This provision applied to all measures except those amending the rules of the Senate which still required a two-thirds vote of Senators present and voting.
Four years later on February 22, 1979, the Senate agreed to a resolution that I submitted establishing a cap of 100 hours of consideration once cloture had been invoked on a measure.
Under my resolution, each Senator would be entitled to 1 hour of time. Senators could yield their time to the majority or minority floor managers of the bill or to the majority or minority leaders. Except by unanimous consent, none of the designated four Senators could have more than 2 additional hours yielded to him or to her. These Senators in turn could yield their time to other Senators. If all available time expired, a Senator who had not yielded time and who had not yet spoken on the matter on which cloture had been invoked could be recognized for 10 minutes for the sole purpose of debate.
The 1979 resolution made in order only those first-degree amendments submitted by 1 p.m. the day following submission of a cloture motion, with second-degree amendments in order only if submitted in writing 1 hour prior to the beginning of the cloture vote.
The substitute amendment contained the current overall limitation of 30 hours of consideration after cloture has been invoked.
So that brings us up to the present day rules with reference to debate and limitation of debate in the Senate, the current cloture rule. That puts us where we are now, and I thought it would be well just to review briefly the history of unlimited debate in the Senate and then the cloture rule limiting debate--the cloture rule as initially adopted requiring two-thirds of those present and voting; and then in 1949, two-thirds of those elected and sworn; and then again in 1975, two-thirds of those Members present and voting, that is where we are--so that we might have this basis for a better understanding of where we go from here.
I thank you, Mr. President. I thank all Senators, and I yield the floor.