Mr. President, in 2002, then-Senator Biden chaired a series of Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on U.S. policy toward Iraq. These hearings challenged many prevailing assumptions and called into question the wisdom of invading…
Mr. President, in 2002, then-Senator Biden chaired a series of Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on U.S. policy toward Iraq. These hearings challenged many prevailing assumptions and called into question the wisdom of invading Iraq. To the detriment of our Armed Forces, our counterterrorism efforts, and the standing of the United States around the world, our government ignored those prescient warnings.
Our country is again contemplating sending tens of thousands of troops into battle, this time as an escalation of the 8-year war in Afghanistan. In fact, the escalation has already begun, with an additional squadron to begin deploying in November.
Sadly, the impact of our expanding military engagement in Afghanistan is becoming increasingly and painfully clear, as October has become the deadliest month for U.S. troops since the war began, and more servicemembers have been killed this year than in the first 4 years combined.
I commend Senator John Kerry for holding a series of exceptional hearings in the Foreign Relations Committee over the past month on U.S. policy in this critical region. Expert witnesses have provided a sober analysis of the situation there.
I urge my colleagues, if they have a chance, to read the transcripts of these hearings and consider the opinions of this diverse group of former military officials, intelligence officers, diplomats, academics, and experts in the region. Of course, a handful of the witnesses supported an escalation of our military involvement in Afghanistan, but the majority of the regional experts--including CIA veterans who have deep experience in the region--questioned whether the stated aims of our military strategy are achievable or necessary in order to deny al- Qaida an uncontested safe haven in Afghanistan. Many expressed concern that our current military-focused approach may be making things worse.
President Obama has refocused our attention on the Afghanistan- Pakistan region, and for this I give him great credit. I am also pleased to see this administration is taking the time to have serious discussions about our strategy and the many possible alternatives. We must find a way to relentlessly pursue al-Qaida's global network without destabilizing this critical region, overstretching our military or needlessly spending money we do not have. This will require a smaller, more targeted,
and sustainable military strategy combined with far more robust regional diplomatic engagement.
I would like to go over what I consider to be some of the myths that are being used to support the notion of a significant buildup of troops in Afghanistan.
One is that preventing a potential al-Qaida safe haven in Afghanistan is more important than addressing existing safe havens elsewhere. That is not what we heard at the hearings.
The committee's hearings have revealed that calls for an open-ended or increased military presence in Afghanistan are based upon several flawed assumptions or myths. The first common myth is that preventing a potential al-Qaida safe haven in Afghanistan is more important than other potential safe havens. Again and again, we hear that if we do not send more troops, the Taliban will regain control of Afghanistan and again provide a safe haven in which al-Qaida could reestablish training facilities or launch attacks on the United States. That statement may be true, but it contains a number of assumptions that need to be closely examined. Will more troops make a difference? How likely is it the Taliban will actually regain control of Afghanistan? Even if it does, what will its relationship be with al-Qaida? But the biggest unasked question is: What are the costs of pursuing this strategy and is it necessary to address the very real threat posed by al-Qaida?
Al-Qaida already has a safe haven in Pakistan and is operating in other countries around the globe. Addressing this global threat requires a smart and sustainable use of our resources around the world, including in Afghanistan, rather than disproportionately directing our resources toward only one of many potential safe havens.
Several witnesses called into question even the likelihood that the Taliban would overrun Kabul. Even if the Taliban were to continue to exert control over certain areas, experts challenged the simplistic assumption that al-Qaida would then be able to reestablish the kind of operational freedom it had in Afghanistan prior to 9/11.
Moreover, sending more troops to Afghanistan may not prevent an al- Qaida safe haven there. As General McChrystal noted in his own assessment, even if we send additional troops, they would necessarily be focused on limited areas and would still leave substantial portions of the country outside the control of the Afghan Government or U.S. forces.
Several witnesses questioned whether we can afford to dedicate so many resources to one country when we face a global adversary. Instead, as Robert Grenier, the former CIA station chief in Islamabad during the 2001 invasion in Afghanistan, testified:
The best that we can hope for is not a permanent
elimination of a safe haven [in Afghanistan] . . . but rather
the elimination of an uncontested safe haven. [W]e need to be
in a place where we can continue to play the game, which
means that we need to be able to do that on a sustainable
basis. . . .What we are currently doing I believe is not
sustainable either by us or by the Afghans.
We have to have a sustainable, targeted counterterrorism strategy that can contest potential safe havens and, thus, prevent al-Qaida from regaining the footing they had in the 1990s. Trying to achieve total elimination of such safe havens through a large-scale, open-ended military mission is not only infeasible, it is physically and politically unsustainable and could provoke even greater instability in the region. It is time we develop a counterterrorism policy for Afghanistan that places it in the context of al-Qaida's many current and potential safe havens, including in Yemen, Somalia and North Africa and many other places around the world.
A second oft-cited myth is, we already tried engaging in such a limited counterterrorism operation in Afghanistan after the 2001 invasion and the situation on the ground only deteriorated.
On the contrary, the strategy of the United States in Afghanistan, over the past 6 years, has been uncoordinated and neglected and much of the limited resources went to pursuing militants in Afghanistan while al-Qaida was rebuilding in Pakistan. This strategy failed not because it was targeted at al-Qaida but because it generated resentment among the local population and created a groundswell of opposition. It also failed because it turned a blind eye to the corruption and lack of legitimacy of both the Afghan and Pakistani Governments. The previous administration's extreme reliance on Pervez Musharraf not only failed to achieve our immediate counterterrorism goals, but it undermined the perception among the Pakistani population that we were working with them against mutual threats. As a result, we lost a crucial opportunity to eliminate al-Qaida and the Taliban from, and bring stability to, Afghanistan.
By contrast, the Obama administration has focused on Pakistan and supported the emergence of a civilian government that shares our counterterrorism goals. We have a strong interest in Pakistan's continued military operations. We must remain engaged so any tactical successes are accompanied by rules of engagement that protect the civilian population and ensure humane treatment of displaced persons, which are essential to ensuring that these successes actually result in strategic victories.
Much more remains to be done, including efforts to strengthen responsive civilian governance and encourage Pakistan to tackle the deeper socioeconomic problems that the Director of National Intelligence has testified are driving instability in that country. None of this will be easy, but counterterrorism in Pakistan will not be achieved through our escalation in Afghanistan. One thing is certain. At no point in the last 8 years has this kind of comprehensive, focused strategy for Pakistan been attempted.
In Afghanistan, I am not suggesting we would necessarily just limit ourselves to what some have called an over-the-horizon presence. We may need to maintain bases and consider a range of counterterrorism options. But we will never return to the neglect and strategic drift of the pre-9/11 period, nor should we resume the unfocused mission we saw for much of the previous administration.
This recognition is why several witnesses testified that a targeted counterterrorism strategy, which has never been tried before, would likely succeed in denying al-Qaida an uncontested safe haven. This sustainable strategy, along with a flexible timetable for the withdrawal of troops of the United States from Afghanistan, could easily reduce the perception that we are engaging in an open-ended military occupation of that country.
As to a third myth, there are many who argue that a larger military presence is required in order to stabilize Afghanistan. However, many of the experts testified that an increase of foreign troops in Afghanistan will likely provoke additional militancy.
Reports indicate that militancy in both Afghanistan and Pakistan has increased over the years. According to Milt Bearden, the former CIA station chief in Islamabad: ``40,000 troops will beget 40,000 more enemy . . . '' We must appreciate that our military presence may well be counterproductive and, in fact, driving the conflict, creating more militants than it is eliminating.
Indeed, it may even be undermining our ability to divide our enemies. CIA veterans Robert Grenier and Mark Sageman testified that, in Mr. Grenier's words, Afghans ``tend to coalesce against what is perceived as an outsider.''
It is not surprising, then, that many of the witnesses who appeared before the Foreign Relations Committee agreed that a political solution is essential to stability in Afghanistan. As Mr. Bearden testified, there is no ``military solution--for us or the Afghans.''
We can and will relentlessly pursue al-Qaida. We have to find a way to do so that does not further destabilize the region. Increasing our troop levels in Afghanistan will only make this more difficult.
As to a fourth myth, another frequently cited myth is we must maintain a large military presence in Afghanistan in order to prevent the destabilization of Pakistan. In reality, our massive military footprint in Afghanistan has contributed to instability in Pakistan.
Several witnesses agreed the majority of Pakistanis would not welcome an increased military presence in Afghanistan. Mr. Grenier stated:
I think that a large increase in U.S. presence in
Afghanistan would not be welcomed by the majority of
Pakistanis. I think that it would make the struggle seem all
the more starkly one of the U.S. against Muslims as opposed
to the U.S. supporting Afghans in their own struggle.
As former British diplomat Rory Stewart testified, the ``stabilized Pakistan'' rationale for a military presence in Afghanistan also ignores ``the real drivers of the problems in Pakistan. Pakistan will not stand or fall on Afghanistan. It's about the Pakistani government, it's about the Pakistani military, it's about the Pakistani economy and the Pakistani society . . . by and large, Afghanistan is far less important to the future of Pakistan than we're suggesting.''
In fact, our presence in Afghanistan could be counterproductive. CIA veteran Paul Pillar recently testified in the House that ``an expanded U.S.-led counterinsurgency in Afghanistan would be more likely to complicate rather than to alleviate the task of Pakistani security forces insofar as it succeeded in pushing additional militants across the Durand line.'' We need to carefully consider the unintended consequences of sending additional troops to Afghanistan, lest we further destabilize its nuclear-armed neighbor, Pakistan.
The Afghanistan hearings provided a crucial forum to question conventional wisdom, justifying our current and proposed military strategy. These expert witnesses have challenged many of the assumptions underlying many of the myths I outlined.
In his testimony before the House, Pillar warned that:
An expanded military effort in the cause of
counterinsurgency in Afghanistan would be unwarranted. The
benefits in terms of ultimately adding to the safety and
security of the American people would be marginal and
questionable. At best, the difference such an effort would
make in the terrorist threat facing Americans would be
slight. At worst, the effort would be counterproductive and
would not reduce the threat at all. Even at its best, the
benefit would be, in my judgment, outweighed by the probable
costs of the counterinsurgency.
There is strong consensus that we must not abandon Afghanistan, and the lack of strategy and focus on this region that occurred over the past 6 years must not be repeated. But there has also been significant agreement among the witnesses that we continue to greatly overestimate the potential benefits and underestimate the risks associated with maintaining or expanding a large, open-ended military presence.
I urge my colleagues, again, to review this excellent testimony from these hearings. We need to reduce our unsustainable military presence in Afghanistan in order to pursue al-Qaida without further destabilizing the region and work through diplomatic channels and the provision of assistance to support the emergence of legitimate, competent governments in both countries that will be effective partners in fighting terrorism.
I yield the floor.