Thank you, Congressman Garamendi. I appreciate very much your taking the leadership tonight on this issue, which is so critically important. There is a tremendous amount of misinformation out there about what has gone on in terms of the…
Thank you, Congressman Garamendi. I appreciate very much your taking the leadership tonight on this issue, which is so critically important.
There is a tremendous amount of misinformation out there about what has gone on in terms of the financial markets. I happen to sit on the Financial Services Committee, so I've seen firsthand what we have been able to do in terms of structuring a fix for what is going on on Wall Street and for what happened on Wall Street.
Yet it would be a mistake just to talk about the fix without talking about the history. Far too often, the Republicans would have us believe that all of this history began in January of 2009, which is when Barack Obama took the oath of office and when we took the oath of office. The facts are far different, and I think it is important to help voters and folks out there to better understand exactly how we got to where we are.
I remember as a State legislator, when I served in the Ohio House from 2001-2008, that these issues of predatory lending and of foreclosure came up over and over again. I pushed Governor Strickland to create a foreclosure task force in the State of Ohio, and I was proud to serve on that task force. Yet what we realized way before the task force was formed was that so many of these problems were Federal in nature. They were Federal in scope; though, the Federal Government was doing very little to regulate Wall Street, to regulate the mortgage industry.
My colleague Mr. Ellison mentioned predatory lending and the failure to enact predatory lending legislation. I will remind the viewers and I will remind this body, Mr. Speaker, that it was in 2000 that Congresswoman Stephanie Tubbs Jones from Ohio--God rest her soul-- introduced predatory lending legislation here in the House. They could have enacted that in 2000. They could have enacted it in 2001, in 2002, in 2003, in 2004, in 2005, and in 2006. Every year, she brought forward legislation concerning predatory lending because she understood the impact this was having in neighborhoods across Ohio and across the country, but they failed to act. We knew that these things were being created on Wall Street, things like mortgage-backed securities and credit default swaps, which backed up the mortgage-backed securities, and collateralized debt obligations, which backed those up. The vast majority of the people had no idea that these things even existed much less what they were doing.
What we soon found out was that these mechanisms on Wall Street were allowing for the bubble to occur, which then led to the collapse when we found out what was actually contained in them.
For just a minute, Congressman, I'll talk about how the risk was shifted, because this is fundamental to what happened. You know, years ago, you would go to a savings and loan or you would go to a bank, and you would try to get a mortgage on your house. The risk would be shared between the financial institution and the homeowner, and they would hold onto the paper. The financial institution would hold onto that mortgage paper, and it would be part of their investment portfolio; but that is not what happened in the 2000s.
What happened in the early 2000s was that investment vehicles were created on Wall Street that no longer required that bank or that savings and loan to hold onto that paper. They sold it immediately. They sold it immediately onto a secondary market that was created. These things were then brought together in thousands of mortgages, called ``mortgage-backed securities.'' They were then sold to international investors, to pension funds--to all kinds of entities.
In the meantime, the rating agencies were rating these things at AAA despite the fact that many of the mortgages contained in these packages were bad mortgages. Oftentimes, they were 2- or 3-year adjustable rate mortgages to subprime borrowers. ``Subprime borrowers'' are simply borrowers who have poor histories of paying back in the first place.
So what behavior did this incentivize? Well, at the front end, I will tell you what it incentivized.
You had mortgage brokers and financial entities going out there trying to qualify anybody they possibly could for a mortgage at the highest prices they could possibly get because they were no longer holding onto the paper. It was no longer a long-term investment of the property value of that home; it was at the close of the deal. If it's at the close of the deal, you're going to close as many deals as you possibly can. That's why they were qualifying people who should never have qualified for mortgages. That is how this bubble was created.
Now, I have heard a lot of my colleagues come down here and blame the Community Reinvestment Act over and over again. If you listen to conservative talk radio, they say the banks were forced to lend into these neighborhoods and the banks were forced to make bad loans. Now, I've never come across a bank that didn't have the power to say ``no'' to a loan, but they would have you believe that it was the banks that were forced to do this because of the Community Reinvestment Act. So I just want to bring a few things to the attention of the public.
First of all, the Community Reinvestment Act was established in 1977. So if the Community Reinvestment Act was the problem, you would think that maybe we would have seen this in the 1980s and the 1990s. But we didn't because the Community Reinvestment Act wasn't the problem.
What the Community Reinvestment Act did was it provided incentives for financial institutions to go into neighborhoods where there were depositors in those financial institutions but folks weren't qualifying for loans because they had red-listed entire areas. They weren't required to make bad loans. They were just required to go into the neighborhoods and make good loans.
And if I can just refer to Ben Bernanke in a letter November 25, 2008, who said this, and he's responding to one of our Senate colleagues:
``Thank you for your letter of October 24, 2008, requesting the Board's view on claims that the Community Reinvestment Act is to blame for the subprime meltdown and current mortgage foreclosure situation. We are aware of such claims but have not seen any empirical evidence presented to support them. Our own experience with CRA over more than 30 years and recent analysis of available data, including data on subprime loan performance, runs counter to the charge that CRA was at the root of, or otherwise contributed in any substantive way to, the current mortgage difficulties.''
The fact of the matter is over 80 percent of the bad loans that went into default, that caused the foreclosure crisis, over 80 percent, were from financial entities and nonfinancial entities that didn't even participate in the Community Reinvestment Act.
I think it's a good point, Congressman. There was no regulation. There was no regulation of mortgage-backed securities. There was no regulation of credit default swaps. So when folks get up and say we have enough regulation on Wall Street, well, there may be regulation, but the regulation was in the wrong place.
So if you look at the bill that came through the House when it comes to regulatory reform, we focused on some sound principles. First, the creation of a Consumer Financial Protection Agency, an independent agency that provides consumers with information, good information, about the products that they are being offered. Now, this isn't a crazy idea. You know, we often said in the State of Ohio that you were safer purchasing a toaster than you were a home loan because you had more consumer protections purchasing a toaster. And that's true. You have consumer protections when it comes to purchasing a vehicle. You have consumer protections if you purchase toys for your kids. But you don't have those same consumer protections when it comes to a home loan.
I appreciate that. And picking up on that point, the CFPA is critical to provide consumers information. But if you go back down to No. 5 on that list, strengthening community banks, this strengthens community banks because so much of the problem occurred outside of the financial institutions in the first place.
Many of these subprime mortgages, many of these bad loans didn't originate with community banks. The community banks were doing the right thing. But there was no regulation of the behavior of these nonfinancial entities. So for the first time, the CFPA will step in and provide regulation over the product itself. So it doesn't matter how you structure your entity to avoid regulation. The regulation will come in the form of the product. So if you're offering a consumer product which is determined to be a bad product for consumers, you will be prohibited from offering that, regardless of the type of entity that you are.
This is important because banks are very wary of regulators and for good reason, especially community banks, who have regulators coming in all the time to make sure that safety and soundness is being complied with and to make sure that consumers are being treated fairly. But what the CFPA gets at isn't additional burdens on community banks, but it's going after those previously nonregulated entities to make sure that they are following the law and that the products they are offering are fair and that the disclosures they are providing are clear, that they're transparent, and consumers know what they are getting themselves into.
Yes, I believe it will absolutely strengthen the community banks.
And as you know, many of the community banks were provided additional protections, Mr. Speaker, by making sure that the CFPA was only part of the regulatory structure when we went into community banks so that we didn't place yet an additional burden in terms of an examination on that community financial institution.
So I believe this is an additional protection because for far too long, these entities were existing outside of a regulated marketplace, which put community banks, the guys that were doing the right thing, the guys that so many of us rely upon, and lend to small businesses, lend to people trying to purchase their homes--they were at a competitive disadvantage, and this really does strengthen those community banks because it forces everybody to have an even playing field.
Getting back to the issue of too big to fail, because I think this is really a critical issue for people to get their arms around. I think it's important that we have strong capital markets; that the private sector works well in providing capital to allow our businesses to grow, to allow people to invest in the economy. That's critically important. But the issue of too big to fail really comes back to our responsibility, because when an entity is too big to fail, then it suggests that they go well beyond losses that might just impact the shareholders or losses that might just impact the owners or the employees of a business, but in fact it impacts all of us.
We then have a responsibility so that when the harm that's caused by these institutions is so great that it impacts the public good, then the United States Congress has a responsibility. In this case, the foreclosure crisis. Not only have we seen the greatest recession in our lifetimes but we have seen neighborhoods just devastated by foreclosures all across this country. Certainly, in the State of Ohio, where I come from.
The cost is enormous. That's not being repaid by Goldman Sachs. Lehman Brothers isn't around to do it. The big investment firms on Wall Street aren't there when we're having crime in our neighborhoods due to the foreclosures. It's the residents and the local governments that are left to pick up the pieces. That's what we mean by too big to fail.
So never again will we allow an entity to get so big that its failure will cause such a calamity not just to the economy but to our neighborhoods, to our communities, and obviously to jobs across the country. So we've put mechanisms in place to prohibit entities from growing that large. And if they are so large that their collapse would have this tremendous impact, we provide for a provision to allow the Fed to
wind them down and allow Treasury to wind them down--not at taxpayer expense but at their own expense and at the expense of financial entities who are contributing to a pool. We don't believe in the government bailouts. We are trying to put an end to government bailouts. What we are trying to do is allow these to be dissolved in a way that's fiscally responsible. That's what we mean by too big to fail.
I think it's critically important as you move through this list to help people better understand exactly what it is that we're doing. One of the big issues that comes up time and time again is the issue of transparency. Because transparency was a big problem. It wasn't that the regulations didn't necessarily exist on some of these products, but people didn't know what was in the products. And so the Wall Street banks were intentionally hiding the risk associated with some of these derivative products.
Derivatives by their very nature are derived from other capital. But they're critically important. They're critically important to our system, our economic system, because they provide capital investment that creates jobs in our economy. So we don't want to stop derivatives. We want to create investment vehicles. Derivatives are okay, but these investment vehicles need to be transparent. That's all we're asking through the legislation, is that the risk associated with the product be clear so that the people investing in these products know the risk associated with their investment. This is basic. This is basic finance, that people asking to invest in products should know the risk associated with those investments. That's what we're trying to achieve through the regulatory reform bill.
Well, I would just share with you and share with everyone here that the reality is that, from a legislative standpoint, nothing has changed. Despite the fact that we're in the worst recession that we've ever experienced--we all know what caused this. We know how we got here. We know the lack of regulation on these very sophisticated financial instruments caused the mortgage meltdown which led to the recession. But the fact of the matter is, legislatively, nothing has changed in statute.
We passed a good bill out of the House----
We passed a good bill that had a lot of measures. Subsequent to that, after it went over to the Senate, there has been stalling by the Republican Senators. We've had closed-door meetings by leadership of the Republicans in the House and in the Senate, both here in Washington and on Wall Street, because the financial firms on Wall Street like the status quo. We've seen their profits. They're back to the days of big bonuses. But our neighborhoods are still struggling. Our neighborhoods are still trying to get out of the foreclosure crisis that has impacted them, And it's going to be years before they come out of that crisis. It's the most important thing that we can do here is make sure that this never happens again, but our Republican colleagues in the Senate are standing in the way. At least here, the Republicans just voted ``no,'' but they couldn't stop the process from moving forward.
We, as a Congress, have an obligation to the people. We, as a Congress, have an obligation to the people to ensure that the crisis that we found ourselves in never happens again. We do that through strong regulatory reform. We've passed a strong measure in the House. We're waiting upon the Senate to tell the American people that we won't let this happen again. That is our responsibility, and that's what we need to impress upon people as we move forward.
Enough of the closed-door meetings with Wall Street; it's time to act on behalf our constituents.