Floor Statements

I thank the gentleman from Missouri. He is correct. The amendment I propose to section 3622 does not and is not intended to preclude any interested party from securing a hearing before the Postal Regulatory Commission if it believes that the rates being charged or the manner in which services being provided to that mailer or mailer group violates the act. It is my hope that in conference that we can work to assure that the Postal Regulatory Commission does not become embroiled in attempts to resolve disputes as to internal affairs or purely operational decisions of the Postal Service. This provision is intended to protect the rights of the mailing public against the potential for monopoly abuse or other unjust or unfair conduct by the Postal Service in terms of rates charged or the nature of service provided.

Mr. President, the Homeland Security Committee of the Senate has been conducting a thoroughly comprehensive, bipartisan, and thorough investigation into the preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina. We have held 15 hearings, the latest of which was today. We have interviewed 270 witnesses. We have reviewed 800,000-- 800,000--pages of documents. We have a completely bipartisan staff of investigators, attorneys, and other experts.

We are working together. We are making great progress. We will finish in March. We will produce a report and legislation. And, most important, we will finish our work before the next hurricane season is here.

I urge opposition to the amendment, and I raise a point of order that the pending amendment is not germane to the measure now before the Senate. I raise a point of order under section 305(b) of the Budget Act.

Mr. President, I rise today to speak in favor of the nomination of Samuel Alito to serve as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court is entrusted with an enormous power--the power to interpret the Constitution, to say what the law is, to guard one branch against the encroachments of another, and to defend our most sacred rights and liberties.

The decision of whether to confirm a nominee to the Supreme Court is a solemn responsibility of the Senate and one that I approach with the utmost care. It is a duty that we must perform despite the fact that nominees are constrained in the information they can provide us.

Some interest groups, and even some of my colleagues, have called on nominees to promise to vote a certain way; they demand allegiance to a particular view of the law or a guarantee in the outcome of cases involving high-profile issues. These efforts are misguided.

To avoid prejudging and to ensure impartiality, a nominee should not discuss issues in areas of the law that are ``live''--where cases are likely to come before the Court. Parties before the Court have a right to expect that the Justices will approach their case with a willingness to fully and fairly consider both sides.

The cases that come before the Supreme Court each year present legal issues of tremendous complexity and import, and Justices should not be asked to speculate as to how they would vote, or make promises in order to win confirmation. Justice Ginsberg stated during her hearing that a nominee may provide ``no hints, no forecasts, no previews'' on issues likely to come before the Court. As Justice Ginsberg's statement underscores, the Justices should reach a conclusion only after extensive briefing, argument, research, and discussion with their colleagues on the Court.

We must also recognize that there are limits to our ability to anticipate the issues that will face the Court in the future. Twenty years ago, few would have expected that the Court would hear cases related to a Presidential election challenge, would try to make sense of copyright laws in an electronic age, or would face constitutional issues related to the war on terrorism.

While we cannot know with certainty how a nominee will rule on the future cases that will come before him or her, we are not without information on which to base our judgement. We must engage in a rigorous assessment of the nominee's legal qualifications, integrity, and judicial temperament, as well as the principles that will guide the nominee's decisionmaking. In fact, in Judge Alito's case, I note that we have significantly more information on which to base our judgement than with other nominees, given his long tenure as a judge on the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

The excellence of Judge Alito's legal qualifications is beyond question. Even his fiercest critics acknowledge that he is an extraordinary jurist with an impressive knowledge of the law, a conclusion also reached by the American Bar Association, ABA.

The ABA Standing Committee on the Judiciary conducted an exhaustive review of his qualifications. During this process, the Committee contacted 2,000 individuals throughout the Nation, conducted more than 300 interviews with Federal judges, State judges, colleagues, cocounsel, and opposing counsel, and formed reading groups to review his published opinions, unpublished opinions, and other materials. Based on its review, the committee found Judge Alito's integrity, his professional competence, and his judicial temperament to be of the highest standard, and decided unanimously to rate him ``well qualified''--the highest possible rating.

When asked at his hearing what type of Justice he would be, Judge Alito directed Senators to his record as a judge on the Third Circuit. I agree this is the appropriate focus.

During his 15 years of service on the Third Circuit, Judge Alito has voted in more than 4,800 cases and has written more than 350 opinions. His record on the bench is one of steady, cautious, and disciplined decisionmaking. He is careful to limit the reach of his decisions to the particular issues and facts before him, and he avoids inflammatory or politically charged rhetoric. And despite this extensive record, there is no evidence that his decisions are results-oriented. For example, in the area of reproductive rights, I note that he has reached decisions favoring competing sides of the political debate.

After reviewing Judge Alito's dissenting opinions, Cass Sunstein, a well-known liberal law professor from the University of Chicago, reached the following conclusion: ``None of Alito's opinions is reckless or irresponsible or even especially far-reaching. His disagreement is unfailingly respectful. His dissents are lawyerly rather than bombastic. . . . Alito does not place political ideology in the forefront.''

During his hearing, the committee heard the testimony of seven judges from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, the court on which Judge Alito currently serves. The panel was comprised of current and retired judges, appointed by both Democratic and Republican Presidents, and holding views ranging across the political spectrum.

Who better to know how Judge Alito thinks, reasons, and approaches the law, than those with whom he worked so closely over the past 15 years? And it is significant that these colleagues were unanimous in their praise of Judge Alito--in his legal skills, his integrity, his evenhandedness, and his dedication to precedent and the rule of law.

As Judge Becker commented, ``The Sam Alito that I have sat with for 15 years is not an ideologue. He's not a movement person. He's a real judge deciding each case on the facts and the law, not on his personal views, whatever they may be. He scrupulously adheres to precedent. I have never seen him exhibit a bias against any class of litigation or litigants.''

Judge Aldisert, who was appointed by President Johnson, had this to say: ``The great Cardozo taught us long ago the judge, even when he is free, is not wholly free. He is not free to innovate at pleasure. This means that the crucial values of predictability, reliance and fundamental fairness must be honored. . . . And as his judicial record makes plain, Judge Alito has taken this teaching to heart.''

Judge Lewis, a committed human rights and civil rights activist who described himself as ``openly and unapologetic pro-choice,'' said: ``I cannot recall one instance during conference or during any other experience that I had with Judge Alito . . . when he exhibited anything remotely resembling an ideological bent. . . . If I believed that Sam Alito might be hostile to civil rights as a member of the

United States Supreme Court, I guarantee you that I would not be sitting here today.''

Judge Alito's colleagues provided compelling testimony of his deep and abiding commitment to the rule of law, the limited role of a judge, and the obligation to decide the case based on the facts and the record before him. They also testified that Judge Alito's decisions have been constrained by established legal rules and specifically by a respect for the rules of precedent. The weight of their testimony is substantial--they know far more about Judge Alito's judicial philosophy than we could hope to learn in a few days of public hearings.

A nominee's judicial philosophy matters to me. When I met with Judge Alito, I specifically asked him about his views on the importance of precedent and stare decisis--the principle that courts should adhere to the law set forth in previously decided cases.

During both our meeting and his hearing, Judge Alito evidenced a strong commitment to the principle of stare decisis. Judge Alito acknowledged the importance of this principle to reliance, stability, and settled expectations in the law.

At his hearing, Judge Alito, referring to the landmark Roe v. Wade decision, testified as follows: ``[I]t is a precedent that is protected, entitled to respect under the doctrine of stare decisis. . . .''

Similarly, Chief Justice Roberts, who was confirmed with a strong bipartisan support, made a nearly identical statement at his hearing. He said that Roe is ``a precedent of the court, entitled to respect under the principles of stare decisis.''

After a careful comparison of these statements and others, I find that on substance, there is little that distinguishes the two nominees' statements on this issue. Both nominees clearly acknowledged the importance of precedent, the value of stare decisis, and the factors involved in analyzing whether a prior holding should be revisited. Both agreed that the Constitution protects the right to privacy, and that the analysis of future cases involving reproductive rights begins not with Roe but with the Casey decision, which reaffirmed Roe's central holding. And both testified that when a case has been reaffirmed multiple times, as Roe has, this increases its precedential value.

Despite the strong testimony of both Chief Justice Roberts and Judge Alito, the reality is that no one can know for certain how a Justice will rule in the future. History has shown us that many predictions about how other Justices would decide cases have proven wrong.

At her hearing in 1981, Justice O'Connor vigorously defended her belief that abortion was wrong and stated that she found it ``offensive'' and ``repugnant.'' Justice Souter once filed a brief as a State attorney general opposing the use of public funds to finance what was referred to in the brief as the ``killing of unborn children.'' Justice Kennedy once denounced the Roe decision as the ``Dred Scott of our time.''

Yet, in 1992, all three of these Justices joined together to write the joint opinion in Casey reaffirming Roe based on the ``precedential force'' of its central holding.

Based on my review of his past decisions, I doubt that I will agree with every decision Judge Alito reaches on the Court, just as I do not agree with all of his previous decisions. I anticipate, however, that his legal analysis will be sound, and that his decisionmaking will be limited by the principle of stare decisis and the particulars of the case before him.

Judge Alito has demonstrated his fitness for this appointment with his clear dedication to the rule of law. After an exhaustive review process, the ABA has given him its highest possible rating. His colleagues on the Third Circuit, both Republican and Democrat appointees alike, have been unqualified in their praise of his nomination.

Based on the record before me, I believe that Judge Alito will be a Justice who will exercise his judicial duties guided not by personal views, but based on what the facts, the law, and the Constitution command.

For these reasons, I will vote to confirm Judge Alito. I hope and expect that he will prove his critics wrong and that his record on the Supreme Court will show the same deference to precedent, respect for the limited role of a judge, and freedom from ideologically driven decisionmaking that he has demonstrated during his tenure on the Third Circuit.

Mr. President, on Tuesday, December 20, I introduced a simple but important bill that would allow an existing General Services Administration, GSA, program for streamlined Government employee relocations to continue for an additional 4 years. Under a pilot program enacted in 1998, government agencies including GSA, Customs and Border Protection, and the Department of Defense have been able to relocate staff in a more economical manner than what can be done under the existing Federal relocation regulations. This innovative and cost saving test program, known as the Voluntary Relocation Program, provides Government agencies additional flexibility to relocate personnel to meet mission critical staffing needs and, according to Customs and Border Protection, has resulted in a cost savings of nearly $25 million in their organization alone.

I am very pleased that Senators Lieberman and Akaka have joined me in cosponsoring this legislation.

The Department of Homeland Security began using the Voluntary Relocation Program to relocate hundreds of Border Patrol agents to critical U.S. border locations after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. As part of its new mission to protect national borders from security threats, agents from the Office of Border Patrol, OBP, eagerly volunteered to transfer to border locations deemed most vulnerable. However, these transfers took a long time to process and were very costly under the Federal travel regulations, FTR.

According to Customs and Border Protection, CBP, relocation of personnel under the Federal travel regulations typically cost the Federal Government an average of $72,000 per Border Patrol agent move. Understandably, the agency's ability to relocate significant numbers of Border Patrol agents was limited, so customs and border protection, CBP, sought alternative funding sources.

Under this voluntary program, employees receive a lump-sum payment to cover relocation costs, rather than submitting expense reports supported by receipts. Transferees that choose to relocate to a new duty station under the Voluntary Relocation Program manage the details of their own move and are fully responsible for determining how to spend the pre-determined lump-sum payment allocated by the Federal Government. Furthermore, employees enjoy greater input in how funds are allocated and transferees have more control over the logistics of their move. To date, the VRP has saved customs and border protection more than $23,500,000 in Border Patrol agent relocation costs.

This Voluntary Relocation Program has provided both the government and its employees with both reduced administrative burdens and increased responsiveness to employees and the organization's mission.

From April 2004 through September 2005, CBP processed 435 relocations at an average cost of $16,888 per move. Interim reports published by customs and border protection on the VRP indicate that participating employees are satisfied with the program and are interested in its continuation. It is anticipated that if the VRP program is extended, ``several hundred'' CBP agents will seek to take advantage of the VRP for career ladder promotions within the first year of it being offered. Based upon the promise of the program's early results, the continuation of the VRP test program would benefit national security needs and the agency's mission.

I believe that the VRP is an excellent example of how Government can work better and more cost effectively to best serve the interests of the public and government employees. This legislation would allow Federal agencies to provide an additional relocation incentive that would assist them in the accomplishment of their mission. I urge my colleagues to join me, Senator Lieberman and Senator Akaka in support of this legislation.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak in morning business for not to exceed 15 minutes.

Mr. President, I rise today, along with my good friend and colleague, Senator Joe Lieberman, to introduce the Chemical Facility Antiterrorism Act of 2005.

This legislation addresses one of the Nation's greatest vulnerabilities, the threat of a terrorist attack against a chemical facility.

My legislation would provide broad new authority to the Department of Homeland Security to ensure that the Nation's chemical facilities are better protected from terrorism.

This legislation would direct the Department of Homeland Security to establish criteria for evaluating the vulnerability of our Nation's chemical facilities to terrorist attack and to establish risk-based tiers for those facilities deemed in need of protection.

These regulations will require designated facilities to conduct vulnerability assessments and to create appropriate site security and emergency response plans. In addition, the Department would establish an office within the Infrastructure Protection Directorate responsible for implementing and enforcing the statute.

The bill also contains robust measures to ensure both compliance by chemical plants and effective implementation by the Department.

This legislation is strong medicine, and I do not prescribe it lightly. But the potential devastation that an attack on a chemical facility could cause, the sheer number of these facilities and the current widespread lack of security, as well as the clearly stated intent of terrorists to cause maximum harm to the American people and to our economy make these measures necessary.

The Homeland Security Committee has invested substantial effort in examining this threat and in deciding how best to respond to it. Our investigation included four hearings on this topic earlier this year.

From the horrifying chemical attacks of the First World War, and the tragic accident at Bhopal, India, in 1984, to the numerous and more recent accidental releases of hazardous chemicals in this country, we were reminded by expert after expert of the potential for useful productive chemicals to kill, if released accidentally or intentionally.

We also know that al-Qaida has a keen interest in the American chemical industry. Indeed, at our first hearing, Steven Flynn of the Council on Foreign Relations testified that the chemical industry is ``at the top of the list'' of al-Qaida and other terrorist groups. The chemical industry, said Commander Flynn, absolutely screams at you as essentially a weapon of mass destruction.

We should not wait until there is an attack on a chemical facility and then act after the fact. So often our security measures and our emergency legislation is passed after something horrible has already occurred and after lives have already been lost. Let us get ahead of this curve. Let us act now to address what witness after witness identified as being one of the greatest threats to our homeland.

The stakes are high and the vulnerability is widespread. The Environmental Protection Agency has cataloged some 15,000 facilities in the United States that manufacture, use, or store large quantities of hazardous chemicals for productive, legitimate purposes, but in amounts that could cause extensive harm if turned against us as weapons. And we have seen al-Qaida do this before. We have seen al-Qaida use commercial aircraft as weapons of mass destruction.

The Department of Homeland Security has identified 3,400 facilities that could affect more than 1,000 people if attacked.

According to the Government Accountability Office, tens of millions of Americans live close enough to chemical facilities to be at risk in the event of a terrorist attack. Yet despite this profound threat, only a fraction of our Nation's chemical facilities are regulated for security by the Federal Government under the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, or subscribe to volunteer security standards.

While I applaud those companies that have taken voluntary measures, an unacceptable number have not. Moreover, given the severity of the threat, I believe it is a mistake in this case to rely on voluntary measures alone. The overwhelming majority of experts at our hearing testified that additional statutory authority is needed to effectively address the threat of terrorism against a chemical facility.

Leading security experts, chemical safety professionals, industry representatives, labor representatives, environmental groups, and the administration, all have testified that Federal legislation in this area is necessary, although obviously they differ considerably on the details.

The legislation I am introducing today provides that critical authority. While establishing the need for Federal legislation, our hearings stressed the importance of getting this right, of striking the right balance.

Chemical shipments in the United States approach $.5 trillion annually. The chemical industry represents our largest export sector, totaling $91.4 billion in 2003.

More than 900,000 people work directly in the American chemical industry with millions more in supplier and indirect jobs.

Chemicals are critical to our food and our water supply, our pharmaceuticals, our electronics, our clothes; in fact, just about everything.

A consistent theme that sounded throughout our hearing was that we cannot afford to drive the chemical sector out of this country in the name of security. And that is why we spent so much time in carefully crafting a bill that strikes the right balance.

Our hearings established a considerable consensus around two important concepts: First, that the legislation should be risk based. Our chemical industry is extremely diverse and any legislation must take into account that diversity. A small plant using chemicals in rural Maine faces very different risks than a major chemical manufacturing plant in the New York City area, and its security response should be structured appropriately. Security measures should be tailored to each particular facility, taking into account its vulnerabilities, its location, impact on the population, and other risk factors. High-risk facilities should undertake the strongest security precautions while obviously fewer precautions are necessary at very low-risk facilities.

Second, the legislation should be performance based. What do I mean by that? By that I mean our focus should be on having the Department establish the standards, the results, rather than prescribing exactly how a corporation should act to meet those standards, those results. Facilities should defend against particular threats. For example, the Secretary might specify that facilities should be able to protect against a hazardous release resulting from a truck bomb. Or the Secretary may mandate that every plant have a secure perimeter. Now, facilities could choose to meet those standards by building fences, erecting barriers, moving the most hazardous chemicals to a more secure area, or even switching to a less hazardous chemical altogether. By specifying the regulations should be performance based, facilities will have the incentives to identify the most effective and cost-efficient means of increasing protection.

The legislation I am introducing today meets those fundamental criteria. It is risk based and it is performance based. This legislation is modeled, in part, on the Maritime Transportation Security Act, consequently referred to as MTSA.

During the course of our four hearings, we heard substantial testimony from security industry experts, the administration and others, that the results-based cooperative approach of MTSA is a major success story. In fact, we heard so many positive things about the law that we brought in the Coast Guard's director of port security, Admiral Bone, to testify about their experience with the current law.

The first step in improving the security of our Nation's chemical facilities is to determine which facilities should be covered by Federal regulations and to what degree. This legislation requires the Department of Homeland Security to issue within 1 year of enactment regulations establishing criteria for evaluating the types of facilities that should be covered, as well as regulations establishing risk-based tiers for the designated facilities.

Following the issuance of these regulations, the Department would designate covered facilities and place them into tiers. The designations would be based on risk factors including potential likelihood of death or illness, proximity to population centers, and the potential impact on national security, the economy, and critical infrastructure. The tier would have increasingly strict security requirements as the risk and consequences of a terrorist attack at a covered facility increase.

The Department would then set security performance standards for each tier. Every facility would be required to conduct a vulnerability assessment, establish and implement a site security plan, and create an emergency response plan or update an existing plan to include provisions for an intentional attack. Vulnerability assessments would address the threats and consequences of a terrorist attack, including

vulnerabilities from the use of hazardous chemicals.

The site security plan would address the identified vulnerabilities and meet the performance standards set by the Department. The site security plan would also identify how the facility is coordinating with Federal, State, and local officials for response to a terrorist attack. The facilities would be required to drill their security plans and emergency response plans. Covered facilities would have 6 months following promulgation of regulations to certify compliance and submit their assessments and plans to the Department for approval.

If a facility fails to comply, the legislation I am introducing provides the strongest remedy to the Department. The bill gives the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority to shut down chemical facilities that are at high risk and which the Secretary believes have not adequately addressed the risk of a terrorist attack. For the highest risk facilities, the Secretary could order an immediate closure. For the other lower risk facilities, the Department could order closure but only after a process of written notification, consultation, and further time for compliance.

Now, I recognize this shutdown authority concentrates considerable power into the Secretary's hands, but the dire consequences of a terrorist attack justify giving the Secretary the authority to shut down a chemical facility that has failed to comply with the law. With hundreds of thousands of lives at stake, the Secretary must have the authority to ensure our chemical facilities have adopted security measures sufficient to reduce the risk of a terrorist attack. If a facility cannot, will not, or has not done so, it simply cannot be allowed to keep operating.

It was only after very careful consideration that I decided to include this power in my bill. I note that the Maritime Transportation Security Act provides similar authority to the Coast Guard. Admiral Bone testified since 2004 the Coast Guard has used this authority to shut down 32 facilities--three of which were chemical facilities. He testified it was imperative the Department of Homeland Security be given that closure authority.

Before closing, I will comment on a couple of very important and controversial issues. One is the issue of inherently safer technology which is often referred to as IST. My bill allows chemical facilities to choose whatever security measures best meet the performance standards required by the Department. IST is one of the recognized means of meeting a performance standard. In addition, my legislation requires the vulnerability assessment include an analysis of security measures, including vulnerabilities arising from the use, storage, and handling of dangerous chemicals. However, I make clear our legislation does not mandate IST. Not only would doing so be at odds with the performance-based approach we have endorsed in this bill, I also do not believe it is appropriate for a bill on security to dictate specific industrial processes. Such uses are outside the scope of the legislation, beyond the jurisdiction of this committee, and are not the only way to address security issues.

I fully expect some facilities will adopt inherently safer technologies. I certainly encourage them to do so if that is the best means for them. However, that should be their decision.

This legislation does not tell facilities how high to build their fences or what chemicals to use or how they may use them. It is the result that matters. I believe this bill will result in significantly enhanced security for the chemical sector. This is a Homeland Security bill. It is not an environmental regulation.

In summary, this legislation requires chemical facilities to conduct vulnerability assessments, create and implement security plans, establish emergency response plans, and to submit these plans to the Department of Homeland Security for approval or disapproval. It gives the Department broad authority to ensure that chemical facilities are addressing the risks of terrorist attacks and giving the Department the authority it needs. The legislation is risk based and performance based, and I am confident it will provide long overdue standards that will ensure stronger and more consistent security at our chemical facilities.

Before closing, I once again thank my lead cosponsor and the ranking member of the Homeland Security Committee, Senator Lieberman. We have worked very hard with the members of our committee, including the Presiding Officer, all year long to explore this through a number of hearings, and we have engaged in many months of negotiations.

I also thank our cosponsors, Senator Coleman, Senator Carper, and Senator Levin, for their hard work on this bill.

I look forward to adding additional cosponsors and working with the committee to move this vital legislation forward.

Thank you, Mr. President.

Mr. President, I rise today, along with my good friend and colleague, Senator Joe Lieberman, to introduce the Chemical Facility Antiterrorism Act of 2005.

This legislation addresses one of the Nation's greatest vulnerabilities, the threat of a terrorist attack against a chemical facility.

My legislation would provide broad new authority to the Department of Homeland Security to ensure that the Nation's chemical facilities are better protected from terrorism.

This legislation would direct the Department of Homeland Security to establish criteria for evaluating the vulnerability of our Nation's chemical facilities to terrorist attack and to establish risk-based tiers for those facilities deemed in need of protection.

These regulations will require designated facilities to conduct vulnerability assessments and to create appropriate site security and emergency response plans. In addition, the Department would establish an office within the Infrastructure Protection Directorate responsible for implementing and enforcing the statute.

The bill also contains robust measures to ensure both compliance by chemical plants and effective implementation by the Department.

This legislation is strong medicine, and I do not prescribe it lightly. But the potential devastation that an attack on a chemical facility could cause, the sheer number of these facilities and the current widespread lack of security, as well as the clearly stated intent of terrorists to cause maximum harm to the American people and to our economy make these measures necessary.

The Homeland Security Committee has invested substantial effort in examining this threat and in deciding how best to respond to it. Our investigation included four hearings on this topic earlier this year.

From the horrifying chemical attacks of the First World War, and the tragic accident at Bhopal, India, in 1984, to the numerous and more recent accidental releases of hazardous chemicals in this country, we were reminded by expert after expert of the potential for useful productive chemicals to kill, if released accidentally or intentionally.

We also know that al-Qaida has a keen interest in the American chemical industry. Indeed, at our first hearing, Steven Flynn of the Council on Foreign Relations testified that the chemical industry is ``at the top of the list'' of al-Qaida and other terrorist groups. The chemical industry, said Commander Flynn, absolutely screams at you as essentially a weapon of mass destruction.

We should not wait until there is an attack on a chemical facility and then act after the fact. So often our security measures and our emergency legislation is passed after something horrible has already occurred and after lives have already been lost. Let us get ahead of this curve. Let us act now to address what witness after witness identified as being one of the greatest threats to our homeland.

The stakes are high and the vulnerability is widespread. The Environmental Protection Agency has cataloged some 15,000 facilities in the United States that manufacture, use, or store large quantities of hazardous chemicals for productive, legitimate purposes, but in amounts that could cause extensive harm if turned against us as weapons. And we have seen al-Qaida do this before. We have seen al-Qaida use commercial aircraft as weapons of mass destruction.

The Department of Homeland Security has identified 3,400 facilities that could affect more than 1,000 people if attacked.

According to the Government Accountability Office, tens of millions of Americans live close enough to chemical facilities to be at risk in the event of a terrorist attack. Yet despite this profound threat, only a fraction of our Nation's chemical facilities are regulated for security by the Federal Government under the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, or subscribe to volunteer security standards.

While I applaud those companies that have taken voluntary measures, an unacceptable number have not. Moreover, given the severity of the threat, I believe it is a mistake in this case to rely on voluntary measures alone. The overwhelming majority of experts at our hearing testified that additional statutory authority is needed to effectively address the threat of terrorism against a chemical facility.

Leading security experts, chemical safety professionals, industry representatives, labor representatives, environmental groups, and the administration, all have testified that Federal legislation in this area is necessary, although obviously they differ considerably on the details.

The legislation I am introducing today provides that critical authority. While establishing the need for Federal legislation, our hearings stressed the importance of getting this right, of striking the right balance.

Chemical shipments in the United States approach $.5 trillion annually. The chemical industry represents our largest export sector, totaling $91.4 billion in 2003.

More than 900,000 people work directly in the American chemical industry with millions more in supplier and indirect jobs.

Chemicals are critical to our food and our water supply, our pharmaceuticals, our electronics, our clothes; in fact, just about everything.

A consistent theme that sounded throughout our hearing was that we cannot afford to drive the chemical sector out of this country in the name of security. And that is why we spent so much time in carefully crafting a bill that strikes the right balance.

Our hearings established a considerable consensus around two important concepts: First, that the legislation should be risk based. Our chemical industry is extremely diverse and any legislation must take into account that diversity. A small plant using chemicals in rural Maine faces very different risks than a major chemical manufacturing plant in the New York City area, and its security response should be structured appropriately. Security measures should be tailored to each particular facility, taking into account its vulnerabilities, its location, impact on the population, and other risk factors. High-risk facilities should undertake the strongest security precautions while obviously fewer precautions are necessary at very low-risk facilities.

Second, the legislation should be performance based. What do I mean by that? By that I mean our focus should be on having the Department establish the standards, the results, rather than prescribing exactly how a corporation should act to meet those standards, those results. Facilities should defend against particular threats. For example, the Secretary might specify that facilities should be able to protect against a hazardous release resulting from a truck bomb. Or the Secretary may mandate that every plant have a secure perimeter. Now, facilities could choose to meet those standards by building fences, erecting barriers, moving the most hazardous chemicals to a more secure area, or even switching to a less hazardous chemical altogether. By specifying the regulations should be performance based, facilities will have the incentives to identify the most effective and cost-efficient means of increasing protection.

The legislation I am introducing today meets those fundamental criteria. It is risk based and it is performance based. This legislation is modeled, in part, on the Maritime Transportation Security Act, consequently referred to as MTSA.

During the course of our four hearings, we heard substantial testimony from security industry experts, the administration and others, that the results-based cooperative approach of MTSA is a major success story. In fact, we heard so many positive things about the law that we brought in the Coast Guard's director of port security, Admiral Bone, to testify about their experience with the current law.

The first step in improving the security of our Nation's chemical facilities is to determine which facilities should be covered by Federal regulations and to what degree. This legislation requires the Department of Homeland Security to issue within 1 year of enactment regulations establishing criteria for evaluating the types of facilities that should be covered, as well as regulations establishing risk-based tiers for the designated facilities.

Following the issuance of these regulations, the Department would designate covered facilities and place them into tiers. The designations would be based on risk factors including potential likelihood of death or illness, proximity to population centers, and the potential impact on national security, the economy, and critical infrastructure. The tier would have increasingly strict security requirements as the risk and consequences of a terrorist attack at a covered facility increase.

The Department would then set security performance standards for each tier. Every facility would be required to conduct a vulnerability assessment, establish and implement a site security plan, and create an emergency response plan or update an existing plan to include provisions for an intentional attack. Vulnerability assessments would address the threats and consequences of a terrorist attack, including

vulnerabilities from the use of hazardous chemicals.

The site security plan would address the identified vulnerabilities and meet the performance standards set by the Department. The site security plan would also identify how the facility is coordinating with Federal, State, and local officials for response to a terrorist attack. The facilities would be required to drill their security plans and emergency response plans. Covered facilities would have 6 months following promulgation of regulations to certify compliance and submit their assessments and plans to the Department for approval.

If a facility fails to comply, the legislation I am introducing provides the strongest remedy to the Department. The bill gives the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority to shut down chemical facilities that are at high risk and which the Secretary believes have not adequately addressed the risk of a terrorist attack. For the highest risk facilities, the Secretary could order an immediate closure. For the other lower risk facilities, the Department could order closure but only after a process of written notification, consultation, and further time for compliance.

Now, I recognize this shutdown authority concentrates considerable power into the Secretary's hands, but the dire consequences of a terrorist attack justify giving the Secretary the authority to shut down a chemical facility that has failed to comply with the law. With hundreds of thousands of lives at stake, the Secretary must have the authority to ensure our chemical facilities have adopted security measures sufficient to reduce the risk of a terrorist attack. If a facility cannot, will not, or has not done so, it simply cannot be allowed to keep operating.

It was only after very careful consideration that I decided to include this power in my bill. I note that the Maritime Transportation Security Act provides similar authority to the Coast Guard. Admiral Bone testified since 2004 the Coast Guard has used this authority to shut down 32 facilities--three of which were chemical facilities. He testified it was imperative the Department of Homeland Security be given that closure authority.

Before closing, I will comment on a couple of very important and controversial issues. One is the issue of inherently safer technology which is often referred to as IST. My bill allows chemical facilities to choose whatever security measures best meet the performance standards required by the Department. IST is one of the recognized means of meeting a performance standard. In addition, my legislation requires the vulnerability assessment include an analysis of security measures, including vulnerabilities arising from the use, storage, and handling of dangerous chemicals. However, I make clear our legislation does not mandate IST. Not only would doing so be at odds with the performance-based approach we have endorsed in this bill, I also do not believe it is appropriate for a bill on security to dictate specific industrial processes. Such uses are outside the scope of the legislation, beyond the jurisdiction of this committee, and are not the only way to address security issues.

I fully expect some facilities will adopt inherently safer technologies. I certainly encourage them to do so if that is the best means for them. However, that should be their decision.

This legislation does not tell facilities how high to build their fences or what chemicals to use or how they may use them. It is the result that matters. I believe this bill will result in significantly enhanced security for the chemical sector. This is a Homeland Security bill. It is not an environmental regulation.

In summary, this legislation requires chemical facilities to conduct vulnerability assessments, create and implement security plans, establish emergency response plans, and to submit these plans to the Department of Homeland Security for approval or disapproval. It gives the Department broad authority to ensure that chemical facilities are addressing the risks of terrorist attacks and giving the Department the authority it needs. The legislation is risk based and performance based, and I am confident it will provide long overdue standards that will ensure stronger and more consistent security at our chemical facilities.

Before closing, I once again thank my lead cosponsor and the ranking member of the Homeland Security Committee, Senator Lieberman. We have worked very hard with the members of our committee, including the Presiding Officer, all year long to explore this through a number of hearings, and we have engaged in many months of negotiations.

I also thank our cosponsors, Senator Coleman, Senator Carper, and Senator Levin, for their hard work on this bill.

I look forward to adding additional cosponsors and working with the committee to move this vital legislation forward.

Thank you, Mr. President.

Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to support this motion to instruct the conferees to add $2.9 billion for the LIHEAP program. The time is growing late. In northern Maine, the high temperature earlier this week--the high temperature--was 12 degrees. Let's act now to avert a real crisis for low-income families across this country.

Mr. President, I rise today to join my colleague from Rhode Island in offering a motion to instruct the conferees to include $2.9 billion in additional funding for the Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program as part of the budget reconciliation bill.

This funding is absolutely critical to help our Nation's low-income citizens keep warm this winter. I believe we simply must provide more LIHEAP funding this year. Let me describe the situation we are facing in my home State.

Just yesterday, I was in northern Maine, in Aroostook County, which is where I come from, and the high for the day was 12 degrees. That was the high temperature for the day. In weather like this, people simply have no choice but to devote a very large part of their household budget to heating their homes. Unfortunately, with the escalating cost of home heating oil, many people simply cannot afford to do so.

In Maine, 78 percent of the households use home heating oil to heat their homes. Currently, the cost of home heating oil is approximately $2.34 per gallon. That is 38 cents above last year's already inflated prices. These high prices greatly increase the need for assistance, and at least 3,000 additional Mainers are expected to apply for LIHEAP funding this year.

So we have a situation where there are more people in need of assistance compared to last year. The prices are much higher than last year, and yet the average benefit is expected to fall by roughly 10 percent to $440 per qualifying household. Unfortunately, at today's high prices, $440 is only enough to purchase 188 gallons of oil. That is far below last year's equivalent benefit of 251 gallons. I can tell you, that is not nearly enough to get even through the first half of the winter in Maine. With rising prices and falling benefits, we have a real problem. Just to purchase the same amount of oil this year as last year, the State of Maine would need an additional $10 million in LIHEAP funds.

Just a few months ago, we passed and the President signed into law the Energy Policy Act of 2005. This law passed the Senate overwhelmingly, and it authorizes $5.1 billion for the LIHEAP program for fiscal year 2006. The chairman of the appropriations subcommittee, Senator Specter, worked very hard to find some funding to increase LIHEAP. He increased it to $2.2 billion. I commend him for his efforts and hard work, but $2.2 billion is not nearly enough.

Our Nation has been struck by three extremely powerful hurricanes. These hurricanes have been devastating to the people of Florida and the gulf coast, but we need to remember that they have had a major impact on the rest of the Nation as well. Just as the Nation should have been building oil supplies for the winter heating season, these hurricanes disrupted our already strained supplies and sent both home heating oil and gasoline prices to painfully high levels.

While high energy prices have been challenges for many Americans, they impose an especially difficult burden on our low-income families and on our elderly living on limited incomes. Low-income families already spend a greater percentage of their incomes on energy, and they have fewer options available when energy prices soar. High energy prices can even cause families to choose between keeping the heat on, putting food on the table, or paying for much-needed prescription medicine. In America today, in a country as prosperous as our country, no family should have to make such a choice. No elderly person should have to choose between buying the fuel oil they need to keep warm to avoid hypothermia and filling a much-needed prescription to stay healthy.

With winter upon us and energy prices soaring, home heating oil bills are already pounding family budgets mercilessly. For low-income families, LIHEAP funds can be the factor that prevents them from having to choose between paying their bills and putting food on the table.

I call on my colleagues to support this motion to instruct the conferees to include this vital assistance as part of the budget reconciliation bill.

I wish to recognize the efforts of my colleague from Rhode Island. We have worked very closely toward this common goal. Those of us who live in the Northeast or the Midwest or cold-weather States have a special appreciation for just how much hardship will be imposed if we do not increase this funding.

I commend the administration for calling for $1 billion in additional funding, but, frankly, that is simply not enough. We need to do more. I hope that just as many of us are responding to the needs of those victims of the hurricanes in the gulf region, that our colleagues from that area of the country and from other areas of the country will join us in averting this looming crisis.

I thank the Chair.

Mr. President, today I am pleased to introduce legislation that would preserve existing seats on the District of Columbia Superior Court. I am pleased to be joined in this effort by Senators Voinovich and Akaka.

The Superior Court is the trail court of general jurisdiction over local matters in the District of Columbia. The associate judges on the court are selected through a two-step review process. When a vacancy on the court occurs, usually because of a retiring judge, the District of Columbia Judicial Nominations Commission solicits applicants to fill the vacancy. The commission narrows the possible number of candidates to three and sends those three names to the President. The President then selects one of those three candidates and sends the nominee to the Senate for confirmation. Existing law caps the total number of judges on the superior court at 59.

Unfortunately, two nominees currently pending in the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and an additional candidate expected to be nominated in the coming months may not be able to be seated on the court even if they are confirmed by the Senate. The three seats that these candidates are intended to fill were left open by retiring judges, so they are not new seats on the court.

The cause of this unusual problem is the District of Columbia Family Court Act, enacted during the 107th Congress. That act created three new seats for the family court, which is a division of the superior court, but failed to increase the overall cap on the number of judges seated on the court. As a result, the Family Court Act effectively eliminated three existing seats in the other divisions of the court, including the criminal and civil divisions.

As a result of this situation, the Committee on Homeland

Security and Governmental Affairs currently has two

nominations pending for the superior court but no seats left

to fill. I also understand that there is yet another

nomination expected in the coming months. Since existing law

sets strict requirements on both the DC Judicial Nominations

Commission as well as the White House on how quickly they

must process potential candidates and make a nomination, it

is unclear whether they have legal grounds to halt their

processes.

This is a highly unusual situation for this body to have nominations pending

before it for which there are no open positions. The bill I introduce today would rectify this problem by amending the District of Columbia Code to increase the cap on the number of associate judges on the superior court. This is not intended to create new seats on the Court; that was already done when the DC Family Court Act was enacted. Instead, this would preserve existing seats on the court and remedy a problem that is affecting not only the court but the Senate as well.

I believe that it is also important to not only remedy the immediate problem before the Senate but also to ensure that all of the divisions of the superior court are fully staffed. This is more than just a procedural issue. It is also important for the citizens of the District of Columbia to know that all of the divisions, including criminal and civil, are operating at full capacity. Eliminating existing seats in the criminal and civil divisions will not improve the administration of justice in the District, but can only result an increased judicial caseload and delays at the courthouse.

The legislation I introduce today is similar to legislation that was favorably reported by the Committee on Governmental Affairs and subsequently passed by the Senate by unanimous consent during the 108th Congress. I hope that my colleagues will join me in supporting this important legislation.

Mr. President, today I am pleased to introduce legislation that would preserve existing seats on the District of Columbia Superior Court. I am pleased to be joined in this effort by Senators Voinovich and Akaka.

The Superior Court is the trail court of general jurisdiction over local matters in the District of Columbia. The associate judges on the court are selected through a two-step review process. When a vacancy on the court occurs, usually because of a retiring judge, the District of Columbia Judicial Nominations Commission solicits applicants to fill the vacancy. The commission narrows the possible number of candidates to three and sends those three names to the President. The President then selects one of those three candidates and sends the nominee to the Senate for confirmation. Existing law caps the total number of judges on the superior court at 59.

Unfortunately, two nominees currently pending in the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and an additional candidate expected to be nominated in the coming months may not be able to be seated on the court even if they are confirmed by the Senate. The three seats that these candidates are intended to fill were left open by retiring judges, so they are not new seats on the court.

The cause of this unusual problem is the District of Columbia Family Court Act, enacted during the 107th Congress. That act created three new seats for the family court, which is a division of the superior court, but failed to increase the overall cap on the number of judges seated on the court. As a result, the Family Court Act effectively eliminated three existing seats in the other divisions of the court, including the criminal and civil divisions.

As a result of this situation, the Committee on Homeland

Security and Governmental Affairs currently has two

nominations pending for the superior court but no seats left

to fill. I also understand that there is yet another

nomination expected in the coming months. Since existing law

sets strict requirements on both the DC Judicial Nominations

Commission as well as the White House on how quickly they

must process potential candidates and make a nomination, it

is unclear whether they have legal grounds to halt their

processes.

This is a highly unusual situation for this body to have nominations pending

before it for which there are no open positions. The bill I introduce today would rectify this problem by amending the District of Columbia Code to increase the cap on the number of associate judges on the superior court. This is not intended to create new seats on the Court; that was already done when the DC Family Court Act was enacted. Instead, this would preserve existing seats on the court and remedy a problem that is affecting not only the court but the Senate as well.

I believe that it is also important to not only remedy the immediate problem before the Senate but also to ensure that all of the divisions of the superior court are fully staffed. This is more than just a procedural issue. It is also important for the citizens of the District of Columbia to know that all of the divisions, including criminal and civil, are operating at full capacity. Eliminating existing seats in the criminal and civil divisions will not improve the administration of justice in the District, but can only result an increased judicial caseload and delays at the courthouse.

The legislation I introduce today is similar to legislation that was favorably reported by the Committee on Governmental Affairs and subsequently passed by the Senate by unanimous consent during the 108th Congress. I hope that my colleagues will join me in supporting this important legislation.

Mr. President, this amendment would express the sense of the Senate that any increases in revenues to the Treasury as a result of this act, above the amounts specified in the reconciliation instructions, shall be dedicated to the Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program, also known as LIHEAP, up to the fully authorized amount.

Just a few months ago, the President signed into law the Energy Policy Act of 2005. This law, which passed the Senate overwhelmingly, authorizes $5.1 billion for the LIHEAP program for Fiscal Year 2006. Unfortunately, even though Chairman Specter worked very hard to increase funding in the Labor-HHS bill, that bill only provides $2.2 billion in LIHEAP funding but $2.2 billion is not nearly enough. The amendment I am offering today expresses the sense of the Senate that up to an additional $2.9 billion in excess revenues should be made available to the LIHEAP program.

Our Nation was struck by three extremely powerful hurricanes. While

these hurricanes were devastating to the people of Florida and the gulf coast, they have also had a major impact on the rest of the Nation. Just as the Nation should be building oil supplies for the winter heating season, these hurricanes have disrupted our already strained supplies and sent both heating oil and gasoline prices to painfully high levels.

While high energy prices have been challenging for almost all Americans, they impose an especially difficult burden on low-income families and on the elderly living on limited incomes. Low-income families spend a greater percentage of their incomes on energy and have fewer options available when energy prices soar. High energy prices can even cause families to choose between keeping the heat on, putting food on the table, or paying for much-needed prescription medicine. These are choices that no American family should ever have to make.

We need more LIHEAP funding this year. Let me describe the situation that we are facing in my home state. While the official start of winter is still 2 months away, temperatures have already fallen below freezing in much of Maine. In Maine, 78 percent of households use home heating oil to heat their homes. Currently, the cost of home heating oil is roughly $2.34 per gallon, $0.38 above last year's already inflated prices. These high prices greatly increase the need for assistance, and at least 3,000 additional Mainers are expected to apply for LIHEAP funding this year. With more people in need of assistance, the benefit is expected to fall by roughly 10 percent to $440 per qualifying household. Unfortunately, at today's high prices, $440 is only enough to purchase 188 gallons of oil--far below last year's equivalent benefit of 251 gallons and not nearly enough to get through even a small portion of a Maine winter. With rising prices and falling benefits, we have a problem. Just to purchase the same amount of oil this year as last year, Maine would need an additional $10 million in LIHEAP funds.

The bill before us is still a work in progress, and at this point it is impossible to know whether the final bill that we pass shall provide any increases in revenues to the Treasury beyond the amounts specified in the reconciliation instructions. I would note that Senator Wyden offered an amendment in committee that eliminates an unnecessary tax subsidy for major oil and gas companies. This subsidy is worth hundreds of millions of dollars. I believe we should eliminate even more unnecessary subsidies for oil gas companies. Regardless, I believe that should this act result in any increase in revenues to the Treasury beyond the reconciliation instructions, those revenues should go to the LIHEAP program, up to the fully authorized amount.

With winter fast approaching and energy prices soaring, home heating bills are set to pound family budgets mercilessly. For low income families, LIHEAP funds can be the factor that prevents families from having to choose between turning off the heat or putting food on the table. I call on my colleagues to support this amendment expressing the sense of the Senate that we should fully fund the LIHEAP program.

Mr. President, competitive sourcing is the process by which the Federal Government conducts a competition to compare the cost of obtaining a needed commercial service from a private sector contractor rather than from Federal employees. Properly conducted, competitive sourcing can be an effective tool to achieve cost savings. Poorly utilized, however, it can increase costs and hurt the morale of the Federal workforce.

The current guidelines under which agencies conduct these competitions are contained in the Office of Management and Budget's Circular A-76. To ensure that we maximize the benefit and minimize the cost of competitive sourcing, A-76 competitions must be conducted in a carefully crafted manner. The rules under which they take place must be fair, objective, transparent, and efficient. In one particular regard, I believe the current rules fail to meet these criteria.

Specifically, they do not allow Federal employees to protest the agency's decisions in an A-76 competition beyond the agency's own internal review processes to the General Accountability Office. Congress has vested in the GAO the jurisdiction to hear and render opinions in protests of agency acquisition decisions generally. Private sector contractors, in contrast to Federal employees, have standing to protest agency procurement decisions, including those in A-76 competitions, before GAO.

The current situation does not arise from any conscious policy decision of Congress, GAO, or OMB. Rather, it occurs because the Federal statute that confers protest jurisdiction upon GAO, the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 or ``CICA'' was not drafted to address the unique nature of A-76 competitions, in particular, the role of Federal employees in the ``Most Efficient Organization'' or ``MEO,'' which is the in-house side of these competitions. This was not deliberate--this particular circumstance for protest was simply not contemplated by Congress when drafting CICA.

Recent revisions to A-76 created the potential for GAO to review past decisions by Federal courts and revisit its own opinions to see whether the revisions would merit a determination that Federal employees had gained standing to protest adverse A-76 competition decisions. However, a GAO protest decision indicates that GAO has concluded

it lacks the authority under CICA to hear protests from Federal employees in the MEO in these competitions. As a result, corrective legislation became necessary in our view.

The Collins-Akaka amendment addresses a very important inequity in our current procurement system. The amendment would ensure that Federal employees have standing to protest to GAO similar to what the private sector enjoys. The amendment would extend GAO protest rights on behalf of the MEO in A-76 competitions to two individuals. The first is the Agency Tender Official or ``ATO.'' The ATO is the agency official who is responsible for developing and representing the Federal employees' MEO. The second is a representative chosen directly by the Federal employees in the MEO for the purposes of filing a protest with GAO where the ATO does not, in the view of a majority of the MEO, fulfill his or her duties in regards to a GAO protest. Our intent is to bolster the A-76 process by providing a mechanism for Federal employees to seek redress from GAO, an entity that is well known for its fair, effective and expert handling of acquisition protests.

Study of Nuclear Power

Mr. President, I am pleased to join my colleague, Senator Murray, in introducing today the GreenLane Maritime Cargo Security

Act. It has been a great pleasure to work with my colleague on this important issue. Senator Murray has been an early leader in the call for greater port security. I am pleased we were able to join our efforts in a bipartisan bill to provide long overdue improvements in maritime security.

Our comprehensive legislation would help build a coordinated approach to maritime and port security across all levels of government and with our overseas trading partners. It would improve our Nation's security as it expedites trade with those governments and businesses that join us in this goal. It would encourage innovation, and it would provide financial assistance to our ports as they strive to strengthen their terrorism prevention and response efforts.

This legislation would provide the structure and resources needed to better protect the American people from attack through these vital yet extremely vulnerable points of entry and centers of economic activity.

Coming from a State with three international cargo ports, including the largest port by tonnage in New England, I am keenly aware of the importance of our seaports to our national economy and to the communities in which they are located. In addition to our ports' obvious economic significance, the link between maritime security and our national security has been underscored time and again by terrorism experts, including the 9/11 Commission. It is easy to see why, if you look at the statistics.

In 2003, more than 6,000 ships made nearly 57,000 calls on American ports. They carried the bulk of approximately 800 million tons of goods that came into our country, including more than 9 million containers. We know that al-Qaida has the stated goal of causing maximum harm to the American people and maximum disruption to our economy. Therefore, when you look at what could achieve those goals, you are instantly drawn to our cargo ports.

We already have a glimpse of the staggering damage a terrorist attack on a cargo port could produce. In the fall of 2002, the west coast dock strike cost our economy an estimated $1 billion a day for each of the 10 days that the work stoppage lasted. It not only brought those western coast ports to a halt but also harmed businesses throughout the country. That astonishing amount of harm, $10 billion worth, was the result of an event that was both peaceful and anticipated. Think of what the impact of a terrorist attack would be.

More recently, Hurricane Katrina brought the port of New Orleans and several other gulf coast ports to a standstill. Fortunately, much of this cargo was able to be diverted to other ports undamaged by the storm. In the aftermath of a terrorist attack, however, it is likely that an attack on one port would result in the closure, at least temporarily, of all ports. All of us remember in the wake of 9/11 that commercial aircraft were grounded across this country for a number of days. It is logical to assume that all of the ports would be closed in this country if there were a terrorist attack on one port.

In addition to the threat of a direct attack on one of our ports, any one of the more than 9 million containers that enter the United States each year has the potential to be the Trojan horse of the 21st century. When we look at these huge cargo ships unloading thousands of containers every day, we think: Oh, that contains consumer goods, maybe television sets or toys or clothing or sneakers. Fortunately, in the vast majority of cases, that is exactly what is in those containers. But a container could include terrorists themselves, biological or chemical agents, or even a small nuclear weapon.

For years, criminals have used cargo containers to smuggle narcotics, firearms, and people into the United States. These containers may come from anyone of 1,000 ports overseas, ports that have varying degrees and levels of security. They could also be intercepted or tampered with along the way.

Earlier year this year, I toured the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach. The sheer size of these facilities and the activities that are going on every day are startling. So, too, are the risks and the vulnerabilities that they offer for terrorists to exploit. By coincidence, my visit came days before 32 Chinese nationals were smuggled into the port of Los Angeles in two cargo containers. Fortunately, that Trojan horse held people who were simply seeking a better way of life, albeit illegally, and they were not terrorists seeking to destroy our way of life. They were caught. But what is particularly disturbing to me, and speaks to the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the current system, is they weren't caught through any security measure. It wasn't the container security initiative or the C-TPAT Program or any other new initiative that resulted in these 32 Chinese nationals being caught. Instead it was an alert crane operator who happened to see them crawling out of the containers.

We cannot continue to rely on luck or even alert crane operators to provide for the security of our seaports, our Nation, and our people.

In August, the President issued the National Security Strategy for Maritime Security. It warns of the probability of a hostile state using a weapon of mass destruction sometime in the next decade, and it identifies the maritime sector as most likely to be used to bring a weapon of mass destruction into the United States. In addition, the use of ``just in time'' inventories, which are now used by most industries, means that a disruption of our ports would have catastrophic repercussions for our entire economy.

A fundamental goal of port security is to head off trouble before it reaches our shores. Current supply-chain security programs within the Federal Government, however, were separately conceived and managed by different agencies, rather than woven together into a layered, consistent approach. The result of that, the Government Accountability Office tells us, is that only 17.5 percent of high-risk cargo identified by our own Customs agents was inspected overseas. I am talking about cargo that has been identified as high risk, and yet we are inspecting less than 20 percent of high-risk cargo. We found that the current programs lack standards, lack staffing, and lack the validation of security measures that are necessary for their success.

We cannot remove the risk of a terrorist attack, but the better security measures outlined by the Murray-Collins bill can build a stronger shield against terrorism without hampering trade.

This legislation provides the tools to construct a more effective security system. It was developed in close consultation with key stakeholders including port authorities, major retailers and importers, carriers, supply chain managers, security and transportation experts, and Federal and State agencies.

First, it addresses the problem of uncoordinated supply-chain security efforts by directing the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a strategic plan to strengthen international security for all modes of transportation by which containers arrive in, depart from or move through seaports of the United States. This plan will clarify the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of government agencies at all levels and of private sector stakeholders. It will establish clear, measurable goals for furthering the security of commercial operations from point of origin to point of destination. It will outline mandatory, baseline security measures and standards and provide incentives for additional voluntary measures.

The new Office of Cargo Security Policy, established in our legislation, would ensure implementation of the strategic plan. This important office will report to the Department's Assistant Secretary for Policy in order to better coordinate maritime security efforts within the Department of Homeland Security and among our international and private-sector partners.

This legislation also gives the Secretary 6 months to establish minimum standards and procedures for securing containers in transit to the U.S., based on the Department's experience with current cargo security programs. All containers bound for U.S. ports of entry must meet those standards no later than 2 years after they are established. Currently, DHS has been too slow to implement certain vital security measures. For example, the Department has been working on a regulation setting a minimum standard for mechanical seals on containers for

more than 2 years. Such delays are unacceptable. This legislation would set clear timelines to ensure steady progress.

The Department has also pledged to deploy radiation detection equipment at all ports of entry in the U.S. to examine 100 percent of cargo. The zero tolerance policy for radiation has been discussed since 2002, though less than a quarter of the detection equipment deemed necessary for domestic coverage had been deployed as of last month. Even more frustrating is that the Department has changed the target for system deployment multiple times. The Department's new Domestic Nuclear Detection Office is beginning to take hold of this critical issue, yet the need for a comprehensive plan for the deployment of radiation detection equipment is evident. Our legislation requires this plan be developed and that 100 percent incoming containers to the U.S. be examined for radiation no later than 1 year after enactment.

I want to thank Senator Coleman for his efforts in this area. These provisions address concerns that have been identified through our joint investigative work on programs protecting our nation against weapons of mass destruction.

For the first time, this legislation would authorize the Container Security Initiative. Ongoing, predictable funding--$175 million a year for the five years beginning in 2007--is essential for this crucial program to succeed. In addition to providing funding, the bill lays out requirements for CSI ports and a process for designating new ports under CSI. The Secretary must undertake a full assessment of the potential risk of smuggling or cargo tampering related to terrorism, before designating a port under CSI. This authorization also will enable our CSI partners to strengthen anti-terrorism measures and to improve training of personnel.

We would authorize C-TPAT at $75 million per year for that same 5- year period, and we clearly outline the certification and validation requirements and the benefits associated with meeting those requirements. Our legislation directs the Secretary to correct the deficiencies of the program, and, within one year, to issue guidelines that will be used to certify a participant's security measures and supply chain practices.

In addition, we would create a new, third tier of C-TPAT, called the GreenLane, which offers additional benefits to C-TPAT participants that meet the highest level of security standards. Cargo in transit to the U.S. through the GreenLane would be more secure through the use of container security devices and stronger supply chain security practices in all areas, such as physical, procedural and personnel security. The legislation directs the Secretary to develop benefits that may include further reduced inspections, priority processing for inspections, and, most significantly, preference in entering U.S. ports in the aftermath of a terrorist attack. Senator Murray, who developed this concept, will describe GreenLane in greater detail.

The bill also places a greater emphasis on communications among government and industry players in responding to an incident and settles the critical question of ``who's in charge.''

Technology plays an important role in maritime and cargo security. The Department of Homeland Security has scattered efforts to deploy existing technologies, to enhance those tools and to develop new ones. It is critical that these efforts be undertaken in a more coordinated fashion. In addition, the Government must work closely with and encourage the ingenuity of the private sector in developing the technologies that will improve both security and trade.

Let me close by saying that this legislation recognizes that America's ports, large and small, are our partners in keeping our Nation safe and our economy moving. Our Port Security Grant Program will help our ports make the investments needed to meet the threat of terrorism. The global maritime industry is crucial to our Nation's economy, and our ports are undoubtedly on the front lines of the war against terrorism. This legislation would set clear goals for improving the security of this vital sector, and it would provide the resources to meet and achieve those goals.

I again thank my colleague, Senator Murray, for her hard work and initiative on this legislation. We are pleased to be joined as original cosponsors by Senators Norm Coleman and Joe Lieberman. That is indicative of the kind of bipartisan support this legislation enjoys, and it is my hope that many more of our colleagues will join us in bringing this legislation to enactment early next year. Our container trading system was designed for a world before September 11.

Now, here we are, 4 years later, and we still have not made our maritime cargo system as secure as it needs to be. Six months after the September 11 attacks, I held a hearing to exam the vulnerability of cargo security. Many of the concerns that were raised at that hearing are still dogging us today.

One of the challenges we face is how we can make trade more secure without slowing it to a crawl. If we have absolute security, we will curtail trade. If we have completely open trade, we will not have enough security.

For the past few years, I have been meeting with leaders in Government and industry to figure out how we can strike the right balance. One thing I know for sure is, it is better for us to work together now to design a security system on our own terms than to wait for an attack and force a security system in a crisis atmosphere.

I have spent several years exploring this challenge and meeting with stakeholders to get their ideas. Senator Collins, as chair of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, has held hearings on this issue and has introduced legislation.

As a result of our work, Senator Collins and I have developed the GreenLane Maritime Cargo Security Act. It provides, for the first time, a comprehensive blueprint for how we can improve security while keeping trade efficient. At its heart, this challenge is about keeping the good things about trade--speed and efficiency--without being vulnerable to the bad things about trade--the potential for terrorists to use our engines of commerce.

There is an incident that occurred a few years ago that shows just how serious a threat we are facing. Four years ago, in Italy, dockworkers noticed something strange about one of the cargo containers. They opened it up and found an Egyptian man inside. But this was not your average stowaway. This man was a suspected al-Qaida terrorist, and he had all of the tools of the trade with him. His cargo container had been outfitted for a long voyage with a bed, a heater, and water. He had a satellite phone and a laptop computer. He also had security passes and mechanic certificates for four U.S. airports.

Now, that happened in 2001. It can still happen today. But don't take my word for it. The Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection said:

[T]he container is the potential Trojan Horse of the 21st

century.

The 9/11 Commission said terrorists may turn from targeting aviation to targeting seaports because ``opportunities to do harm are as great, or greater, in maritime or surface transportation.''

As we all know, our Government has uncovered al-Qaida training manuals, and some of these books suggest that terrorists try to recruit workers at borders, airports, and seaports.

There are two main scenarios we need to think about.

First, a group like al-Qaida could use cargo containers to smuggle weapons and personnel into the United States. They could split up a weapon and ship it to the U.S. in separate containers. And those pieces could be reassembled anywhere in the United States. So the first danger is that terrorists could use these cargo containers to get dangerous weapons into the United States.

Secondly, terrorists could use a cargo container as a weapon itself. A terrorist could place a nuclear, chemical, or biological weapon inside a container and then detonate it once it reaches a U.S. port or another destination inside the United States.

This week, the 9/11 Commission said we have not done enough to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. One study said if a nuclear device was detonated at a major seaport, it could kill up to a million people.

Now, many of our ports are located near major cities. Others are located near key transportation hubs. For example, if a chemical weapon were detonated in Seattle, the chemical plume could contaminate the rail system, Interstate 5, and SeaTac Airport, not to mention the entire downtown business and residential areas.

Terrorists could also detonate a dirty bomb or launch a bioterror attack. Any of those scenarios would impose a devastating cost in human lives, but that is not all.

We also know that al-Qaida wants to cripple our economy. Cargo containers could offer them a powerful way to do just that, and the damage goes beyond lives. An attack launched through our ports would also have a devastating economic impact. That is because after an attack the Federal Government is likely to shut down our ports to make sure that additional hazards weren't being brought into the country-- similar to what we did with airplanes after 9/11.

When we stopped air travel then, it took us a couple of days to get back up to speed. And as we all remember, it cost our economy a great deal. But if you stopped cargo containers without a resumption system in place, it could take as long as 4 months to get them inspected and moving again. That would cripple our economy, and it could even spark a global recession.

Today, our cargo containers are part of the assembly line of American business. We have just-in-time delivery and rolling warehouses. If you shut down the flow of cargo, you are shutting down the economy. If our ports were locked down, we would feel the impact at every level of our economy.

Factories would not be able to get the raw materials they need. Many keep small inventories on hand. Once those inventories run out, factories would be shut down and workers laid off. We would also see the impact in stores. Merchants would not be able to get their products from overseas. Store shelves would go bear, and workers, again, would be laid off.

One study, in fact, concluded that if U.S. ports were shut down for 12 days, it could cost our economy $58 billion. In 2002, we saw what closing down a few ports on the west coast would do. When west coast dockworkers were locked out, it cost our economy about $1 billion a day. Imagine if we shut down all our ports, not just those on the west coast.

Dr. Stephen Flynn, who is a national security expert, has said that a 3-week shutdown could spawn a global recession. It is clear that we are vulnerable and that an attack could do tremendous damage.

If our ports were shut down today, we do not have a system in place for getting them started again. There is no protocol for what would be searched, what would be allowed in, and even who would be in charge.

Now, I want to acknowledge that we have made some progress since 9/ 11. We have provided some funding to make our ports more secure. I have fought for port security grants to make sure we are controlling access to our ports, and our local ports are on the cutting edge of security. We have implemented the 24-hour rule so we know what is supposed to be in a container before it reaches the United States. We are adding some more detection equipment to American ports, but, remember, once a nuclear device is sitting on a U.S. dock, it is too late. Customs created a program that works with foreign ports to speed some cargo into the United States. It is a good idea, but to date it has not been implemented well.

In May, the Government Accountability Office issued a very troubling report. It found that if companies applied for C-TPAT status, we gave them less scrutiny simply for submitting paperwork. We never checked to see if they actually did what they said they were going to do. We just inspected them less. One expert called that approach ``trust, but don't verify.''

Even when U.S. Customs inspectors do find something suspicious at a foreign port, they cannot force a container to be inspected today. They can ask the local government, but those requests are frequently rejected.

So because we cannot enforce those agreements through our State Department, our Customs officials do not have the power they need, and potentially dangerous cargo can arrive at U.S. ports without being inspected overseas.

I am deeply concerned about this issue because I know that maritime cargo, especially container cargo, is a critical part of our economy. My interest in trade goes back to my childhood. My dad ran a small dime store. He relied on imports to stock the shelves in his store. International trade put food on our table, and I have never forgotten that. So I want to make sure we close the loopholes that threaten our ability to trade, while we protect our lives and our economy.

I have worked on this challenge for several years. I have held hearings. I wrote and funded Operation Safe Commerce. And I have been meeting with various stakeholders.

I know this proposal has to work for everyone in the supply chain: importers, freight forwarders, shippers, terminal operators, and workers such as longshoremen, truckdrivers, and port employees--all the people who are on the frontlines as our eyes and our ears. They need to be part of the solution because they would be among the first to be hurt if an incident occurred.

Senator Collins and I have worked together to get input from stakeholders, and with that we have crafted a bill that I believe strikes the right balance. Our proposal is built around five commonsense ideas.

It has been over 4 years since the tragedy of September 11, and some of our most vulnerable assets--our ports and our maritime cargo system--still do not have a coordinated security regime. So the GreenLane Act will take that first step and ensure minimum security standards are in place for all container cargo entering our ports.

Secondly, because there are so many cargo containers coming into our country, we need to make that haystack smaller. We need to do a better job in front-loading our inspections overseas before the cargo ever gets loaded on a ship that is headed for the United States. Then, instead of focusing on a small percent of all containers, we can separate the most secure containers from the ones that need more security.

Third, we need to give businesses incentives to adopt better security. Companies are going to do what is in their financial interest, and we can use market incentives to make the entire industry more secure.

Fourth, we need to minimize the impact of any incident. Right now, if there were a terrorist attack through one of our ports, there would be an awful lot of confusion. So we need to put one office in charge of cargo security policy. We need to create protocols for resuming trade after an incident occurs. And we need to establish joint operations centers to help make local decisions that will get our trade moving again.

We cannot afford to leave cargo on the docks for weeks. We need a plan that tells us in advance what cargo will be unloaded first, and how we will get this system back on its feet.

Finally, we need to monitor and secure cargo from the factory floor overseas until it reaches our own shores. There are vulnerabilities at every step of the supply chain. A secure system is going to start at the factory overseas and continue until that cargo reaches its final destination.

I want to detail how our bill will make the American people safer. First of all, it raises the security standards for everyone across the board and directs the Department of Homeland Security to take all of the best practices and lessons learned and create new standards that will establish a new baseline of security for everyone.

Secondly, it creates the GreenLane. If shippers agree to follow the higher security standards of the GreenLane, they get a series of benefits.

To be designated as GreenLane cargo, importers have to ensure that all entities within their supply chain are validated C-TPAT participants; access to the cargo and containers is restricted to those employees who need access and we are assured of their identification; a logistics system is in place that provides the ability to track everything loaded into a GreenLane container back to the factory; and, a container security device, such as an e-seal, is used to secure the container.

Remember, GreenLane is optional. No one has to participate. I believe companies will want to participate because they will get benefits in return.

What are those benefits? Their bonding requirements could be reduced or

eliminated. Instead of paying customs duties on every shipment, they could be billed monthly or quarterly. Their cargo will be subject to fewer searches and will be released faster upon entering the United States. They will lose less cargo to theft, and they will have the stability that comes from having one uniform standard to plan around.

Finally, the GreenLane Act sets up a plan so that trade can be resumed quickly and safely if an attack occurs. Today, there are no protocols. There is no guide on how to get the system going again. Our bill will create one, and it will let the most secure cargo--the GreenLane cargo--be released first.

Our bill creates joint operations centers to ensure a coordinated, measured response and the resumption and flow of commerce in the event of an incident or heightened national security threat level.

Our bill takes other steps. It expands port security grants. It makes sure we continue to monitor our security system to make sure it is working. It makes sure that a company's cargo data is not available to competitors. It sets a uniform standard for security so shippers and others have some certainty, rather than a hodgepodge of different standards.

There have been a lot of commissions and studies on port security, and we have worked to address their recommendations in our bill.

The 9/11 Commission said we need ``layered'' security, that we need to centralize authority so we can have more accountability, and that Federal agencies need to share information better. Our bill implements all of those recommendations.

The Government Accountability Office looked at current Customs programs and identified some troubling shortcomings.

Mr. President, I am pleased to join my colleague, Senator Murray, in introducing today the GreenLane Maritime Cargo Security

Act. It has been a great pleasure to work with my colleague on this important issue. Senator Murray has been an early leader in the call for greater port security. I am pleased we were able to join our efforts in a bipartisan bill to provide long overdue improvements in maritime security.

Our comprehensive legislation would help build a coordinated approach to maritime and port security across all levels of government and with our overseas trading partners. It would improve our Nation's security as it expedites trade with those governments and businesses that join us in this goal. It would encourage innovation, and it would provide financial assistance to our ports as they strive to strengthen their terrorism prevention and response efforts.

This legislation would provide the structure and resources needed to better protect the American people from attack through these vital yet extremely vulnerable points of entry and centers of economic activity.

Coming from a State with three international cargo ports, including the largest port by tonnage in New England, I am keenly aware of the importance of our seaports to our national economy and to the communities in which they are located. In addition to our ports' obvious economic significance, the link between maritime security and our national security has been underscored time and again by terrorism experts, including the 9/11 Commission. It is easy to see why, if you look at the statistics.

In 2003, more than 6,000 ships made nearly 57,000 calls on American ports. They carried the bulk of approximately 800 million tons of goods that came into our country, including more than 9 million containers. We know that al-Qaida has the stated goal of causing maximum harm to the American people and maximum disruption to our economy. Therefore, when you look at what could achieve those goals, you are instantly drawn to our cargo ports.

We already have a glimpse of the staggering damage a terrorist attack on a cargo port could produce. In the fall of 2002, the west coast dock strike cost our economy an estimated $1 billion a day for each of the 10 days that the work stoppage lasted. It not only brought those western coast ports to a halt but also harmed businesses throughout the country. That astonishing amount of harm, $10 billion worth, was the result of an event that was both peaceful and anticipated. Think of what the impact of a terrorist attack would be.

More recently, Hurricane Katrina brought the port of New Orleans and several other gulf coast ports to a standstill. Fortunately, much of this cargo was able to be diverted to other ports undamaged by the storm. In the aftermath of a terrorist attack, however, it is likely that an attack on one port would result in the closure, at least temporarily, of all ports. All of us remember in the wake of 9/11 that commercial aircraft were grounded across this country for a number of days. It is logical to assume that all of the ports would be closed in this country if there were a terrorist attack on one port.

In addition to the threat of a direct attack on one of our ports, any one of the more than 9 million containers that enter the United States each year has the potential to be the Trojan horse of the 21st century. When we look at these huge cargo ships unloading thousands of containers every day, we think: Oh, that contains consumer goods, maybe television sets or toys or clothing or sneakers. Fortunately, in the vast majority of cases, that is exactly what is in those containers. But a container could include terrorists themselves, biological or chemical agents, or even a small nuclear weapon.

For years, criminals have used cargo containers to smuggle narcotics, firearms, and people into the United States. These containers may come from anyone of 1,000 ports overseas, ports that have varying degrees and levels of security. They could also be intercepted or tampered with along the way.

Earlier year this year, I toured the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach. The sheer size of these facilities and the activities that are going on every day are startling. So, too, are the risks and the vulnerabilities that they offer for terrorists to exploit. By coincidence, my visit came days before 32 Chinese nationals were smuggled into the port of Los Angeles in two cargo containers. Fortunately, that Trojan horse held people who were simply seeking a better way of life, albeit illegally, and they were not terrorists seeking to destroy our way of life. They were caught. But what is particularly disturbing to me, and speaks to the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the current system, is they weren't caught through any security measure. It wasn't the container security initiative or the C-TPAT Program or any other new initiative that resulted in these 32 Chinese nationals being caught. Instead it was an alert crane operator who happened to see them crawling out of the containers.

We cannot continue to rely on luck or even alert crane operators to provide for the security of our seaports, our Nation, and our people.

In August, the President issued the National Security Strategy for Maritime Security. It warns of the probability of a hostile state using a weapon of mass destruction sometime in the next decade, and it identifies the maritime sector as most likely to be used to bring a weapon of mass destruction into the United States. In addition, the use of ``just in time'' inventories, which are now used by most industries, means that a disruption of our ports would have catastrophic repercussions for our entire economy.

A fundamental goal of port security is to head off trouble before it reaches our shores. Current supply-chain security programs within the Federal Government, however, were separately conceived and managed by different agencies, rather than woven together into a layered, consistent approach. The result of that, the Government Accountability Office tells us, is that only 17.5 percent of high-risk cargo identified by our own Customs agents was inspected overseas. I am talking about cargo that has been identified as high risk, and yet we are inspecting less than 20 percent of high-risk cargo. We found that the current programs lack standards, lack staffing, and lack the validation of security measures that are necessary for their success.

We cannot remove the risk of a terrorist attack, but the better security measures outlined by the Murray-Collins bill can build a stronger shield against terrorism without hampering trade.

This legislation provides the tools to construct a more effective security system. It was developed in close consultation with key stakeholders including port authorities, major retailers and importers, carriers, supply chain managers, security and transportation experts, and Federal and State agencies.

First, it addresses the problem of uncoordinated supply-chain security efforts by directing the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a strategic plan to strengthen international security for all modes of transportation by which containers arrive in, depart from or move through seaports of the United States. This plan will clarify the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of government agencies at all levels and of private sector stakeholders. It will establish clear, measurable goals for furthering the security of commercial operations from point of origin to point of destination. It will outline mandatory, baseline security measures and standards and provide incentives for additional voluntary measures.

The new Office of Cargo Security Policy, established in our legislation, would ensure implementation of the strategic plan. This important office will report to the Department's Assistant Secretary for Policy in order to better coordinate maritime security efforts within the Department of Homeland Security and among our international and private-sector partners.

This legislation also gives the Secretary 6 months to establish minimum standards and procedures for securing containers in transit to the U.S., based on the Department's experience with current cargo security programs. All containers bound for U.S. ports of entry must meet those standards no later than 2 years after they are established. Currently, DHS has been too slow to implement certain vital security measures. For example, the Department has been working on a regulation setting a minimum standard for mechanical seals on containers for

more than 2 years. Such delays are unacceptable. This legislation would set clear timelines to ensure steady progress.

The Department has also pledged to deploy radiation detection equipment at all ports of entry in the U.S. to examine 100 percent of cargo. The zero tolerance policy for radiation has been discussed since 2002, though less than a quarter of the detection equipment deemed necessary for domestic coverage had been deployed as of last month. Even more frustrating is that the Department has changed the target for system deployment multiple times. The Department's new Domestic Nuclear Detection Office is beginning to take hold of this critical issue, yet the need for a comprehensive plan for the deployment of radiation detection equipment is evident. Our legislation requires this plan be developed and that 100 percent incoming containers to the U.S. be examined for radiation no later than 1 year after enactment.

I want to thank Senator Coleman for his efforts in this area. These provisions address concerns that have been identified through our joint investigative work on programs protecting our nation against weapons of mass destruction.

For the first time, this legislation would authorize the Container Security Initiative. Ongoing, predictable funding--$175 million a year for the five years beginning in 2007--is essential for this crucial program to succeed. In addition to providing funding, the bill lays out requirements for CSI ports and a process for designating new ports under CSI. The Secretary must undertake a full assessment of the potential risk of smuggling or cargo tampering related to terrorism, before designating a port under CSI. This authorization also will enable our CSI partners to strengthen anti-terrorism measures and to improve training of personnel.

We would authorize C-TPAT at $75 million per year for that same 5- year period, and we clearly outline the certification and validation requirements and the benefits associated with meeting those requirements. Our legislation directs the Secretary to correct the deficiencies of the program, and, within one year, to issue guidelines that will be used to certify a participant's security measures and supply chain practices.

In addition, we would create a new, third tier of C-TPAT, called the GreenLane, which offers additional benefits to C-TPAT participants that meet the highest level of security standards. Cargo in transit to the U.S. through the GreenLane would be more secure through the use of container security devices and stronger supply chain security practices in all areas, such as physical, procedural and personnel security. The legislation directs the Secretary to develop benefits that may include further reduced inspections, priority processing for inspections, and, most significantly, preference in entering U.S. ports in the aftermath of a terrorist attack. Senator Murray, who developed this concept, will describe GreenLane in greater detail.

The bill also places a greater emphasis on communications among government and industry players in responding to an incident and settles the critical question of ``who's in charge.''

Technology plays an important role in maritime and cargo security. The Department of Homeland Security has scattered efforts to deploy existing technologies, to enhance those tools and to develop new ones. It is critical that these efforts be undertaken in a more coordinated fashion. In addition, the Government must work closely with and encourage the ingenuity of the private sector in developing the technologies that will improve both security and trade.

Let me close by saying that this legislation recognizes that America's ports, large and small, are our partners in keeping our Nation safe and our economy moving. Our Port Security Grant Program will help our ports make the investments needed to meet the threat of terrorism. The global maritime industry is crucial to our Nation's economy, and our ports are undoubtedly on the front lines of the war against terrorism. This legislation would set clear goals for improving the security of this vital sector, and it would provide the resources to meet and achieve those goals.

I again thank my colleague, Senator Murray, for her hard work and initiative on this legislation. We are pleased to be joined as original cosponsors by Senators Norm Coleman and Joe Lieberman. That is indicative of the kind of bipartisan support this legislation enjoys, and it is my hope that many more of our colleagues will join us in bringing this legislation to enactment early next year. Our container trading system was designed for a world before September 11.

Now, here we are, 4 years later, and we still have not made our maritime cargo system as secure as it needs to be. Six months after the September 11 attacks, I held a hearing to exam the vulnerability of cargo security. Many of the concerns that were raised at that hearing are still dogging us today.

One of the challenges we face is how we can make trade more secure without slowing it to a crawl. If we have absolute security, we will curtail trade. If we have completely open trade, we will not have enough security.

For the past few years, I have been meeting with leaders in Government and industry to figure out how we can strike the right balance. One thing I know for sure is, it is better for us to work together now to design a security system on our own terms than to wait for an attack and force a security system in a crisis atmosphere.

I have spent several years exploring this challenge and meeting with stakeholders to get their ideas. Senator Collins, as chair of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, has held hearings on this issue and has introduced legislation.

As a result of our work, Senator Collins and I have developed the GreenLane Maritime Cargo Security Act. It provides, for the first time, a comprehensive blueprint for how we can improve security while keeping trade efficient. At its heart, this challenge is about keeping the good things about trade--speed and efficiency--without being vulnerable to the bad things about trade--the potential for terrorists to use our engines of commerce.

There is an incident that occurred a few years ago that shows just how serious a threat we are facing. Four years ago, in Italy, dockworkers noticed something strange about one of the cargo containers. They opened it up and found an Egyptian man inside. But this was not your average stowaway. This man was a suspected al-Qaida terrorist, and he had all of the tools of the trade with him. His cargo container had been outfitted for a long voyage with a bed, a heater, and water. He had a satellite phone and a laptop computer. He also had security passes and mechanic certificates for four U.S. airports.

Now, that happened in 2001. It can still happen today. But don't take my word for it. The Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection said:

[T]he container is the potential Trojan Horse of the 21st

century.

The 9/11 Commission said terrorists may turn from targeting aviation to targeting seaports because ``opportunities to do harm are as great, or greater, in maritime or surface transportation.''

As we all know, our Government has uncovered al-Qaida training manuals, and some of these books suggest that terrorists try to recruit workers at borders, airports, and seaports.

There are two main scenarios we need to think about.

First, a group like al-Qaida could use cargo containers to smuggle weapons and personnel into the United States. They could split up a weapon and ship it to the U.S. in separate containers. And those pieces could be reassembled anywhere in the United States. So the first danger is that terrorists could use these cargo containers to get dangerous weapons into the United States.

Secondly, terrorists could use a cargo container as a weapon itself. A terrorist could place a nuclear, chemical, or biological weapon inside a container and then detonate it once it reaches a U.S. port or another destination inside the United States.

This week, the 9/11 Commission said we have not done enough to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. One study said if a nuclear device was detonated at a major seaport, it could kill up to a million people.

Now, many of our ports are located near major cities. Others are located near key transportation hubs. For example, if a chemical weapon were detonated in Seattle, the chemical plume could contaminate the rail system, Interstate 5, and SeaTac Airport, not to mention the entire downtown business and residential areas.

Terrorists could also detonate a dirty bomb or launch a bioterror attack. Any of those scenarios would impose a devastating cost in human lives, but that is not all.

We also know that al-Qaida wants to cripple our economy. Cargo containers could offer them a powerful way to do just that, and the damage goes beyond lives. An attack launched through our ports would also have a devastating economic impact. That is because after an attack the Federal Government is likely to shut down our ports to make sure that additional hazards weren't being brought into the country-- similar to what we did with airplanes after 9/11.

When we stopped air travel then, it took us a couple of days to get back up to speed. And as we all remember, it cost our economy a great deal. But if you stopped cargo containers without a resumption system in place, it could take as long as 4 months to get them inspected and moving again. That would cripple our economy, and it could even spark a global recession.

Today, our cargo containers are part of the assembly line of American business. We have just-in-time delivery and rolling warehouses. If you shut down the flow of cargo, you are shutting down the economy. If our ports were locked down, we would feel the impact at every level of our economy.

Factories would not be able to get the raw materials they need. Many keep small inventories on hand. Once those inventories run out, factories would be shut down and workers laid off. We would also see the impact in stores. Merchants would not be able to get their products from overseas. Store shelves would go bear, and workers, again, would be laid off.

One study, in fact, concluded that if U.S. ports were shut down for 12 days, it could cost our economy $58 billion. In 2002, we saw what closing down a few ports on the west coast would do. When west coast dockworkers were locked out, it cost our economy about $1 billion a day. Imagine if we shut down all our ports, not just those on the west coast.

Dr. Stephen Flynn, who is a national security expert, has said that a 3-week shutdown could spawn a global recession. It is clear that we are vulnerable and that an attack could do tremendous damage.

If our ports were shut down today, we do not have a system in place for getting them started again. There is no protocol for what would be searched, what would be allowed in, and even who would be in charge.

Now, I want to acknowledge that we have made some progress since 9/ 11. We have provided some funding to make our ports more secure. I have fought for port security grants to make sure we are controlling access to our ports, and our local ports are on the cutting edge of security. We have implemented the 24-hour rule so we know what is supposed to be in a container before it reaches the United States. We are adding some more detection equipment to American ports, but, remember, once a nuclear device is sitting on a U.S. dock, it is too late. Customs created a program that works with foreign ports to speed some cargo into the United States. It is a good idea, but to date it has not been implemented well.

In May, the Government Accountability Office issued a very troubling report. It found that if companies applied for C-TPAT status, we gave them less scrutiny simply for submitting paperwork. We never checked to see if they actually did what they said they were going to do. We just inspected them less. One expert called that approach ``trust, but don't verify.''

Even when U.S. Customs inspectors do find something suspicious at a foreign port, they cannot force a container to be inspected today. They can ask the local government, but those requests are frequently rejected.

So because we cannot enforce those agreements through our State Department, our Customs officials do not have the power they need, and potentially dangerous cargo can arrive at U.S. ports without being inspected overseas.

I am deeply concerned about this issue because I know that maritime cargo, especially container cargo, is a critical part of our economy. My interest in trade goes back to my childhood. My dad ran a small dime store. He relied on imports to stock the shelves in his store. International trade put food on our table, and I have never forgotten that. So I want to make sure we close the loopholes that threaten our ability to trade, while we protect our lives and our economy.

I have worked on this challenge for several years. I have held hearings. I wrote and funded Operation Safe Commerce. And I have been meeting with various stakeholders.

I know this proposal has to work for everyone in the supply chain: importers, freight forwarders, shippers, terminal operators, and workers such as longshoremen, truckdrivers, and port employees--all the people who are on the frontlines as our eyes and our ears. They need to be part of the solution because they would be among the first to be hurt if an incident occurred.

Senator Collins and I have worked together to get input from stakeholders, and with that we have crafted a bill that I believe strikes the right balance. Our proposal is built around five commonsense ideas.

It has been over 4 years since the tragedy of September 11, and some of our most vulnerable assets--our ports and our maritime cargo system--still do not have a coordinated security regime. So the GreenLane Act will take that first step and ensure minimum security standards are in place for all container cargo entering our ports.

Secondly, because there are so many cargo containers coming into our country, we need to make that haystack smaller. We need to do a better job in front-loading our inspections overseas before the cargo ever gets loaded on a ship that is headed for the United States. Then, instead of focusing on a small percent of all containers, we can separate the most secure containers from the ones that need more security.

Third, we need to give businesses incentives to adopt better security. Companies are going to do what is in their financial interest, and we can use market incentives to make the entire industry more secure.

Fourth, we need to minimize the impact of any incident. Right now, if there were a terrorist attack through one of our ports, there would be an awful lot of confusion. So we need to put one office in charge of cargo security policy. We need to create protocols for resuming trade after an incident occurs. And we need to establish joint operations centers to help make local decisions that will get our trade moving again.

We cannot afford to leave cargo on the docks for weeks. We need a plan that tells us in advance what cargo will be unloaded first, and how we will get this system back on its feet.

Finally, we need to monitor and secure cargo from the factory floor overseas until it reaches our own shores. There are vulnerabilities at every step of the supply chain. A secure system is going to start at the factory overseas and continue until that cargo reaches its final destination.

I want to detail how our bill will make the American people safer. First of all, it raises the security standards for everyone across the board and directs the Department of Homeland Security to take all of the best practices and lessons learned and create new standards that will establish a new baseline of security for everyone.

Secondly, it creates the GreenLane. If shippers agree to follow the higher security standards of the GreenLane, they get a series of benefits.

To be designated as GreenLane cargo, importers have to ensure that all entities within their supply chain are validated C-TPAT participants; access to the cargo and containers is restricted to those employees who need access and we are assured of their identification; a logistics system is in place that provides the ability to track everything loaded into a GreenLane container back to the factory; and, a container security device, such as an e-seal, is used to secure the container.

Remember, GreenLane is optional. No one has to participate. I believe companies will want to participate because they will get benefits in return.

What are those benefits? Their bonding requirements could be reduced or

eliminated. Instead of paying customs duties on every shipment, they could be billed monthly or quarterly. Their cargo will be subject to fewer searches and will be released faster upon entering the United States. They will lose less cargo to theft, and they will have the stability that comes from having one uniform standard to plan around.

Finally, the GreenLane Act sets up a plan so that trade can be resumed quickly and safely if an attack occurs. Today, there are no protocols. There is no guide on how to get the system going again. Our bill will create one, and it will let the most secure cargo--the GreenLane cargo--be released first.

Our bill creates joint operations centers to ensure a coordinated, measured response and the resumption and flow of commerce in the event of an incident or heightened national security threat level.

Our bill takes other steps. It expands port security grants. It makes sure we continue to monitor our security system to make sure it is working. It makes sure that a company's cargo data is not available to competitors. It sets a uniform standard for security so shippers and others have some certainty, rather than a hodgepodge of different standards.

There have been a lot of commissions and studies on port security, and we have worked to address their recommendations in our bill.

The 9/11 Commission said we need ``layered'' security, that we need to centralize authority so we can have more accountability, and that Federal agencies need to share information better. Our bill implements all of those recommendations.

The Government Accountability Office looked at current Customs programs and identified some troubling shortcomings.