GreenLane Maritime Cargo Security Act

Mr. President, I am pleased to join my colleague, Senator Murray, in introducing today the GreenLane Maritime Cargo Security

Act. It has been a great pleasure to work with my colleague on this important issue. Senator Murray has been an early leader in the call for greater port security. I am pleased we were able to join our efforts in a bipartisan bill to provide long overdue improvements in maritime security.

Our comprehensive legislation would help build a coordinated approach to maritime and port security across all levels of government and with our overseas trading partners. It would improve our Nation's security as it expedites trade with those governments and businesses that join us in this goal. It would encourage innovation, and it would provide financial assistance to our ports as they strive to strengthen their terrorism prevention and response efforts.

This legislation would provide the structure and resources needed to better protect the American people from attack through these vital yet extremely vulnerable points of entry and centers of economic activity.

Coming from a State with three international cargo ports, including the largest port by tonnage in New England, I am keenly aware of the importance of our seaports to our national economy and to the communities in which they are located. In addition to our ports' obvious economic significance, the link between maritime security and our national security has been underscored time and again by terrorism experts, including the 9/11 Commission. It is easy to see why, if you look at the statistics.

In 2003, more than 6,000 ships made nearly 57,000 calls on American ports. They carried the bulk of approximately 800 million tons of goods that came into our country, including more than 9 million containers. We know that al-Qaida has the stated goal of causing maximum harm to the American people and maximum disruption to our economy. Therefore, when you look at what could achieve those goals, you are instantly drawn to our cargo ports.

We already have a glimpse of the staggering damage a terrorist attack on a cargo port could produce. In the fall of 2002, the west coast dock strike cost our economy an estimated $1 billion a day for each of the 10 days that the work stoppage lasted. It not only brought those western coast ports to a halt but also harmed businesses throughout the country. That astonishing amount of harm, $10 billion worth, was the result of an event that was both peaceful and anticipated. Think of what the impact of a terrorist attack would be.

More recently, Hurricane Katrina brought the port of New Orleans and several other gulf coast ports to a standstill. Fortunately, much of this cargo was able to be diverted to other ports undamaged by the storm. In the aftermath of a terrorist attack, however, it is likely that an attack on one port would result in the closure, at least temporarily, of all ports. All of us remember in the wake of 9/11 that commercial aircraft were grounded across this country for a number of days. It is logical to assume that all of the ports would be closed in this country if there were a terrorist attack on one port.

In addition to the threat of a direct attack on one of our ports, any one of the more than 9 million containers that enter the United States each year has the potential to be the Trojan horse of the 21st century. When we look at these huge cargo ships unloading thousands of containers every day, we think: Oh, that contains consumer goods, maybe television sets or toys or clothing or sneakers. Fortunately, in the vast majority of cases, that is exactly what is in those containers. But a container could include terrorists themselves, biological or chemical agents, or even a small nuclear weapon.

For years, criminals have used cargo containers to smuggle narcotics, firearms, and people into the United States. These containers may come from anyone of 1,000 ports overseas, ports that have varying degrees and levels of security. They could also be intercepted or tampered with along the way.

Earlier year this year, I toured the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach. The sheer size of these facilities and the activities that are going on every day are startling. So, too, are the risks and the vulnerabilities that they offer for terrorists to exploit. By coincidence, my visit came days before 32 Chinese nationals were smuggled into the port of Los Angeles in two cargo containers. Fortunately, that Trojan horse held people who were simply seeking a better way of life, albeit illegally, and they were not terrorists seeking to destroy our way of life. They were caught. But what is particularly disturbing to me, and speaks to the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the current system, is they weren't caught through any security measure. It wasn't the container security initiative or the C-TPAT Program or any other new initiative that resulted in these 32 Chinese nationals being caught. Instead it was an alert crane operator who happened to see them crawling out of the containers.

We cannot continue to rely on luck or even alert crane operators to provide for the security of our seaports, our Nation, and our people.

In August, the President issued the National Security Strategy for Maritime Security. It warns of the probability of a hostile state using a weapon of mass destruction sometime in the next decade, and it identifies the maritime sector as most likely to be used to bring a weapon of mass destruction into the United States. In addition, the use of ``just in time'' inventories, which are now used by most industries, means that a disruption of our ports would have catastrophic repercussions for our entire economy.

A fundamental goal of port security is to head off trouble before it reaches our shores. Current supply-chain security programs within the Federal Government, however, were separately conceived and managed by different agencies, rather than woven together into a layered, consistent approach. The result of that, the Government Accountability Office tells us, is that only 17.5 percent of high-risk cargo identified by our own Customs agents was inspected overseas. I am talking about cargo that has been identified as high risk, and yet we are inspecting less than 20 percent of high-risk cargo. We found that the current programs lack standards, lack staffing, and lack the validation of security measures that are necessary for their success.

We cannot remove the risk of a terrorist attack, but the better security measures outlined by the Murray-Collins bill can build a stronger shield against terrorism without hampering trade.

This legislation provides the tools to construct a more effective security system. It was developed in close consultation with key stakeholders including port authorities, major retailers and importers, carriers, supply chain managers, security and transportation experts, and Federal and State agencies.

First, it addresses the problem of uncoordinated supply-chain security efforts by directing the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a strategic plan to strengthen international security for all modes of transportation by which containers arrive in, depart from or move through seaports of the United States. This plan will clarify the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of government agencies at all levels and of private sector stakeholders. It will establish clear, measurable goals for furthering the security of commercial operations from point of origin to point of destination. It will outline mandatory, baseline security measures and standards and provide incentives for additional voluntary measures.

The new Office of Cargo Security Policy, established in our legislation, would ensure implementation of the strategic plan. This important office will report to the Department's Assistant Secretary for Policy in order to better coordinate maritime security efforts within the Department of Homeland Security and among our international and private-sector partners.

This legislation also gives the Secretary 6 months to establish minimum standards and procedures for securing containers in transit to the U.S., based on the Department's experience with current cargo security programs. All containers bound for U.S. ports of entry must meet those standards no later than 2 years after they are established. Currently, DHS has been too slow to implement certain vital security measures. For example, the Department has been working on a regulation setting a minimum standard for mechanical seals on containers for

more than 2 years. Such delays are unacceptable. This legislation would set clear timelines to ensure steady progress.

The Department has also pledged to deploy radiation detection equipment at all ports of entry in the U.S. to examine 100 percent of cargo. The zero tolerance policy for radiation has been discussed since 2002, though less than a quarter of the detection equipment deemed necessary for domestic coverage had been deployed as of last month. Even more frustrating is that the Department has changed the target for system deployment multiple times. The Department's new Domestic Nuclear Detection Office is beginning to take hold of this critical issue, yet the need for a comprehensive plan for the deployment of radiation detection equipment is evident. Our legislation requires this plan be developed and that 100 percent incoming containers to the U.S. be examined for radiation no later than 1 year after enactment.

I want to thank Senator Coleman for his efforts in this area. These provisions address concerns that have been identified through our joint investigative work on programs protecting our nation against weapons of mass destruction.

For the first time, this legislation would authorize the Container Security Initiative. Ongoing, predictable funding--$175 million a year for the five years beginning in 2007--is essential for this crucial program to succeed. In addition to providing funding, the bill lays out requirements for CSI ports and a process for designating new ports under CSI. The Secretary must undertake a full assessment of the potential risk of smuggling or cargo tampering related to terrorism, before designating a port under CSI. This authorization also will enable our CSI partners to strengthen anti-terrorism measures and to improve training of personnel.

We would authorize C-TPAT at $75 million per year for that same 5- year period, and we clearly outline the certification and validation requirements and the benefits associated with meeting those requirements. Our legislation directs the Secretary to correct the deficiencies of the program, and, within one year, to issue guidelines that will be used to certify a participant's security measures and supply chain practices.

In addition, we would create a new, third tier of C-TPAT, called the GreenLane, which offers additional benefits to C-TPAT participants that meet the highest level of security standards. Cargo in transit to the U.S. through the GreenLane would be more secure through the use of container security devices and stronger supply chain security practices in all areas, such as physical, procedural and personnel security. The legislation directs the Secretary to develop benefits that may include further reduced inspections, priority processing for inspections, and, most significantly, preference in entering U.S. ports in the aftermath of a terrorist attack. Senator Murray, who developed this concept, will describe GreenLane in greater detail.

The bill also places a greater emphasis on communications among government and industry players in responding to an incident and settles the critical question of ``who's in charge.''

Technology plays an important role in maritime and cargo security. The Department of Homeland Security has scattered efforts to deploy existing technologies, to enhance those tools and to develop new ones. It is critical that these efforts be undertaken in a more coordinated fashion. In addition, the Government must work closely with and encourage the ingenuity of the private sector in developing the technologies that will improve both security and trade.

Let me close by saying that this legislation recognizes that America's ports, large and small, are our partners in keeping our Nation safe and our economy moving. Our Port Security Grant Program will help our ports make the investments needed to meet the threat of terrorism. The global maritime industry is crucial to our Nation's economy, and our ports are undoubtedly on the front lines of the war against terrorism. This legislation would set clear goals for improving the security of this vital sector, and it would provide the resources to meet and achieve those goals.

I again thank my colleague, Senator Murray, for her hard work and initiative on this legislation. We are pleased to be joined as original cosponsors by Senators Norm Coleman and Joe Lieberman. That is indicative of the kind of bipartisan support this legislation enjoys, and it is my hope that many more of our colleagues will join us in bringing this legislation to enactment early next year. Our container trading system was designed for a world before September 11.

Now, here we are, 4 years later, and we still have not made our maritime cargo system as secure as it needs to be. Six months after the September 11 attacks, I held a hearing to exam the vulnerability of cargo security. Many of the concerns that were raised at that hearing are still dogging us today.

One of the challenges we face is how we can make trade more secure without slowing it to a crawl. If we have absolute security, we will curtail trade. If we have completely open trade, we will not have enough security.

For the past few years, I have been meeting with leaders in Government and industry to figure out how we can strike the right balance. One thing I know for sure is, it is better for us to work together now to design a security system on our own terms than to wait for an attack and force a security system in a crisis atmosphere.

I have spent several years exploring this challenge and meeting with stakeholders to get their ideas. Senator Collins, as chair of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, has held hearings on this issue and has introduced legislation.

As a result of our work, Senator Collins and I have developed the GreenLane Maritime Cargo Security Act. It provides, for the first time, a comprehensive blueprint for how we can improve security while keeping trade efficient. At its heart, this challenge is about keeping the good things about trade--speed and efficiency--without being vulnerable to the bad things about trade--the potential for terrorists to use our engines of commerce.

There is an incident that occurred a few years ago that shows just how serious a threat we are facing. Four years ago, in Italy, dockworkers noticed something strange about one of the cargo containers. They opened it up and found an Egyptian man inside. But this was not your average stowaway. This man was a suspected al-Qaida terrorist, and he had all of the tools of the trade with him. His cargo container had been outfitted for a long voyage with a bed, a heater, and water. He had a satellite phone and a laptop computer. He also had security passes and mechanic certificates for four U.S. airports.

Now, that happened in 2001. It can still happen today. But don't take my word for it. The Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection said:

[T]he container is the potential Trojan Horse of the 21st

century.

The 9/11 Commission said terrorists may turn from targeting aviation to targeting seaports because ``opportunities to do harm are as great, or greater, in maritime or surface transportation.''

As we all know, our Government has uncovered al-Qaida training manuals, and some of these books suggest that terrorists try to recruit workers at borders, airports, and seaports.

There are two main scenarios we need to think about.

First, a group like al-Qaida could use cargo containers to smuggle weapons and personnel into the United States. They could split up a weapon and ship it to the U.S. in separate containers. And those pieces could be reassembled anywhere in the United States. So the first danger is that terrorists could use these cargo containers to get dangerous weapons into the United States.

Secondly, terrorists could use a cargo container as a weapon itself. A terrorist could place a nuclear, chemical, or biological weapon inside a container and then detonate it once it reaches a U.S. port or another destination inside the United States.

This week, the 9/11 Commission said we have not done enough to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. One study said if a nuclear device was detonated at a major seaport, it could kill up to a million people.

Now, many of our ports are located near major cities. Others are located near key transportation hubs. For example, if a chemical weapon were detonated in Seattle, the chemical plume could contaminate the rail system, Interstate 5, and SeaTac Airport, not to mention the entire downtown business and residential areas.

Terrorists could also detonate a dirty bomb or launch a bioterror attack. Any of those scenarios would impose a devastating cost in human lives, but that is not all.

We also know that al-Qaida wants to cripple our economy. Cargo containers could offer them a powerful way to do just that, and the damage goes beyond lives. An attack launched through our ports would also have a devastating economic impact. That is because after an attack the Federal Government is likely to shut down our ports to make sure that additional hazards weren't being brought into the country-- similar to what we did with airplanes after 9/11.

When we stopped air travel then, it took us a couple of days to get back up to speed. And as we all remember, it cost our economy a great deal. But if you stopped cargo containers without a resumption system in place, it could take as long as 4 months to get them inspected and moving again. That would cripple our economy, and it could even spark a global recession.

Today, our cargo containers are part of the assembly line of American business. We have just-in-time delivery and rolling warehouses. If you shut down the flow of cargo, you are shutting down the economy. If our ports were locked down, we would feel the impact at every level of our economy.

Factories would not be able to get the raw materials they need. Many keep small inventories on hand. Once those inventories run out, factories would be shut down and workers laid off. We would also see the impact in stores. Merchants would not be able to get their products from overseas. Store shelves would go bear, and workers, again, would be laid off.

One study, in fact, concluded that if U.S. ports were shut down for 12 days, it could cost our economy $58 billion. In 2002, we saw what closing down a few ports on the west coast would do. When west coast dockworkers were locked out, it cost our economy about $1 billion a day. Imagine if we shut down all our ports, not just those on the west coast.

Dr. Stephen Flynn, who is a national security expert, has said that a 3-week shutdown could spawn a global recession. It is clear that we are vulnerable and that an attack could do tremendous damage.

If our ports were shut down today, we do not have a system in place for getting them started again. There is no protocol for what would be searched, what would be allowed in, and even who would be in charge.

Now, I want to acknowledge that we have made some progress since 9/ 11. We have provided some funding to make our ports more secure. I have fought for port security grants to make sure we are controlling access to our ports, and our local ports are on the cutting edge of security. We have implemented the 24-hour rule so we know what is supposed to be in a container before it reaches the United States. We are adding some more detection equipment to American ports, but, remember, once a nuclear device is sitting on a U.S. dock, it is too late. Customs created a program that works with foreign ports to speed some cargo into the United States. It is a good idea, but to date it has not been implemented well.

In May, the Government Accountability Office issued a very troubling report. It found that if companies applied for C-TPAT status, we gave them less scrutiny simply for submitting paperwork. We never checked to see if they actually did what they said they were going to do. We just inspected them less. One expert called that approach ``trust, but don't verify.''

Even when U.S. Customs inspectors do find something suspicious at a foreign port, they cannot force a container to be inspected today. They can ask the local government, but those requests are frequently rejected.

So because we cannot enforce those agreements through our State Department, our Customs officials do not have the power they need, and potentially dangerous cargo can arrive at U.S. ports without being inspected overseas.

I am deeply concerned about this issue because I know that maritime cargo, especially container cargo, is a critical part of our economy. My interest in trade goes back to my childhood. My dad ran a small dime store. He relied on imports to stock the shelves in his store. International trade put food on our table, and I have never forgotten that. So I want to make sure we close the loopholes that threaten our ability to trade, while we protect our lives and our economy.

I have worked on this challenge for several years. I have held hearings. I wrote and funded Operation Safe Commerce. And I have been meeting with various stakeholders.

I know this proposal has to work for everyone in the supply chain: importers, freight forwarders, shippers, terminal operators, and workers such as longshoremen, truckdrivers, and port employees--all the people who are on the frontlines as our eyes and our ears. They need to be part of the solution because they would be among the first to be hurt if an incident occurred.

Senator Collins and I have worked together to get input from stakeholders, and with that we have crafted a bill that I believe strikes the right balance. Our proposal is built around five commonsense ideas.

It has been over 4 years since the tragedy of September 11, and some of our most vulnerable assets--our ports and our maritime cargo system--still do not have a coordinated security regime. So the GreenLane Act will take that first step and ensure minimum security standards are in place for all container cargo entering our ports.

Secondly, because there are so many cargo containers coming into our country, we need to make that haystack smaller. We need to do a better job in front-loading our inspections overseas before the cargo ever gets loaded on a ship that is headed for the United States. Then, instead of focusing on a small percent of all containers, we can separate the most secure containers from the ones that need more security.

Third, we need to give businesses incentives to adopt better security. Companies are going to do what is in their financial interest, and we can use market incentives to make the entire industry more secure.

Fourth, we need to minimize the impact of any incident. Right now, if there were a terrorist attack through one of our ports, there would be an awful lot of confusion. So we need to put one office in charge of cargo security policy. We need to create protocols for resuming trade after an incident occurs. And we need to establish joint operations centers to help make local decisions that will get our trade moving again.

We cannot afford to leave cargo on the docks for weeks. We need a plan that tells us in advance what cargo will be unloaded first, and how we will get this system back on its feet.

Finally, we need to monitor and secure cargo from the factory floor overseas until it reaches our own shores. There are vulnerabilities at every step of the supply chain. A secure system is going to start at the factory overseas and continue until that cargo reaches its final destination.

I want to detail how our bill will make the American people safer. First of all, it raises the security standards for everyone across the board and directs the Department of Homeland Security to take all of the best practices and lessons learned and create new standards that will establish a new baseline of security for everyone.

Secondly, it creates the GreenLane. If shippers agree to follow the higher security standards of the GreenLane, they get a series of benefits.

To be designated as GreenLane cargo, importers have to ensure that all entities within their supply chain are validated C-TPAT participants; access to the cargo and containers is restricted to those employees who need access and we are assured of their identification; a logistics system is in place that provides the ability to track everything loaded into a GreenLane container back to the factory; and, a container security device, such as an e-seal, is used to secure the container.

Remember, GreenLane is optional. No one has to participate. I believe companies will want to participate because they will get benefits in return.

What are those benefits? Their bonding requirements could be reduced or

eliminated. Instead of paying customs duties on every shipment, they could be billed monthly or quarterly. Their cargo will be subject to fewer searches and will be released faster upon entering the United States. They will lose less cargo to theft, and they will have the stability that comes from having one uniform standard to plan around.

Finally, the GreenLane Act sets up a plan so that trade can be resumed quickly and safely if an attack occurs. Today, there are no protocols. There is no guide on how to get the system going again. Our bill will create one, and it will let the most secure cargo--the GreenLane cargo--be released first.

Our bill creates joint operations centers to ensure a coordinated, measured response and the resumption and flow of commerce in the event of an incident or heightened national security threat level.

Our bill takes other steps. It expands port security grants. It makes sure we continue to monitor our security system to make sure it is working. It makes sure that a company's cargo data is not available to competitors. It sets a uniform standard for security so shippers and others have some certainty, rather than a hodgepodge of different standards.

There have been a lot of commissions and studies on port security, and we have worked to address their recommendations in our bill.

The 9/11 Commission said we need ``layered'' security, that we need to centralize authority so we can have more accountability, and that Federal agencies need to share information better. Our bill implements all of those recommendations.

The Government Accountability Office looked at current Customs programs and identified some troubling shortcomings.

Mr. President, I am pleased to join my colleague, Senator Murray, in introducing today the GreenLane Maritime Cargo Security

Act. It has been a great pleasure to work with my colleague on this important issue. Senator Murray has been an early leader in the call for greater port security. I am pleased we were able to join our efforts in a bipartisan bill to provide long overdue improvements in maritime security.

Our comprehensive legislation would help build a coordinated approach to maritime and port security across all levels of government and with our overseas trading partners. It would improve our Nation's security as it expedites trade with those governments and businesses that join us in this goal. It would encourage innovation, and it would provide financial assistance to our ports as they strive to strengthen their terrorism prevention and response efforts.

This legislation would provide the structure and resources needed to better protect the American people from attack through these vital yet extremely vulnerable points of entry and centers of economic activity.

Coming from a State with three international cargo ports, including the largest port by tonnage in New England, I am keenly aware of the importance of our seaports to our national economy and to the communities in which they are located. In addition to our ports' obvious economic significance, the link between maritime security and our national security has been underscored time and again by terrorism experts, including the 9/11 Commission. It is easy to see why, if you look at the statistics.

In 2003, more than 6,000 ships made nearly 57,000 calls on American ports. They carried the bulk of approximately 800 million tons of goods that came into our country, including more than 9 million containers. We know that al-Qaida has the stated goal of causing maximum harm to the American people and maximum disruption to our economy. Therefore, when you look at what could achieve those goals, you are instantly drawn to our cargo ports.

We already have a glimpse of the staggering damage a terrorist attack on a cargo port could produce. In the fall of 2002, the west coast dock strike cost our economy an estimated $1 billion a day for each of the 10 days that the work stoppage lasted. It not only brought those western coast ports to a halt but also harmed businesses throughout the country. That astonishing amount of harm, $10 billion worth, was the result of an event that was both peaceful and anticipated. Think of what the impact of a terrorist attack would be.

More recently, Hurricane Katrina brought the port of New Orleans and several other gulf coast ports to a standstill. Fortunately, much of this cargo was able to be diverted to other ports undamaged by the storm. In the aftermath of a terrorist attack, however, it is likely that an attack on one port would result in the closure, at least temporarily, of all ports. All of us remember in the wake of 9/11 that commercial aircraft were grounded across this country for a number of days. It is logical to assume that all of the ports would be closed in this country if there were a terrorist attack on one port.

In addition to the threat of a direct attack on one of our ports, any one of the more than 9 million containers that enter the United States each year has the potential to be the Trojan horse of the 21st century. When we look at these huge cargo ships unloading thousands of containers every day, we think: Oh, that contains consumer goods, maybe television sets or toys or clothing or sneakers. Fortunately, in the vast majority of cases, that is exactly what is in those containers. But a container could include terrorists themselves, biological or chemical agents, or even a small nuclear weapon.

For years, criminals have used cargo containers to smuggle narcotics, firearms, and people into the United States. These containers may come from anyone of 1,000 ports overseas, ports that have varying degrees and levels of security. They could also be intercepted or tampered with along the way.

Earlier year this year, I toured the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach. The sheer size of these facilities and the activities that are going on every day are startling. So, too, are the risks and the vulnerabilities that they offer for terrorists to exploit. By coincidence, my visit came days before 32 Chinese nationals were smuggled into the port of Los Angeles in two cargo containers. Fortunately, that Trojan horse held people who were simply seeking a better way of life, albeit illegally, and they were not terrorists seeking to destroy our way of life. They were caught. But what is particularly disturbing to me, and speaks to the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the current system, is they weren't caught through any security measure. It wasn't the container security initiative or the C-TPAT Program or any other new initiative that resulted in these 32 Chinese nationals being caught. Instead it was an alert crane operator who happened to see them crawling out of the containers.

We cannot continue to rely on luck or even alert crane operators to provide for the security of our seaports, our Nation, and our people.

In August, the President issued the National Security Strategy for Maritime Security. It warns of the probability of a hostile state using a weapon of mass destruction sometime in the next decade, and it identifies the maritime sector as most likely to be used to bring a weapon of mass destruction into the United States. In addition, the use of ``just in time'' inventories, which are now used by most industries, means that a disruption of our ports would have catastrophic repercussions for our entire economy.

A fundamental goal of port security is to head off trouble before it reaches our shores. Current supply-chain security programs within the Federal Government, however, were separately conceived and managed by different agencies, rather than woven together into a layered, consistent approach. The result of that, the Government Accountability Office tells us, is that only 17.5 percent of high-risk cargo identified by our own Customs agents was inspected overseas. I am talking about cargo that has been identified as high risk, and yet we are inspecting less than 20 percent of high-risk cargo. We found that the current programs lack standards, lack staffing, and lack the validation of security measures that are necessary for their success.

We cannot remove the risk of a terrorist attack, but the better security measures outlined by the Murray-Collins bill can build a stronger shield against terrorism without hampering trade.

This legislation provides the tools to construct a more effective security system. It was developed in close consultation with key stakeholders including port authorities, major retailers and importers, carriers, supply chain managers, security and transportation experts, and Federal and State agencies.

First, it addresses the problem of uncoordinated supply-chain security efforts by directing the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a strategic plan to strengthen international security for all modes of transportation by which containers arrive in, depart from or move through seaports of the United States. This plan will clarify the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of government agencies at all levels and of private sector stakeholders. It will establish clear, measurable goals for furthering the security of commercial operations from point of origin to point of destination. It will outline mandatory, baseline security measures and standards and provide incentives for additional voluntary measures.

The new Office of Cargo Security Policy, established in our legislation, would ensure implementation of the strategic plan. This important office will report to the Department's Assistant Secretary for Policy in order to better coordinate maritime security efforts within the Department of Homeland Security and among our international and private-sector partners.

This legislation also gives the Secretary 6 months to establish minimum standards and procedures for securing containers in transit to the U.S., based on the Department's experience with current cargo security programs. All containers bound for U.S. ports of entry must meet those standards no later than 2 years after they are established. Currently, DHS has been too slow to implement certain vital security measures. For example, the Department has been working on a regulation setting a minimum standard for mechanical seals on containers for

more than 2 years. Such delays are unacceptable. This legislation would set clear timelines to ensure steady progress.

The Department has also pledged to deploy radiation detection equipment at all ports of entry in the U.S. to examine 100 percent of cargo. The zero tolerance policy for radiation has been discussed since 2002, though less than a quarter of the detection equipment deemed necessary for domestic coverage had been deployed as of last month. Even more frustrating is that the Department has changed the target for system deployment multiple times. The Department's new Domestic Nuclear Detection Office is beginning to take hold of this critical issue, yet the need for a comprehensive plan for the deployment of radiation detection equipment is evident. Our legislation requires this plan be developed and that 100 percent incoming containers to the U.S. be examined for radiation no later than 1 year after enactment.

I want to thank Senator Coleman for his efforts in this area. These provisions address concerns that have been identified through our joint investigative work on programs protecting our nation against weapons of mass destruction.

For the first time, this legislation would authorize the Container Security Initiative. Ongoing, predictable funding--$175 million a year for the five years beginning in 2007--is essential for this crucial program to succeed. In addition to providing funding, the bill lays out requirements for CSI ports and a process for designating new ports under CSI. The Secretary must undertake a full assessment of the potential risk of smuggling or cargo tampering related to terrorism, before designating a port under CSI. This authorization also will enable our CSI partners to strengthen anti-terrorism measures and to improve training of personnel.

We would authorize C-TPAT at $75 million per year for that same 5- year period, and we clearly outline the certification and validation requirements and the benefits associated with meeting those requirements. Our legislation directs the Secretary to correct the deficiencies of the program, and, within one year, to issue guidelines that will be used to certify a participant's security measures and supply chain practices.

In addition, we would create a new, third tier of C-TPAT, called the GreenLane, which offers additional benefits to C-TPAT participants that meet the highest level of security standards. Cargo in transit to the U.S. through the GreenLane would be more secure through the use of container security devices and stronger supply chain security practices in all areas, such as physical, procedural and personnel security. The legislation directs the Secretary to develop benefits that may include further reduced inspections, priority processing for inspections, and, most significantly, preference in entering U.S. ports in the aftermath of a terrorist attack. Senator Murray, who developed this concept, will describe GreenLane in greater detail.

The bill also places a greater emphasis on communications among government and industry players in responding to an incident and settles the critical question of ``who's in charge.''

Technology plays an important role in maritime and cargo security. The Department of Homeland Security has scattered efforts to deploy existing technologies, to enhance those tools and to develop new ones. It is critical that these efforts be undertaken in a more coordinated fashion. In addition, the Government must work closely with and encourage the ingenuity of the private sector in developing the technologies that will improve both security and trade.

Let me close by saying that this legislation recognizes that America's ports, large and small, are our partners in keeping our Nation safe and our economy moving. Our Port Security Grant Program will help our ports make the investments needed to meet the threat of terrorism. The global maritime industry is crucial to our Nation's economy, and our ports are undoubtedly on the front lines of the war against terrorism. This legislation would set clear goals for improving the security of this vital sector, and it would provide the resources to meet and achieve those goals.

I again thank my colleague, Senator Murray, for her hard work and initiative on this legislation. We are pleased to be joined as original cosponsors by Senators Norm Coleman and Joe Lieberman. That is indicative of the kind of bipartisan support this legislation enjoys, and it is my hope that many more of our colleagues will join us in bringing this legislation to enactment early next year. Our container trading system was designed for a world before September 11.

Now, here we are, 4 years later, and we still have not made our maritime cargo system as secure as it needs to be. Six months after the September 11 attacks, I held a hearing to exam the vulnerability of cargo security. Many of the concerns that were raised at that hearing are still dogging us today.

One of the challenges we face is how we can make trade more secure without slowing it to a crawl. If we have absolute security, we will curtail trade. If we have completely open trade, we will not have enough security.

For the past few years, I have been meeting with leaders in Government and industry to figure out how we can strike the right balance. One thing I know for sure is, it is better for us to work together now to design a security system on our own terms than to wait for an attack and force a security system in a crisis atmosphere.

I have spent several years exploring this challenge and meeting with stakeholders to get their ideas. Senator Collins, as chair of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, has held hearings on this issue and has introduced legislation.

As a result of our work, Senator Collins and I have developed the GreenLane Maritime Cargo Security Act. It provides, for the first time, a comprehensive blueprint for how we can improve security while keeping trade efficient. At its heart, this challenge is about keeping the good things about trade--speed and efficiency--without being vulnerable to the bad things about trade--the potential for terrorists to use our engines of commerce.

There is an incident that occurred a few years ago that shows just how serious a threat we are facing. Four years ago, in Italy, dockworkers noticed something strange about one of the cargo containers. They opened it up and found an Egyptian man inside. But this was not your average stowaway. This man was a suspected al-Qaida terrorist, and he had all of the tools of the trade with him. His cargo container had been outfitted for a long voyage with a bed, a heater, and water. He had a satellite phone and a laptop computer. He also had security passes and mechanic certificates for four U.S. airports.

Now, that happened in 2001. It can still happen today. But don't take my word for it. The Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection said:

[T]he container is the potential Trojan Horse of the 21st

century.

The 9/11 Commission said terrorists may turn from targeting aviation to targeting seaports because ``opportunities to do harm are as great, or greater, in maritime or surface transportation.''

As we all know, our Government has uncovered al-Qaida training manuals, and some of these books suggest that terrorists try to recruit workers at borders, airports, and seaports.

There are two main scenarios we need to think about.

First, a group like al-Qaida could use cargo containers to smuggle weapons and personnel into the United States. They could split up a weapon and ship it to the U.S. in separate containers. And those pieces could be reassembled anywhere in the United States. So the first danger is that terrorists could use these cargo containers to get dangerous weapons into the United States.

Secondly, terrorists could use a cargo container as a weapon itself. A terrorist could place a nuclear, chemical, or biological weapon inside a container and then detonate it once it reaches a U.S. port or another destination inside the United States.

This week, the 9/11 Commission said we have not done enough to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. One study said if a nuclear device was detonated at a major seaport, it could kill up to a million people.

Now, many of our ports are located near major cities. Others are located near key transportation hubs. For example, if a chemical weapon were detonated in Seattle, the chemical plume could contaminate the rail system, Interstate 5, and SeaTac Airport, not to mention the entire downtown business and residential areas.

Terrorists could also detonate a dirty bomb or launch a bioterror attack. Any of those scenarios would impose a devastating cost in human lives, but that is not all.

We also know that al-Qaida wants to cripple our economy. Cargo containers could offer them a powerful way to do just that, and the damage goes beyond lives. An attack launched through our ports would also have a devastating economic impact. That is because after an attack the Federal Government is likely to shut down our ports to make sure that additional hazards weren't being brought into the country-- similar to what we did with airplanes after 9/11.

When we stopped air travel then, it took us a couple of days to get back up to speed. And as we all remember, it cost our economy a great deal. But if you stopped cargo containers without a resumption system in place, it could take as long as 4 months to get them inspected and moving again. That would cripple our economy, and it could even spark a global recession.

Today, our cargo containers are part of the assembly line of American business. We have just-in-time delivery and rolling warehouses. If you shut down the flow of cargo, you are shutting down the economy. If our ports were locked down, we would feel the impact at every level of our economy.

Factories would not be able to get the raw materials they need. Many keep small inventories on hand. Once those inventories run out, factories would be shut down and workers laid off. We would also see the impact in stores. Merchants would not be able to get their products from overseas. Store shelves would go bear, and workers, again, would be laid off.

One study, in fact, concluded that if U.S. ports were shut down for 12 days, it could cost our economy $58 billion. In 2002, we saw what closing down a few ports on the west coast would do. When west coast dockworkers were locked out, it cost our economy about $1 billion a day. Imagine if we shut down all our ports, not just those on the west coast.

Dr. Stephen Flynn, who is a national security expert, has said that a 3-week shutdown could spawn a global recession. It is clear that we are vulnerable and that an attack could do tremendous damage.

If our ports were shut down today, we do not have a system in place for getting them started again. There is no protocol for what would be searched, what would be allowed in, and even who would be in charge.

Now, I want to acknowledge that we have made some progress since 9/ 11. We have provided some funding to make our ports more secure. I have fought for port security grants to make sure we are controlling access to our ports, and our local ports are on the cutting edge of security. We have implemented the 24-hour rule so we know what is supposed to be in a container before it reaches the United States. We are adding some more detection equipment to American ports, but, remember, once a nuclear device is sitting on a U.S. dock, it is too late. Customs created a program that works with foreign ports to speed some cargo into the United States. It is a good idea, but to date it has not been implemented well.

In May, the Government Accountability Office issued a very troubling report. It found that if companies applied for C-TPAT status, we gave them less scrutiny simply for submitting paperwork. We never checked to see if they actually did what they said they were going to do. We just inspected them less. One expert called that approach ``trust, but don't verify.''

Even when U.S. Customs inspectors do find something suspicious at a foreign port, they cannot force a container to be inspected today. They can ask the local government, but those requests are frequently rejected.

So because we cannot enforce those agreements through our State Department, our Customs officials do not have the power they need, and potentially dangerous cargo can arrive at U.S. ports without being inspected overseas.

I am deeply concerned about this issue because I know that maritime cargo, especially container cargo, is a critical part of our economy. My interest in trade goes back to my childhood. My dad ran a small dime store. He relied on imports to stock the shelves in his store. International trade put food on our table, and I have never forgotten that. So I want to make sure we close the loopholes that threaten our ability to trade, while we protect our lives and our economy.

I have worked on this challenge for several years. I have held hearings. I wrote and funded Operation Safe Commerce. And I have been meeting with various stakeholders.

I know this proposal has to work for everyone in the supply chain: importers, freight forwarders, shippers, terminal operators, and workers such as longshoremen, truckdrivers, and port employees--all the people who are on the frontlines as our eyes and our ears. They need to be part of the solution because they would be among the first to be hurt if an incident occurred.

Senator Collins and I have worked together to get input from stakeholders, and with that we have crafted a bill that I believe strikes the right balance. Our proposal is built around five commonsense ideas.

It has been over 4 years since the tragedy of September 11, and some of our most vulnerable assets--our ports and our maritime cargo system--still do not have a coordinated security regime. So the GreenLane Act will take that first step and ensure minimum security standards are in place for all container cargo entering our ports.

Secondly, because there are so many cargo containers coming into our country, we need to make that haystack smaller. We need to do a better job in front-loading our inspections overseas before the cargo ever gets loaded on a ship that is headed for the United States. Then, instead of focusing on a small percent of all containers, we can separate the most secure containers from the ones that need more security.

Third, we need to give businesses incentives to adopt better security. Companies are going to do what is in their financial interest, and we can use market incentives to make the entire industry more secure.

Fourth, we need to minimize the impact of any incident. Right now, if there were a terrorist attack through one of our ports, there would be an awful lot of confusion. So we need to put one office in charge of cargo security policy. We need to create protocols for resuming trade after an incident occurs. And we need to establish joint operations centers to help make local decisions that will get our trade moving again.

We cannot afford to leave cargo on the docks for weeks. We need a plan that tells us in advance what cargo will be unloaded first, and how we will get this system back on its feet.

Finally, we need to monitor and secure cargo from the factory floor overseas until it reaches our own shores. There are vulnerabilities at every step of the supply chain. A secure system is going to start at the factory overseas and continue until that cargo reaches its final destination.

I want to detail how our bill will make the American people safer. First of all, it raises the security standards for everyone across the board and directs the Department of Homeland Security to take all of the best practices and lessons learned and create new standards that will establish a new baseline of security for everyone.

Secondly, it creates the GreenLane. If shippers agree to follow the higher security standards of the GreenLane, they get a series of benefits.

To be designated as GreenLane cargo, importers have to ensure that all entities within their supply chain are validated C-TPAT participants; access to the cargo and containers is restricted to those employees who need access and we are assured of their identification; a logistics system is in place that provides the ability to track everything loaded into a GreenLane container back to the factory; and, a container security device, such as an e-seal, is used to secure the container.

Remember, GreenLane is optional. No one has to participate. I believe companies will want to participate because they will get benefits in return.

What are those benefits? Their bonding requirements could be reduced or

eliminated. Instead of paying customs duties on every shipment, they could be billed monthly or quarterly. Their cargo will be subject to fewer searches and will be released faster upon entering the United States. They will lose less cargo to theft, and they will have the stability that comes from having one uniform standard to plan around.

Finally, the GreenLane Act sets up a plan so that trade can be resumed quickly and safely if an attack occurs. Today, there are no protocols. There is no guide on how to get the system going again. Our bill will create one, and it will let the most secure cargo--the GreenLane cargo--be released first.

Our bill creates joint operations centers to ensure a coordinated, measured response and the resumption and flow of commerce in the event of an incident or heightened national security threat level.

Our bill takes other steps. It expands port security grants. It makes sure we continue to monitor our security system to make sure it is working. It makes sure that a company's cargo data is not available to competitors. It sets a uniform standard for security so shippers and others have some certainty, rather than a hodgepodge of different standards.

There have been a lot of commissions and studies on port security, and we have worked to address their recommendations in our bill.

The 9/11 Commission said we need ``layered'' security, that we need to centralize authority so we can have more accountability, and that Federal agencies need to share information better. Our bill implements all of those recommendations.

The Government Accountability Office looked at current Customs programs and identified some troubling shortcomings.

Madam Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

At the outset before we begin this debate, which will be a very positive debate, let me express my thanks to the ranking member, Mr. Thompson, for the tremendous cooperation he has given throughout deliberations on this bill, and also to the ranking member, Ms. Loretta Sanchez, and to Ms. Harman for working so closely with all the Members, especially Chairman Dan Lungren who is the prime sponsor of this legislation.

I also want to mention other Members such as Chairman Reichert and the ranking member, Mr. Pascrell, for the important amendments that they introduced during the committee markup which have made this a very significant bill.

Madam Chairman, on September 11 all of us pledged that we would do all we could to prevent another terrorist attack from occurring in this country. One of the areas where we are most vulnerable is our ports. There are 11 million containers that come into our ports every year from foreign countries. Much progress has been made since September 11 in protecting our ports and improving the inspection process, the screening process, the scanning process; but the reality is that more has to be done.

I strongly believe that the SAFE Ports Act is a major step in the direction of giving us that level of protection that we need. For instance, it provides $400 million a year in risk-based funding for a dedicated port security grant program.

It mandates the deployment of radiation portal monitors which will cover 98 percent of the containers entering our country and then going out into the country.

It mandates implementation of the TWIC identity cards, and it sets up port training between the employees at the ports and first responders. It also requires more cargo data to be given to improve our automated targeting system.

And as far as the Container Security Initiative, CSI, it mandates that the Secretary of Homeland Security will not allow any container to be loaded onto a ship overseas unless that container is inspected at our request. In the past, we have had a number of countries that refused to make these inspections. There have been 1,000 containers that have entered this country unexamined, uninspected because the overseas ports would not carry out the inspection. In the future, that will not be allowed to happen.

Also, we require DHS to continually evaluate emerging radioactive detection and imaging technology. We also increase the number of inspectors by 1,200. All of these are part of the layered response and the layered system of defense that we need to significantly and dramatically upgrade the level of protection in our ports.

This is a bill which I believe warrants the support of the entire House. It passed out of the subcommittee unanimously, and it passed out of the full committee by a vote of 29-0, and I will be urging its adoption today.

Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Madam Chairman, I include for the Record letters of jurisdiction.

House of Representatives

Committee on Homeland Security,

Washington, DC, May 3, 2006.

Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.,

Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, Rayburn House Office

Building, Washington, DC.

Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter regarding the

Judiciary Committee's jurisdictional interest in H.R. 4954,

the SAFE Port Act. The bill was introduced on March 14, 2006,

and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security. The

Committee on Homeland Security marked up the bill and

reported it on April 28, 2006.

I appreciate your willingness to waive further

consideration of H.R. 4954 in order to expedite proceedings

on this legislation. I agree that by not exercising your

right to request a referral, the Judiciary Committee does not

waive any jurisdiction it may have over H.R. 4954. As you

have requested, I will support your request for an

appropriate appointment of outside conferees from your

Committee in the event of a House-Senate conference on this

or similar legislation should such a conference be convened.

I will include a copy of your letter and this response as

part of the Congressional Record during consideration of the

legislation on the House floor.

Thank you for your cooperation as we work towards the

enactment of H.R. 4954.

Sincerely,

Peter T. King,

Chairman.

Madam Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. McCaul), chairman of the Subcommittee on Investigations.

Madam Chairman, I continue to reserve.

Madam Chairman, I join the lady in the commemoration of the greatness of this day. And with that, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Rogers), the chairman of the Subcommittee on Management Integration Oversight.

Madam Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Linder), the chairman of the Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack.

Madam Chairman, I am privileged to yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Daniel E. Lungren), the former attorney general of California and the sponsor of the bill.

Madam Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Reichert), the former sheriff of King County and chairman of the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness.

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Ginny Brown-Waite), who, as has been noted by several of the speakers, has made an extraordinary contribution by her amendment at the full committee level.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Delaware (Mr. Castle) for the purpose of a colloquy.

Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. Castle, I share your concerns. The legislation under consideration today is only one part of an aggressive campaign to bring common sense to our homeland security efforts. Rail security has been one of my highest priorities, certainly coming from New York, which has one of the largest subway systems in the world. The terrorist attacks on the rail systems in London and Madrid were very grim reminders that our enemies are not above exploiting civilian targets.

In the next few weeks, we will be moving TSA reform legislation that has provisions designed to enhance rail and transit security. This matter is a priority for the committee, and I thank the gentleman for his leadership in this area.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, we went through a very long and productive, bipartisan process in arriving at this point today. It trivializes the debate, it demeans the process, to be suggesting that anyone, anyone at all in this body, certainly anyone on this committee, is not absolutely committed to the protection of every American life. Those of us who came from districts who lost large numbers of people on September 11 perhaps have even a more acute interest in doing all we possibly can.

But we also don't want to do the most cruel thing of all, and that is hold out a false hope. The worst thing of all is to adopt legislation which is symbolic rather than real. We want results. We are not looking for sound bites, we are not looking for headlines, we are not looking for the evening news, we are not looking for the tabloids. We are looking to get results to save American lives and to make America safer.

That is exactly what this legislation does, through layers of defense, through layers of security, through well-thought-out processes and urging as quickly as possible the advancement and the use of technology that can be done. Not technology that might work or might not work, but technology that can work and will work and can be implemented in an effective way.

That is what this is about. That is what the debate should be about. As the late morning and early afternoon goes forward, I am sure the American voters who are watching this will see that there are those of us who do want to maintain the level of debate on both sides of the aisle, and that level is going to bring about American security.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself as much time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, the manager's amendment makes technical changes, adds several new findings on the importance of maintaining vibrant international trade, clarifies that port security funds can be used to address vulnerabilities in vessel and facility plans in addition to maritime security plans, and clarifies that the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office is responsible for implementing Department of Homeland Security requirements under the Global Nuclear Architecture and that any private testing performed by DNDO will be confidential.

Additionally, the manager's amendment includes two provisions at the request of Chairman LoBiondo to set deadlines for the enhanced crew member identification cards so that the rollout is on the same expedited schedule as the Transportation Worker Identification Credential, TWIC, in the base bill. The second provision is the establishment of a Center of Excellence for Maritime Domain Awareness.

The base bill represents the work of the Homeland Security Committee and also input from several other committees: Science, Ways and Means, Transportation and Infrastructure, Government Reform and others. The manager's amendment also includes several changes to the base bill at the request of our colleagues from other committees.

Specifically, given that H.R. 889, the Coast Guard Authorization Bill Conference Report, is complete and likely to be considered on the floor in the near future, the amendment removes two provisions accepted during full committee consideration that relate to the Coast Guard. The first establishes a pilot program for training Coast Guard reserve officers and, two, the funding for the acceleration of Deepwater. Finally, the manager's amendment establishes a Director of Trade Policy in the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Policy.

The changes and additions made in the manager's amendment are consistent with the overall goals in the base bill and represent perfecting changes at the requests of several of our colleagues. I ask my colleagues for their support for the amendment and the underlying bill.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. LoBiondo).

Mr. Chairman, may I inquire how much time is remaining?

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, at the outset, let me thank the gentleman from Mississippi for his very kind and generous remarks, and I want to again return the compliment by saying it has been an outstanding privilege to work with him as the bill has worked its way to this present stage.

I also want to thank the gentleman from New Jersey for once again reaffirming his support of the Deepwater Program and pledging to work to get the necessary funding for the Coast Guard. All of us saw the outstanding job in Katrina, the outstanding job. They were the true heroes of Katrina, certainly from the Federal level. So I think we stand as one in urging full funding for the Coast Guard.

Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for his support of the amendments.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time and urge adoption of the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to control the time in opposition to the amendment even though I am not opposed to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the gentleman from Maryland for proposing a study of an important Customs and Border Protection initiative. The study of the NTC will assist Congress in determining whether the NTC in its current form is accomplishing its mission of better coordinating CBP field operations and communications.

Improving ATS is essential for a robust container security regime. As the home to ATS, the National Targeting Center must have appropriate resources and management to sufficiently operate the system. As stated, I thank the gentleman for offering his amendment, and I am willing to accept it.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to control the time in opposition to the amendment even though I am not opposed.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I want to thank my friend from Maryland for all his efforts in relation to this amendment and to his commitment to the establishment of maritime security command centers.

These centers will be vital tools in the war on drugs, will assist in preventing illegal immigration, and will monitor possible terrorist activity in each region by tracking shipping movements.

I agree that the close cooperation and coordination between the Federal, State, and local governments is an integral part of a successful command center structure, and I will be pleased to accept the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Brown).

Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of our time to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Poe).

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to control the time in opposition even though I am not opposed to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, at the outset let me thank the gentleman from Texas for introducing this amendment and doing it in such a spirit of bipartisanship. To me, it typifies what this issue should be about: good people from both parties working together to resolve one of the most serious issues facing our country today.

I agree that such a study is necessary primarily because of the sharp increase of trade that the United States has experienced through its ports in recent years. All forecasts seem to indicate this trend will continue.

While this debate largely focuses on seaports, our land ports play a vital role in our economy. Therefore, a comprehensive strategy is needed to address the challenges of efficient trade and land port security. The balance between trade efficiency and adequate security is central to the future success of the United States economy. I urge adoption of the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Again, Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to control the time even though I am not opposed to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Including mobile detection capabilities in the evaluation process is vital and will aid search capabilities. Also, these potentially cheap sensors will allow for more widespread application. This detection equipment will be considered under the same criteria and measured against the same real-world performance criteria before they are deployed.

The gentleman's amendment raises responsible questions that must be addressed prior to asking our allies to deploy new inspection equipment or for domestic use.

I appreciate this thoughtful addition to the bill offered by the gentleman from Kansas, and I am prepared to accept the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Linder).

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.

I rise in support of the gentleman from Connecticut's amendment. The type of technology to which he is referring certainly has extraordinary promise. The measured approach he is proposing here, I believe, is the way we should go forward. I understand the Department of Homeland Security may have some concerns, but the fact is, I think, all of us agree the government does not always have the right answer to a particular problem. I believe that the gentleman from Connecticut should be commended for pushing this matter forward and for using his energies and abilities to bring that about.

I know that this technology is said to have limitations, but a thorough operational test by independent evaluators will enable us to look at it much more objectively.

So with that, I strongly urge the adoption of the gentleman's amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to control the time in opposition even though I am not opposed.

Mr. Chairman, let me just say that I commend the gentleman from New Hampshire for his proposal. It is something that is needed. It fills a very vital need, and I urge the adoption of his amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Madam Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to control the time in opposition to the amendment, even though I am not opposed.

Madam Chairman, I would like to raise several points. I want to commend my good friend from New York for offering the amendment. Obviously, more oversight is needed. This amendment serves that purpose.

I did have some concerns about the danger of potential national security information being listed. But the language of the amendment does provide an exception on that. There is also some concerns about whether or not this could prove burdensome on some local governments.

I just want to work with him to ensure the amendment does not impose unnecessary burdens on State and local governments.

Madam Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Fossella).

Madam Chairman, I yield back the balance of our time.

Madam Chairman, I rise to claim the time in opposition to the amendment, and I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Loretta Sanchez).

Madam Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr. Daniel E. Lungren).

Madam Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), the coauthor of the legislation.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

(Mr. YOUNG of Alaska asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. Chairman, I want to compliment Mr. King in the efforts here and Mr. Lungren and, yes, even the minority in this case, on working on this legislation.

I was somewhat taken back by the comments even made by the gentleman from Massachusetts, because this should not be a partisan issue. This should not be railing against the Republicans or should not be railing against Bush. If you want to make headlines, go outside and stand on your head. That is the best way to make headlines.

What we are trying to do, as Mr. King said, is try to make our ports secure and we are trying to make them secure in a proper time fashion.

We have already done some of this work that should have been done through the Transportation Committee. The Maritime Transportation Security Act does a lot of what is in this bill, and we are implementing it right now. The ports are more secure than what people will say and what you read in the newspapers.

Yes, we can do better and we will. But Members keep in mind that what we are faced with today is how do we do it and do it in a fashion which continues to allow us to have a commerce circle. Without commerce, this country will fail.

Now, I can suggest respectfully that there is a way and we will continue to do it, if the ports wish to do so, that they will unload their ships that have been screened thoroughly 100 percent overseas at point of origin.

It will not take long for those shipping companies to make sure that the containers are screened 100 percent. Keep in mind what I said, that which has been screened will be first unloaded. I guarantee it will happen in the very near future.

But what we have done here under this bill is try to make the right step forward, a good step forward, and to accomplish I believe what is correct, that is, eventually total security for our ports.

I have some concern in the bill, and I have expressed to Mr. Lungren and Mr. King there are, and I understand why; but I hope as we go through this conference that there will be a recognition that the smaller ports will be recognized as much as the larger ports.

Because under this legislation it primarily concentrates on the larger ports. And I do not believe that is what we are seeking. I think we should consider all ports that receive cargo containers from whatever origin they may be. And if they are not screened, they should not be allowed in.

So I am saying the smaller ports should also be recognized. They are not under this bill. And we have to, as time goes by through the conference, try to recognize that those smaller ports have equal concern as well as the larger ports.

And, lastly, I would suggest I have a deep concern about the grant program. We already have a grant program for port security. It is already on the books. It is already down in Homeland Security. And I will say in defense of the committee, the Homeland Committee, that there is in fact a lack of action through the Department itself.

But I am hoping that we do not duplicate, that we do not do something that costs more money but gets less results. We can work this out through the conference, so we will have an opportunity to make sure either the Port Security Act itself, Maritime Transportation Security Act, which has a grant program in it, that if it is not being implemented correctly, that we rectify that, or in fact we might eliminate that so there are not two bills on top of one another causing more confusion and less real security within our ports.

Again, Mr. Chairman, I am somewhat comfortable with this legislation in the sense that it has been well thought out. Again, I want to compliment the minority side and Mr. Lungren, Mr. King, for bringing this to the floor in time. I wish to say, if I can, I am a little concerned. I have been here probably longer than eight other people, and I do not like what I hear in these debates. Because it seems like everybody is saying the other guy is the bad guy, and we are the good guys. I thought we were here to solve some problems. This is a problem. I think this bill does it. I think we ought to keep our eye on the ball and protect our people and provide a flow of commerce, which is necessary.

Mr. Chairman, I urge the people to consider this bill in total. If there would be a recommit, vote against the motion to recommit, and let us get forward and get this job done.

If you only listen to the press outcry over the Dubai Ports World now-aborted takeover of certain U.S. port operations, you would not know that significant actions have been taken since 9/11 to improve the security of U.S. ports.

Nonetheless, congress and the administration have taken important steps towards making our ports safer. These port security initiatives may not be as thorough and complete at this point as we would hope, and the press may choose to only cover the remaining gaps, but significant progress has been made.

In 2002, congress enacted the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA). This legislation originated in the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee and significantly strengthened our ability to prevent and respond to maritime security incidents.

MTSA required U.S. port facilities and the vessels calling at those facilities to prepare and submit detailed security plans to the Coast Guard. Those plans have been submitted and approved by the Coast Guard. This is the first nationwide effort to assess the state of port security and plan for improvements in that security. These plans are required for each and every U.S. port facility and each and every vessel that visits those facilities.

Recently the administration has also completed the long awaited National Maritime Transportation Plan which was mandated by MTSA. In conjunction with the national strategy for maritime security, there is now a meaningful framework for assessing, planning for, preventing and responding to maritime transportation security incidents.

Of course, all the planning in the world is worthless unless real assets are put in place to back up and carry out those plans. Such assets are being put in place, some more quickly than others.

The Administration estimates that spending on maritime security has increased 700 percent since 2001. The Coast Guard has dramatically increased their security-related patrol hours and established 13 maritime safety and security teams as authorized in MTSA.

Congress and the administration have committed to a 20 year rebuilding of the Coast

Guard's ships, planes, and communications infrastructure. These new and upgraded assets will greatly improve the service's ability to carry out its maritime law enforcement missions, including port security.

There are still portions of MTSA that have not been implemented in as timely a manner as I would wish. Transportation worker identity cards are still a work in progress, and virtually no progress has been made by the government on implementing long range vessel tracking.

H.R. 4954, the Safe Port Act, makes some improvements to MTSA. At the request of the Coast Guard sub-committee chairman, Mr. LoBiondo, and the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, the bill requires that the facility security officers identified in the security plans be U.S. citizens and that facility security plans be resubmitted when facilities change ownership.

The bill also sets up a temporary system for verifying the identity of individuals with access to secure areas of seaports, and develop timelines for the implementation of transportation worker identification credentials. Perhaps most importantly, it authorizes maritime security command centers. These interagency facilities which already exist at several ports are crucial to coordinated Federal, State and local port security prevention and response efforts.

Concerns remain about the safety of cargo entering the United States. We can all agree that the cargo must be secured at the earliest possible time and monitored throughout its journey.

By the time it reaches our shores, it is too late to find out what is in a container and decide whether it is safe. Much of the Safe Port Act is designed to address these cargo supply chain safety concerns, and I comment Chairman King for his efforts in this area.

There is one are in which I strongly disagree with the Safe Port Act. The bill removes the existing port security grant program from the Maritime Transportation Security Act and replaces it with a less focused grant program that is accessible only to very few ports-- ironically those that have the greatest resources available to pay for port security improvements.

The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA), established a grant program to make Federal funding available to assist ports, terminal facilities, and State and local governments meet maritime security requirements imposed by the act.

This port security grant program is designed to address vulnerabilities that are identified through Coast Guard inspections, area maritime transportation security plans, and facility security plans that are all carried out under the MTSA.

The Safe Port Act removes the port security grant program from the MTSA port security framework. If any changes are made to the program, those changes should enhance the connection between the existing maritime security framework under the MTSA and federal assistance.

I hope that as we move towards conference on this bill that we will continue to work together to strengthen the existing port security grant program.

I also disagree with the bill's proposal to restrict federal port security grants to only select ports or select projects.

I do agree that we need to have criteria and a competitive process to determine which ports and projects should receive the funding; however, I object to the idea that any of our ports should be excluded outright from competing for this federal funding.

Each of our Nation's 361 ports is connected to every part of this Nation through our intermodal transportation system.

If we fail to implement real port security at any of our ports, we are failing in our efforts to secure our Nation from threats in the maritime domain.

Under the MTSA, each port is required to operate under the same maritime security standards regardless of size or location.

As a result, dedicated funding in the form of federal port security grants should be available to address security vulnerabilities at each of our Nation's 361 ports.

In order to allow this important bill to move on an expedited schedule, I have decided not to offer an amendment that would return fairness, equity and effectiveness to the port security grant program.

However, I look forward to working with Chairman King and the other conferees to make these necessary changes as we move to conference on this important bill.

We can improve the grant program without reinventing the grant program.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. LoBiondo) control the remaining amount of my time.

Mr. President, today I come to the Senate, along with my good friend and coauthor, Senator Dan Inouye of Hawaii, to introduce a bill to reauthorize the Magnuson-Stevens Fisheries Conservation and Management Act.

This legislation reauthorizes the law that manages and regulates fisheries in the United States exclusive economic zone. It is cosponsored by Senators Snowe, Cantwell, and Vitter.

The law was originally enacted in 1976. A that time it was titled the Fishery Conservation and Management Act. Senator Warren Magnuson and I developed the law after Warren sent me to monitor the law of the sea negotiations, which took place all over the world. A concept considered during these negotiations was the expansion of a coastal nation's sovereignty over its seaward waters out to 200 miles.

Warren and I took a bipartisan approach to the legislation and developed a bill that established our country's exclusive right to harvest fishery resources from 3 to 200 miles and put in place one of the most successful Federal-State management systems. This system recognized the complexity of our differing fish stocks and the unique regional approaches needed to manage these resources.

This is now the seventh authorization of the act we created over 30 years ago. It is the first reauthorization I have been a part of as chairman of the Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee, which has jurisdiction over this legislation.

The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 2005 implements many of the recommendations made by the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy--the first such commission authorized by Congress to review our nation's ocean policies and laws in over 35 years. This was coauthored by my great friend from South Carolina, Senator Ernest Hollings. The Commission's recommendations were important to the development of this act we present to the Senate today.

The intent of this legislation is to authorize these recommendations and to build on some of the sound fishery management principles we passed in the Sustainable Fisheries Act in 1996, which was the last time we reauthorized the act.

Our bill will preserve and strengthen the regional fishery management councils. The eight regional councils located around the United States and Caribbean Islands are a model of Federal oversight benefiting from local innovation and management approaches. This reauthorization establishes a council training program designed to prepare members for the numerous legal, scientific, economic, and conflict of interest requirements which apply to the fishery management process. In addition, this reauthorization addresses concerns over the transparency of the regional council process--it provides additional financial disclosure requirements for council members and clarifies the act's conflict of interest and recusal requirements.

In order to prevent overfishing and preserve the sustainable harvest of fishery resources in all eight regional council jurisdictions, this bill mandates the use of annual catch limits which shall not be exceeded. Under the 1996 Sustainable Fisheries Act, overfishing of overfished stocks was to end. To meet this goal, we required the implementation of rebuilding plans which would restore any overfished species to sustainable levels. It has been almost 10 years since we passed the Sustainable Fisheries Act and overfishing of overfished stocks remains a significant problem. The legislation we are introducing today requires every fishery management plan to contain an annual catch limit which is set at or below optimum yield, based on the best scientific information available.

This bill also requires that any harvests exceeding the annual catch limit be deducted from the annual catch limit for the following year.

An important recommendation from the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy was to establish national standards for quota programs. Our legislation establishes national guidelines for the harvesting of fish for limited access privilege programs, which are also called LAPPs. These guidelines would require that any LAPP must accomplish important objectives, including: assisting in rebuilding an overfished fishery; reducing capacity in a fishery that is overcapitalized; promoting the safety of human life at sea; promoting conservation and management; and providing a system for monitoring, management, and enforcement of the program.

The regional councils, the administration, and to a lesser extent the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, all recommended we address the inconsistencies between the Magnuson-Stevens Act and the National Environmental Protection Act. They recommended we resolve timeline or ``process'' issues which have required councils to spend much of their time and funding developing litigation-proof environmental impact statements and environmental assessments under NEPA.

This bill provides a uniform process under which councils can consider the substantive requirements of NEPA while adhering to the timelines found in Magnuson-Stevens when they are developing fishery management plans, plan amendments, and regulations.

Several of the provisions in this bill strengthen the role of science in council decisionmaking, which was another strong recommendation made by the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy. Our bill specifies that the scientific and statistical committees, called SSCs, are to provide their councils with on-going scientific advice needed for management decisions. This may include

recommendations on acceptable biological catch or optimum yield, annual catch limits, or other mortality limits. The SSCs are also expected to advise the councils on a variety of other issues, including stock status and health, bycatch, habitat status, and socioeconomic impacts.

We have enhanced the overall effectiveness of this act by improving data collection and management. Our legislation authorizes a national cooperative research and management program, which would be implemented on a regional basis and conducted through partnerships between Federal and State managers, commercial and recreational fishing industry participants, and scientists. This will improve data related to recreational fisheries by establishing a new national program for the registration of marine recreational fishermen who fish in Federal waters. Our legislation also directs the secretary, in cooperation with the councils, to create a regionally based bycatch reduction engineering program which will develop technological devices and engineering techniques for minimizing bycatch, bycatch mortality, and post-release mortality.

The Magnuson-Stevens Act has worked well. It has enabled effective conservation and management of our fishery resources and allowed for sustainable harvests. Both the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy and the Pew Oceans Commission singled out the fisheries managed by the North Pacific Council--which does not have an overfished or endangered species of fish--as an example of proper fisheries management.

Let me say that again. They singled out the fisheries management by the North Pacific Council, which does not have an overfished or endangered species of fish, as an example of proper fisheries management.

The council consistently sets an optimum yield far below the acceptable biological catch, and the fisheries in its jurisdiction have remained sustainable and abundant. That is the North Pacific Council, Mr. President. Our goal is to build upon this success and ensure the sustainability of this resource for generations to come.

Unfortunately, management internationally and especially on the high- seas is lacking. Industrial foreign fleets continue to expand and fish in remote and deep parts of the oceans. When we first developed this legislation over 30 years ago, such practices were unimaginable. The illegal, unreported, and unregulated--we call this IUU--fishing on the high-seas now threatens the good management taking place in U.S. waters that we control.

Our bill strengthens U.S. leadership in international conservation and management. It requires the Secretary of Commerce to establish an international compliance and monitoring program and to provide Congress with reports on our progress in reducing IUU fishing. This bill also requires the Secretary to promote international cooperation and strengthen the ability of regional fishery management organizations to combat IUU and other harmful fishing practices. In addition, this legislation allows the use of measures authorized under the High Seas Driftnet Act to force compliance in cases where regional or international fishery management organizations are unable to stop IUU fishing.

I have been pleased with the bipartisan approach we have taken on this bill. My co-chairman, Senator Inouye, and I have worked together on this reauthorization, and I look forward to working with my colleagues on the Commerce Committee to move this legislation forward.

Mr. President, I introduce today a bill to implement the provisions of the ``Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation on the Conservation and Management of the Alaska-Chukotka Polar Bear Population''. This bill is co-sponsored by Senator Inouye.

The United States-Russia Polar Bear Conservation and Management Implementation Act of 2005 will amend the Marine Mammal Protection Act adding provisions to create a binational U.S. and Russian Polar Bear Commission. This commission will be authorized to determine annual take limits and the adoption of other measures to restrict the taking of polar bears for subsistence purposes. The Commission will also identify polar bear habitats and ``develop recommendations for habitat conservation measures.'' Additionally, it prohibits the possession, import, export, transport, sale, receipt, acquisition, or purchase of any polar bear, or any part or product thereof, that is taken in violation of the Agreement.

This bill will simultaneously support the conservation of U.S. and Russian Polar Bear populations and the historical traditions of indigenous peoples in the arctic region.

This implementing legislation for the Polar Bear Treaty is necessary to establish the needed regulatory and management entities in both the U.S. and Russia. The shared population of Polar Bears that migrate between our two nations deserve the added protections and conservation this bill will provide.

The U.S.-Russian Polar Bear Treaty was completed and signed by both countries on October 16, 2000. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing on the treaty in June of 2003, and reported it out favorably on July 23, 2003. The full Senate agreed to the resolution of advice and consent on the treaty on July 31, 2003. This legislation is needed for the U.S. to ratify and implement the treaty. The administration is supportive of the treaty and the proposed legislation, as are Alaska Natives, the State of Alaska, and conservation groups.

Russia has indicated that once the U.S. ratifies the treaty, it will promptly do the same.