Floor Statements

Mr. President, it is my understanding that Senator Stevens no longer needs to use his time at this time. I believe he will be speaking later. So I ask unanimous consent to vitiate the order that reserved time for Senator Stevens and instead have Senator Hutchison recognized to offer an amendment.

Mr. President, before the Senator from Mississippi has to leave the floor, I want to thank him for his advice and his support as we bring this very important legislation before the Senate for consideration. I very much value the advice and support of the Senator, and I appreciate all he is doing to help move this legislation forward. He has been a very early voice in identifying the flaws in our current intelligence system and has been stalwart in his support for significant reform. I thank the Senator from Mississippi.

I also commend the Senator from Texas for her continued effort to examine the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and to pursue legislative solutions, particularly in the area of improving the security of cargo and general aviation security in general. Senator Hutchison has been a longtime leader in this area. Her amendment encompasses a significant portion of S. 165 that the Senate passed by unanimous consent in May. I commend her for her foresight in recognizing areas of concern that have been singled out by the 9/11 Commission.

In the Commission's report, for example, the Commission noted that:

Major vulnerabilities still exist in cargo and general

aviation security.

The Commission went on to say that:

The TSA and Congress must give priority attention to

improving the ability of screening checkpoints to detect

explosives.

The Commission says:

More attention and resources should be directed to reducing

or mitigating the threat posed by explosives in vessels'

cargo holds.

These are all areas of weakness identified by the Commission that the Senator from Texas would address in her amendment. It will assist in implementing several of the Commission's recommendations and as a whole will help to make our Nation's air passengers, air carriers, and air cargo more secure. I would note that the Department of Homeland Security has no objections to the Senator's amendment. When the roll call does occur, I will be urging our colleagues to support her efforts.

I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I, too, thank our leaders for their cooperation in moving this bill forward. The process they have outlined is a fair one. It will help us know how many amendments there are, and we will work with the sponsors of those amendments to ensure adequate debate.

If the Senator from Florida could tell me how much time he anticipates needing.

Mr. President, we would be happy, in light of the devastation to his State, to give the Senator from Florida 10 minutes, if that would be helpful.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the following cosponsors be added to Collins-Carper-Lieberman-Coleman amendment No. 3705: Senators Voinovich, Leahy, Akaka, Rockefeller, Nelson of Nebraska, and Hagel.

Mr. President, Senator Voinovich, along with Senator Levin, was very instrumental in helping to draft the compromise represented in this amendment. I talked earlier about the efforts of the Senator from Delaware and the Senator from Connecticut, but I also wanted to acknowledge that Senator Voinovich and Senator Levin worked very hard to help us strike the right balance in allocating funding so that large States with high-threat areas would receive additional funding. Yet we wanted to make sure that we recognize that every State, regardless of size or population, has certain vulnerabilities.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. President, Senator Specter is offering the first of what I anticipate will be many amendments to alter the authority of the national intelligence director. He is arguing that the Collins- Lieberman bill does not go far enough. Later on in this debate you will hear from those who believe our bill empowers the NID too far, with too much authority in the NID.

Our approach gives the national intelligence director full budget authority, including the authority to execute, reprogram, and transfer funds over the entire budgets of the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office, which are all now located within the Department of Defense.

Our bill also gives the NID enhanced tasking authority, the power to transfer personnel and authority over the selections of the heads of these agencies with concurrence from the Secretary of Defense.

What it does not do is sever the link between these agencies and the Secretary of Defense, nor does it give the NID exclusive control over these agencies. And that would be the impact of Senator Specter's amendment. He would sever the link between these agencies and the Secretary of Defense, and he would give the NID exclusive control over these agencies. I think that would be a mistake.

I believe our legislation strikes the right balance in the relationship that it sets forth between the NID and these agencies. I note that our approach is consistent with the recommendations of the 9/ 11 Commission. It is consistent with the recommendations of the administration. The 9/11 Commission, indeed, opposes adoption of Senator Specter's amendment. The Commission believes it would be a mistake to sever that link between these agencies and the Secretary of Defense.

In deciding to keep these agencies--the NSA, the NGA, and the NRO-- within the Department of Defense, we were cognizant of the fact that the NSA and the NGA are designated as combat support agencies. We did not want to in any way weaken or break the bonds between these agencies and the military forces that serve in that capacity. Indeed, many current and former defense officials warned that taking such a step would be counterproductive and would risk breaking something that is working well for the military today.

For example, at our hearings, Secretary Powell said:

We should not break the link between these intelligence

organizations and the organizations that they are supporting,

especially within the military context and the direct kind of

support that the NRO and similar organizations give to the

warfighter.

I would note that by severing that link, the Specter amendment would create some real anomalies. For example, in his proposal, he requires that every 2 years, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would submit to the national intelligence director a report on the combat readiness of these organizations. Why would a report on

combat readiness go to the national intelligence director rather than to the Secretary of Defense?

There are some other unanticipated consequences of the Specter amendment that illustrate how wholesale changes to the status of NGA, NRO, and the NSA might have completely unintended consequences. For example, title X, section 442(b) now provides that the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency shall improve means of navigating vessels of the Navy and the merchant marine by providing, under the authority of the Secretary of Defense, accurate and inexpensive nautical charts, sailing directions, books on navigation, and manuals of instructions for the use of all vessels in the United States and of navigators generally. The Specter amendment, in changing the Secretary of Defense to the national intelligence director, would make the national intelligence director responsible for a navigation mapping responsibility that has nothing to do with intelligence. That is just an example of some of the unintended consequences.

Again, the approach taken by Senator Specter--and I know he has given this matter a great deal of thought--does not have the support of the 9/11 Commission. It does not have the support of the administration. It would sever the link between these combat support agencies and the Secretary of Defense.

I will note that these three agencies within the Pentagon do serve customers other than the Secretary of Defense. There are other consumers, such as the CIA, for the intelligence information they produce. That is why our legislation does give the NID significant authority over these agencies, including budget authority, the ability to transfer personnel, and the ability, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense, to name the heads of these agencies. That is the right balance. But to break that link between these agencies and the Secretary of Defense simply, in my judgment, does not make sense.

I urge opposition to the amendment.

Mr. President, I thank the Senator from West Virginia for his excellent comments. He states the case very well.

There are two final points that I would like to make on Senator Specter's amendment, and that is, when we asked Philip Zelikow, the executive director of the 9/11 Commission, to comment on this, he gave us a history of why the Commission specifically rejected this approach, and we talked about many of the reasons.

But one other that he mentioned is that one damaging consequence of stripping NSA, NGA, and NRO out of the Department of Defense is that then the Pentagon might well feel obligated to recreate the capabilities within the Department at great expense and creating many more opportunities for bureaucratic conflict. That was a point made by the executive director in expressing his opposition to Senator Specter's amendment and in giving us an insight into why the Commission specifically rejected the route taken in this amendment.

I also note that Senator Specter's amendment, while it is intended to create clear lines of authority between the NID and the combat support agencies, in reality could well create much ambiguity and confusion. While the amendment gives the NID supervision, direction, and control over these combat support agencies, it keeps them housed in DOD buildings, on DOD land, and the amendment does not take away from the Secretary of Defense the direction and control he currently has over these agencies.

For example, the law that created the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, which is now the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, establishes that Agency under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. Yet under the Specter amendment, the NSA, the NGA, and the NRO would fall under the line authority of both Agencies. I think that would create tremendous confusion and ambiguity.

Mr. President, I see the time for the vote has arrived.

Mr. President, I urge support for Senator Hutchison's amendment.

If the Senator will yield on that point, I think this points out the confusion and ambiguity I pointed out earlier due to the way the Specter amendment is drafted. I agree that it creates confusion and also that the implications of substituting the national intelligence director for the Secretary of Defense throughout the laws creating these agencies creates a lot of unintended problems. That is one reason I believe this amendment should be defeated.

Mr. President, the bottom line of the Specter amendment is that it would sever the reporting relationship between the heads of these three combat support agencies and the Secretary of Defense. I don't think that makes sense. I understand these three agencies serve consumers of intelligence other than the Pentagon, other than the war fighters, but the Pentagon, the war fighter, is a very important consumer of the intelligence produced by these agencies, and that is why in our legislation we gave a lot of thought to how to handle the organization of these agencies and the reporting requirements.

We followed the advice of the 9/11 Commission. We kept a reporting relationship to the Secretary of Defense in acknowledgment of the combat support agency role played by these organizations. But in recognition of the fact that they also provide critical intelligence to the CIA and to a host of other agencies and to the President, we recognized that they are national as well.

What we have is a dual reporting responsibility to both the Secretary of Defense and the new national intelligence director. We do strengthen the control of the national intelligence director in significant ways in acknowledgment that these are national assets. We give the director control over the budget of these agencies. We allow the director to appoint the heads of these agencies with concurrence from the Secretary of Defense. The new national intelligence director can transfer personnel and funds. But we should not sever the link between those agencies and the Secretary of Defense. That would be a big mistake.

I urge my colleagues to oppose the Specter amendment.

I appreciate the support of the chairman of the Armed Services Committee.

The Senator is correct and his points are well taken. In reading to me the statement from that letter, the Senator has brought up another important point. Do we really believe that the national intelligence director should have line authority, day-to-day operational authority over all of those agencies? We know that the 9/11 Commission found that one reason the CIA Director was not as effective as he should be was he had too many jobs. He is head of the intelligence community, he runs the CIA, and he is the principal adviser to the President.

Under the formulation proposed by the Senator from Pennsylvania, we would be worsening that problem by giving the NID line authority, day- to-day operational authority. That person cannot possibly run all of those agencies and still coordinate, oversee, and manage the intelligence community.

So I believe this amendment goes too far. The Specter amendment essentially creates a de facto department of intelligence, as my colleague from Connecticut has pointed out, and that approach was specifically rejected by the 9/11 Commission. They specifically considered what should be the reporting relationships of these three combat support agencies. They rejected the approach taken by the Specter amendment. The administration also opposes that approach. Our committee rejected that approach. Our witnesses did not think that approach was wise.

I urge my colleagues to join in opposition to the amendment offered by Senator Specter.

Mr. President, in committee, some of the Senators who signed that letter participated in the debate. They did not convince the majority of the committee members. So far in this debate today, I don't believe that other advocates of this approach have yet been heard, but they may well be heard tomorrow. I know Senator Bond wants to speak. I think there are both proponents and opponents who still wish to be heard.

The Senator's point is well taken.

It has not.

Mr. President, to answer the question of the Senator from Virginia, I believe it is consistent. I direct the Senator's attention to the very first sentence of this Statement of Administration Policy where it states: ``The Administration supports Senate passage of S. 2845.'' That is the bill before us. That is the bill that is also known as the Collins-Lieberman bill.

Mr. President, to respond to the question of the Senator from Virginia, our bill makes very clear that the budgets for the tactical intelligence programs remain under the authority of the Secretary of Defense. That is consistent with the position of the administration, and it is also consistent with the position of the 9/11 Commission.

What we are seeking to do is to put national intelligence assets--the budget for those programs--under the national intelligence director and, indeed, much of the budget for these agencies is currently within the National Intelligence Program, or what is now known as the NFIP, the National Foreign Intelligence Program, because as the Senator is well aware, these agencies are providing intelligence not just to the combatant commanders, the troops, DOD, but as one of the generals with whom we met told us, he talks far more often to the Director of the CIA than he does to the Secretary of Defense.

If we look at the administration's legislative language they have sent up, they, too, exclude the tactical intelligence assets. I think what this language is intended to convey is, as one of our witnesses said--as many of our witnesses said--the worst thing we could do is to create a national intelligence director who did not have budget authority. That power of the purse is arguably the most important authority given to the NID, but no one, to my knowledge, has advocated giving the NID authority over the tactical intelligence in the Department of Defense.

Yes, that the President has requested for the NID.

What I am telling the Senator is that if he looks at the language sent up by the administration, he will see--and if he looks at the language in our bill, he will see there has never been discussion in putting tactical intelligence--

Mr. President, I say to the Senator, I, obviously, am not the author--

That is correct, other than there may be some programs that are now part of the JMIP that are not principally for--and I see my colleague from Michigan joined us; we had a long debate in committee about this--that are not principally used for joint military purposes, but rather are national intelligence assets, and an example of that would be DIA.

Mr. President, I have no objection. I think that would be helpful.

Mr. President, if the Senator will yield?

I do not want to give the impression that our legislation tracks the administration's legislation in all respects, because it does not. What I was saying to the Chair and to the Senator from Virginia is there has never been support for bringing the tactical intelligence assets, bringing the budget for those programs under the national intelligence director's control. Our legislation specifically carves them out and keeps them under the control of the Pentagon. So I am a bit perplexed by this debate because nobody is proposing what the Senator seems to be fearing.

The full budget authority, in my view, applies to the national intelligence assets.

The Senator is correct.

I would say to the Senator that the Secretary already does have a voice. There is a requirement that as the national intelligence director develops the budget to be recommended to the President, he must do it in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy for the part of the intelligence community that is under the Secretary of Energy's control, et cetera.

In addition, we create a new entity called the joint intelligence community council, which I think already has an acronym, on which the Secretary of Defense will serve, which serves as an advisory board to the national intelligence director.

I also point out to the distinguished Senator from Virginia that ultimately it is the President's call on the budget. These are recommendations made by the national intelligence director. It is the President who ultimately decides.

Those provisions are extremely clear in the bill. I do not see how they can be ambiguous.

I would be happy to put the provisions in the Record. I question why it is necessary when everybody has the bill available. It is on page 12, for example, lines 20 through 25, in describing what the national intelligence director shall do. It says:

Developing and presenting to the President an annual budget

for the National Intelligence Program after consultation with

the heads of agencies or elements, and the heads of their

respective departments . . .

I do not see how it could be clearer.

After Congress acts.

And the law is signed by the President.

The appropriation is received by the NID for the national intelligence program.

Not for what is known as TIARA or JMIP.

Which portion?

Correct.

Mr. President, I apologize for interrupting the Senator.

The leaders have been waiting for Senator Lieberman and me since 5:30 for a meeting and they have summoned us again. I did not want to walk off the floor without explaining to my distinguished colleagues the fact that we have already kept our leaders waiting for more than 20 minutes.

I am sorry, I couldn't hear the Senator.

The Senator is correct. The vote will occur tomorrow.

We do not. We have not been able to determine how many people still want to speak on the amendment. We are trying to accommodate those who do wish to speak.

I would certainly welcome that. Perhaps we can try with the help of the floor staff to order the series of speakers. We will make sure the distinguished chairman of the Intelligence Committee is protected in that regard.

We hope the Senator will be here.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. President, I know the Senator from Kansas is waiting. I need to make a couple of very brief announcements, with the Senator's indulgence.

Amendment No. 3731 to Amendment No. 3705

Mr. President, I have two amendments that have been cleared on both sides. Both of these amendments are second-degree amendments to my underlying amendment No. 3705 regarding Homeland Security grants. Therefore, I ask unanimous consent that the Inhofe- Jeffords second-degree amendment No. 3731, which is at the desk, be considered and agreed to, with the motion to reconsider laid upon the table.

Mr. President, I further ask unanimous consent that the Levin second-degree amendment No. 3732, which is at the desk, now be considered and agreed to, with the motion to reconsider laid upon the table.

Mr. President, I hope we can continue to work on the underlying amendment with the goal of having a vote on it shortly. I also want to announce to all of my colleagues that we do intend to vote on Senator Specter's amendment tomorrow. I recognize there are a few Senators who have not been heard on it who desire to be heard, but we do intend to conclude the debate and vote on Senator Specter's amendment tomorrow.

I thank the Chair.

amendment no. 3731

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the remainder of morning business time on both sides be yielded back.

Mr. President, today the Senate begins an important debate on the National Intelligence Reform Act. This legislation, which I have introduced with my good friend and colleague, Senator Joe Lieberman, represents the most sweeping reform of our intelligence structures in more than 50 years. It reorganizes an intelligence community designed for the Cold War into one designed for the war against global terrorism and future national security threats. It recognizes that the fundamental obligation of government is to protect its citizens and that those protections must evolve along with the threats. It reorders the priorities of an intelligence structure that was devised for a different time and a different enemy.

On July 22, the 9/11 Commission released its final report on terrorist attacks against the United States. On that same day, our leaders, Senator Frist and Senator Daschle, assigned the Governmental Affairs Committee the task of developing legislation addressing the Commission's recommendations to restructure the intelligence agencies within the executive branch. Our committee performed that task with dedication and diligence, and with the active participation of its talented members. From late July until mid-September, we held eight indepth hearings to assess the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. We heard testimony from more than two dozen witnesses, including Secretary of State Powell, Secretary of Homeland Security Ridge, FBI Director Mueller, CIA Director McLaughlin, the 9/11 Commission Cochairmen, Kean and Hamilton, Commissioners Fielding and Gorelick, intelligence experts, field operatives, professors, and representatives of the 9/11 families. As a result of this unprecedented effort and wide-ranging input, the committee has produced the legislation now before the Senate. It is legislation that is comprehensive, bipartisan--indeed, unanimous--and historic.

This legislation is not, however, merely the product of 2 months' work by our committee. It is based upon the work of the 9/11 Commission and the inquiry that spanned 20 months, with 19 days of hearings and 160 witnesses, the review of 2.5 million documents,

and interviews of more than 1,200 individuals in 10 countries. The new intelligence structure we propose in our legislation is built upon a rock-solid foundation of inquiry and information.

In crafting a structure designed for today and for the future, the committee built on the strengths of our current system, recognized the progress that has been made since 9/11, and charted a new course to strengthen our intelligence community. We understood that the 15 agencies that comprise the intelligence community provide a wide range of unique experience, expertise, and viewpoints that must be preserved. We realize that the barriers to information sharing, cooperation, and coordination--what the 9/11 Commission referred to as ``stovepipes''-- must be demolished.

We set as our goal an intelligence structure with the agility that the times and the threats demand, not simply another layer of bureaucracy. We were determined that this new structure not infringe upon the freedoms that Americans cherish.

This legislation uses the Commission's recommendations as our guide and these principles as our compass. It begins with the creation of the position of national intelligence director. The NID will be the head of our intelligence community and the principal adviser to the President of the United States. As the head of the new National Intelligence Authority, this Presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed official will truly be in charge of our intelligence community. No longer will there be confusion and doubt about who is in charge and accountable. The answer will clearly be the national intelligence director.

The director will have broad authority to unify and strengthen our intelligence community's efforts and to eliminate barriers that impede the coordination of intelligence activities. He or she will set standards for information sharing and classification across the intelligence community and develop an integrated, coordinated communications network. His responsibility will be to turn the stovepipes that separate our intelligence community into conduits that promote cooperation. Along with this responsibility will come strong authority to direct budgetary and personnel resources where they are needed most.

To illustrate why these authorities are crucial, consider this passage from the 9/11 Commission Report.

In late 1998, it had become increasingly apparent that Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida posed a direct, immediate, and deadly threat to the United States. On December 4 of that year, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet issued this memorandum. I quote from it:

We are at war. I want no resources or people spared in this

effort, either inside CIA or the Community.

You may ask, What is the result of this clear, concise and direct order from the head of our intelligence community.

According to the Commission:

The memorandum had little overall effect on mobilizing the

CIA or the intelligence community.

Why did it have so little impact? The expert witnesses before our committee and before the Commission provided the answer. Under the current structure, the DCI is responsible for managing the intelligence community but does not have the real authority to do so. No organization can succeed with such a disconnect between responsibility and authority.

At our committee hearing on September 13, I asked Secretaries Powell and Ridge what I consider to be the bottom-line question in this debate. I asked them both: Do you believe that a strong national intelligence director with enhanced power to set collection priorities, to task the collection of intelligence, will improve the quality of intelligence that you both need in your capacity as policymakers?

Each answered with an enthusiastic and unambiguous ``yes.'' As Secretary Powell put it, our intelligence team needs, and I quote the Secretary, ``a stronger, empowered quarterback.'' The Collins-Lieberman bill would provide that quarterback.

Perhaps the most important power that we provide to the national intelligence director is the power of the purse. In order to foster cooperation throughout the intelligence community, the NID will have control over the budget for national intelligence. Currently, that funding is largely funneled through the Department of Defense, and the director of the CIA has only very limited authority over the overall resources of the intelligence community.

Under the Collins-Lieberman bill, the NID, in consultation with the agency and department heads, will develop and recommend an intelligence budget to the President. After congressional action, it will be the NID who receives the appropriations for what will be known as the national intelligence program. The NID will also have significant authority to reprogram and transfer funds so that he can marshal the resources needed to counter a threat.

Never again should we have the kind of situation we saw with the directives issued by George Tenet in December of 1998, calling on the marshaling of resources and yet nothing happens.

After careful consideration, the committee decided to declassify only the aggregate figure for the national intelligence program. The Collins-Lieberman bill does not require the declassification of the budget totals for the various agencies that make up the NIP. Our witnesses generally urged great caution in going that far; instead, we require the directors to report to Congress on whether further declassification of budget totals is appropriate.

The NID will allocate the budget to the various intelligence agencies in accordance with the appropriations determined by the Congress. That includes agencies such as the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and parts of the Defense Intelligence Agency which serve national intelligence consumers but are located within the Department of Defense. In recognition of the dual roles played by these important agencies, which provide critical intelligence not only to the Department of Defense but also to the CIA and other national customers, our bill keeps these agencies within the department but strengthens the NID's authority over them.

It is important to emphasize that nothing in the national intelligence agency's authority will in any way hinder military operations or readiness. Tactical and joint military intelligence programs will remain under the control of the Pentagon and outside the national intelligence program as they are today. The Collins-Lieberman bill will not affect the tactical intelligence assets of the Army, Air Force, Navy, or Marines. This bill will not impede the flow of real- time actionable intelligence that our war fighters require. In fact, by strengthening and improving the collection and analysis of intelligence, our legislation should improve the quality of intelligence provided to Pentagon officials and the combatant commanders.

The members of the intelligence community collect a vast amount of information, but the Commission found that we have a weak system for processing and transmitting this information where it is needed. As the 9/11 report reveals, this weakness has been evident during many terrorist attacks over many years. It took an attack that claimed the lives of 3,000 people for this weakness to be fully exposed, and now it cannot be ignored.

Our legislation contains strong provisions that make information sharing the rule, not the exception, and requires integrated communications networks to be developed, a serious deficiency in our current system which Senator Durbin highlighted in our hearings. We simply can no longer tolerate a system where the pieces of the puzzle are not assembled, where the CIA and the FBI each have vital, urgent, and compelling information, but no one puts the picture together.

The second major Commission recommendation included in our bill is the establishment of a national counterterrorism center. It would expand the communitywide intelligence analysis capabilities of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center established by the President last year.

A major benefit of this new center is that much of its staff will be drawn from the various intelligence agencies now scattered across the Federal Government. These intelligence experts will work side by side sharing and analyzing information, gaining an understanding of each other's mission, and

creating a culture of cooperation. A significant responsibility of the NCTC will be joint planning. The center will have the authority to develop plans that include a mission, objectives to be achieved, courses of action, and recommendations from operational plans. Moreover, the center will assign responsibilities for counterterrorism operations to the agencies as set forth in these plans.

As an example of how this might work, the NCTC would have the authority to create an interagency plan to dismantle a particular al- Qaida cell. The center would assign specific tasks to the appropriate agencies. But I want to be clear that the NCTC would not have the authority to tell any agency how it must execute that task, nor will it be in the military chain of command. Should an agency object to the NCTC assignment, the national intelligence director could either accede to the objection or appeal to the President to resolve the conflict.

These provisions are important. They will ensure an integrated approach to operational planning. We are not telling the various agencies precisely how to carry out the plan, how to execute it, but we will make sure that someone is looking at plans that span agencies, and in doing the planning when it affects more than one agency, when it is joint.

The legislation also includes provisions recommended by the Commission and authored by Senator Voinovich that streamline and standardize the system for security clearances, a system that we have heard, over and over again, is inconsistent, slow, and backlogged. An important provision requires the President to designate a single agency to handle security clearances for Government employees and contractors.

The final chapter of the 9/11 report, the chapter that outlines the recommendations we seek to implement, begins with this statement:

Some of the saddest aspects of the 9/11 story are the

outstanding efforts of so many individual officials

straining, often without success, against the boundaries of

the possible. Good people can overcome bad structures. They

should not have to.

This summarizes one of the major reasons we need reform. We have a system now that does not allow us to respond with agility to the threats we face today.

As this next chart shows, in our legislation we are not adding a layer of bureaucracy, nor are we breaking up individual agencies, nor are we creating a new department of intelligence. We are, instead, creating a new structure for cooperation, accountability, and results. Our legislation gives the good people in our intelligence community the structure they deserve. It also takes steps recommended by Senator Jay Rockefeller, the vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee, to ensure that we will always have good people. It creates a scholarship program to encourage bright young Americans to join the intelligence community and it will enable veteran intelligence officers to enhance their skills. Intelligence reform requires this investment in human capital. We also create a reserve corps of retired intelligence officers who can be called upon when their special skills and judgment are needed.

Our bill also creates a civil liberties board as recommended by the Commission and strengthened by amendments offered by Senator Durbin. Nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, the members of this board will advise agencies of the civil liberties ramifications of policies before they are adopted and then will conduct oversight.

In addition, our legislation will create both a civil liberties and privacy officer as part of the new national intelligence authority.

The fundamental obligation of any government is to protect its citizens. The American Government has an additional obligation to protect the freedom of its citizens. Our legislation does not ask the American people to choose between security and liberty. We firmly believe that no such choice is necessary. Our structure reflects that belief.

To help ensure a smooth transition from the current structure to the new, the bill provides a 6-month phase-in period that gives the President considerable discretion in implementing these reforms. We will not let our guard down during any point in this process.

We also recognize that reforms of this magnitude require continued and careful congressional oversight and review. The bill includes a provision recommended by former Senator Warren Rudman that requires a report to Congress on implementation of these reforms after 1 year. As a result of an amendment offered by Senator Pryor, it also includes a useful requirement for a government accountability study and report to Congress.

As I have indicated, this legislation is the product of a concerted effort by the Governmental Affairs Committee. It reflects the recommendations of other committees and it builds upon the work of the 9/11 Commission. But it is important to know that the 9/11 Commission did not start from scratch, either. Its work takes into account nearly a half century of studies on intelligence reform dating back to the Eisenhower administration.

The titles of the studies and commissions reads like a ``Who's Who'' of 20th century military, intelligence, and diplomatic expertise: Hoover, Doolittle, Schlesinger, Rockefeller, Scowcroft, to name just a few. These studies were conducted under a variety of conditions and threats but a central theme emerges: America's intelligence system is hindered by a fragmented structure and compartmentalized thinking.

Our past failure to act on these many studies, which spans decades, which is repeated over and over again, is why we are here today. For example, the Boren-McCurdy legislation of 1992 realized the emerging threat of the post-Cold War era, terrorism, and weapons proliferation. Using the successful restructurings of the military since World War II as models, the National Security Act of 1947 and the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, this legislation called for the creation--yes, you guessed it, Mr. President--the creation of a national director of intelligence with strong authority similar to what we propose today.

The Boren-McCurdy Act was not adopted. At the same time that those reforms were being set aside for another day, one component of our intelligence community had identified Osama bin Laden as the mastermind behind a foiled plot to bomb American troops. Another noted bin Laden's close ties to a known terrorist who was later revealed as the architect of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Yet another considered bin Laden to be nothing more than an extremist financier. Information that could have led to effective action against bin Laden a decade ago was there, but it was not shared or acted on. In 1996, the Aspin-Brown Commission reached the same post-Cold War conclusion and made very similar reform recommendations. The result: yet another failure by Congress to take action.

Meanwhile, our intelligence community was starting to agree that bin Laden had started something called al-Qaida and that it was some kind of terrorist army. As the 9/11 Commission notes, however, every relevant member of the intelligence community had a different plan for dealing with bin Laden and al-Qaida, from cruise missiles to diplomacy with the Taliban. While these conflicting plans were butting heads, two American Embassies in Africa were bombed, the attack on the USS Cole was approved, and what became known as the Planes Operation was taking shape.

The need for reform was made clear by the 9/11 Commission's exhaustive study on the intelligence failures that preceded the murder of 3,000 innocent people on September 11, 2001. In late July of this year, as the Governmental Affairs Committee's work began, Washington, New York City, and northern New Jersey were placed under elevated terrorist alert, an alert that is still very much evident at the intersections of this city today. Our committee work neared its conclusion as terrorists murdered once again, this time at a schoolhouse in Russia.

These terrible events, combined with the slaughter we have seen in Bali, Istanbul, Madrid, Jerusalem, Jakarta, and so many other places, leaves no doubt that the enemy we face has both a global reach and an unlimited capacity for cruelty. Our response must be far reaching, and it must unleash America's capacity to meet any challenge. This legislation is an essential part of that response.

The calls for reform go back 50 years. For nearly 2 years, the 9/11 Commission conducted an investigation of unprecedented depth. Our committee produced comprehensive legislation with unanimous support.

Hardly a day passes in which we do not see new evidence of terrorism's depravity. Yet there are still some who say: We should wait. We need more information. Under the current threat of terrorist attack, the time is not right. The charged atmosphere of the election season is not the right environment for such important decisions.

I ask, What more information do we need? Look at the list of witnesses who appeared before the 9/11 Commission and our committee. What point of view has not been heard? What area of expertise was not explored? What more compelling evidence do we need before we act?

I ask, If the time is not right now, when will the right time come? When will there be no threats? I ask, What could be more cynical than our failure to act on something of such critical importance to the citizens of our country?

At our very first Commission hearing on July 30, Commission Chairman Thomas Kean spoke on the need to move forward with these reforms. This is what he said--and I hope we will heed his words--

These people are planning to attack us again and trying to

attack us sooner, rather than later. Every delay we have in

changing structures or changing people . . . to make that

less likely is a delay the American people can't tolerate.

Yes, we can wait. We can wait until the day when we know everything we possibly can know, when there are no more threats, when the American people do not expect their leaders to lead. We can wait until the day another attack leaves us all wondering once again why we did not see it coming.

That first day will never come. If we do not act, the second surely will.

Thank you, Mr. President.

Madam President, I thank the Senator from West Virginia for his eloquent statement of support for this legislation. As vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, he brings extraordinary knowledge to this debate. We are very grateful for his contributions to the Collins-Lieberman bill.

As both Senator Lieberman and I mentioned, Senator Rockefeller responded to our request for input and advice. We incorporated into our legislation several of the suggestions he provided. We are very grateful to have his support. It means a great deal as we proceed with this debate.

Madam President, I thank the chairman of the Commerce Committee, the distinguished Senator from Arizona, for his contributions to this entire enterprise. I am very grateful to have his support for the underlying bill drafted by Senator Lieberman and myself. And I very much appreciate his offering of the first amendment to strengthen the bill still further, by adding one of the recommendations made by the 9/11 Commission.

As the Senator indicated, the Governmental Affairs Committee largely confined its review to the major recommendations of the Commission that had to do with the reorganization of our intelligence community. That does not mean, however, that we slight in any way the many other recommendations made by the Commission. The amendment of the Senator from Arizona would implement the transportation security recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.

It is my understanding the Senator's amendment was drafted in consultation with officials from the Department of Homeland Security. I believe it will help make our Nation more secure. Specifically, the 9/ 11 Commission recommended establishing a national strategy for transportation security, assigning responsibility for the no-fly list to the Transportation Security Administration, and enhancing passenger and cargo screening.

The amendment offered by the Senator will require the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security to develop and implement a national strategy for transportation security and to revise and update that strategy as necessary to improve or maintain its currency.

I particularly want to comment on the provisions of the McCain amendment that task the TSA with the responsibility of developing the no-fly list and comparing the names of air passengers against the Government database containing the consolidated terrorist watch list.

I think recent incidents in the news show why it is a good idea for the Transportation Security Administration to have that authority rather than vesting it in the airlines, as is now the case. I would indicate to my colleagues that the Department of Homeland Security agrees with Senator McCain that it is the more appropriate entity to perform this matching of names against the Government's database.

Two incidents which come to mind are, first, one of our colleagues, the senior Senator from Massachusetts, finding that he had difficulty boarding flights because of confusion with the names listed on the terrorist database. I have a similar case of a retired physician in Camden, ME, whose name, unfortunately, including his middle initial, is very similar to a name that is on the terrorist watch list. As a result, this retired physician, who is no more a terrorist than you or I, Madam President, has an extremely difficult time every single time he flies. That shows me that we need to do a far better job of improving the quality of that watch list to make sure it is consolidated but also to make sure it is accurate and that people who have similar names are not needlessly subjected to an in-depth search or even denied boarding privileges altogether.

The second incident involves the singer formerly known as Cat Stevens, who was allowed to board an air flight from London to the United States recently because the airline was using a list that did not include all of the names on the terrorist watch list. So clearly we have a problem in that direction as well. There are too many watch lists. They need to be consolidated.

The quality of information on those lists needs to be improved to make sure innocent Americans are not needlessly targeted, and it should be a Government responsibility--that of the Transportation Security Administration--to maintain and check these databases against the lists of airline passengers. It is really not fair to ask the airlines to accept that responsibility, particularly when they may not have access to the entire database that the Government has compiled.

The McCain amendment appropriately vests in the Transportation Security Administration the responsibility for the no-fly list and for checking airline passengers against this list. I again emphasize that the Department of Homeland Security agrees that TSA should assume that responsibility and it should no longer be carried out by the airlines.

For these reasons, I urge adoption of the McCain amendment. I believe it strengthens the Collins-Lieberman bill by incorporating some worthwhile and commonsense recommendations made by the 9/11 Commission in the area of airline security.

Madam President, I thank the distinguished Senator from California for her longstanding expertise in this area. I know the Senator presented a bill to create a national intelligence director long before it was popular to do so. She has been a leader in intelligence reform. She has made several very constructive and helpful suggestions and recommendations to the committee. We very much appreciate her leadership, and we consider it a great coup to have her support for our legislation.

I thank her for her hard work and her leadership. We look forward to continuing to work with her.

Mr. President, I appreciate the commitment of the Senator from Oregon to work with us on this issue. I certainly understand his frustration at a tendency to overclassify information that it is not warranted to be classified, that is not necessary to protect intelligence sources and methods.

I note a couple of points. One is that the Collins-Lieberman bill vests in the national intelligence director the authority to establish requirements and procedures for the classification of intelligence information.

Another portion of our bill requires the national intelligence director to establish intelligence-reporting guidelines that maximize the dissemination of information, while protecting intelligence sources and methods.

In addition, the administration has expressed grave reservations about the amendment as it is now drafted.

What I would like to suggest and what the Senator from Oregon has graciously offered to do is have our staff on both sides of the aisle sit down with the Senator, see if we can address some of the administration's concerns, see if we can look at language that is already in the bill, and understand how that interacts with the Senator's proposal.

I thank him for his commitment to this area. He has identified a very real problem. I hope, perhaps, we can come up with an approach that will address his concerns.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President, it is my understanding that the senior Senator from Maine, Senator Snowe, is on her way to the floor to speak to the amendment temporarily laid aside.

Before the Senator from Florida leaves the floor, I want to thank him for all the work he has done in this area. The Senator recently spent about an hour with me, sharing some of his experiences as chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee. He has a great deal of knowledge and expertise, and I very much appreciated his taking the time to give me the benefit of his thoughts on intelligence reform. I am also the proud owner of his book, which is on my bedside table right now and is very appropriate reading as we do this debate. I thank him for his contributions. Like Senator Lieberman, I look forward to working with him, Senator Wyden, Senator Snowe, Senator Lott, on the amendment they have proposed.

Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk on behalf of myself, Senator Carper, and Senator Lieberman.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. President, I will not debate this amendment tonight. I wanted to alert our colleagues that this amendment represents the work of the Governmental Affairs Committee to reform and improve and strengthen the formula for the allocation of Homeland Security grant moneys. Our committee has held several hearings over the last 2 years on this issue. This legislation reflects the result of those hearings. It also parallels the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission,

that the formula needs to be revised so that it is more of a threat- based formula.

We worked very hard to come up with a compromise on the committee. We maintained the minimum that each State would get to ensure that every State can respond to its preparedness needs. But we also rewrote the formula in recognition of the fact that some areas of our country, some States, are indeed high-threat areas.

This legislation represents a careful balance that reflects the membership of our committee, which includes both large-State Senators, such as Senator Levin of Michigan, and small-State Senators, such as Senator Carper of Delaware. Senator Levin, in particular, I recognize for his very hard work on revising the formula. As I said--and I see members of the leadership on the floor--we will not debate this at length tonight. I did want to send the amendment to the desk.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the following Governmental Affairs Committee detailees be granted floor privileges during the duration of this bill: Deborah Barger, Donald Bumgardner, Keith Herrington, Keith Janssen, William Murray, Edward Priestap, and Cornelius Southall.

Mr. President, I congratulate the senior Senator from Maine for her comments and her work on this issue. As a member of the Intelligence Committee she has understood very early the need for significant intelligence reform. The provisions included in the Collins-Lieberman bill that created an inspector general for the new national intelligence authority are the direct result of the legislation sponsored by the senior Senator from Maine.

I thank the Senator for her expertise and her leadership. This is an area, as she indicated, on which she has been working for many years. We very much value her contributions to the debate.

I know of no other requests to speak tonight.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, which the Committee on Governmental Affairs is reporting today, be printed in the Record.

There being no objection the bill was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, which the Committee on Governmental Affairs is reporting today, be printed in the Record.

There being no objection the bill was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

Mr. President, I rise today to introduce legislation to address the inability of promising, talented young athletes from other countries to play for sports teams in the United States, such as the MAINEiacs, a junior league hockey team in Lewiston, ME. This year's shortage of H-2B nonimmigrant visas for temporary or seasonal nonagricultural foreign workers is a matter of great concern to me and to many in my home State of Maine. In early March, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services announced that the congressionally mandated cap of 66,000 H-2B visas would soon be met. It immediately stopped accepting applications for these visas. This meant that thousands of employers in Maine and across the United States who rely on the H-2B program have been in a very difficult position this summer.

For example, Maine's tourism and hospitality industry, as well as its forest products industry, have been particularly hard-pressed to find enough American workers to keep their businesses running at normal levels during what is their busiest time of year. What many people do not know, however, is that the H-2B visa shortage has also meant that hundreds of promising athletes have been unable to come to the United States to play for minor league and amateur sports teams across the Nation.

Those affected by the H-2B problem are not confined to just one industry or one State. That is why I cosponsored two pieces of legislation that would immediately address this problem: S. 2252, the Save the Summer Act, introduced by Senator Kennedy, and S. 2258, the Summer Operations and Services (SOS) Relief and Reform Act, introduced by Senators Hatch and Chambliss. The former would increase the H-2B visa cap by 40,000 this fiscal year, while the

latter would exclude from the cap returning foreign workers who were counted against the cap within the past 2 years. It has become clear, however, that until this legislation comes before the full Senate for a vote, we must continue to actively seek alternative solutions to this problem.

One issue we must address is the problem facing the many minor league professional teams, as well as junior league hockey teams, that rely on H-2B visas. Without these visas, sports teams in Maine and across the Nation have been unable to bring some of their most talented prospects to the United States. Major League sports have also lost a traditional source of talent for their teams.

In my home State of Maine, for example, the Lewiston MAINEiacs, a Canadian junior hockey league team, has been unable to obtain the H-2b visas necessary for the majority of its players to remain in the United States to play in the team's first home games this September. Although these players range in age from 16 to 20, the majority of them are between 16 and 18 years old and are required during the hockey season to balance the demands of athletics and academics. These scholar- athletes are among Canada's most talented junior players, but due to the shortage of H-2B visas, they are in danger of missing out on a tremendous opportunity to improve their skills and, possibly, graduate to a career in professional hockey. In addition, for each home game that the team must cancel or reschedule, the economic impact on the city of Lewiston, and nearby Auburn, in terms of lost hotel and restaurant revenue will be considerable.

The Portland Sea Dogs, a Double-A level baseball team affiliated with the Boston Red Sox, also relies on H-2B visas to bring several of its most skilled players to the United States. Thousands of fans come out each year to see this team, and others like it across the country, play what is arguably one of America's favorite sports. This year, however, approximately 300 talented young, foreign baseball players have been prevented from coming to the U.S. to play for minor league teams, a proving ground for athletes hoping to make it to the Major Leagues.

The P-1 nonimmigrant visa is used by athletes who are deemed by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services as performing at an ``internationally recognized level of performance.'' Unfortunately, USCIS has interpreted this visa category to exclude these talented minor and amateur league athletes. This visa is typically reserved for only those athletes who have already been promoted to Major League sports. However, none of these promising athletes is likely to earn a Major League contract if the players are not first permitted to hone their skills, and to prove themselves, in the minor leagues. This problem can easily be solved by expanding the P-1 visa category to include minor league athletes, as well as those amateur-level athletes, like the Lewiston MAINEiacs, who have demonstrated a significant likelihood of graduating to the major leagues.

I have received a letter from officials from Major League Baseball, which strongly supports the expansion of the P-1 visa category to include professional minor league baseball players. I ask unanimous consent to print this letter in the Record. As the League points out, by making P-1 visas available to this group of athletes, teams would be able to make player development decisions based on the talent of its players, without being constrained by visa quotas. The P-1 category, the League argues, is appropriate for minor league players because these are the players that the Major League Clubs have selected as some of the best baseball prospects in the world.

There is no question that Americans are passionate about sports. We have high expectations for our teams, and demand only the best from our athletes. By expanding the P-1 visa category, we will make it possible for athletes to be selected based on talent and skill, rather than nationality. I ask that we act quickly to amend the law to make this possible.

Mr. President, I rise today to introduce legislation to address the inability of promising, talented young athletes from other countries to play for sports teams in the United States, such as the MAINEiacs, a junior league hockey team in Lewiston, ME. This year's shortage of H-2B nonimmigrant visas for temporary or seasonal nonagricultural foreign workers is a matter of great concern to me and to many in my home State of Maine. In early March, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services announced that the congressionally mandated cap of 66,000 H-2B visas would soon be met. It immediately stopped accepting applications for these visas. This meant that thousands of employers in Maine and across the United States who rely on the H-2B program have been in a very difficult position this summer.

For example, Maine's tourism and hospitality industry, as well as its forest products industry, have been particularly hard-pressed to find enough American workers to keep their businesses running at normal levels during what is their busiest time of year. What many people do not know, however, is that the H-2B visa shortage has also meant that hundreds of promising athletes have been unable to come to the United States to play for minor league and amateur sports teams across the Nation.

Those affected by the H-2B problem are not confined to just one industry or one State. That is why I cosponsored two pieces of legislation that would immediately address this problem: S. 2252, the Save the Summer Act, introduced by Senator Kennedy, and S. 2258, the Summer Operations and Services (SOS) Relief and Reform Act, introduced by Senators Hatch and Chambliss. The former would increase the H-2B visa cap by 40,000 this fiscal year, while the

latter would exclude from the cap returning foreign workers who were counted against the cap within the past 2 years. It has become clear, however, that until this legislation comes before the full Senate for a vote, we must continue to actively seek alternative solutions to this problem.

One issue we must address is the problem facing the many minor league professional teams, as well as junior league hockey teams, that rely on H-2B visas. Without these visas, sports teams in Maine and across the Nation have been unable to bring some of their most talented prospects to the United States. Major League sports have also lost a traditional source of talent for their teams.

In my home State of Maine, for example, the Lewiston MAINEiacs, a Canadian junior hockey league team, has been unable to obtain the H-2b visas necessary for the majority of its players to remain in the United States to play in the team's first home games this September. Although these players range in age from 16 to 20, the majority of them are between 16 and 18 years old and are required during the hockey season to balance the demands of athletics and academics. These scholar- athletes are among Canada's most talented junior players, but due to the shortage of H-2B visas, they are in danger of missing out on a tremendous opportunity to improve their skills and, possibly, graduate to a career in professional hockey. In addition, for each home game that the team must cancel or reschedule, the economic impact on the city of Lewiston, and nearby Auburn, in terms of lost hotel and restaurant revenue will be considerable.

The Portland Sea Dogs, a Double-A level baseball team affiliated with the Boston Red Sox, also relies on H-2B visas to bring several of its most skilled players to the United States. Thousands of fans come out each year to see this team, and others like it across the country, play what is arguably one of America's favorite sports. This year, however, approximately 300 talented young, foreign baseball players have been prevented from coming to the U.S. to play for minor league teams, a proving ground for athletes hoping to make it to the Major Leagues.

The P-1 nonimmigrant visa is used by athletes who are deemed by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services as performing at an ``internationally recognized level of performance.'' Unfortunately, USCIS has interpreted this visa category to exclude these talented minor and amateur league athletes. This visa is typically reserved for only those athletes who have already been promoted to Major League sports. However, none of these promising athletes is likely to earn a Major League contract if the players are not first permitted to hone their skills, and to prove themselves, in the minor leagues. This problem can easily be solved by expanding the P-1 visa category to include minor league athletes, as well as those amateur-level athletes, like the Lewiston MAINEiacs, who have demonstrated a significant likelihood of graduating to the major leagues.

I have received a letter from officials from Major League Baseball, which strongly supports the expansion of the P-1 visa category to include professional minor league baseball players. I ask unanimous consent to print this letter in the Record. As the League points out, by making P-1 visas available to this group of athletes, teams would be able to make player development decisions based on the talent of its players, without being constrained by visa quotas. The P-1 category, the League argues, is appropriate for minor league players because these are the players that the Major League Clubs have selected as some of the best baseball prospects in the world.

There is no question that Americans are passionate about sports. We have high expectations for our teams, and demand only the best from our athletes. By expanding the P-1 visa category, we will make it possible for athletes to be selected based on talent and skill, rather than nationality. I ask that we act quickly to amend the law to make this possible.

Madam President, I am very pleased to join my good friend, the Senator from Connecticut, Mr. Lieberman, in introducing legislation that will strengthen our capabilities to prevent and respond to acts of terrorism. The bill we are introducing will improve communications among the various levels of Government and will assist our State and local first responders in upgrading their communications equipment. I thank Senator Lieberman and his staff for their efforts in putting together this very important legislation and for working with me to make this bill a bipartisan effort.

In the immediate aftermath of September 11, the phrase ``connect the dots'' gained a prominent place in our national lexicon. The agencies charged with intelligence gathering, analysis, and enforcement did not have structures in place that would have enabled them to effectively share information and coordinate responses. The dots were there, but our intelligence and law enforcement personnel were, in far too many cases, unable to connect them.

The heroism of our first responders on September 11 will never be forgotten. Their devotion to duty, their courage, and their training saved a great many lives that terrible day. Yet we now know that the lack of a unified command structure, the uneven and in some cases outright absence of interdepartmental coordination and incompatible communications equipment may have prevented them from saving even more lives, and it cost many first responders their own lives.

Throughout the Nation on that day, there was another problem. False reports of car bombings and other terrorist acts spread quickly, overwhelming the immediate efforts and response, preventing a full comprehension of what had actually occurred, and causing needless fear. Our frontline civilian and military agencies struggled to improvise a defense against an attack of unknown nature and scope. As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff told the 9/11 Commission:

We fought many phantoms that day.

The enemy we are fighting is no phantom. It is real, and it is deadly. From the agencies of the Federal Government down to the State and local levels, we have dedicated personnel who can defeat that enemy. We must enable them to work together more effectively in this great cause. We cannot expect them to connect the dots if so many dots are hidden from view.

Although the Department of Homeland Security has made remarkable progress in forging cohesive strategies, State and local officials still tell Senator Lieberman and they still tell me that they have difficulty in obtaining needed information from Federal agencies and that they lack a reliable way to convey their own information to Federal officials.

Turf battles, unfortunately, are still being fought among some agencies. There still is no effective system in place for State and local governments to share information with one another.

From computer systems to emergency radios, the technology that should allow these different levels of government to communicate with each other too often is silenced by incompatibility. Clearly, the barrier to a truly unified effort against terrorism is a matter of both culture and equipment. This legislation will help break down that barrier.

A General Accounting Office report on interoperable communications released last week notes that the lives of first responders and those they are trying to assist can be lost when first responders cannot communicate effectively. That is the crux of the matter that the Lieberman-Collins bill seeks to address. A substantial barrier to effective communications, according to the GAO, is the use of incompatible wireless equipment by many agencies and levels of government when they are responding to a major emergency.

Among the GAO recommendations are that Federal grants be used to encourage States to develop and implement plans to improve interoperable communications and that the Department of Homeland Security needs to establish a long-term program to coordinate these same communications upgrades throughout the Federal Government. Our legislation would do much to implement these sensible recommendations.

It is vitally important that we assist the States in getting the right communications technology into the hands of their first responders. That would be accomplished by the interoperability grant program in this legislation. I believe that grant program is the most important feature of our legislation.

At a homeland security conference held in my home State of Maine in May, one of the most persistent messages that I heard from Maine's first responders concerned the lack of compatibility in communications equipment. It remains a substantial impediment to their ability to respond effectively in the event of a terrorist attack. For a State like mine that has three deepwater cargo ports, two international airports, key defense installations, hundreds of miles of coastline, and a long international border, compatible communications equipment is essential. Yet it remains an illusive goal.

Maine's firefighters, police officers, and emergency medical personnel do an amazing job in providing aid when a neighboring town is in need. Fires, floods, and accidents are local matters in which they have great expertise and experience. Their defense of the front lines in the war against terrorism, however, is a national matter. Maine's first responders, along with first responders across the country, are doing their part, but they need and deserve Federal help.

The grant program established by our bill would guarantee every State a share of interoperability funding and makes additional funding available for States with special needs and vulnerabilities. It is designed to get this vital funding to first responders quickly, in coordination with a statewide plan.

At that Maine conference, I was joined by Under Secretary Asa Hutchinson. He, perhaps, best described the mutual responsibilities of this Federal-State partnership when he said:

We cannot secure the homeland of America from Washington,

Madam President, I am very pleased to join my good friend, the Senator from Connecticut, Mr. Lieberman, in introducing legislation that will strengthen our capabilities to prevent and respond to acts of terrorism. The bill we are introducing will improve communications among the various levels of Government and will assist our State and local first responders in upgrading their communications equipment. I thank Senator Lieberman and his staff for their efforts in putting together this very important legislation and for working with me to make this bill a bipartisan effort.

In the immediate aftermath of September 11, the phrase ``connect the dots'' gained a prominent place in our national lexicon. The agencies charged with intelligence gathering, analysis, and enforcement did not have structures in place that would have enabled them to effectively share information and coordinate responses. The dots were there, but our intelligence and law enforcement personnel were, in far too many cases, unable to connect them.

The heroism of our first responders on September 11 will never be forgotten. Their devotion to duty, their courage, and their training saved a great many lives that terrible day. Yet we now know that the lack of a unified command structure, the uneven and in some cases outright absence of interdepartmental coordination and incompatible communications equipment may have prevented them from saving even more lives, and it cost many first responders their own lives.

Throughout the Nation on that day, there was another problem. False reports of car bombings and other terrorist acts spread quickly, overwhelming the immediate efforts and response, preventing a full comprehension of what had actually occurred, and causing needless fear. Our frontline civilian and military agencies struggled to improvise a defense against an attack of unknown nature and scope. As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff told the 9/11 Commission:

We fought many phantoms that day.

The enemy we are fighting is no phantom. It is real, and it is deadly. From the agencies of the Federal Government down to the State and local levels, we have dedicated personnel who can defeat that enemy. We must enable them to work together more effectively in this great cause. We cannot expect them to connect the dots if so many dots are hidden from view.

Although the Department of Homeland Security has made remarkable progress in forging cohesive strategies, State and local officials still tell Senator Lieberman and they still tell me that they have difficulty in obtaining needed information from Federal agencies and that they lack a reliable way to convey their own information to Federal officials.

Turf battles, unfortunately, are still being fought among some agencies. There still is no effective system in place for State and local governments to share information with one another.

From computer systems to emergency radios, the technology that should allow these different levels of government to communicate with each other too often is silenced by incompatibility. Clearly, the barrier to a truly unified effort against terrorism is a matter of both culture and equipment. This legislation will help break down that barrier.

A General Accounting Office report on interoperable communications released last week notes that the lives of first responders and those they are trying to assist can be lost when first responders cannot communicate effectively. That is the crux of the matter that the Lieberman-Collins bill seeks to address. A substantial barrier to effective communications, according to the GAO, is the use of incompatible wireless equipment by many agencies and levels of government when they are responding to a major emergency.

Among the GAO recommendations are that Federal grants be used to encourage States to develop and implement plans to improve interoperable communications and that the Department of Homeland Security needs to establish a long-term program to coordinate these same communications upgrades throughout the Federal Government. Our legislation would do much to implement these sensible recommendations.

It is vitally important that we assist the States in getting the right communications technology into the hands of their first responders. That would be accomplished by the interoperability grant program in this legislation. I believe that grant program is the most important feature of our legislation.

At a homeland security conference held in my home State of Maine in May, one of the most persistent messages that I heard from Maine's first responders concerned the lack of compatibility in communications equipment. It remains a substantial impediment to their ability to respond effectively in the event of a terrorist attack. For a State like mine that has three deepwater cargo ports, two international airports, key defense installations, hundreds of miles of coastline, and a long international border, compatible communications equipment is essential. Yet it remains an illusive goal.

Maine's firefighters, police officers, and emergency medical personnel do an amazing job in providing aid when a neighboring town is in need. Fires, floods, and accidents are local matters in which they have great expertise and experience. Their defense of the front lines in the war against terrorism, however, is a national matter. Maine's first responders, along with first responders across the country, are doing their part, but they need and deserve Federal help.

The grant program established by our bill would guarantee every State a share of interoperability funding and makes additional funding available for States with special needs and vulnerabilities. It is designed to get this vital funding to first responders quickly, in coordination with a statewide plan.

At that Maine conference, I was joined by Under Secretary Asa Hutchinson. He, perhaps, best described the mutual responsibilities of this Federal-State partnership when he said:

We cannot secure the homeland of America from Washington,

Mr. President, I rise in support of the Australia Free Trade Agreement. On balance, this agreement is overwhelmingly beneficial to the State of Maine, and to the country as a whole. Critical to my decision to support this agreement is the fact that it will provide new and expanded opportunities to Maine businesses that want to expand into the Australian market. This agreement will create and support good jobs in my State.

It is clear that businesses across Maine are interested in initiating or expanding trade with Australia. The Maine International Trade Center held a seminar recently on export market opportunities in Australia. Representatives from more than fifty Maine companies, including many small businesses and manufacturers, attended.

It is no wonder: the United States has a trade surplus with Australia of $9.1 billion, the second largest trade surplus of any U.S. trading partner. Australia is a net consumer of United States exports and particularly United States manufactured goods. Ninety-three percent of United States exports to Australia are manufactured goods, and 99 percent of these goods will be duty-free if the agreement is implemented. The National Association of Manufacturers predicts that the agreement could result in nearly $2 billion per year in new United States exports of manufactured goods to Australia, a boost to our hard- pressed manufacturers.

In addition, Australia is the 15th largest economy in the world and has been growing over the past few years while the rest of the world is in recession. This means more Australian buying power--and many new opportunities for Maine and United States companies to export their products to Australia.

Australia has a strong and vibrant trading relationship with Maine. Australia is Maine's 12th largest export market, and in 2003, Maine exported nearly $29 million in high-value goods, such as electrical equipment, computers, and paper products, to the country. The agreement will make these goods 99.25 percent duty free, on average, in the Australian market.

Maine's forest and paper products industry will be stronger and will be able to grow as a result of this agreement. The agreement lifts all Australian tariffs on all U.S. forest products, which currently face tariffs up to 5 percent. This is important, because the United States is Australia's second largest supplier of paper and paperboard, with exports totaling $178 million in paper products in 2003.

Expanded access to the Australian market will directly benefit Maine mills. For example, International Paper's mill in Jay ME, exports about 1,200 tons of paper to Australia every year. These exports currently face a 5 percent tariff. If the free trade agreement is implemented, the tariff will be eliminated, and International Paper will be able to fulfill its plans to increase the amount of paper it exports to Australia from Maine, preserving and even increasing the number of jobs supported by the mill.

The agreement will benefit other Maine companies as well. The elimination of tariffs will enable FMC Coporation's Rockland plant to significantly expand its export of carrageenan products to Australia. In Southern Maine, National Semiconductor and Fairchild Semiconductor will benefit from the agreement's elimination of tariffs on all U.S. high-tech manufactured goods and from expanded opportunities for U.S. suppliers to compete for a broad range of Australian government contracts.

The Maine Potato Board has endorsed the agreement because it will open and expand Australian markets for Maine potato products. The MPB notes that the long-term success of the Maine potato industry is absolutely dependent on the growth of new markets.

Despite the overwhelming benefits of this pact, I do have some concerns with this agreement. While Maine does stand to reap substantial benefits, I am disappointed that the United States Trade Representative has included language that conflicts with the goal of drug reimportation.

One of the greatest challenges facing American consumers is the high cost of prescription drugs. That is why I have long supported legislation to allow Americans to benefit from international price competition on prescription drugs by permitting FDA-approved medicines made in FDA-approved facilities to be imported into this country.

Despite the ongoing debate in Congress and the strong support for drug reimportation on the part of the American public, I am disappointed that our trade representatives have insisted on including language in this trade agreement that is contrary to these critically important efforts.

The Australian government already bans the export of drugs subsidized under the Australian Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme. Since 90 percent of the drugs prescribed in Australia are subsidized, Australia would not be a significant source of supply of imported drugs into the United States, with or without this agreement. Drugs imported into the United States are far more likely to come from Canada and Western Europe.

I am concerned, however, that these provisions set a bad precedent. While Australia itself is not necessarily a good source for imported drugs, this language could become a template for future agreements.

I am also disappointed that this agreement provided some additional market access for Australian dairy products in the U.S. market. However, I am pleased the final version of the agreement includes marked improvements over initial drafts. For example, the agreement gradually phases in limited increases in dairy imports over an 18-year period. In addition, the agreement maintains the current U.S. above- quota tariffs on dairy products indefinitely. These improvements were included in the agreement after I joined with my colleagues in sending a letter to U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick asking that the interests of our dairy farmers be taken into account as the agreement was negotiated. The inclusion of these provisions, in addition to my consultations with Maine's agricultural leaders, has led me to conclude that this agreement will not have a significant impact on Maine's dairy industry. Moreover, Australia currently exports only a small amount of MPCs to the United States, and this agreement will not change this.

Australia is one of our oldest and most reliable partners. The country is a growing market for high-value U.S. exports from both Maine and the country. The free trade agreement we are considering today will strengthen the economic and diplomatic ties between our countries. On balance, it is good for Maine, and for both countries.

Madam President, I rise today to introduce the Medicare Rural Home Health Payment Fairness Act. This legislation would extend the additional payment for home health services delivered in rural areas. This additional 5 percent reimbursement is currently scheduled to sunset on April 1, 2005. This legislation would make the additional reimbursement permanent.

I note the presence of one of the strongest advocates of home health care, and that is my colleague from Missouri, Senator Bond. He has worked tirelessly to make certain that our seniors and disabled citizens are able to receive the home health care they need. I am very pleased to have him as one of the key supporters of this legislation.

Home health care has become an increasingly important part of our health care system. The kinds of highly skilled and often technically complex services that our home health caregivers provide have enabled millions of our most frail and vulnerable older and disabled citizens to avoid hospitals and nursing homes and to receive health care just where they want to be--in the comfort, privacy, and security of their own homes.

I have had the great honor of accompanying several of Maine's caring home health nurses on their visits to serve their patients. I have seen firsthand the difference that they are making for Maine's elderly. I remember visiting one elderly couple who told me that it was home health care that allowed them to stay together in their very own home, rather than being separated with one of them being forced to go into a nursing home in the remaining years of their life. Another woman told me that her late husband received home health care in the months leading up to his death. That had allowed him to be treated at home and to be with his family, which is where he very much wanted to be.

Nevertheless, surveys have shown that the delivery of home health services in rural areas can be as much as 12 to 15 percent more costly because of the extra travel time required to cover long distances between patients, the higher transportation expenses, and other factors. Because of the longer travel times, rural caregivers are unable to make as many visits in a day as their urban counterparts. The executive director of Visiting Nurses of Aroostook in northern Maine where I am from tells me that her agency covers 6,600 square miles with a population of only 73,000 people. Her costs are understandably much higher than other agencies due to the long distances her staff must drive to see their clients. Moreover, her staff is obviously not able to see as many patients in a day.

Agencies in rural areas are also frequently smaller than their urban counterparts, which means that their relative costs are higher. Smaller agencies with fewer patients and fewer visits mean that fixed costs, particularly those associated with meeting regulatory requirements, are spread over a much smaller number of patients and visits, thus increasing overall the per-patient and per-visit costs. Moreover, in many rural areas, home health agencies are the primary caregivers for homebound beneficiaries with limited access to transportation. These rural patients often require more time and care than urban patients and are understandably more expensive for home health agencies to serve. If the rural extra payment is not extended, agencies may be forced to make decisions

not to accept patients living in remote areas who have greater care needs. That would translate into less access to health care for ill homebound seniors.

Failure to extend the rural add-on payment will only put more pressure on rural home health agencies that are already operating on very narrow margins. It could force some of these agencies to close their doors altogether. Many home health agencies operating in rural areas are the only home health providers in large geographic areas. If any of these agencies is forced to close, the Medicare patients in that region could lose all their access to home health care.

The bipartisan legislation I am introducing today, with Senators Lincoln, Bond, Feingold, Thomas, Conrad, and Burns, will help to ensure that Medicare patients in rural areas continue to have access to the home health services they very much need. I urge all of our colleagues to join us as cosponsors. We must act to ensure that this extra payment does not expire next April 1.

I yield the floor.

Madam President, I rise today to introduce the Medicare Rural Home Health Payment Fairness Act. This legislation would extend the additional payment for home health services delivered in rural areas. This additional 5 percent reimbursement is currently scheduled to sunset on April 1, 2005. This legislation would make the additional reimbursement permanent.

I note the presence of one of the strongest advocates of home health care, and that is my colleague from Missouri, Senator Bond. He has worked tirelessly to make certain that our seniors and disabled citizens are able to receive the home health care they need. I am very pleased to have him as one of the key supporters of this legislation.

Home health care has become an increasingly important part of our health care system. The kinds of highly skilled and often technically complex services that our home health caregivers provide have enabled millions of our most frail and vulnerable older and disabled citizens to avoid hospitals and nursing homes and to receive health care just where they want to be--in the comfort, privacy, and security of their own homes.

I have had the great honor of accompanying several of Maine's caring home health nurses on their visits to serve their patients. I have seen firsthand the difference that they are making for Maine's elderly. I remember visiting one elderly couple who told me that it was home health care that allowed them to stay together in their very own home, rather than being separated with one of them being forced to go into a nursing home in the remaining years of their life. Another woman told me that her late husband received home health care in the months leading up to his death. That had allowed him to be treated at home and to be with his family, which is where he very much wanted to be.

Nevertheless, surveys have shown that the delivery of home health services in rural areas can be as much as 12 to 15 percent more costly because of the extra travel time required to cover long distances between patients, the higher transportation expenses, and other factors. Because of the longer travel times, rural caregivers are unable to make as many visits in a day as their urban counterparts. The executive director of Visiting Nurses of Aroostook in northern Maine where I am from tells me that her agency covers 6,600 square miles with a population of only 73,000 people. Her costs are understandably much higher than other agencies due to the long distances her staff must drive to see their clients. Moreover, her staff is obviously not able to see as many patients in a day.

Agencies in rural areas are also frequently smaller than their urban counterparts, which means that their relative costs are higher. Smaller agencies with fewer patients and fewer visits mean that fixed costs, particularly those associated with meeting regulatory requirements, are spread over a much smaller number of patients and visits, thus increasing overall the per-patient and per-visit costs. Moreover, in many rural areas, home health agencies are the primary caregivers for homebound beneficiaries with limited access to transportation. These rural patients often require more time and care than urban patients and are understandably more expensive for home health agencies to serve. If the rural extra payment is not extended, agencies may be forced to make decisions

not to accept patients living in remote areas who have greater care needs. That would translate into less access to health care for ill homebound seniors.

Failure to extend the rural add-on payment will only put more pressure on rural home health agencies that are already operating on very narrow margins. It could force some of these agencies to close their doors altogether. Many home health agencies operating in rural areas are the only home health providers in large geographic areas. If any of these agencies is forced to close, the Medicare patients in that region could lose all their access to home health care.

The bipartisan legislation I am introducing today, with Senators Lincoln, Bond, Feingold, Thomas, Conrad, and Burns, will help to ensure that Medicare patients in rural areas continue to have access to the home health services they very much need. I urge all of our colleagues to join us as cosponsors. We must act to ensure that this extra payment does not expire next April 1.

I yield the floor.