Floor Statements

Mr. President, Tuesday, September 14, was National POW/ MIA Recognition Day. American citizens in towns and communities all across our Nation commemorated this occasion by pausing to remember American prisoners of war, those who continue to be missing, and their families.

A national observance was held on the River Parade Field at the Pentagon with an honor guard parade consisting of units from the Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force and Coast Guard. Guests included the families of former POWs and MIAs and representatives of veterans' organizations.

The guest of honor for this occasion was our distinguished colleague and our dear friend, Senator Dan Inouye of Hawaii. Senator Inouye spoke eloquently about the significance of this remembrance as did Gen Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz.

Secretary Wolfowitz's statement included an introduction of Senator Inouye that captured the life and legacy of this great patriot. The eloquent remarks of General Myers, Secretary Wolfowitz and Senator Inouye deserve the attention of the Senate. I ask unanimous consent that the speeches of General Myers, Dr. Wolfowitz and Senator Inouye be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, I have filed a series of amendments. I would like to address the one on disclosure of intelligence funding.

Mr. President, I direct the attention of the Senate to page 115. This is title II. It pertains to the amounts to be disclosed. It deals with amounts authorized and appropriated in each fiscal year.

My amendment follows the recommendation of the administration and, I might add, the intelligence community to think twice before we do this. It may be that we will want to do this after the NID comes into being and we all have a better knowledge of how these funds are going to be handled.

This amendment would require a further study of the disclosure of funds that are provided for intelligence programs. The basic need for this amendment rests on the testimony of the Acting Director of Central Intelligence John McLaughlin before the Governmental Affairs Committee. He said:

I would not go so far as to declassify the numbers for the

individual agencies. I think that gives too much opportunity

for adversaries to understand how we are moving our money

from year to year from technical programs to human source

collection and to other objectives.

In the administration's statement of policy, the administration is also concerned that the committee bill mandates disclosure of sensitive information about the intelligence budget. The

legislation should not compel disclosure, including to the Nation's enemies in war, of the amounts requested by the President and the amounts provided for the conduct of the Nation's intelligence activities.

I understand that the committee intends to comply with the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission with regard to this. But I think it is time we slow down a little bit and respond at least in part to some of the comments of those people who have spent their lifetimes now in our intelligence service.

I can tell you that I have not spent my whole lifetime there, but I have spent some 30 years now in terms of watching over the Defense Appropriations Committee and being part of it at least. In terms of being chairman and ranking member, it has been now 23 years. This concerns me greatly because one of the problems of the appropriators is to find ways to have an honest budget but to put the money where the enemies of this country, those who want to do us harm, do not know what our emphasis is way out into the future.

I remember when we started transitioning to electronic intelligence and how we traveled from place to place to look at these new satellites and the things they were going to do and got briefings on capacities. Those were developed over a series of years, and they got more complicated as they went along. But the money that was involved was substantial.

To have a disclosure of ``we are engaging in an entirely new effort in intelligence'' would be highly unwise.

I quote from the second page of the administration statement:

The Administration is also concerned that the Committee

bill mandates disclosure of sensitive information about the

intelligence budget. The legislation should not compel

disclosure, including to the Nation's enemies in war, of the

amounts requested by the President, and provided by the

Congress, for the conduct of the Nation's intelligence

activities.

I am deeply concerned about some of the problems of how we find a way to maintain the secrets of this country with regard to what we are doing in terms of human intelligence. We are building up human intelligence at the same time as we are changing the utilization of the electronic concept of intelligence. And while I believe the time may come when we can find a way to disclose certain portions of the budget, I have a real resistance to this proposal that says:

Congress shall disclose . . . for each fiscal year after

fiscal year 2005 the aggregate amount of funds authorized to

be appropriated, and the aggregate amount of funds

appropriated by Congress for such fiscal year for the

National Intelligence Program.

Then it directs the study of disclosure of additional information. We are certainly not opposed to the study. It is the mandate beginning in 2005. We are going to start, for the fiscal year 2006, disclosing these amounts at a time when there is great change in the intelligence community. The whole structure of the intelligence community will be changed by this bill. To start disclosing where money is going is to tell the enemies of this country where our emphasis for the future is. It is the future I am concerned about in terms of disclosure.

In the future we set up reserve accounts, and I will be talking about some of those soon. But if we set up reserve accounts, the reserves are classified as reserves because that is where they get the money for innovation and new developments. We don't have to disclose it. We don't have to tell them: Yes, we are going to build new satellites or we are going to build other devices that can listen to transmissions in the air and on the land and under sea.

We have a lot of secrets in this country. They are all related to intelligence. Let me repeat that. Every one of our secrets is related to intelligence. They are highly classified. Many of them are known only to the President and a close circle. Part of that circle includes Members of Congress who deal with the very high-level, classified programs of the intelligence services.

I urge that the Senate listen to us and listen to the administration and to those who have been involved in these activities. Again, I call to the attention of the Senate that when we returned and found there were a whole series of people who had not been heard on their viewpoints--they wanted to express their concerns--we held a hearing and listened to the intelligence people, who had great, distinguished records in the past. We listened to Secretary Kissinger and a whole series of people who wore our uniform and have been the top officers of our military. To a person, they do not believe we should move this fast on this disclosure item.

Let us have the study. We are entirely in favor of the study. But to mandate the disclosure in the bill we will prepare in 2005, I think, is much too early, in view of the changes taking place in the area of intelligence. This is where we are going to start to see if there is any reaction to those who have had experience in the area, to the President, and to those who have reviewed the whole thing. Is the Senate going to listen to these people with some experience and say, OK, let's study it, but not make the judgment first and then study it?

This disclosure in the next fiscal year is wrong, until we know what the policies of the NID are and what are going to be the policies of Congress and how we are going to handle this appropriation. It appears to me that the result of this bill will be to fractionalize the intelligence appropriation, anyway. Part of it is going to go to the Department of Defense; part will be split up into several agencies within the NID.

I think we ought to know first what we are doing before we decide what we are going to disclose so we can maintain the secrecy that is required in order to prepare for the future. This is not something to correct mistakes of the past; this is something to prevent making mistakes in the future.

Will the chairman yield for a question?

I am looking at the bill. The bill says the President shall disclose to the public for each fiscal year after fiscal year 2005 the aggregate amount of funds authorized and appropriated for the national intelligence program. Then I go back to the page 6 for the definition of national intelligence programs. It says:

Refers to all national intelligence programs, projects, and

activities of the elements of the intelligence community;

Includes all programs, projects, and activities (whether or

not pertaining to national intelligence) of the National

Intelligence Authority, the Central Intelligence Agency, the

National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-

Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the

Office of Intelligence of the Federal Bureau of

Investigation, and the Office of Information Analysis of the

Department of Homeland Security.

That involves five different bills in the appropriations process. We currently put in any one of those five bills a portion of the clandestine activities we are financing with these moneys. So what you are going to tell us is, we no longer can use any portion of those because we are going to disclose the whole amount in every one of those bills.

Listen to me. You have not lived with how we have financed the intelligence community. The money is not disclosed. It is put in parts of the budget and you don't know where it is. It rests with Senator Inouye and me, to be honest about it, and we make sure that is what it is. Maybe four people in the House and Senate know where this is. You are telling us to disclose it, without regard to where we put that money--disclose the money that is in each account and it goes into five separate bills. I say that is wrong. Wait until the NID comes into office and have him tell us how we can disclose what should be disclosed to the public. The public should not ask us to disclose this very classified, secret information to protect the future of the country through clandestine activities and acquisitions.

I ask the question, does the Senator understand what her bill does? It will disclose the aggregate amount of funds--disclose them all, including the very, very top secret items, which probably three or four people in the White House, a few people in the CIA, or the DIA, and maybe eight people in the Congress would know.

It says:

The aggregate amount of funds authorized to be

appropriated, and the aggregate amount of funds appropriated,

by Congress for each fiscal year for each element of the

intelligence community.

Both authorized and appropriated. That is on page 116, line 9.

Will the Senator yield?

The problem is not that, from my point of view. My problem is we are going through a transition and saying for the very first year we are going to be asked to disclose the full amounts appropriated to the whole intelligence community.

My amendment strikes all of section 201, in effect. I urge, at the very least, that we strike that provision that requires disclosure in 2005. Let's have the study. I hope the NID will be able to make studies and get back to us sometime next year. But why put on us the requirement that we must collate and take all the moneys going to the intelligence community in 2006 when we are going to be working on that and, at the same time, he is making his adjustments in the whole community?

My effort is to protect the clandestine amounts, protect the amounts that are necessary for security. Why can we not at least agree to make it just the study? We all agree on the study. Maybe the Commission is right, and the Senator from Connecticut is wrong and I am wrong. Why don't we have the study and find out what the NID people think is right and then let us act on 2006?

We have been there before.

Yes, Mr. President, the Senator is, along with Senator Inouye.

Mr. President, I heard the last part of the comments of the Senator from Connecticut. I suggest we put this aside and see if we can come to some conclusion.

The Senator makes a good suggestion of putting a time limit on the study and getting us to the point where we might be able to follow this suggestion by the fiscal year 2006 bill. That bill will, in all probability, move through the Congress, I would say, by the May, June, and July timeframe. With the 180 days, I am afraid the Senator may be referring to the start of the fiscal year. That bill goes through the House and Senate. These are the first bills--Defense and Homeland Security, and Intelligence. Obviously; It is going to be in the first three without any question.

So the 180 days is going to be June, and this bill will be moving through the House before that time.

We probably could catch it before they finish in terms of if there is a recommendation we need, but I would urge my colleagues to consider repealing the requirement for disclosure and say that we urge the NID to give us the earliest possible date for that disclosure, when it could be done in the national interest.

We are putting a lot of control and power in this person. Let's have him tell us when and if it should happen rather than direct it now. Make the study and leave it up to him to recommend to us, at least to what extent we should disclose, commencing in fiscal year 2006.

Will the Senator yield?

Unfortunately, that is not a part of the report. That is a comment after the recommendation. It sort of demonstrates the extent of the knowledge they had about what they were dealing with in the recommendations, because that is not true. We do not disclose the amount we appropriate for defense intelligence. We disclose the amount in the budget that we support defense intelligence agencies with pay, facilities, and offices, but the amounts of their programs are not disclosed.

What I am saying to the Senator is, as we approach this, I think there is a growing desire to know how much money we are spending. The Senator may be right. Maybe people want us to spend more. I have wanted to spend more for a long time.

The problem is people ought to know what they are talking about before they change the system. In these budgets are both moneys for acquisition and for salaries, and somewhere in there is some money that everybody knows, in the intelligence community, where it is and what it is for.

In the Defense authorization bill there is a classified portion of that budget.

I am not even sure, other than the chairman and ranking member, if the Senator knows what is in there. I am saying so apologetically, but the system that requires secrecy in this country on some things is kept secret. This disclosure prematurely might trigger someone saying ``watch that'' in answering the question, and that would be bad because if they answer the question about what they knew was in there, that would disclose what they did not know was in there.

Reserving the right to object, it is my understanding that that would set aside the pending amendment and take up that procedure. We would come back to this amendment. Or is there another amendment in the queue by regular order?

Will the Senator from Virginia yield for a question?

Mr. President, I am a cosponsor of this amendment. As I listen to the Senator from Virginia, I wonder, I don't see anything in this bill that allows the separate agencies to communicate with the Congress, as they have in the past, such as the CIA and the NRO. They have all come directly to us. Would your amendment preserve the right of the people who would disagree with the NID to communicate with the Congress, as well as the Executive?

Will the Senator yield for another question?

The Senator from Virginia and I both served for a while in the executive branch. We know Cabinet officers often put down in the law about who can contact Congress on what. I don't know if it happened on your watch. It happened on mine.

Some people don't believe this language is necessary. Would the Senator agree if there is going to be the right to communicate, to go up the line toward the President or to the Congress, it has to be in the law? People's rights have to be protected to contact us?

(Mr. CORNYN assumed the Chair.)

Mr. President, if the Senator will yield once more, I sort of feel we have to put some meat on the bones of this commission a little bit as we go along to allow the Secretaries of the whole community to participate in the process--budget, management, and oversight. Will not the amendment of the Senator from Virginia strengthen oversight by giving the people involved in oversight the chance to hear the dissenting opinions as well as the opinion of the

I thank the Senator.

I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President, is there any time limit on speaking right now?

There is a vote set for 2:15?

Mr. President, I come to the Senate to make extensive remarks on this bill. I do so with the full realization that my schedule prevented me from attending the hearings of the committee on which I am a member, chaired by Senator Collins and the ranking member, Senator Lieberman. I commend them for their activities through July and August with the hearings they conducted. During that period of time, the Senator from Hawaii and I were in a parliamentary conference with the Chinese National Peoples Congress, and we had other events that prevented us from being in Washington while they conducted the hearings.

I preface this to say I voted for the bill to come out of the committee, but at the time I stated specifically to the managers of the bill that I would have some amendments in the Senate and whether I voted for the final passage of this bill would depend upon the outcome of some of those amendments.

Let me also say in this preface to my comments that as the staff reports were prepared by the 9/11 Commission, and my staff delivered those to me from the Internet and I read those--I also read the report when it first came out--and then, on the increased pressure that came from the members of the former 9/11 Commission to have early consideration of this subject, I reread the report and formed some very fixed opinions about this subject.

I have never seen members of a Commission, which went out of existence upon delivering the report, lobby the Congress so hard. My understanding is they raised a considerable amount of money, rehired some of their staff, and are currently lobbying the Congress. I do hope they have complied with the lobbying laws. In any event, this pressure has been significant and it is compelling the Congress to judgment in a very short period of time, in my judgment.

As I said, I have read and reread the 9/11 Commission Report. Last week, our Appropriations Committee held hearings on the report recommendations. We did that because when I returned to Washington I found there was a series of people who indicated they had not been heard by the Governmental Affairs Committee who wanted to have an opportunity to present testimony to the Congress.

We heard from Dr. Henry Kissinger; from three former military commanders in chief: GEN Joe Ralston, U.S. Air Force, retired, former commander of the U.S. European Command and supreme allied commander of Europe and NATO; ADM Dennis Blair, U.S. Navy, retired, former commander of the U.S. Pacific Command; ADM James Ellis, retired, former commander of the U.S. Strategic Command. Our committee also heard testimony from Dr. John Hamre, president and CEO of the Center for Strategic and International Studies and former Under Secretary of Defense. We heard from Judge Richard Posner of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and Dale Watson, former Executive Assistant Director of Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence for the FBI.

Our committee spent 2 days listening to the testimony on the 9/11 Commission's recommendations. Each witness who appeared was an expert in his field with years of dedicated service to the Nation. After listening to their thoughts and suggestions, I have come to the conclusion we have only begun to scratch the surface for what needs to be considered by the Congress before we finally act on this subject.

Copies of the hearings we held before the Appropriations Committee have been given to every Senator and to all intelligence-related staff of the Senate. They are available to anyone who wishes. They were printed as a public document.

Since the passage of the National Security Act in 1947, at least 19 commissions, committees, and panels have made recommendations aimed at reorganizing our Nation's intelligence community. Those proposals have led to changes in internal agency direction, precedence, or directive, and to new statutes, but none of those reports were adopted in their entirety or in this type of timeframe or context.

During last week's hearings before our committee, Senator Inouye asked whether it would be wise for Congress to make a decision about restructuring the intelligence community in the next 2 weeks. Judge Posner, who is a very erudite professor of law at the University of Chicago in addition to being a Federal circuit judge--he also recently authored a very thoughtful article on intelligence reform in the New York Times--testified he thought it would be ``unwise and most unfortunate.'' He expressed doubts that the analytical problems could be resolved in that timeframe and expressed concerns that the Presidential campaign and politics should not be the right setting for this reform.

I agree with Judge Posner. However, I have approached this legislation as a committee member with an open mind, and I am hopeful that the Senate will move forward on some reforms during this year.

I do have concerns about current efforts to restructure the Nation's intelligence community. For starters, the witnesses I heard last week revealed serious issues with the underlying document for these efforts. That was the 9/11 Commission Report. The Commission's recommendations do not reflect their own account of what happened on September 11. As Judge Posner said before our committee:

The first 338 pages of the commission's report are an

extremely detailed and thorough narrative of the background

to the attacks themselves, and the immediate response.

It is a very fine job. . . . Then after that, the

commission goes off on what is really a different tangent in

considering organizational change because it is not clear,

from reading their narrative, that the problems were

organization[al] problems for which organization[al]

solutions or reorganization would be indicated. So I think

there is a mismatch between this very detailed narrative and

a rather more summary discussion of organizational change

that really does not match the problems that the report

itself had identified.

That is the end of Judge Posner's quote.

Because the Commission's recommendations are somewhat divorced from its own account of what happened on 9/11, the Commission adopts, in my view, a flawed vantage point from which to suggest reforms. For example, one of the concerns Judge Posner expressed in our hearings last week was that the report--and again I quote--

. . . really is oriented toward preventing not new threats,

but a repetition of 9/11. Now, an exact repetition of 9/11 is

extremely unlikely because that has already happened. We know

about that. What I think we have to worry [more] about [is

the threat of] biological terrorism, nuclear terrorism,

agricultural terrorism because, you know, destruction of

agriculture by biological weapons could be as destructive as

biological warfare against people. So we ought to try to

think about the disasters that have not happened, but that is

very difficult to do, so we tend to think about what has

already happened.

That is the end of Judge Posner's comments about that.

As we debate this legislation, one of the things we must keep in mind is there have been substantial changes in our intelligence-gathering methods and operations since 9/11. We personally witnessed those on trips to Afghanistan and Iraq during this past year. The situation we faced in the morning of 9/11 is not the situation we face today, and the threats, although related, are not identical. Efforts to reorganize the intelligence community must take into account the current state of operations and the broad scope of the risks we face. We cannot be mesmerized by just one threat.

As I said, I am not opposed to intelligence reform. But any changes should reflect the current context of intelligence. Since 9/11, many members of the intelligence community have testified before Senate committees, and they have told us they are doing things differently, that today there is a free flow of ideas that did not exist before 9/ 11. Congress should not take any action that might--intentionally or unintentionally--stifle that progress.

I support many aspects of this legislation. I am in favor of the creation of a national intelligence director who can serve as the President's primary intelligence adviser. I also support the creation of a national counterterrorism center. However, I am very concerned about the way the NID's role is defined in this legislation. I urge Members to read it. Read it. Look at the pages. There are nine and a half pages that describe the powers of this person. It would do well for people to understand what it says, what the real context of this is. This person is going to be a very unique individual. What I fear is, this person is going to assemble underneath the NID a series of staff people who will be telling other people what to do based upon their understanding of what the director of NID intended to do. Quoting from the bill:

The National Intelligence Director shall--

determine the annual budget for the intelligence and

intelligence-related activities of the United States by--

providing to the heads of the departments containing

agencies or elements within the intelligence community and

that have one or more programs, projects, or activities with

the National Intelligence program, and to the heads of such

agencies and elements, guidance for development [of] the

National Intelligence Program budget pertaining to such

agencies or elements. . . .

It goes on, all the way through. The national intelligence director is in charge of preparing the annual defense budgets, including those for the Department of Defense related to military intelligence programs, with the concurrence of the Secretary. He would be in charge of ``collection and analysis requirements'' for the entire intelligence community. He is going to have to ``provide advisory tasking on the collection of intelligence to elements of the United States Government having information collection'' activities. He will have the right to go to any Department or agency of the Federal Government and say, ``What are you doing?'' and have access to their information. He will ``manage and oversee the National Counterterrorism Center,'' which, again, I say, I do believe in that type of center, but can he manage that and be a director at the same time?

I urge the Senate to look at the job description of this one person. No person on Earth can do all those things. What he is going to do is assemble a whole series of subordinates who will tell the existing agency heads, many of whom are constitutional officers, Secretaries, confirmed by the Senate, to perform the functions of their Department. But this person is going to have assistants telling those Secretaries what to do and demanding they have access to information those Secretaries have collected through their own processes. Now, I think, if you read this, this is an enormous task for any individual. An NID is needed, but that type of bureaucracy that is set up by this bill is just overwhelming.

He also ensures ``that appropriate officials of the United States Government . . . have access to a variety of intelligence assessments and analytical views,'' protecting ``intelligence sources and methods,'' establishing ``requirements and procedures for the classification of intelligence.''

He is a czar, one person. Now, we know not one person can do all those things. This means to me a new level of bureaucracy, an appointed level, not described in this bill at all. But he is going to have a series of people working for him. I am told there will probably be 800 people in this office of national intelligence director. There is the flaw. There is the flaw, and the President's letter yesterday mentioned it.

This legislation also gives the NID authority to set security, personnel, and informational technology standards all the way across the intelligence

community. In other words, no matter whether you are the FBI, CIA, or DIA, you must follow the standards set by the NID to do your business. Unheard of, just unheard of.

This also includes the establishment and direction over information sharing. This person alone will determine who shares what information. Now, I believe this effort will create more problems than it solves. Judge Posner, again, addressed this in his testimony to our committee last week. He said:

The commission thinks the reason the bits of information

that might have been assembled into a mosaic spelling 9/11

never came together in one place is that no one person was in

charge of intelligence.

He means at that time. But he said:

That is not the reason. The reason, or rather, the reasons

are, first, that the volume of information is so vast that

even with the continued rapid advances in data processing it

cannot be collected, stored, and retrieved and analyzed in a

single database. . . .

That is an objective of this bill. Anyone in the industry will tell you it is not possible yet.

Second, legitimate security concerns limit the degree to

which confidential information can safely be shared,

especially given the ever-present threat of moles like the

infamous Aldrich Ames.

Now, Mr. President, still quoting Judge Posner:

And third, the different intelligence services and the

subunits of each service tend, because information is power,

to hoard it. Efforts to centralize the intelligence function

are likely to lengthen the time it takes for intelligence and

analyses to reach the President, reduce diversity and

competition in the gathering and analysis of intelligence

data, limit the number of threats given serious consideration

and deprive the President of a range of alternative

interpretations of ambiguous and incomplete data--and

intelligence data will usually be ambiguous and incomplete.

That is, again, the end of Judge Posner's comment.

Giving the NID information-sharing authority may actually prove to be counterproductive. The implications Judge Posner raises need full debate and discussion. I hope we will have some of that today. At the very least, we cannot assume that Congress has rectified this problem by simply vesting information-sharing authority in one individual, only one individual, because that is the process for information sharing.

What if, in a later administration, the NID wants more centralized control? What if that person shares the viewpoint of the prior administration that there should be walls between these agencies? He will determine when they learn what is going on between one agency and another. That is the implication of what we are hearing here. We took down the walls with the PATRIOT Act. We said no more walls. Yet here is one person who determines the total rules for sharing. And probably under the current atmosphere, the return to the walls is impossible, but this authority does not prevent walls.

There is no limit on the NID's concept of sharing. That person alone will determine what sharing is between agencies and who gets the information and who has access to it.

I am also concerned about the language in this legislation concerning the structure of the office of NID. I mentioned that before. We don't need to create a new bureaucracy here, and it seems to me this legislation risks doing just that. We need to delete or significantly revise the parts of this bill that delve into unnecessary or excessive detail about the organization of the office of NID. Again, I call the attention of Senators to the bill itself. It has greater detail concerning specific authority for one individual than I have ever seen.

The Statement of Administration Policy, dated September 28, specifically addressed this issue of creating ``a cumbersome new bureaucracy'' or ``legislated mandated bureaucracy will hinder, not help, in the effort to strengthen U.S. intelligence capabilities and to preserve our constitutional rights.''

Continuing from the administration's letter:

The Administration urges the Senate to delete or

significantly revise these problematic provisions.

We will have amendments to do just that at a later time.

I believe we must take time to carefully consider the people in the field now and how this legislation will impact them. I recently had occasion to meet with the chiefs of station of the CIA from around the world. I was most impressed with what they said about how long it takes to establish a position as a chief of station and how long it takes to develop assets who have the willingness and the ability to go into a neighboring country or in the same country they are in and try to obtain the information we need about developments that might threaten our future.

Currently there are 175,000 persons working in the intelligence community. One hundred fifty thousand of them are military personnel today. They do an incredible job with much personal sacrifice, many under difficult circumstances and far away from their families for years. The creation of the NID will have serious consequences for them and the Department of Defense intelligence personnel. The consequences for the Department of Defense intelligence personnel must be carefully considered as we adopt these reforms.

I don't believe you can alter one piece of this puzzle without having an impact somewhere else. I am concerned not only about the impact the legislation will have in terms of unintended consequences of the big picture but also the impact it will have on our career intelligence operatives who are working out in the field today.

I hope to go on to that later. We had a gap in our development of human intelligence, and it was a serious gap for a series of years. It takes more than 5 years to develop one of these people. Now we are operating with a group of human intelligence experts which is very limited.

This legislation says the NID will ``establish intelligence collection and analysis requirements for the intelligence community.'' This arrangement will centralize the prioritization and control of intelligence and, I believe, could detrimentally affect military leaders outside Washington, DC.

The NID would inevitably focus on the current crisis in Washington--I assume, this doesn't say anywhere, that NID will be here, somewhere near the President--possibly shortchanging the long-term collection and analysis needed for intelligence preparation for battlefields in distant regions.

Currently there is a diversity within intelligence. I do believe in a NID, but I believe in more of a coordinator than a commander. This creates a new commander in chief of intelligence. The Constitution didn't create one. I do believe this is a very difficult proposition the way it is described, what the powers and authorities will be.

When combat occurs, intelligence could swing into full force to support the troops, but by then it would be too late. We need a consistent peacetime intelligence effort to ensure that we can either avoid conflict or give U.S. forces high-quality information when they must engage an enemy.

I am also concerned about the nature of the NID position. Right now we have one agency that deals with domestic threats and another that deals with foreign threats. There are reasons for this division.

Domestic and international threats are distinct and require different intelligence tactics and strategies. The NID collapses international and domestic intelligence concerns into one position, one control, one definition authority, and one access authority. I do believe that this is the kind of situation Judge Posner warned us about last week where we would have an intelligence community that is too rough on our citizens or too gentle with foreign threats because it needs to adhere to uniform policies across the domestic and international context. If that is not the intent, the bill should so state.

There is a reason for different approaches to foreign threats than those that are internal within our constitutional authorities. I believe Judge Posner's warning ought to be listened to by the Senate. We do not need an intelligence community that is too rough on our own citizens and too gentle with foreign threats.

I believe the NID position should reflect what Dale Watson, another witness before our committee, recommended last week. He has a long service in the FBI intelligence division. This was his judgment:

This position must be a job and not a position. The

individual who has this responsibility of being the NID needs

to work within the NID and within the intelligence community.

The NID should not be a public relations job. The NID should

not be on the

speaking circuit or conducting liaison. The NID should be a

central-focused individual that looks at where [we] are

across the board in all areas. . . . I think the NID ought to

be a term appointment. I think the NID has to have the

responsibility and be able to do the task.

What we are really saying is, Congress should not rush to implement the recommendations put forth in the 9/11 Commission report. For my part, I hope to spend more time in the Chamber listening to my colleagues and exchanging views on this legislation.

As of now I am inclined to support a course that creates a national intelligence director and a national counterterrorism center, gives them 6 months to get up and running, and then invites them to come and tell those of us in Congress who must make the final decision what additional authorities and changes they actually need. This director ought to become familiar with what we have now before he tries to fix it.

That is one of the things we learned as young men, I thought. If the watch is running and it works, you ought not to try to fix it until you know that there might be some way you can improve it.

This situation is just the opposite. I do think we ought to look forward in this week to a debate that is one that will be productive so that the changes in the administration's letter we received yesterday are not only listened to but they are accommodated to the maximum extent possible.

I have a series of questions that I want to read into the Record. These are questions I intend to ask the managers of these bills as we go through this process. It is a long list of questions, I will say. The first is in regard to military personnel.

Based on the fact there is no differentiation between civilian and military personnel in your bill, could the NID have the power to hold military personnel for more than their stated rotations, more than their career path that they are on? For example, could they hold a military person at the National Counterterrorism Center longer than is detailed from the Department of Defense? If they could, what is the effect on their ability for promotion in the future? If needed for a military mission, how would the Secretary of Defense or one of the service chiefs be able to have that military individual returned to a nonintelligence program or position?

Is it true that once in the NID, the NID has control over the individual person's future, particularly when, I remind the Senate, again, 80 percent of the people we are talking about are Department of Defense people, most of whom have career programs, are on a career path, and part of that path involves being an intelligence official for a period of time?

Also, based on the educational requirements designated for personnel in the national intelligence program by the national intelligence director, how would this be reconciled for those military personnel who must complete military education courses for the advancement of their careers?

Periodically, particularly the officers, and some noncommissioned officers, must complete additional military education courses in order to move upward, have upward mobility in their particular service.

Also, how much control would the DOD have over military personnel assigned to the NID? Would the NID control their assignments and their careers? How would the NID ensure that they have the requisite training and assignments to remain competitive for promotion within their parent military service? What role does the Secretary of Defense have in meeting the statutory responsibilities in title 10 and title 5 for the Armed Forces personnel?

I have heard comments that this new national intelligence director organization could, as I said, be in excess of 800 people. If that is true, it would seem that this legislation will create a new bureaucracy to deal with intelligence.

So I asked the managers directly, how large will the national intelligence director organization be? Does the NID have unlimited ability to hire people? Where would the personnel for such a structure come from? There is already a shortage of intelligence people in the intelligence community. Where are these people going to come from? Is he going to take them from the CIA or the DIA? And if he does, do they lose their career path? Is everybody subject to the control of the NID? Can he tell them you must come? I thought intelligence was a volunteer organization. I think it must be if we are to be successful.

Why does this legislation single out the FBI for the NID's ability to fix the rate of pay? This bill gives only the NID the power to fix the rate of pay for the FBI and the intelligence section. Why doesn't it extend this to all personnel involved if he is to be so powerful? It seems to be a very strange section.

The number of qualified personnel in the intelligence field is fairly limited. Will the creation of the NID and this organization dilute the numbers? How long would it take to build and to grow the additional numbers if they are required in order to create and fulfill the obligations of the director under this reorganization?

I have some questions about the Department of Defense directly. If the national intelligence assets are transferred to a new national intelligence director, how do we ensure to our military commanders that national assets will be reliably available to them before a conflict? They have control under this bill when the conflict comes, when they have the right to obtain their own intelligence. How will the Department of Defense relate to its defense support agencies, such as the NRO, National Reconnaissance Agency, or NSA, or the National Geo spatial-Intelligence Agency, NGA, if they are effectively under the national intelligence agency? Will they still be combat support agencies, subject to the military leaders, as they are now--the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense? Where does this fit in? Will the NID have the power to convert current military positions into civilian positions? Where does he recruit from?

Within this bill, I would like to have an answer as to whether you have altered the definition of ``joint military intelligence programs.'' I do not see such a definition, but it is a very important segment of intelligence.

As to the budget, am I correct in understanding the NID controls the budget of the NSA, NGA, NRO, and that the NID recommends nominees to be directors of these entities, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense? What happens to the current directors? Is this some time off in the future? Can he immediately clear the deck and put new people in charge of the agencies? These agencies, along with DIA, are both national and combat support agencies. How will the proposed bill ensure these agencies remain responsive to the military forces they support if their funding and personnel are controlled by another department?

How does the National Security Advisory and Office of Management and Budget fit into the overall role of coordination or budget coordination envisioned by this legislation?

Particularly, how would the national intelligence director, with strong budgetary and personnel authority and the ability to control the dollars, 85 percent of which are now controlled by the Department of Defense, still maintain a relationship with the DOD? Does it control the whole 85 percent or just the part that is related to the defense agencies specifically mentioned? Currently, I assume the committee knows that the payroll for all of those people comes through the Department of Defense. This assumes, I take it, that the payroll will now come through the budget of the NID. Which ones are you going to pay? Who will make the separation, the Secretary of Defense or NID, as to which ones NID pays and which ones the Department of Defense pays? That is going to be a headache, in my opinion.

The bill provides the national director, in terms of an organization, with the power to reach into other departments to manage personnel, budget, and acquisition programs. Is this on a day-by-day basis, or on the basis of a plan or the formation of a divide-and-command authority? It seems to be that. It seems to be an invitation for turmoil that will cause operational problems as soon as it is created. He is supposed to reach in and tell them I will manage your personnel, your budget, and your acquisitions? A series of things is on the books that envisions particular acquisitions by various agencies over the period ahead. Some of those laws, apparently, will have to

be changed if this person's authority is to be effective, because it will conflict with existing laws, if they are not changed.

How do the benefits of centralization of the intelligence function impact the benefits of diversity and competition in the production of useful intelligence? Does the committee believe that diversity in competition is not needed and that is intended by this bill?

Is it possible to link the national intelligence director to the National Security Council and place it under the control of the national security adviser? Is that possible? Today, the President is in control of those entities within the executive branch, and they are personally responsible to him. That is what the letter we received yesterday says. I hope we think twice about the lines of authority and what are the prerogatives of the President as Commander in Chief and as President of the United States under the Constitution.

Currently, national intelligence priorities are established by the President and the National Security Council. Does a national intelligence director with such powers weaken the NSC process and the roles of the National Security Adviser and the Secretary of State? Will they still have the same role, notwithstanding this national intelligence director is going to have the authority to tell them and make the decisions on what intelligence they need in carrying out their authorities as constitutional advisers to the President?

Could some of the objectives sought by the reorganization be achieved by strengthening the existing institutions? I am not sure that has been considered adequately. That seems to be the compelling rush of the 9/11 Commission--throw everything out and set up something new. There is not even a period for transition in this process. This cannot happen overnight. The reorganization proposed by this bill would take at least a year. During that process, what happens to careers and to people's morale? Why can we not build on what we have, rather than creating something so new that has the extreme power to invade every agency that even touches any piece of intelligence?

Does this legislation create a system in which intelligence is reported to two masters? For example, would the members of the intelligence community be under the control of the national intelligence director and their own agency bosses? I assume that is the case. How does it work on a day-to-day basis if they are not? I assume persons employed by one agency are responsible to the person who hired them. This bill now envisions, I take it, that the NID has the right to hire and fire in any of the agencies involved.

Will the system envisioned by this legislation create conflicts in collection and analysis tasking? Currently, there is a working relationship between these agencies as to who is going to pursue one subject or another, as they task the analysis of information coming in on a daily basis. I don't see why the system creates other conflicts in that process.

The 9/11 Commission report highlighted that there was a lack of information sharing within the intelligence community. But evidence points out this was just as serious within agencies as it was across agencies. How can problems of sharing within agencies be solved by layering another set of controls over all of the agencies?

We ought to think about what happens to the agencies that exist now and how they should transition into this national intelligence director realm, and not assume it is automatically created as soon as the bill is passed.

Would the national intelligence director's role in crafting intelligence policy supplant that of other Cabinet Secretaries? Under this bill, would the Cabinet Secretaries lose their own organic capability to do intelligence analysis? Are we telling the Secretary of State he cannot hire somebody to do intelligence that he thinks he needs? If so, would this undercut Cabinet Secretaries who are constitutional officers of the Government charged with managing the instruments of foreign and security policy for the country?

I do not think we should proceed to create a national intelligence director that has the power to tell those Cabinet Secretaries what they can do in terms of gathering intelligence and analysis.

How would these same Cabinet Secretaries fulfill the constitutional authority vested in them by Congress unless they have the power to make an independent judgment about what is the proper conclusion from the intelligence available to them?

Could the national intelligence director function without having the analytical branch of the CIA placed under his or her direction? I say that again, the only analytical branch we really have is the CIA, and this bill seems to say that the NID gets that analytical branch of the CIA. If it does not, will we have duplicate analytical branches? What is the role of CIA under this concept, as far as analysis is concerned?

If the essential relationship between analysts and operators is weakened, does the operational branch become rudderless and the analytical branch too academic? Would the CIA become an organization for conducting clandestine activities only?

I do not think this bill tells us what we expect from CIA in the future. It says what we expect the NID to do, but it really does not reaffirm the role of any existing agencies that I have defined.

Creating an intelligence czar with domestic surveillance authority that is not under the Attorney General, and measures that separate domestic intelligence from law enforcement, go against all the lessons learned by democratic governments the hard way. What are the concerns and dangers of merging domestic and foreign counterterrorism operations under one organization?

Again, I refer to extensive comments Judge Posner made to us before our committee. How will competing views on intelligence be brought to the President's attention? Indeed, how will competing views merge at all in a structure that is so centralized and under the control of the

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the attached statement from the Office of Compliance be printed in the Record today pursuant to section 304(b)(1) of the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 1384(b)(1)).

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President, there are times when one reads a speech that has been given by another Senator and reaches a conclusion and says: I could have given that speech.

Today I was given a copy of the statement made by my Senate brother from Hawaii, Senator Inouye, at the David Sarnoff Award Banquet last night. I came to the floor to commend that speech to Members of the Senate. I do think if Senators read it, some of them at least might change their position on some of the issues that are going to come before us next week.

This is a very thoughtful speech that Senator Inouye made. This David Sarnoff Award, as we all know, is named after the founder of the Association of Communications, Electronics, Intelligence and Information Systems Professionals, a group of people who have devoted their lives to improving the technology for our people who are engaged in the intelligence-gathering system of the United States.

This is an award that has been given to many distinguished people in the past--former Secretary Bill Perry, Secretary of State Colin Powell, former Senator and Vice President Al Gore, our current Vice President, Dick Cheney. It is an award anyone would be proud to receive, but as a practical matter, I bet those people did not expect the speech of the type they heard. It is one that I think, as I said at the beginning, demonstrates what we say from time to time: That the two of us think alike and speak alike.

I commend this speech to Members of the Senate and hope Members will read it and understand it. I ask unanimous consent that Senator Inouye's speech be printed in the Record.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. President, the Open World Program has grown from a pilot program in 1999 to a robust program, not only in Russia but in countries in both the former Soviet Union and the Baltics. I am grateful to Dr. James Billington's continued leadership of Open World, as well as to my Senate colleagues who serve with me on the board of the center and who take the time to meet with Open World delegations in the United States.

Open World has brought over 8,000 participants to 1,254 communities in all 50 States. I am pleased that my home State of Alaska has welcomed many delegations and strengthened ties between Alaskans and Russian in the Far East. I want to note that the GAO reviewed Open World from top to bottom this year and noted both the broad participation it has achieved in Russia. The GAO team traveled to Russia and interviewed a number of participants to determine its impact. GAO reported that ``Most delegates viewed their program experience very favorably and . . . have taken concrete steps to adapt what they learned from their U.S. visits to the Russian environment.''

Last year we asked Open World to expand its operations to new counties, including strategic allies for the U.S. defense interests, such as Uzbekistan. I

would like to ask my colleagues, Senator Campbell and Senator Durbin, if they would like to comment on Open World's expansion.

I thank my colleagues for their interest and support. In addition to the groundbreaking work that you have described in Belarus and the Baltics, I would like to point out that the Russian Federation has many areas with predominantly Muslim populations--Chechnya, Tatarstan, Baskortostan, Ingushetia--areas where Stalin deported more than a million people from the North Caucasus to Siberia and Central Asia. I suggested to my fellow board members on Open World that we focus, in particular, on these regions for 2004. We also launched a pilot in Uzbekistan at the same time. In a matter of months, Open World had found U.S. hosts and selected young leaders from these key regions; 500 leaders traveled from the Russian Muslim republics and 100 from Uzbekistan. The strength of Open world and its future lies with its ability to take a simple, cost-effective model rooted in our American communities, values, and hospitality and adapt to new countries of the greatest strategic interest to the United States.

In 2003 Congress authorized expansion of Open World to 14 new countries. a number of these--Armenia, Georgia, Belarus, Moldova, Kazakhstan--warrant their own program. I hope that we can work with our House colleagues to maintain sufficient funding for Open World to continue its success, while not diminishing terribly the important work it must continue to do in Russia--as important now as when I first helped establish the program in 1999.

With my colleagues support, I would like to ask Dr. Billington and the staff of Open World to explore the possibility of expansion of the program to Afghanistan and Pakistan. These countries are crucial to U.S. interests. Recognizing that these nations lay outside the present scope of Open World, I am offering legislative language that would allow the Board of Trustees and staff to explore the feasibility of expanding the program and reporting back to the Senate and House appropriations Committees within 90 days. Dr. Billington is the Librarian of Congress, in addition to his role as chairman of the Open World board. The Library's expertise in CRS and through its overseas offices will be of great assistance to Open World in responding to this request.

I want to thank Dr. Billington for his continued leadership. I also thank my colleagues, Senator Campbell and Senator Durbin, for their interest in Open world and appreciation for the important work it has accomplished.

Mr. President, today our Appropriations Committee held a hearing and listened to distinguished individuals as to their views on the recommendations for intelligence reform. At that time, we were provided a statement which is entitled ``Guiding Principles for Intelligence Reform'' dated September 21, 2004. It is signed by the following persons: former Senator David Boren, former Senator Bill Bradley, former Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, former Secretary of Defense William Cohen, former CIA Director Robert Gates, former Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre, former Senator and Presidential candidate Gary Hart, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, former Senator Sam Nunn, former Senator Warren Rudman, and former Secretary of State George Shultz.

I do call it to the attention of all Senators in connection with this current review of the 9/11 Commission recommendations on intelligence reform.

I ask unanimous consent that the ``Guiding Principles for Intelligence Reform'' be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

I thank the Chair.

(The remarks of Mr. Stevens pertaining to the submission of the resolution are located in today's Record under ``Submission of Concurrent and Senate Resolutions.'')

Mr. President, I have come to the Senate to submit a resolution honoring the great philanthropist John Kluge whose 90th birthday is tomorrow. He is a personal friend.

John Kluge is a self-made man. He came to this country as a young boy from Germany with virtually nothing but a china Dresden horse--which he still has. From these humble origins and through hard work he received a scholarship to Columbia University.

After distinguished service as an army intelligence officer during WW II--and I say parenthetically he served in Alaska during that period-- he went on in the business world to create a vast media empire which he converted into a great engine of philanthropy, supporting many educational programs, aimed in particular toward helping minorities.

John Kluge's quiet commitment to public service and generosity of spirit will live on for generations. For years to come, individuals will be able to attend college on a Kluge scholarship

who might otherwise be unable to afford it. Countless future national leaders will benefit from the intellectual stimulation he has made possible through his work at the Library of Congress.

Mr. Kluge is the founding chairman of the James Madison Council, the Library of Congress's private sector philanthropic organization, where he has inspired many others to join in support of the library and its programs.

Through his generosity, John Kluge helped the Library of Congress bridge the gap into the digital world by enabling it to invest heavily in technologies that bring the vast collections of the Library of Congress to people all over the world.

As chairman of the Joint Committee on the Library, I was pleased to announce at a ceremony in the Capitol in 2000 with the Librarian of Congress, Jim Billington, Mr. Kluge's generous gift of $60 million to establish the John W. Kluge center in the Library of Congress. Thanks to this endowment, the Kluge Center brings some of the world's best minds--the Kluge Scholars--into residence to use the rich resources of the library and interact with national policy makers.

John Kluge has also generously supported the creation of advanced training for a new generation of library leaders through the leadership development program at the Library of Congress.

John Kluge is a man who has made a difference. He has touched countless lives and truly deserves the recognition of this body.

I ask unanimous consent to submit this resolution and ask that it be held at the desk so others might join in cosponsoring this resolution. It is my intention to ask the leadership to try to clear it for adoption this afternoon.

We will provide the needed disaster relief for Florida agriculture as soon as possible. This relief will come in the form of appropriations for the U.S. Department of Agriculture disaster relief programs. These funds will be used to help Florida citrus farmers as well as other Florida farmers. If the funds are not provided before we address Hurricane Ivan, we will address this issue when we do address Ivan in the conference on this bill, the Homeland Security bill.

Mr. President, yes, that is my commitment to the Senator from Florida. We fully intend to take up the Hurricane Ivan funds as an amendment to this bill in conference when the supplemental request is received.

I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. President, I call to the attention of the members of the Appropriations Committee that there will be a markup in our committee of three bills at 10:30. We will also consider appropriations bills on the floor tomorrow morning.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President, although I will be speaking on intelligence matters and other matters relating to the CR, I ask unanimous consent that my statement not be considered a violation of the Pastore rule and I be able to speak on general matters.

Mr. President, a lot of people are talking about a continuing resolution for appropriations this year. This is not a normal year. This is the end of Congress. This Congress goes out of being. We will come back next year and have to deal with new bills. I want to talk a little bit about the problem of a continuing resolution for a series of bills.

For instance, my State had over 5 million acres of timberland burned this year. Forest fires were just enormous. We have provided in the Interior bill moneys for hazardous fuels reduction to try to reduce the fires, really, on some of the wildlands of the United States. If we had that money we could probably prevent what we call follow-on fires. Where lightning fires strike, the next year they strike almost in the same place. The next year they strike almost in the same place. But as they do in years following a fire, they are hitting timber that has been dried out, burned, dried out, and it is just like kindling. It just causes the whole area to burn more and then more and then more. The way to stop that is to do the hazardous fire reduction program, go into the area that burned and take that timber out--try to plant new trees, but at least do something to prevent a follow-on fire the following year. If the Interior bill doesn't pass, there will not be that money available.

We have additional money for the Indian Health Service this year. We have had substantial problems in health areas in the Indian community. That money wouldn't be available under a CR.

Many people don't know what a CR is. It is a continuing resolution which continues the moneys that were appropriated in 2003 to be spent in 2004; now that same amount of money is going to be spent in 2005. Judgments of 2003 of what should be happening in 2004 are not valid in 2005. We need each of these bills this year more than we ever have before.

Take, for instance, the hurricanes that just happened. We have in the budget request what is called the beach renourishment policy. It is a one-time funded program to try to replace some of these beaches that have been lost in the hurricane season. There are approximately 43 projects already outlined that have to be funded this year in order to undertake this new concept. It is sort of like the fires concept. If we move in and repair these beaches now, a subsequent follow-on hurricane will not aggravate the damage and leave even further destruction in the area. Again, unless we get the Energy and Water bill, it will not be done. There will be no dredging of the low-use waterway and harbors that have had extensive damage. These hurricanes change the bottom of the sea in the areas adjacent to the shore of where the hurricanes come ashore. We need new money to deal with that. The only way to get it is to get an Energy and Water appropriations bill passed.

If you look at the Department of Energy, we have a whole series of items requested by the President and approved by the Appropriations Committee on energy and water. The budget this year requests $1.16 billion more than was enacted for this fiscal year of 2004. A continuing resolution will carry the figures for 2004 forward as long as the continuing resolution continues until Congress passes a bill next year.

But meanwhile, the money that is needed for security and the safeguard problems of our national weapons labs, the President asked for $706 million to make those laboratories more safe and more secure.

He asked for $6.9 billion in energy environmental management activities. That is an increase over 2004. This is expected to have a specific effect on the environmental cleanup activities in Tennessee, Washington, Idaho, and South Carolina.

In terms of energy supply, we have money this year for energy research, including renewable resources such as hydrogen, solar, wind, and biomass. The President's request this year is $835 million, a 13- percent increase over 2004.

I will come back later. I don't want to monopolize the time. I keep reminding the Senate that we cannot operate under a CR for 2005. It is not possible.

Take the Department of Agriculture: The 2005 bill is not passed and the medical device user fee authority expires at the end of this fiscal year because we did not provide the required level of funding authority. This bill takes care of that. If the bill does not pass, there won't be funding to maintain the participation rates for the WIC Program.

The budget request is underestimated by over $300 million. That would be required to continue the program in 2005. That would not be available under 2004 money.

This Homeland Security bill is an example. If it does not pass, the counterterrorism food safety money for FDA will not be available.

There are a whole series of things. I am sure the chairman, my distinguished friend from Mississippi, has described that in more detail.

But the real problem with our thinking about a continuing resolution is money would not be available to other Departments to meet emergency situations--some caused by natural events such as hurricanes and fires and others caused by changes in the security requirements of the departments of the Government which have security requirements. They are conducting their business differently now after the Department of Homeland Security examined how they handled buildings and security of employees. Each one of them now has a mandate to change the way they do business. We have provided the money for those new directions in the 2005 bills. That money for the security of the Federal buildings will not be available under the 2004 program without substantial reprogramming, which couldn't be done until well into next year.

I am trying to make the case for the Members of the Senate to think about getting all of these bills done this year. Don't think about a continuing resolution. A continuing resolution will not work for the appropriations process this year.

I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I commend the managers of the bill for the way this bill is proceeding. But I want to make a plea to the Senate. We have been informed that the FBI, the Customs Service, the Immigration Service, and other portions of the Homeland Security Department are running short of money, as so many agencies are concerned with the problems of homeland security now. I consider this bill to be the second most important bill before our Appropriations Committee. We finished the Department of Defense bill which is the first bill. It was the bill to fund those who are serving in uniform abroad when we have forces involved in wartime circumstances. We did act on the Defense bill before the last recess. We are going to be in a period next week which is a very confusing period. It is a period justifiably recognizing a Jewish holiday that is coming up, but it is a situation I think that requires us to consider the time factor on this bill.

I am rising tonight to tell the Senate that it is my hope we will finish this bill by next Tuesday. If we get this bill passed by the Senate next Tuesday night, we can get it to the House and we can get conferees appointed and the various conference staff who are not involved with the holiday we are going to observe will be able to work on the bill. I hope we can get this bill to the President before the end of this month. September 30 is the end of this fiscal year. These agencies need this money. The agencies of the Homeland Security Department need this money by October 1.

I plead with the Senate to recognize the time factor and cooperate with the managers of the bill. It is entirely possible for us to finish this bill by next Tuesday as far as I can see.

I again congratulate particularly my good friend, the chairman of the subcommittee, for the way this bill is being handled.

But please consider the effect of not getting this bill passed in time for the money being available on October 1. A continuing resolution will have to be before us sometime next week, but it will continue the Department of Homeland Security at the existing level. This bill represents an increase in money for various agencies in the Department of Homeland Security, and that money is necessary by October 1. It is a security matter now. It is not a matter of adopting a resolution for departments that can operate for at least a month or so on the continuing resolution. This committee cannot and should not operate on a continuing resolution. I urge the Senate to help us get this bill passed by next Tuesday night.

I thank the Senator for yielding the time.

Mr. President, one of the pleasures of being in this body is to

be around men younger than I. One in particular I have traveled with considerably and for whom I have great fondness--he must have just walked off the Senate floor; I hope someone brings him back. I wish to call the attention of the Senate to the fact that my brother from Hawaii is 80 years old today.

(Applause.)

Mr. President, our Appropriations Committee is pleased to present to the Senate the Defense Appropriations Conference Report for the Fiscal Year 2005. I believe passage of this measure today represents the earliest date the Defense bill has ever been sent to the President for signing.

This conference report symbolizes a balanced approach to fulfilling the financial needs for the Department for the fiscal year 2005.

It provides $416.2 billion in new discretionary spending authority for the Department of Defense. This amount includes $25 million in emergency spending requested by the President for the fiscal year 2005 costs associated with the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. That provision becomes effective immediately upon the signing of this bill by the President.

The conference report fully funds key readiness programs critical to the global war on terrorism such as land forces training, helicopter flying hours, ship steaming days, and spare parts.

It fully funds the 3.5 percent military pay raise proposed in the President's budget, and increases levels for basic allowance for housing, eliminating service members' average out-of-pocket housing from 3.5 percent to zero in 2005.

It provides $1.5 billion above the President's budget request for Army and Marine Corps recapitalization of combat and tactical vehicles, helicopters, and ammunition, and provides a total of $18.2 billion for the Defense Health Program, an increase of $2.5 billion over the fiscal year 2004 enacted level.

I urge all Members to support the men and women in uniform who risk their lives for our country each day by voting for this measure.

I would like to thank Larry Lanzillota, the Acting Department of Defense Comptroller, for his hard work, dedication, and diligence throughout the past year. He has done a superb job and we wish him success in his future endeavors.

I also thank my cochairman, Senator Inouye, for his support and valuable counsel, and recognize him for any statement he wishes to make.

I wish to put in the Record the names of the diligent staff members who have worked on this bill night and day to be able to present it to the Senate at this time, as follows:

Charlie Houy, Betsy Schmid, Nicole DiResta, Sid Ashworth, Jennifer Chartrand, Kraig Siracuse, Tom Hawkins, Kate Kaufer, Lesley Kalan, Alycia Farrell, Brian Potts, Brian Wilson, Janelle Treon, and Mazie Mattson.

I yield to my friend from Hawaii, if he wishes to make an opening statement.

Mr. President, on behalf of my colleague from Hawaii, I reserve the remainder of our time. Senator Byrd has his time, Senator McCain will have his time, and we will withhold our time.

Our time is reserved?

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the time during this quorum call be charged against the time of the Senator from Hawaii and my time.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.