Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk. Mr. Chairman, the right to choose one's own counsel is a basic right in our democracy. This is a right that is a foundation of a fair and impartial judicial system. Having the right to choose…
Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
Mr. Chairman, the right to choose one's own counsel is a basic right in our democracy. This is a right that is a foundation of a fair and impartial judicial system.
Having the right to choose one's own attorney ensures that a person can hire an attorney who will best represent their interests and protect their rights in the judicial process.
H.R. 985, the Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act, undermines this basic right by requiring a court to deny any class action certification based solely on a proposed class representative or named plaintiff being represented by a family member. The bill provides no discretion to the court and no exceptions.
The bill uses an expansive definition that includes not only immediate family members, but extended parts of a family tree by blood and marriage. Such a broad definition is an unfair restriction on the right to an attorney of one's own choosing.
Previously, the manager's amendment modified this provision but did not relieve these concerns. Such broad, blanket assumptions about family relationships fail to recognize the importance of trust and expertise into the attorney-client relationship.
In many instances, a family member will best represent their interests in court or could have specialized training and experience relevant to the case, yet the language in this bill does not provide for any discretion or any exceptions.
The fact that a lawyer representing a potential class is a family member of a named class member does not, in itself, create a conflict of interest; and under current law, there is a process for courts to address real conflicts of interest when they arise.
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23(g), courts have an extensive list that must be satisfied when appointing counsel to represent a class. There also already is a strong disincentive against conflicts through fairness hearings after settlement is reached. Any potential conflict of interest risks spoiling the agreement and wasting the efforts of counsel and the class.
Removing the discretion of the courts is overly broad and will remove access to appropriate counsel where no conflict exists. I urge strong support for my amendment and the removal of this provision from this bill.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to adopt this important amendment to ensure that they have an opportunity to be heard when they are injured by an attorney of their choice.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
Mr. Chairman, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, the right to vote, the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, and other rights enumerated in the Constitution have an intrinsic value that cannot be adequately expressed in dollars and cents. When a person's constitutional rights are violated, they cannot be made whole entirely with money, and yet the bill that we have before us today would require our judicial system to hang a price tag on our most cherished constitutional rights.
Under H.R. 985, the Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act, if a ``judgment or proposed settlement in a class action provides for equitable relief, the portion of any attorney's fee award to class counsel that is attributed to the equitable relief shall be limited to a reasonable percentage of the value of the equitable relief, including any injunctive relief.''
Mr. Chairman, when a court grants such relief, it is not awarding money to a plaintiff. In these cases, the courts are stepping in to say this is a violation of constitutional rights and it must stop.
My amendment would strike the provision in this bill that would devalue our fundamental rights by requiring a highly subjective and wasteful, costly, and demeaning process of putting a price tag on these rights. Worse, it would deter attorneys from bringing critical civil lawsuits that reform systemic and widespread violations of individual rights.
When we think of class actions, we usually imagine a group of people seeking money to compensate them for an injury or a harm--a toxic spill, a horrific accident, an Erin Brockovich-type story. But the reality is that there are many class actions that do not seek monetary damages but are fighting to right a systemic wrong in our society.
These class actions have made lasting changes to our legal system and society that have moved our country closer to equality and justice, landmark class actions such as: Brown v. Board of Education, ending separate but equal as a basis for racial segregation in our schools; Allen v. State Board of Elections, finding that section 5 of the Voting Rights Act requires preclearance of any changes in voting practices; and Alexander v. Holmes County School District, requiring immediate integration of the schools. In these cases, plaintiffs asked the courts to protect and preserve their constitutional rights for themselves and others in similar situations in the future.
Under the system set forward by H.R. 985, a court would have to also set a dollar value to the judgment. How do you place a price tag on desegregating our Nation's public schools? How do you place a price tag on protecting the right to vote? How do you put a price tag on preserving the Constitution's Sixth Amendment right to counsel? How do you put a price tag on the fundamental right of marriage? It is not possible. These are fundamental, constitutional rights, and these rights are priceless.
If this bill were to become law, courts and civil cases would become bogged down in ancillary litigation aimed at establishing the value of rights, rights that are protected through equitable and injunctive relief. It would be a mess, and we don't have to make this unforced error.
I oppose the underlying bill, but it is my sincere hope that, if the House is going to pass it, the least that we can do is remove this provision from the bill and end this insulting pretense that the courts or anyone else can put a dollar value on our constitutional freedoms.
I urge support for my amendment, and I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, section 1983 that my friend, the chairman, refers to as to providing attorney's fees, requires a determination of attorney's fees by the number of hours reasonably expended on litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly fee.
This bill is very different from that. Instead of referring to hours and an hourly rate reasonably spent by an attorney, this bill requires the court to establish the value of the actual, equitable, or injunctive relief.
As I have suggested already, I cannot think of anyone who would believe that we should leave it up to a court to put a value on our constitutional rights that are, without question, priceless in our democracy.
Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this good amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.