Floor Statements

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the joint resolution be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the joint resolution be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, how much time is remaining on this side?

Mr. President, I request 3 minutes.

Mr. President, I have to agree with my colleague from Virginia, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee. We have had this issue before us not only this year a number of times but last year a number of times, and even the year before that to one degree or another.

Whether it is intentional, the net effect of these types of amendments is it delays the programs and it adds to extra costs.

We have had a lot of debate on all these issues that have been in this particular amendment. I think it is time for the Senate to move forward.

I will point out in response to the question that was raised by my colleague from Michigan that we had testimony in the full committee from the chief tester who says he believes we are in full compliance with the law. I do not think anything else needs to be said. We have that testimony. It is on the record in the committee.

I urge my colleagues again to join both Senator Warner and myself in opposing this particular amendment.

We do have some different testing procedures. That is because this is a different program, unlike the many other programs we have had. So we have to deal with it a different way.

The bottom line again is the chief tester is happy with the way it is progressing. He has had access to the program that has been unprecedented. He is satisfied with the cooperation between the program office and the test community. I have a letter, again, that I submitted for the Record in the past that indicates he is fully satisfied. I will read specifically from the letter. It says:

My office has unprecedented access to GMD, and I am

satisfied with the cooperation between the program office and

the test community. I will continue to advise the Secretary

of Defense and the Director of MDA on the BMDS test program.

I will also provide my characterization of system

capabilities and my assessment of test program adequacy

handling as required by Congress.

In my view, it is time we move on. In effect, when we go for the formal testing that is being advocated in this particular amendment, we add an extra year of delay. It breaks up the manufacturing lines.

We have had this discussion at a previous date. The net effect is subcontractors have to be requalified, workers need to be retrained, and then the manufacturing process has to be relearned. It takes time, up to 2\1/2\ years, and money--some have estimated as much as adding $250 million to the cost.

So I ask my colleagues to join me and Senator Warner in opposing this Reed amendment. It has the net effect of adding costs to the program, delaying the program unnecessarily, and we do have adequate testing now.

I yield 8 minutes to the Senator from Alaska.

Mr. President, I yield myself 10 minutes.

I rise to strongly oppose the Levin amendment. Senator Levin proposes to cut $515 million from missile defense and shift funds to a variety of homeland security and counterterrorism provisions. I urge my colleagues to oppose this amendment on a number of grounds.

First, it makes a false distinction between missile defense and homeland security. Missile defense is quintessentially homeland security. That is right, missile defense is homeland security. It protects our homeland from long-range missiles and the most destructive weapons on the planet.

Second, it makes a false distinction between missile defense and counterterror. Throughout the cold war, we were concerned with the balance of terror. Rogue nations with missiles and weapons of mass destruction will use those missiles and weapons to threaten and terrorize the United States, our allies, and our friends.

Third, it would do serious harm to the Missile Defense Program. The $515 million cut in the Levin amendment is for the next 10 ground-based midcourse defense interceptors. Cutting these funds would break the production line for these missiles. It would cause the loss of key personnel, expertise, subcontractors, and suppliers, and then they would have to start all over again, with lead-in delays and extra costs to the program.

The Missile Defense Agency would have to reconstitute the production, requalify and recertify subcontractors and suppliers, and it would have to restart production. Losing these funds for a year could result in a long delay in fielding the next 10 interceptors--between 2 and 3 years after we would have fielded them, I am told--and result in restart costs of nearly $300 million.

Those who oppose missile defense obviously would like to delay. That is what we have been arguing over the last few days. They would like to add costs and then come back and say how this program is not proceeding the way it should. This is an essential program. We should not have delays. We should do everything we possibly can to cut down unnecessary costs because of time delays.

Fourth, it would do serious harm to the defense of the Nation against long-range missile threats. The Missile Defense Agency's assessment is that delaying the next 10 interceptors would leave us critically short of assets in the 2007 timeframe to defend against known and potential threats.

We cannot talk about all the information that is available that informs Senators and how that judgment comes about, but it is available to all Senators, and if they have any questions about that, I urge them to get that information and review it.

And fifth, this amendment is inconsistent with national policy established in legislation and signed into law by President Clinton. The National Missile Defense Act of 1999 established a national policy to deploy a national missile defense as soon as technologically feasible. It is feasible, and these additional interceptors are important to that effort. The Senate approved that act by a vote of 97 to 3, I remind Members of the Senate.

Furthermore, this amendment would move the funds to accounts that are already well funded. Again, I remind my colleagues in the Senate, this missile defense is homeland security.

I want to talk a little bit about these funds. For example, the President's budget includes $47.4 billion for homeland security activities, not including ballistic missile defense throughout the Government, an increase of $6.1 billion, or 15 percent, compared to last year, a $26.8 billion increase to fiscal year 2002.

Being on the Budget Committee, I had an opportunity to do a comparison. Homeland security is getting far more percentage increase than any other agency the President proposed in his budget. Now we are piling in on top of that.

Funding for the Department's activities to counter terrorism has more than doubled in 3 years to $10.2 billion. Of that amount, the President's budget request included $8 billion in DOD programs for homeland defense. The committee's mark added more than $300 million above the budget request.

All of the programs for which Senator Levin proposes to add funds in his amendment were funded either at or above the amount of the President's budget request. Many of the recommendations for increased funding in this measure are simply flawed.

For example, one of the first items recommends an increase of $50 million in Air Force research and development to be allocated to NORAD for low altitude threat detection and response technology. This item appears to be directed at cruise missile defense, but it is not clearly enough defined to know how the proposed funding increase would be used. A $50 million increase for ill-defined purposes would not be executable.

I note that the proposal was apparently justified on the basis that the NORTHCOM integrated priority list includes cruise missile defense. This proposed amendment also reduces one of the highest NORTHCOM priorities on its list--that is ballistic missile defense--by $515 million, again reminding the Members of the Senate that missile defense is homeland security.

Finally, I have a letter that was sent to the chairman of the Armed Services Committee from Admiral Ellis, commander of the Strategic Command at Omaha, NE, the head military integrator for missile defense, who expresses his opposition to any cuts to missile defense funding. I will read this letter for the benefit of my colleagues.

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am writing to express concern about possible efforts to

cut funding from the President's FY05 budget request for

continued fielding of missile defense capabilities, including

additional Ground-based Interceptors. As the operational lead

for Global Missile Defense, USSSTRATCOM supports the

continued appropriate development of missile defense

capabilities that will be incrementally fielded and improved

under the evolutionary approach of Concurrent Test and

Operations. It is especially important to our early success

that we have funding support for the production of ground-

based interceptors at a rate and quantity sufficient to

sustain the evolutionary developmental approach, testing

milestones, and our initial defense operational capabilities.

A reduction of interceptor funding would: (1) limit the

capability and capacity of the Ballistic Missile Defense

System to defend the U.S. against long-range missile attack,

and (2) limit the opportunity to gain operational test

experience as it will reduce the number of interceptors

available to replace deployed interceptors subsequently used

in operational testing.

He goes on to say he further appreciates the chairman's support to both develop and provide the Nation with a rudimentary missile defense capability and indicated that this letter was also forwarded to the ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. So the sponsor of this amendment has seen this letter, which is from an individual whom I have had before my committee and somebody whom I highly respect. So there we have it, somebody who is part of STRATCOM giving us a clear reason for why we need to have those additional missiles.

In response to what the sponsor of the amendment said about whether all the missiles are going to be used, that was addressed in a full committee hearing on March 9 in which Senator Levin himself, the sponsor of the amendment, asked General Kadish, after he commented about the fact that the missiles would work: How many of the Fort Greeley ones would be launched?

General Kadish answered--and this is not new evidence or new facts that have been brought before the Armed Services Committee or even before the full Senate. General Kadish said: Eventually, all of them.

That response was further pursued by my colleague on the Armed Services Committee, who asked: They would be moved somewhere else, is that it?

General Kadish said: No. Well, they may--this is part of the ongoing planning. That is why we all get frustrated from time to time when we change our plans.

The current plan is to use all of those out at Fort Greeley.

I yield myself an additional 3 minutes.

I will respond to the concerns that were raised by the sponsor of the amendment about what he referred to as ``loose nukes,'' and from that same report which he quoted, I would point out that in the report it says the probability that a weapons of mass destruction armed missile will be used against U.S. forces or interests is higher today than during most of the cold war.

This is a real threat, and we should not be saying we have a higher priority on homeland defense or a higher priority on missiles. The fact is we are vulnerable in all areas. We need to address that, and we have been adequately addressing it with our funding for homeland security. Now we need to take care of missile defense and make sure we have adequately taken care of the threat with weapons of mass destruction through missiles that might be launched.

In response to a hearing we had earlier on the need for a missile defense test bed, I will share with my colleagues some testimony by Admiral Ellis, who is the commander of STRATCOM. I asked Admiral Ellis: Do you support the use of the missile defense test bed to provide limited operational capability, yes or no?

Admiral Ellis replies: Yes, sir. Yes, sir.

Then I asked him a further question: Does such a capability contribute to deterrence?

Admiral Ellis says: Absolutely.

Then I responded back: Does such a capability provide a useful strategic option?

Admiral Ellis says: Yes, it does.

Then I further questioned: Does such a capability raise the nuclear threshold?

Admiral Ellis says: It certainly does.

The fourth point I would like to talk about is the funding of the nonproliferation initiative. The biggest portion of Senator Levin's proposal adds $211 million for a new nonproliferation initiative in the Department of Energy, but DOE cannot spend the funding it has already for nonproliferation. Right now, DOE has $735 million in unobligated balances for nonproliferation programs, and Senator Levin's amendment would push that total up to nearly a billion dollars.

In summary, we are on the right track. The Armed Services Committee has received testimony both in my subcommittee as well as in the full committee and the testimony indicates we have a real need in missile defense and we are taking care of homeland security. I urge my colleagues to join me in opposing the Levin amendment.

Mr. President, on Tuesday, June 15, I received some very sad news, that Jessie Roberson had announced her resignation as the Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management at the Department of Energy effective July 15.

I have known Jessie since I was first elected to the Senate in 1996. At the time she was the site manager for the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology site in my State of Colorado. Through our common interest at Rocky Flats, I got to know her quite well. She not only impressed me with her depth of knowledge but here innovation and determination in making sure that Rocky Flats would be one of the first major DOE sites to close. Under her watch from 1996 to 1999, the Rocky Flats closure date went from 2015 to 2006. I know it was her leadership that moved this ambitious plan forward.

When President Bush was elected in 2000, it was that same leadership and determination that convinced me to put her name forward knowing that she would be the best person for the job of Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management at the Department. And I can say, unequivocally, that she has not disappointed.

When I met with her shortly after being confirmed, I told her that the environmental management program was broken and in need of major reforms. I added that this would not be easy and that some people would not like the changes which are necessary to make the program work. She agreed and she promised that she would work hard to effect change. While she later told me that it has not been easy, she kept the course and has transformed the program from one of just motion to true action. The Department has made tremendous progress in getting sites closer to closure. I can honestly say that what some people did not think possible 3 years ago is closer to happening; and that is that sites will be closing. I can only attribute this to the leadership of this extraordinary woman.

During her confirmation hearing before the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee on May 16, I inserted into the Record a Denver Post editorial entitled ``Roberson a Top Flight Pick'' and quoted one line from the editorial. It said:

The Department's environmental management job is in fact

one of the toughest positions in the Federal Government.

There likely is not a better person around to tackle the

task, than Jessie Roberson.

I believed that statement then, and after 3 years on the job, she proved that statement to be true.

She has done a tremendous job not just for President Bush and Secretary Abraham, but for the entire country. She has made our country safer by accelerating the cleanup of some of the world's most dangerous places. She is making sure that our children and grandchildren are not going to have to bear the burden of these contaminated sites.

While I am saddened to see her leave her post at the Department, I know that she has nothing but the brightest future ahead of her. I am proud to call her my friend and I wish Jessie and her daughter Jessica all the best. Thank you, Jessie Roberson, for your service.

Madam President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

I rise in strong opposition to Reed amendment No. 3353, which fences the funds for ground-based midcourse interceptors pending completion of initial operational test and evaluation.

In effect we have already had that debate, and I find it perplexing that here we are, having that same issue introduced again in the form of another Reed amendment on the floor of the Senate. I think we adequately addressed it yesterday when we had a Reed amendment at that particular time where he put in some requirements for operational testing, and we second-degreed that with the Warner amendment where we talked about modifying that in a way so that we maintain flexibility with the Secretary of the Department of Defense, yet had some accountability.

There was a policy set forward where we could move forward with the missile defense issue and still show the accountability we needed. We had that vote and the Warner amendment was adopted as a second-degree amendment on the Reed amendment. We resolved that issue. But here again we are talking about the same issue.

I certainly don't quarrel with the need to conduct operational realistic testing. We recognized that yesterday. Everyone supports that, so much so that this body voted, as I said, strongly. They didn't just vote for it, they strongly voted in favor of the Warner amendment yesterday, which requires such a test to be conducted next year so we can get that behind us and move on. We address it in terms of realistic testing instead of operational testing, which would be much more restrictive.

But this amendment would cause serious harm to the effort to defend our Nation from missile attack. It is a delay in our moving forward. In fact, it would disrupt the production lines to a point where it may even put the total program in severe jeopardy. By fencing these funds, the amendment would prevent obligation or expenditure of fiscal year 2005 funds for the next ground-based midcourse missile interceptors until completion of initial operational test and evaluation.

I know some Senators have maintained this is not a cut to the program. To plan, conduct, and assess a formal operational test--just one test--would take the Missile Defense Agency and the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation a year or more.

The fact is, the fiscal year 2005 funds requested could not be executed in fiscal year 2005. That is the problem. In effect, this is a deep cut to a very important effort.

This reduction would cause serious disruption in the effort to acquire additional interceptors. The contractors making the interceptors would have to interrupt their efforts. Subcontractors would be lost. Key personnel would be lost. Valuable manufacturing experience and processes would also be lost.

Requalifying, then, these subcontractors and retraining workers and relearning the manufacturing process takes time and money. The projections are it would delay the program up to 2\1/2\ years and cost taxpayers more than $250 million extra.

Ironically, the loss of expertise and experienced personnel, and the effort to retrain and requalify, inevitably involves increased technical risk, exactly the opposite result which I know Senator Reed hopes to achieve.

Let me make several key points. First of all, the GMD effort is threat driven. North Korean ballistic missiles already pose a serious threat to the United States. The justification for the additional 10 interceptor missiles is to defend the country. It is clear for all those who want to look at the evidence. Delay will leave us critically short of assets to defend ourselves.

Second, the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command has expressed concern

with efforts to reduce the number of GMD interceptors. He supports the early exploitation of the operational capabilities inherent in the BMD test bed and believes the GMD element provides him with a useful military capability and enhances deterrence.

Third, the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, the Department's chief tester, as I like to refer to him, wrote in a letter to me that operational testing for a GMD element is premature and would not be helpful to the program. I have introduced that letter into the Record in previous debates. This is in direct contradiction to the direction of this amendment.

The Director, Mr. Christie, has testified that he supports the BMD test program and how it is being conducted, that the testing of the ground-based midcourse element is appropriate, and that he provides operational assessments on a continuing basis.

Fourth, this amendment offers no real benefit to the GMD test program. It is characteristic of a spiral development program such as the ballistic missile defense development effort to incorporate both developmental goals and operational goals and testing. The GMD testing already incorporates operational goals in each of its tests and, as I noted, the Director of OT&E already provides operational assessments based on this testing.

I believe this amendment provides no benefit, absolutely no benefit to the GMD effort and, in fact, will do significant harm to our national defense.

I urge my colleagues to oppose this Reed amendment.

I yield the floor.

That should do it, yes.

Mr. President, I thank the chairman for yielding to me. Senator Kyl was on the Senate floor. I thought I would go ahead and give him an opportunity to make some comments. I would like to make some comments following his remarks.

I do. If you take down the test bed, you in effect are going to stop the progress of the missile defense program. The real issue is, if you take down any part of it, it is so intertwined and interconnected, you slow down and stop the whole system. Your comments are very pertinent. They are very much in order. I have tremendous concern that this in effect is going to undo what the Congress has worked so hard to do.

If you remember, initially the legislation directed that we move forward on missile defense as soon as technologically feasible. We are ready to move ahead, and we need to.

I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Arizona.

I thank the Senator for his statement. I recognize in a public way his great work on this particular issue, and his comments are very enlightening.

I will yield myself 6 minutes.

I rise in strong opposition to the Boxer amendment. Today, we face a clear threat from long-range missiles in North Korea. Iran has made no secret of its intent to develop long-range missiles. We may have to deal with that threat in the not-too-distant future. That is the truth.

Consequently, I have great concern about this amendment, which seems relatively straightforward but it is potentially devastating to the effort to defend our Nation from long-range missile threats. I say ``seems straightforward'' because I can actually read this amendment three different ways. None of these readings seem useful to the defense of this country.

If I focus on mission, I would note that Admiral James Ellis, Commander of Strategic Command, has testified to our committee that the ground-based midcourse element of the ballistic missile defense system enhances deterrence and provides him a militarily useful capability. On that basis, perhaps the Secretary could provide the certification required by the amendment, even at this stage of the testing. I don't believe that is what the Senator from California has in mind.

If I focus on operations, I might read this amendment to say we can deploy all we want, but we cannot use what we deployed operationally. Taken literally, that would mean if North Korea or some other nation would launch a missile at us, we would be forbidden by law from trying to defend ourselves. I don't believe that is what the Senator has in mind either. Of course, to be able to try to intercept such a missile, the ground-based midcourse element would have to be on alert and operationally ready. This is precisely why Admiral Ellis strongly supports taking advantage of the operational capabilities of the missile defense test bed.

That brings us to the third reading focusing on deployment. If I read the amendment correctly, it would impose a prohibition on any deployment of defenses against long-range ballistic missiles. Any additional deployment would be prohibited until the Secretary of Defense certifies that operationally realistic testing has demonstrated that the ground-based midcourse defense element can perform its mission.

If that is the Senator's intent, as I read this, if this amendment were to become law at the beginning of the new fiscal year, no further fielding of ground-based midcourse interceptors, radars, battle management facilities, command and control facilities, or communications assets would be permitted. These are the components of the BMD test bed on which the initial defense capability of the GMD element are based.

This has the potential to cause extraordinary harm to the GMD effort by disrupting ongoing efforts to acquire assets for the BMD test bed, including all of the assets I just mentioned. Recovering from this disruption, depending on how long fielding of capabilities were to be suspended, could take years and cost hundreds of millions of dollars. But beyond that, as a consequence of this disruption, and the consequent harm to the BMD test bed, it is not clear to me at all how the Missile Defense Agency could achieve the operationally realistic testing that all of us support.

Furthermore, I believe this amendment fails to grasp the essentials of how the Department of Defense and the Missile Defense Agency are attempting to field missile defenses as effectively and expeditiously as possible.

The ballistic missile defense program is a spiral development effort. That means, in essence, develop missile defenses and field those defenses if the warfighter believes the capability has military utility without necessarily waiting for the 100-percent solution. Further development then allows those defenses to be improved in subsequent spirals.

This amendment does not seem to take account of this spiral development, that the ground midcourse defense system element will be able to perform at a certain level early in its fielding and will improve in its capabilities over time or that continued testing will demonstrate new capabilities as they are developed. Testing, which already incorporates operational goals and some measure of operational realism, gets more realistic and more rigorous with time.

This method of development, testing, and fielding does not seem to me to be compatible with the one-time certification by the Secretary. We all support operationally realistic testing, but banning deployment until a certification appears to me to be self-defeating.

I urge my colleagues to join me in opposing this amendment.

I would like to bring to the attention of my colleagues a quote by Christie, who is the Director of the Operational Test and Evaluation Program:

I continue to strongly support the construction and

integration of the BMDS test bed. This test bed will provide

the elements that make up the initial defense operations or.

. . .

the architecture of the missile defense system.

Who is this director? He is the chief tester. This is what the chief tester himself is saying about how important it is that we move forward with spiral development where we can operationally show in a test bed the dual capability.

Mr. President, I yield the floor and yield--how much time does the Senator from Alabama wish?

I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Alabama.

Mr. President, I yield myself 3 minutes.

My colleague said all we have to have is mutually assured deterrence. That is a policy out of the cold war: Blow me up and I am going to blow you up. We are past that in this day and age. We are dealing with leaders in other countries who do not care, and that is where our threat is coming from, it is coming from countries such as Iran and North Korea. We need to figure out a new system, and we need to get it in place as quickly as we possibly can to make sure we can continue to provide the security to this country that the American people expect. The missile defense system is the answer.

We are talking about a test bed that is overlapping with an operational capability, and anything we do to delay the operational capability, we delay testing. When testing is delayed, the cost of the program is run up and the program is delayed out. Then pretty soon there are cost overruns and then the opposition says, well, we cannot move forward because of all of these delays and cost overruns.

The fact is, we are on schedule. We expect to get these missiles in the ground this fall, and we are going to begin to have a system in place where we can defend this country from an unexpected missile attack that may occur out of North Korea or Iran.

Mr. Christie, who I had quoted earlier, in simple terms, was our chief tester, and he states that the test bed is necessary for evolution improvement to the ballistic missile defense system, and that the challenge is to do testing in a manner that will improve the system while supporting an operational system.

Stating something Mr. Christie said from his recent testimony to the full committee, he says that fielding the test bed provides an opportunity to gather operational data on system performance, safety, survivability, availability, and maintainability. We should expect these data to drive system enhancements. The challenge will be in achieving a defensive posture that is flexible enough to accommodate the necessary changes to hardware, software, and processes that will be necessary to maintain a highly available

ballistic missile defense system, while supporting a comprehensive testing program that is designed to mature, improve, and demonstrate mission capabilities through continued development.

Mr. Christie believes the Missile Defense Agency test program is a strong one, and that it is working. Unnecessary delays are unnecessary. We simply cannot tolerate those. This issue is too important to the security of this country. So I am asking that my colleagues join me in opposing the Boxer amendment. This is a devastating amendment. It is creating all sorts of problems as far as the defense of this country is concerned, and it is going to severely hinder what we are trying to do with ballistic missile defense.

I yield the floor.

Would you repeat your request?

On the Defense authorization bill? We have no objection.

Mr. President, I would like to call on the Senator from Mississippi and yield him 3 minutes to comment on the Boxer amendment. I want to recognize, in a public way, that he is the one who carried the initial amendments on the missile defense system that said we move forward when technologically feasible and he has been a real leader in the defense of this country.

Mr. President, I would like to know what time remains on the Boxer amendment.

On our side. How about the other side?

Mr. President, I would like to yield myself 2 minutes. I would like to make a couple of summary comments.

First, technologically we are ready to move ahead. The various components of this missile defense system have been shown to be functional and scientifically can happen. What needs to be established is all the communications systems that run from California to Alaska to Colorado, to some of our space satellites, to some of our ships at sea, to the Hawaiian Islands, to the Kwajalein Islands, over thousands and thousands of miles, that they can communicate with one another.

There is only one way to do that. You have to put together a large test bed. This test bed happens to also be the same thing we would use to operationally defend ourselves. To not continue on a dual pathway does not make any sense at all. That is why it is so very important that we defeat this Boxer amendment.

Mr. Christie, who is the tester, is the one who has been following this. It has been stated time and time again that he is satisfied with the progress, the way we are moving forward. He is the expert. He says: You are doing a good job. Keep it up. I am satisfied. I am responsible and accountable for how this program has gone ahead. He has been before the committee and made that statement.

It is very important that we defeat this Boxer amendment. I ask my colleagues to join me.

I think the chairman has a concern or two he wants to raise. I yield the floor.

I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. President, I yield myself 10 minutes.

Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the Reed amendment that was before us prior to the amendment from Senator Warner, and I want to talk about that briefly. Then I want to talk about the second- degree amendment by Senator Warner.

With respect to the Reed amendment, from my standpoint and the standpoint of the Missile Defense Agency and the Pentagon's office of Test and Evaluation and Formal Operation, tests at this juncture simply would not be helpful.

According to a letter I received on May 17, 2004--and I think this is the most current position--the letter from the Pentagon's Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, Mr. Tom Christie, in response to several questions I asked him, Mr. Christie writes--he is the chief tester we referred to, and he is responsible for overseeing much of the testing that goes on at the Department of Defense and obviously has a deep interest in what is happening as far as accountability in the missile defense system.

Mr. Christie writes, and this is important:

The Ground-based Midcourse Defense element is currently at

a maturity level that requires continued developmental

testing with oversight and assistance from operational test

personnel.

I would add at this point that the Missile Defense Agency is currently stressing the system is involved in every developmental test to ensure that they are as realistic as possible.

Mr. Christie continues in his letter:

Conducting realistic operational testing in the near-term

for the GMD element would be premature and not beneficial to

the program.

I ask unanimous consent that his letter of May 17, 2004, be printed in the Record.

In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Mr. Christie expressed his support for the approach the Missile Defense Agency is taking to incorporate operational realism in the developmental test and is conducting, in his words, continuous operational assessments of the ballistic missile defense system.

We must consider that missile defense is a capabilities-based spiral development evolutionary acquisition program--this is a mouthful--and under this approach the missile defense programs are designed to focus on developing capabilities to meet a range of possible threats. These programs are developed incrementally in blocks with the recognition that full capability would not be reached in the first block.

Missile defense does not have a final architecture that is defined in the first block but will continue to evolve over time. Therefore, testing of the system should occur as we continue to develop it.

We should also consider rethinking how we do formal tests and evaluation. Formal operational testing carries with it certain requirements. There can be no developmental goals because of that. Contractors cannot be involved.

The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation must approve the operational test plans. Even the current Director of Operational Test and Evaluation recognizes the need to adopt a new acquisition paradigm for tests and evaluation.

Here is what Mr. Christie said about that in his speech just 2 months ago:

The concept of milestone driven operational test and

evaluation appears to be becoming a process of the past.

Either we change our way of doing business, adapt to the new

acquisition paradigms and the realities of the war on

terrorism, or we will find ourselves becoming irrelevant with

dire consequences for our operational forces. . . . Users

need up to the minute, continuous test and evaluation to keep

them informed of system capabilities and limitations. Even

after fielding, the acquisition community needs continuous

evaluation to feed spiral development and other evolutionary

acquisition concepts.

I ask unanimous consent that a copy of Mr. Christie's speech be printed in the Record.

This quote that I just shared describes exactly what he is doing with testing and the Missile Defense Program. Heavy involvement in the developmental test program, with the intent to achieve operational test goals during development, continued test evaluation assessments to keep the warfighter informed of system capabilities and limitations, and continuous evaluation after fielding to feed spiral development. That is the role the Director of the OT&E describes for himself, and that is the role he is playing in missile defense testing.

Everyone on both sides of the aisle, and I would add everyone in the Pentagon, supports operational realistic testing of the ballistic missile defense system, and that is why we are building a missile defense test bed today. That is why the Director of OT&E has over 100 operational test agents influencing and providing input for the GMD. That is why military operators are being used in the tests. Perhaps more importantly, that is why operational test goals are incorporated into each developmental test.

Now, make no mistake, the threat drives this program. We are building missile defenses to meet that threat. The test bed is needed to perform operationally realistic tests of the ballistic missile defense system and testing will proceed, becoming progressively more realistic, and will improve the system. Yet it is these same test bed capabilities that would afford us an early operational capability.

We cannot forget that we have no defense against long-range missiles. The Armed Services Committee has seen intelligence information which illustrates, more than ever, that the ballistic missile threat is real and growing. We are vulnerable and it is time to change that vulnerability. We need a missile defense capability in the field as soon as possible. For that reason, I will oppose the Reed amendment as it was introduced, and I urge my colleagues to oppose those efforts that would tie up our system in a way that adds delays and adds to our inability to defend ourselves from emerging threats in other parts of the world.

With the Warner second-degree amendment, my view of this amendment of Senator Reed changes; that is, if we adopt the Warner amendment. This is why I think we need to support Senator Warner's amendment. The intent is to assure that the Department of Defense conducts operational realistic testing of the BMD system and to support Senator Warner's second-degree amendment because I believe we will achieve our common goal of operational, realistic testing while avoiding some of the potential pitfalls.

Everyone on both sides supports operational realistic testing, as I mentioned earlier, on the ballistic missile system. I certainly support the Senator's intent to make sure the BMD system is tested. The question is how best to test effectively while improving system capabilities and fielding capabilities as quickly as we can.

Formal operation and testing carries with it certain requirements where there can be no developmental goals. Contractors cannot be involved and the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation approves of the operational test plan.

I think the Warner amendment improves on what was proposed by the Senator from Rhode Island. This is operational testing.

Again, as I said earlier, we are looking at a two-way path here. While we are doing testing, we want to get something in place that is operational. The more we tie this down in a step-by-step process, which happens with the Reed amendment, with accountability on every little finite step in development, the more you delay the process and the more you add to the cost of the program. That is why I am supporting the Warner amendment.

I ask for an additional 1 minute.

What happens with the step-by-step process in the Reed amendment which leads to delays and additional costs, the Warner amendment refines that down so it is more streamlined and becomes palatable to us who would like to see rapid deployment of some kind of missile defense system for this country.

It is not going to be perfect. That is why we have spiral development. We are going to develop it and improve upon it with time. This is a process we have used before. It works and it is something that is going to assure us that we will have security rapidly deployed for this country where we have emerging threats in Iran and North Korea.

Mr. President, I support the Warner amendment to the Reed amendment because it adds flexibility with accountability. The second- degree amendment will allow the Missile Defense Program to field capabilities expeditiously and to improve those capabilities rapidly and avoids the disadvantages I see in Senator Reed's approach, which requires realistic testing broken off into blocks.

Specifically, Senator Warner's second-degree amendment will require the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of OT&E, to set forth formal criteria to define operationally realistic testing for the ballistic missile defense system as a spiral development program. It will require operationally realistic testing consistent

with those criteria during the fiscal year 2005, and it will require operationally realistic testing of each block or spiral of the ballistic missile defense system.

The Warner second-degree amendment provides the flexibility needed to incorporate both operational test goals and developmental test goals in missile defense tests--flexibility that is denied in the Reed amendment. Thus, it avoids the substantial replanning, delay, and additional costs that would result if the Reed amendment is adopted.

But the second-degree amendment also helps ensure that the testing of the missile defense system is realistic and will result in a well- tested system that will be capable of defending our Nation. It requires a formal and appropriate role for the Director of OT&E, and it requires this realistic testing to be conducted during fiscal year 2005--almost certainly sooner than the formal OT&E required in Senator Reed's amendment, perhaps even sooner.

I urge my colleagues to support the Warner second-degree amendment.

I yield the floor.

Mr. President, on this side, most Members have said whatever they want to say.

I, again, state we have a number of amendments we dealt with last year and this year which, in effect, add delays because of an excess reevaluation of the program. What we are striving for is a commonsense approach to accountability in the missile defense program without so much evaluation that we delay it. Each delay adds more and more costs to the program. Then those people who oppose the missile defense program will use that as a reason to defeat the program.

The fact is, right now we are in the process of putting those missiles in the ground. This fall we expect them to be operational. In order to have the proper developmental process in place, we have to have a test bed. While we are putting the test bed in place, it requires such a wide area we might as well make it operationally functional at the same time. That is what we are trying to do.

The Warner amendment provides the flexibility but still the accountability that we need. I am happy with what he has laid out in that amendment.

Dr. Thomas Christie has indicated time and time again that he is satisfied with his current role and the role his office plays in ballistic missile defense testing. He has testified. He states in his recent letter to me--and maybe I need to read the substance of this letter just to give my colleague an opportunity to hear clearly what his position is--the following:

The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is building a BMDS test

bed that is essential to support realistic testing, and is

absolutely essential for conducting adequate operational

testing in the future. The test bed is also key to developing

operational concepts, techniques, and procedures, while

allowing my office to exploit and characterize its inherent

defense capability.

The Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) element is

currently at a maturity level that requires continued

developmental testing with oversight and assistance from

operational test personnel. Conducting realistic operational

testing in the near-term for the GMD element would be

premature and not beneficial to the program.

My office has unprecedented access to GMD, and I am

satisfied with the cooperation between the program office and

the test community. I will continue to advise the Secretary

of Defense and the Director, MDA, on the BMDS test program. I

will also provide my characterization of system capabilities,

and my assessment of test program adequacy annually, as

required by Congress.

This is the chief accountability officer. He is responsible to make sure everything is ready to move forward. He is satisfied. There is no doubt that he is satisfied with the way things are going.

In order to meet some of Senator Reed's concerns, the Warner amendment allows that. We address some of his concerns. Now we need to adopt the Warner amendment so we can still have the flexibility we need to deal with changing technology and perhaps

some unexpected events as we move forward.

I don't think anyone who has watched the development of military systems ever figures we have it right the first time. We come awfully close. With each passing year, new technology evolves and new ideas evolve and there are things we can do to improve the system. That is what spiral development is all about.

Again, Dr. Christie indicates that he is satisfied with his role and the role his office plays in the Missile Defense Program. He states that his office has ``unprecedented access'' to the ground-based midcourse effort and that cooperation is very good between the program office and his office.

He testified that he makes recommendations related to the developmental test program and his office has the ability to bring input into and influence the GMD test program.

Again, to quote Dr. Christie:

My staff and I remain involved on a daily basis with the

Missile Defense System and the BMDS element program offices

in order to ensure that operational tests are addressed in

their testing.

We have over 100 operational test agents involved in the

missile defense test program. A considerable amount of

resources are being put forward to make sure we have

accountability.

He goes on and indicates again that he is clearly satisfied with emphasis on operational test goals in the BMD system test plan. I will quote directly:

The GMD [Ground-based Midcourse] program combined test

force effectively integrated the operational testers into the

program development activities and the test design and

planning efforts.

He approved the operational test goals for the last three integrated flight tests.

He recently testified as follows:

While I am very encouraged by the improved testing

environment and capability that the BMDS test bed will

provide, I am even more pleased with the increased emphasis

on system integration and user involvement that I have seen

over the past year.

We go on and on about his testimony as to how he has testified. The fact is, it is working. We are ready to put it in the ground this fall. We all recognize there are going to be improvements as we move along, but we are in a position to make those improvements.

I think the commonsense approach is to support the Warner amendment. I support it and encourage my colleagues to support it.

I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I see the Senator from Alabama is here. I appreciate Senator Sessions serving on the Strategic Subcommittee with me and serving on the Armed Services Committee. He works very hard on that committee. The defense of this country is important. He agrees with that. He brings a stroke of common sense to our deliberations which I, for one, truly appreciate. I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Alabama.

Does the Senator from Rhode Island wish to draw this to a close and move to a vote?

And I will make just a brief closing comment for about a minute or two. Why don't we go ahead. The Senator can make his statement, then I will make my brief statement, and we will move forward to a vote. I think we may have to go into a quorum call briefly before the vote and get things in order.

Mr. President, I yield myself 1 minute. I want to make a very brief comment, and that is this: The key argument is that the Pentagon's chief tester says the operational test is premature. The Warner second-degree amendment requires the definition of ``realistic testing,'' and it requires a test according to these criteria next year. That means we will get realistic testing years sooner than with the Reed amendment.

The Warner second-degree amendment provides a formal and appropriate role for the Director of the Office of Test and Evaluation in a developmental program. That is an unusual step and actually enhances his role in the ballistic missile test program. It does all this without incurring the cost and delay of the Reed amendment.

Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time and ask my colleagues to vote in support of the Warner amendment.

Mr. President, I have a unanimous consent request that I need to propound.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that following the vote in relation to the pending Warner second-degree amendment, the Senate proceed to executive session and consecutive votes on the confirmation of the following nominations: James L. Robart, Roger Benitez, and Jane Boyle. I further ask unanimous consent that prior to each of the judge votes there be 4 minutes equally divided for debate on the nominations; provided further, that following the votes, the President be notified of the Senate's action, and the Senate then resume legislative session.

I agree to modify the request to 10-minute votes on the two following the initial vote--or does the Senator want all three of them?

On all three of them.

Missile defense is OK.

Mr. President, I understand we may need to ask for the yeas and nays.

We are ready to proceed to the vote, Mr. President.

I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Amendment No. 3354

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Colin Woodall, a member of Senator Cornyn's staff, be granted the privilege of the floor during the course of the debate on the Defense authorization bill, S. 2400.

I would like to be recognized to speak against the amendment.

I join my colleague from Virginia and my colleague from Alabama in opposing the Dodd amendment.

I will take one part of our interrogating process and look at Guantanamo Bay. We have 140 translators, of which 105 are contractors; 60 analysts there, of which 35 are contractors; and 45 interrogators, of which 20 are contractors. If we pass this amendment, we shut off the interrogation process and we lose the opportunity to gather vital information that could be valuable to what we are doing in Iraq. We would lose 50 percent of intelligence. Generally, these individuals are well qualified, and they have been carefully vetted as contractors.

I join my colleagues in opposing the Dodd amendment.

Mr. President, I understand we now have the Defense authorization bill before us and an amendment to that bill, which is the Kennedy-Feinstein amendment; is that the regular order?

I thank the Chair. I yield the floor. The sponsor of that amendment wishes to make a few comments, and I wish to follow with a few comments.

I rise today in opposition to the Kennedy-Feinstein amendment that would strip the authorization for funding for the robust nuclear earth penetrator and the advanced concepts. Again, we have heard the argument of how somehow or another we would have further world peace if we just weakened America, and I could not disagree more with that.

I believe we do have peace through strength, and what we have in this particular legislation is a study to study where the strengths are of our adversaries and where the proper response to those strengths would be. I do not think anybody has any preconceived notion of how this study should come out; we just think we need to know some vital information to make sure America remains strong.

I am disappointed once again by the efforts of those on the other side of the aisle to eliminate altogether this administration's effort to study options for modernizing our nuclear deterrent. To me, it seems that sponsors of this amendment may not fully understand how important it is for the United States to maintain a credible deterrent, or how a modernized deterrent could result in a substantial reduction in our nuclear stockpile.

Over the last several years, the Department of Defense closely examined our nuclear weapons posture. It became apparent that the cold- war paradigm of mutually assured destruction was no longer an appropriate response for the United States. Increasingly, irrational rogue nations and nonstate actors have emerged as a greater threat to U.S. security than historical adversaries. As part of this examination, it was discovered that many of our adversaries are building increasingly hardened and more deeply buried facilities in order to protect high-value targets such as command and control nodes, ballistic missiles, and, in some cases, the actual development of facilities for weapons of mass destruction.

Many of these buried targets are immune to our conventional weapons. Therefore, our ability to deter such undesired activities is greatly eroded.

The need to hold these targets at risk became so apparent that in 1994 U.S. Strategic Command and Air Combat Command issued a mission needs statement for a capability to defeat hardened and deeply buried targets.

In 1997, the Department conducted an analysis of alternatives to address intelligence and strike capabilities related to defeating hardened and deeply buried targets. To almost everyone's surprise, the analysis of alternatives found that not all hardened and deeply buried targets could be defeated by current or conceptual conventional weapons.

Then, in 1999, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff requested that a capstone requirements document for hardened and deeply buried targets be developed. Again, this document provided additional justification for a requirement for both conventional and nuclear weapons capable of defeating these targets.

Meanwhile, during these military studies and analyses, the Clinton administration was already building and deploying an interim nuclear earth penetrator.

I have noticed that the advocates of the Kennedy-Feinstein amendment have tried to place the blame on the Bush administration. But here we are--the Clinton administration building and deploying an interim nuclear earth penetrator. Even he recognized the need and the changing environment in which we must act in order to maintain a strong America.

The modified nuclear weapon was designated the B61-11 and entered service in April 1997. While this weapon provided a limited capability, it does not have capability to defeat all types of hard and deeply buried targets.

With this history in mind, it surprises me that once again we are here to debate whether we should go forward with a feasibility study on a modified nuclear weapon and whether our scientists can explore nuclear weapon concepts.

Let me take a moment to respond to clear up some misconceptions that have been suggested by the supporters of Kennedy amendment.

First, opponents of RNEP argue that conventionally armed ``bunker buster'' weapons are sufficiently effective to destroy hardened and deeply buried targets. Clearly, advanced conventional earth penetrators are the weapon of choice for most hardened and deeply buried facilities, but according to the Department of Defense, they are not effective against a growing class of hardened and deeply buried targets. Moreover, the precise location of surface support facilities are not always known, and at best, we can only hope to disrupt the operation of a hardened or deeply buried target for a few hours or days at most.

The second argument used by opponents of RNEP is that any modifications to the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal will encourage other nations to develop new nuclear weapons. This argument suggests that there is a direct correlation between our activities and those of other nations. I could not disagree more with this notion.

Over the last 10 years, we have conducted very little work on new nuclear weapons. Yet Pakistan and India have conducted nuclear tests. Russia and China continue to develop nuclear weapons. And, countries such as Iran and North Korea are secretly working to build new nuclear weapons. All of this activity has taken place without the U.S. taking any action with regard to our nuclear stockpile.

In response to our mini-nukes, first, ``battlefield nuclear weapons'' would be tactical, not strategic. Second, President George H.W. Bush's Presidential Nuclear Initiative, announced September 27, 1991, did away with all U.S. battlefield nuclear weapons. In fact the Pantex plant in Amarillo, TX, dismantled the last battlefield nuclear weapon, the W-79 artillery shell in 2003. The administration has no plans to change that decision. Nor are there plans by the Department of Defense or Department of Energy to research or develop ``battlefield nuclear weapons.'' The administration believes that nuclear weapons are strategic weapons of last resort.

In fact, if the United States does not show that it is serious about ensuring the viability of our entire military capability, including our weapons of last resort, we might not be able to dissuade potential adversaries from developing weapons of mass destruction and deter those adversaries from using those weapons they already have.

The third argument used by opponents of RNEP is that the administration has already decided to develop, build, and test a new robust nuclear earth penetrator. They point to a Congressional Research Service report that seems to suggest that the RNEP is not merely a study because the budget projections over the next 5 years are nearly $500 million for the program.

To be clear, it was Congress that directed the Department of Energy to prepare 5-year budget profiles. The nearly $500 million outlined in the latest profile is only a projection of what the costs might be if the results of the feasibility study are reasonable, the administration opts to proceed, and the Congress approves the development of such a weapon.

We must keep in mind that the administration cannot begin the development, much less build or test, a new robust nuclear earth penetrator without the expressed approval from Congress. Section 3117 of the Fiscal Year 2004 National Defense Authorization bill makes this clear. It specifically states that ``the Secretary of Energy may not commence the engineering development phase of the nuclear weapons development process, or any subsequent process, of a Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator weapons unless specifically authorized by Congress.''

The fourth argument used by opponents of RNEP, and perhaps the most egregious, is that the RNEP will lower the nuclear threshold. Crossing the nuclear threshold represents a momentous decision for any President. A nuclear weapon's size or purpose does not alter the gravity of the decision for using a nuclear weapon. No President would use a nuclear weapon unless it was the option of last resort.

Therefore, to suggest that simply modernizing a nuclear weapon automatically lowers the rigor and deliberation in deciding to employ that weapon is unfounded.

The success of our goal of assuring our allies and dissuading potential adversaries is dependent upon a modern, effective nuclear detterent that can counter today's threats. We must keep in mind that the current U.S. stockpile was developed for very different purposes than the threats that exist today. It was developed for a massive nuclear exchange with one nation. Today, these weapons are too powerful and may result in greater damage than necessary to neutralize a target.

Moreover, these weapons continue to age, making it increasingly more difficult to predict their reliability. We depend upon their reliability, as do our allies and our troops in the field.

We must also recognize that a modernized nuclear stockpile will result in significant reductions in our stockpile. If we have specific weapons that can hold certain targets at risk, it will not be necessary to have a vast inventory of strategic nuclear warheads. This path forward would yield substantial cost savings and, more importantly, demonstrate our country's commitment to reducing nuclear stockpiles around the world.

For over 50 years, we, as a Congress, and every President have agreed that nuclear weapons are a critical element of our national security strategy. They remain so today. I believe a modernized detterent will help ensure that our adversaries are deterred tomorrow.

Therefore, I will oppose this amendment and urge my colleagues to oppose it as well.

I yield the floor.

Mr. President, to suggest that somehow or the other this particular President does not want to be a leader in reducing nuclear threats is absurd.

I call to the attention of the Members of the Senate the Moscow Treaty which was put together at the first of this administration. He brought down some 8,000 warheads to 1,700 to 2,200 active warheads.

The result from our potential adversaries is to produce more nuclear warheads. Our adversaries are not necessarily responding to what we do in the United States. Take India and Afghanistan. They are more interested in

how each other's country is responding to that issue. They are not that concerned about what is happening here. Despite that, they continue to be proliferating. And there is always the potential they could be proliferating warheads that could have an impact on us.

We know our adversaries are building hard bunkers, deeply buried. This particular piece of legislation is not putting in place the engineering or development of nuclear warheads. I have just shared that language with my colleagues. But what we are looking at is a study. I think it is foolhardy and irresponsible to not even look at the facts, to not call for a study to see where we are in relation to the rest of the world. We know other countries, other than just Afghanistan, such as North Korea--I don't see a real stepdown as far as Russia and other countries around the world. We know Iran, admittedly, is looking at a nuclear weapons program.

So this is an important step in making sure that America remains secure. I think it is a responsible step because we are saying that in order to maintain peace in this world we need to have a strong America. If we want to have some response to terrorism and that flexible threat we have out there, we have to have a more flexible defense posture. We need to look at alternatives. And, yes, I believe terrorists throughout the world have the potential of being a real threat to this country, although the main threat that is recognized today is from many of those countries that I cited.

But that is why it is important to have a study. I think those people in the know--whether they are in the Bush administration or were in the Clinton administration--agree we need to stay on top of this issue. I think the irresponsibility would be for us to bury our heads in the sand and ignore the fact that the world is changing. The fact is, the world is changing, the threat is changing, and for us to deal with those potential threats, we need to look at modernizing our ability to deal with those changing threats. That is what the provision in this particular bill is all about.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. President, I request 10 minutes in morning business.

Mr. President, I rise today to pay tribute to a distinguished American. Lieutenant General Ronald T. Kadish, United States Air Force, will soon be retiring from the U.S. military after 34 years of exceptional service to our Nation.

Many of my colleagues have come to know and respect General Kadish. Over the past 5 years, he has served as the Pentagon's Director of the Missile Defense Agency and the Program Manager for the Ballistic Missile Defense System. General Kadish's performance as Director has been nothing short of superb.

Throughout his unprecedented 5-year tour of duty, General Kadish applied his unparalleled experience and knowledge of public and private industry in the pursuit of effective defenses against enemy ballistic missiles.

He succeeded in motivating and aligning our political, scientific, and engineering communities to tackle the challenges of evolving a layered, mulitnational missile defense capability. And, he succeeded in transforming and focusing a large defense bureaucracy into a true joint planning, joint operating system acquisition and business activity.

Today, because of his singular and tireless efforts, we stand on the threshold of eliminating our Nation's long-standing vulnerability to the very real threat of ballistic missile attack.

General Kadish was commissioned into the Air Force in 1970 after completing the Reserve Officers Training

Corps program at St. Joseph's University in Philadelphia, PA. He went on to earn his master's of business administration at the University of Utah, and continued his professional military education at the Air University, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and the Defense Systems Management College.

In the early 1970s and 1980s, he was a pilot and instructor for the C-130 aircraft and served in tactical airlift squadrons in the United States and Germany. Over his career, he flew more than 2,500 hours in aircraft that form the airlift and fighter backbone of our Air Force-- the C-130s and C-17s, and the F-15s and F-16s, respectively.

As a young acquisition professional, he participated in the Education-with-Industry program in Dallas with the Vought Corporation, and then got 3 years of hands-on management experience in the F-16 development program. A few years later, he was appointed the director of manufacturing and quality assurance for the B-1B bomber, one of the most technologically complex production efforts ever undertaken by our Nation up to that time.

The Air Force later called upon his managerial talents to serve in three successive high visibility, high pressure, and high impact positions as program director for the F-15 fighter, the F-16 fighter, and the C-17 military transport acquisition programs.

Some of my colleagues will remember the developmental difficulties the C-17 program faced. It was General Kadish's expertise that straightened out this troubled program. Our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, and indeed in all points of the globe, remain the beneficiaries of his managerial accomplishment.

As the current Bush administration came into office, Secretary Rumsfeld looked to General Kadish to lead a major transformation of the Ballistic Missile Defense program. The daunting task of realigning a multi-billion-dollar, cutting-edge defense technology program into a streamlined, capability-focused effort did not deter General Kadish. His charge was to produce reliable defenses that will protect our citizens and friends across the globe from the growing threat posed by ballistic missiles. We are on the threshold of providing that capability as I speak.

Armed with his 20-plus years of military acquisition experience, it was clear to General Kadish that enhanced authorities and improved techniques were needed to accomplish the mission. General Kadish was never satisfied with business as usual when a better way could be found. Bureaucratic change is tough enough to execute under any circumstance. It is doubly so in a culture reinforced by longstanding legal requirements and administrative procedures. Add to that a measure of healthy and vocal skepticism from critics, and his missile defense transformation achievements stand out in stark relief.

Defense acquisition has historically been an activity carried out by the individual military services. General Kadish has broadened that vision by pioneering a joint acquisition strategy for the Department of Defense. This approach has been more responsive to the needs of our troops, more effective for the funds under his charge, and more attuned to the complexities of missile defense, than traditionally could have been possible. He leaves an important legacy of example and accomplishment for those who follow, inspiring a new generation of program managers for the joint arena.

In so doing, General Kadish earned the trust and respect of his associates in the Pentagon and my colleagues here in the Senate. We could always count on him to be clear in his goals, demanding in his standards, and forthright in acknowledging issues. He never promised more than he could deliver.

Indeed, one of my distinguished colleagues in this body, a declared skeptic of the missile defense program, has called him ``a class act.'' I, personally, am privileged to be able to call him a friend, and to have him as a thoughtful and experienced advisor.

We will miss his leadership and his counsel as he moves on to a most well-earned retirement from the Air Force. We owe him a profound debt of gratitude and deep thanks for his extraordinary contributions to our Nation and our Nation's security over a lifetime of selfless service. I am sure I speak for all of us in this body in saying we wish him and his family health and happiness in the years ahead.

I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a quorum.

What is our order of business?

I ask unanimous consent that we lay aside the Kennedy amendment so I can send an amendment to the desk.

Mr. President, I call up amendment No. 3322.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

I rise today to offer this amendment in order to draw attention to the importance of encouraging missile defense international cooperation.

My amendment accomplishes the following: First, it requires the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, to establish an expedited process for considering the transfer of missile defense-related agreements and licenses within 30 days. The Secretary of State may use more time if he determines the proposed transfer necessitates a careful review to prevent the proliferation of U.S. ballistic missile technology.

Second, the amendment requires the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, to conduct a study on major project authorizations for missile defense. The purpose of this study would be to examine the feasibility of providing major project authorizations for projects related to missile defense.

Third, the amendment requires the Secretary of Defense to prescribe procedures to increase the efficiency and transparency of the practices used by the Department of Defense to review applications for technical assistance agreements and licenses related to missile defense.

These provisions are limited in scope and have been refined considerably over the last month. They are specifically designed to provide a mechanism for increasing our cooperation on missile defense with our closest allies.

Why is this amendment important? Why should we work with our closest allies on missile defense? Let me take a moment to explain why.

Widespread proliferation of ballistic missiles and illegal weapons technology is a major threat to the United States as we enter the 21st century. Today, unfortunately, the United States remains defenseless against a ballistic missile attack.

President Bush, who is committed to eliminating this vulnerability, has taken extraordinary measures to remove obstacles to developing a missile defense capability. The technology has been proven. The timing is right. As a result, the President's vision for a national missile defense system will likely become a reality this fall.

Yet we must acknowledge this complex system could become even more complicated without the assistance of other nations. We need early warning and tracking sensors in other countries in order to predict and intercept an incoming ballistic missile. We also need intelligence other countries may have on the activities of those who may threaten our Nation.

Without this information, it could become extremely difficult for us to defeat a ballistic missile attack. A prudent step on our part would then be to recognize the value of this assistance and exhibit a willingness to help those who have been so willing to help us.

We cannot forget that while the United States may have a legitimate missile defense capability, most of our allies do not. For example, Japan, Australia, and South Korea are perhaps more vulnerable than the United States due to their close proximity to the North Korean ballistic missile threat. Yet these three close allies are defenseless against most ballistic missile attacks. Our NATO allies in Europe are also vulnerable to a similar threat from the Middle East.

We also cannot forget hundreds of thousands of U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are deployed in many tough regions around the world, and many of these regions have rogue states that have substantial offensive ballistic missile capability. We cannot ignore this looming threat to our troops overseas. Having allies with missile defenses would greatly reduce the threat offensive ballistic missiles could pose against our troops overseas.

Some might suggest cooperation on missile defense could lead to the proliferation of ballistic missile technologies. This is a legitimate concern, and I certainly agree we must do everything we can to protect our most sensitive technologies. That is why I included in my amendment an exception that authorizes the Secretary of State to conduct an extended review of a proposed transfer if there is a concern about the transfer of ballistic missile technologies. None of us want to see ballistic missile technologies fall into the wrong hands.

We must recognize, though, that international cooperation on missile defense can greatly reduce the proliferation of ballistic missiles. It does so by directly devaluing the ballistic missile as an offensive weapon of terror. With missile defenses deployed, as in Operation Iraqi Freedom, an enemy can no longer be assured of success when considering a missile attack. It thus acts as a counterproliferation tool that forces our adversaries to think twice about investing billions of their scarce resources into ballistic missiles.

I commend President Bush for already taking the lead on international cooperation on missile defense. At his direction, the Pentagon is planning wide-ranging cooperative missile defense activities with the United Kingdom, Australia, Japan, Germany, Italy, other NATO allies, and friends. The Pentagon is also looking into other opportunities with Russia in the wake of the decision to cancel the Russian-American Observation Satellite, or what we refer to as the RAMOS Program.

Yet our Government has only limited experience with large-scale missile defense cooperation abroad. This limited experience has drawn out inefficiencies and problems that could limit cooperative missile defense programs. Here are two recent examples that have troubled me.

First, it took almost 6 months to execute the United States-Japanese cooperative program on the Aegis-based Standard Missile-3. This holdup was despite Japan's sterling nonproliferation reputation, a detailed United States and Japan memorandum of understanding, and a United States-Japanese exchange of diplomatic notes underpinning the MOU.

Similarly, for our joint operations centers in NORAD, where we conduct missile defense operator training and exercises, we require numerous special authorizations, taking months to review, to permit our industry experts to work with Canadian military operators already in place behind the computer

terminals providing missile defense early warning in Colorado Springs.

I believe we should be thinking beyond our own borders and begin looking at ways to assist our friends and allies. My amendment takes a small step forward in this direction. It still provides for a case-by- case review and permits a careful and close review of a transfer that might be of vital importance to our Nation. Perhaps most importantly, it upholds the virtue of our nonproliferation regimes and helps develop another counterproliferation tool for the President's use in the future.

I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.

I yield the floor.

I will yield to the Senator from Oklahoma.

I yield to the Senator from Oklahoma for a question.

Well, the 30-day mandate is to emphasize the importance of considering these agreements and licenses for international cooperation on missile defense in a timely manner, not being dragged out forever and ever. Too often, applications for technical assistance programs and licenses for missile defense are held up for months at a time, causing our allies needless frustrations, in my view.

The process is so cumbersome for missile defense agreements and licenses that it takes weeks to get an application approval for something as simple as permitting the British Ministry of Defense officials to attend the Missile Defense Agency's annual conference we have here in DC.

We are trying to bring a stroke of common sense in our cooperation with our allies. There are cases, obviously, when more time is needed. So the judgment can be applied by the Secretary of Defense, as well as the Secretary of State, to use more time to determine the feasibility of extending licensing agreements to our allies.

What we are trying to reach is a proper balance. There are times when it is not necessary to delay this for extended times. Sometimes we may take longer because of the type of technology we are dealing with. We are trying to have a proper balance so we can adequately protect our technical systems, defense systems, as well as to have a format out here so we can work in an effective manner with our friends and allies.

Mr. President, I haven't had an opportunity to review this particular amendment that I understand has just been laid down to my amendment, and I need a little time to review that. I did have another amendment that we are sharing with the other side, expecting them to introduce another amendment. I am going to have to take some time here and look at this particular amendment because I have not seen this amendment.

Mr. President, I have an amendment that we have laid aside. I guess the proper thing is we need to call it up for consideration. The reason I am calling it up is because our staffs have worked this out. There is a second-degree amendment that was offered by Senator Reid on behalf of Senator Levin. We have worked out an agreement, I understand, between the staffs, and I know the chairman would like to expedite and move forward and not leave these amendments hanging out there.

So I call up that amendment.

Yes, I request the regular order on that amendment, please.

Now, I think Senator Levin has to be recognized to move the modification forward.

That is correct.

Yes.

Madam President, if I could be recognized briefly, we did have some exceptions in that to be sensitive to your concerns about the 30-day portion. In the judgment of the Secretary of State, they could extend that if they believe that is necessary. There is also a paragraph in here that was adopted on policy to address some of your concerns about proliferation and whatnot. Hopefully, we met those concerns.

I think this is a good compromise. I thank the Senator from Michigan for working with me and our staff over here and for your staff working together with us. I think now that we have resolved this matter we can move forward on the amendment.

Now, Madam President, have we adopted the modification?

I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. President, some people have the capacity to change your life. For me, Ronald Reagan was one of those people. Ronald Reagan's message of strengthening individual liberties, maintaining a strong national defense, cutting through the thicket of Government regulations and lowering taxes inspired me to run for public office in the 1980s. He made me believe it is possible to bring about change for the better.

I first ran for the Colorado State senate in 1982, the second year of Reagan's Presidency, and fought to pass resolutions there supporting the policies that the President advocated, such as the balanced budget amendment.

I was a small businessman. I operated a private veterinary practice. So Ronald Reagan's vision of strengthening America's small businesses, because they are the backbone of our economy and way of life, had a great deal of appeal. His belief in small Government and cutting taxes to allow people to decide how best to spend their own money have been two of my guiding principles since I was first elected to public office. I believe him to be the father of the modern Republican Party.

My wife Joan and I never had the opportunity to meet Ronald Reagan until he came to Colorado in 1988. Talking to him one on one was an emotional high point of my life. We smiled all the way back home to Loveland, CO. I have kept his picture hanging in my office, first in the U.S. House of Representatives and now in the Senate, ever since.

It is hard to describe to the young people who live in our vibrant economy and confident culture just how unsure and discouraged Americans were in the late 1970s. Everything that could go wrong had. America seemed to be shrinking before our eyes. Those in charge of our Government had apparently given up on winning the cold war. The Soviet Union loomed dangerous and, we were told, invincible. We were being admonished to get used to a dysfunctional economy that combined high inflation with low growth, a demoralized military, an ever more intrusive and intruding Government, a depressed and depressing spiritual malaise that left many in doubt about our fundamental values. No one offered a way out.

Ronald Reagan's fresh voice of optimism was like manna to our hungry spirits. He talked about how our idling economy could regain its formidable power. He talked about how great our country was and how much greater it could be. He talked about facing down our foes and our fears. He talked about restoring American pride and patriotism. He, more than any other individual in the second half of the 20th century, brought America back from the brink of self-imposed defeat and despair. He made us proud once again.

Ronald Reagan was a monumentally gifted man, and a man of many gifts.

To those in doubt, he brought the gift of optimism.

To his supporters and allies, he brought the gift of confidence and assurance.

To an audience, he brought a magnificent gift of humor.

To his opponents, he brought the gift of disagreeing without being disagreeable.

His gift to the world was even more significant. He brought about the end of a cold war that had cast a 50-year shadow of fear over all the people on the planet.

Ronald Reagan never doubted his country's need to defend itself from all foes. ``Of the four wars in my lifetime,'' President Reagan said, ``none came about because the United States was too strong.''

It is of paramount importance for us to remember, during this period of threat and conflict, the wisdom of one of his favorite phrases: ``Peace through strength.'' Among his greatest achievements was to rearm us, to reinvigorate

the American military, and to let our adversaries know, beyond any doubt, that they were in a race they were not going to win.

In the past 15 years or so, the United States has decisively fought and won two significant wars. The keys to those victories were highly motivated and skilled combat personnel fighting with unmatched military equipment and employing unprecedented tactics.

How did this renewed and reinvigorated American military might come about?

Let's look back to Ronald Reagan's acceptance speech at the 1980 Republican nominating convention. As only the Great Communicator could, he laid out his vision for us with not only clarity, but with a conviction that rings true and is still good counsel today.

He said:

We are awed--and rightly so--by the forces of destruction

at loose in the world in this nuclear era. But neither can we

be naive or foolish. . . . We know only too well that war

comes not when the forces of freedom are strong, but when

they are weak. It is then tyrants are tempted.

He added:

Let our friends and those who may wish us ill take note:

the United States has an obligation to its citizens and to

the people of the world never to let those who would destroy

freedom dictate the future course of human life on this

planet. . . . This nation will once again be strong enough to

do that.

He was, of course, as good as his word. Once assuming office, President Reagan launched a military renaissance that not only led to the demise of the Soviet Union, Soviet communism, and the cold war, but also set the course for our military leadership that continues to this day ensuring our safety.

President Reagan's initiative was threefold: upgrade our military equipment; improve the training and morale of our service men and women to improve recruitment and retention; and restore national pride in-- and global respect of--the United States' military.

A major accomplishment of President Reagan's was the development of a credible, modern strategic deterrent. He reinvested in our strategic ballistic missile weapons inventories, modernized a complement of land, sea, and aircraft-based platforms to project our strategic force.

This display of offensive force proved to be an effective deterrent, but President Reagan envisioned a world with far fewer of these destructive weapons, and pressed throughout his Presidency for significant reductions of nuclear weapons. In 1983, President Reagan launched the Strategic Defense Initiative in the hopes of one day rendering all such ballistic missiles ``impotent and obsolete.''

Today we are building on his legacy by deploying strategic missile defenses and aggressively eliminating excessive nuclear stockpiles. President Reagan's legacy to us, of a safer world, is one we must constantly guard and honor.

There is no doubt that President Reagan was one of the greatest Presidents of the modern era. A man of huge confidence and unwavering principle, he revived the American spirit, revitalized our economy and engineered the fall of communism. He changed the world for the better. We share his family's grief, and keep them in our prayers.

In his memory, let us recommit ourselves to President Reagan's goal of ensuring that America always remains the ``bright, shining city on the hill.''

Mr. President, I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Patricia Kimpan, a fellow in Senator Bunning's office, be given the privilege of the floor during consideration of the Department of Defense authorization bill.

Will the Senator yield?

We did have a committee hearing on February 25, 2004. We had the committee hearing and Mr. Roberson testified in front of that committee. On March 23, 2004, there was a committee hearing on the very same issue. Those two previous committees were within my subcommittee on Armed Services. On March 31, 2004, Senator Domenici in his committee had this debate. It has been going on in the Environment and Public Works Committee back to 2000. We have testimony from there. There has already been a lot of discussion about this subject and the proper way of disposing it.

This is the same kind of procedure we have used in Colorado to clean up Rocky Flats where we have had an expedited procedure. The people of Colorado are delighted because now we have closure and we have it ahead of time and under budget, so far. Hopefully, we can get this to apply to other areas.

If the Senator will yield, I would like to clarify that it was not the Energy Committee, it was the Appropriations Energy and Water Development Subcommittee. Make that clear for the Record.

Will the Senator yield?

In a moment, I will call on the junior Senator from South Carolina.

First of all, I want to clarify this for the Record. We have had three hearings this year on this very issue. Prior to this year, we have had a number of hearings dealing with the disposal of nuclear waste. I know for a fact the Environment and Public Works Committee had a hearing in 2000 on the disposal of nuclear waste.

On February 25, 2004, the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee held a hearing on the development of an energy environmental management program, and a key witness was Jesse Roberson, and we talked about this very issue.

On March 23, 2004, in the Armed Services Committee hearing we had on the Department of Energy programs, a key witness in that particular hearing was Secretary Spencer Abraham.

On March 31, 2004, at the Appropriations Energy and Water Subcommittee hearing on environmental management, a key witness was Jesse Roberson.

Having clarified that for the Record, I yield 10 minutes to the junior Senator from South Carolina.

I yield an additional 5 minutes.

I yield 6 minutes to the Senator from Georgia.

I yield myself 5 minutes.

I reiterate for the record this was a collaborative approach between the State of South Carolina and the Department of Energy. They sat down for hours and they looked at wherever jurisdiction was and said: We have a common goal. We would like to remove this waste as soon as possible. So they have worked out an agreement.

That is what this amendment is all about that Senator Graham is talking about. It is good science. We have a lot of support out there. In fact, in an Environment and Public Works hearing in the year 2000, my colleague from South Carolina mentioned that particular hearing where they talked about the disposal of nuclear waste. The Natural Resources Defense Council actually said the regulation of radioactive waste should be based on its hazardous characteristics and not when it was generated.

That is what has been proposed by the Department of Energy. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission had this to say about what the Department of Energy is trying to do with the work:

In all cases, the NRC staff found that DOE's proposed

methodology and conclusions met the appropriate WIR criteria

and therefore met the performance objectives and dose limits

that would apply to near-surface low-level waste disposal and

would protect public health and safety.

This was out of the letter sent May 18, 2004, to the Chair of the Committee on Environment and Public Works, James Inhofe.

I have another letter from the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.

When it comes to safety, they are strong advocates for safety. One sentence illustrates what this letter is all about, dated May 14, 2004:

The Board believes that disposal of waste as contemplated

in Section 3116 can be accomplished safely and should enable

efficient disposition of the radioactive waste.

This is the agreement, again, worked out between South Carolina and the Department of Energy.

I yield back my time.

Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Idaho.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the vote occur in relation to the Cantwell amendment at 2:10 p.m. today, with the remaining time until then divided so Senator Cantwell controls her remaining time and the remaining time under the control of Senator Allard or his designee.

We have one speaker remaining.

I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I yield 8 minutes to the Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. President, I yield 10 seconds to the Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. President, I yield myself the remainder of our time.

I happen to believe that the sooner you clean up a nuclear waste site the better. And you do it within the guidelines of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. That is what we are trying to do with the WIR project. That is what the Department of Energy is trying to do. I think quicker is better because it means less seepage throughout the ground, less pollution.

And there is a cost. If we stay with the original plan that was drawn out, we do not get cleaned up until 2065. It is going to cost well over $138 billion. With rapid cleanup, we save $86 billion and we help clean up the environment quicker, which means less pollution. I think it is better for the citizens of these States.

I ask my colleagues to join Senator Warner, myself, the Senator from Idaho, Mr. Crapo, and the Senator from South Carolina, Mr. Graham, in voting no on the Cantwell amendment.

Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.