Second Amendment Protection Act of 2003

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to control the time of the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers) in opposition to the bill.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself as much time as I may consume.

First of all, I think I want to clarify this debate because, starting at 7:30 this morning, eight o'clock this morning, I was on a television show debating about the bill I thought, and I heard all of the arguments related to how trial lawyers are irresponsible, how judges are irresponsible. I heard arguments about whether people ought to have guns or not have guns.

I submit to my colleagues that this debate is not about any of that. It is about a bill which I believe is an extreme bill, and I want to call my colleagues' attention to five points.

This is reform. I believe it is extreme reform. We are not talking about capping recoveries or putting a limit on recoveries from gun manufacturers, sellers, dealers, importers. We are talking about immunizing them from their liability for negligence. So this is extreme reform. It is not the kind of reform that we have been talking about in other contexts.

The second point I want to make is, this is unprecedented reform. The reform that this bill would provide is not available to any other manufacturer in America. It is not available to the automobile industry. It is not available to the pharmaceutical industry. It is not, despite what my chairman has said, about the tobacco industry. It is not available to the tobacco or the cigarette industry. There is no industry in America that has this kind of immunity. So it is unprecedented reform that is being sought here.

The third point I want to make is, this is not well-thought-out reform. There are major problems with this bill, and the committee made no effort to try to debate those problems, consider those problems, try to correct those problems.

There was no markup. If my colleagues heard the debate on the rule, there really was no markup. The total markup of this bill in committee took a total of 44 minutes, 44 minutes, and most of that was spent debating and arguing about whether the previous question ought to have been called. So these issues have not been considered. So we have got a bill that has not been well thought out because nobody has taken the time to worry about the specific provisions in the bill.

The fourth point I would make to my colleagues is that this is unconstitutional reform. We have a bill that says,

not only will it apply henceforth, now and forever, forward, but it will apply henceforth, now and forever, backwards. So if a person had a lawsuit and they are already in court, they already had their trial, their case is on appeal, this lawsuit would tell the appeals court to dismiss that lawsuit. If a person is in the middle of selecting a jury, if they have had motions and arguments about whether the conduct of the manufacturer or seller or dealer has been outrageous, this legislation would require that that lawsuit be dismissed. I think that retroactivity is unconstitutional, and if it is not unconstitutional, it is certainly unfair, unwise and unwarranted.

The fifth point I want to make about this legislation is that it is politically motivated reform. The reason this bill had not gotten any attention in the Committee on the Judiciary and that nobody wants to take the time to really debate about it on the floor is that we are rushing this bill through to the other side so that 2 weeks from now, when the National Rifle Association convenes its national convention in Florida, they will be energized, they will be motivated to do whatever they need to do to support many of the supporters of this bill. There is no reason that this bill has to be dealt with in the form that it is being dealt with.

So it is extreme. It is unprecedented. It is not well thought out, has not been debated. It is unconstitutional and if not unconstitutional, certainly unfair and unwise, and it is politically motivated.

Those five things should give us pause today, even aside from how this bill got here. We should be concerned that this institution is moving an irresponsible piece of legislation that is solely for the benefit of some right-wing agenda.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 30 seconds, just long enough to respond to the gentleman that I am glad he demonstrated the court process is working. Most of the cases he talked about have been dismissed if they did not have merit, and that is exactly what should happen to them. And to distinguish for him between all of those cases, I know he would like to put this bill in the category of volunteer protections and Good Samaritans, but I do not think he is going to succeed on that front.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 3\1/4\ minutes to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Moran).

Mr. Chairman, I yield 4\1/4\ minutes to the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. McCarthy).

Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Scott).

(Mr. SCOTT of Virginia asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Delahunt).

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Pascrell).

Mr. Chairman I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Emanuel).

(Mr. EMANUEL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Rhode Island (Mr. Langevin).

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. Blumenauer).

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I thank all Members who have participated in the debate. I would just reemphasize the five points that I made at the outset of this debate.

This legislation is extreme. It is unprecedented because it will give gun manufacturers, sellers and dealers immunity that no other industry has in America. It is not well thought out, because it has not gone through the process in a proper way and had amendments put on it. It is unconstitutional. Finally, it is politically motivated.

Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to vote against this legislation.

Mr. Chairman, I offer Amendment No. 1.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, the bill, because it has not been properly considered through the committee process, leaves a lot to be desired in terms of drafting. This amendment is an effort to correct a real problem with the bill, because the bill purports to give an exception for suits where there are physical injuries or property damage resulting directly from a defect in design or manufacture of the product when the product is used as intended.

The problem is that there is no definition of ``when the product is used as intended,'' so you are left with this situation.

I am sure my colleagues are going to tell you all kinds of things where lawsuits could go forward under this rubric, but I think a number of lawsuits are going to be foreclosed by this language, and I would like to just give one or two examples.

First of all, I am holding in my hand 13 recall notices from manufacturers of weapons. These recall notices recall a product, a gun, a kind of gun, in a lot of cases because when it is accidentally dropped, the gun will discharge.

Well, the question then becomes, if a gun is accidentally dropped, is it being used as intended? Is that gun being used as intended if a person accidentally drops the gun and it discharges?

Mr. Chairman, you have heard the gentleman from Rhode Island (Mr. Langevin) say that was the exact situation which left him paralyzed here, and we should leave no doubt that in those circumstances that there should be liability.

Under this bill, this would apply even if the manufacturer had sent out a recall notice and the person had not acted on that recall notice. In fact, some of those recall notices say, do not do anything immediately on this, we are going to get to you 6 months down the road, and you can bring the gun

back to the dealer, and we will correct whatever problem there is with the gun.

So even if it is during that time period, there could be no potential liability here under this bill.

I think this language is irresponsible; and I am sure my colleagues are going to say, well, we did not intend that. But that is what the bill says, I am reading from the language, and if we had considered this bill in the regular process in the committee, perhaps we could have done a better job. But they were so intent on getting this bill out of committee to the floor and at the National Rifle Association's convention 2 weeks down the road that they did not care about the language.

Mr. Chairman, we should correct this, and this amendment allows us to do that.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Engel).

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Inslee).

(Mr. INSLEE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, I think, regarding the people who have made statements in support of and against this amendment, I think the problem is that we have left a substantial ambiguity in the law because we have not taken the time to deal with this in the committee, where it should have been dealt with.

With all respect to the chairman of my subcommittee, the gentleman from Utah (Mr. Cannon), whom I respect and admire greatly, the fact that somebody shows up at a hearing and says that this language, ``used as intended,'' means one thing or another really is not going to be what controls that. The same judges that they have said are irresponsible are going to be making that determination.

Mr. Chairman, when we write a piece of legislation, it is our responsibility to write it in a way that leaves them no discretion about what we mean. I would submit that a child who picks up a gun and drops it, and it discharges, most of us would stand here and say that that gun was not being used as intended. Therefore, the parents of that child would have no recourse; nobody would have any recourse against the manufacturer.

I would submit that anybody who drops a gun and it accidentally discharges, as it did in the case of the gentleman from Rhode Island (Mr. Langevin), could reasonably argue that that was not, or that that falls within the exception.

It is our responsibility to close these loopholes, not open additional ones. I ask my colleagues to support the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I just want to join in support of this amendment offered by the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Scott). Again, this is a case where, had we taken the time in committee to evaluate the language and allow the amendment of the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Scott), which was at the desk when the question was called on the bill in committee, if we had had this debate, we could probably have corrected this language to say what the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Feeney) would like for it to say.

Unfortunately, the bill says what it says. As much as he would like for it to say something different than what it says, it does not. It says that in order to pursue a cause of action, we have to have had a conviction.

That is ridiculous. The bill should not say that. Now, maybe the drafters did not intend for it to say that, which is exactly the point that I have been making throughout this process: If we had taken the time to evaluate the provisions of this bill, then we could have at least gotten the bill to say what they intend for it to say.

However, no judge is going to have the luxury of saying, well, they intended to say this, and therefore I am going to interpret this statute in that way. The judge has to look at the law as we have written it. Right now, this bill does not say what my colleagues would like for it to say because we have not taken the time to make it say that.

Mr. Chairman, we are being irresponsible and we are passing legislation through this House that we know has a serious flaw, and they are looking at us saying, well, you cannot read. I learned to read a long time ago. I can read what the language of this bill says, and it says exactly what the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Scott) says it says. Nothing that my colleagues on the other side can say can change that.

We need to amend the bill so that it says what they want it to say.

Mr. Chairman, I rise to ask my colleague from Virginia a question.

Suppose there is a conviction in a case and then a civil lawsuit is filed which would be allowed, and then the conviction is reversed on appeal. What would happen under this bill under those circumstances?

I yield to the gentleman from Virginia.

Mr. Chairman, I demand that the words of the gentlewoman from Wyoming (Mrs. Cubin) be taken down.

Mr. Chairman, I do not need the gentlewoman to apologize for my sensibilities. She needs to be apologizing for using words that are insulting to the entire African American race. And if that is what she is doing, then I gracefully accept her apology. But if she is saying that this is somehow because I am sensitive to those words, then I will not.

That is not what she said, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I do insist, yes.

Mr. Speaker, I appeal the ruling of the Chair.

Motion to Table Offered by Mr. Sensenbrenner

Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.

Mr. Chairman, I offer amendment No. 5.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, I would say to my colleagues that the effect of this amendment would be to limit the application of this bill to manufacturers only.

As I said during the brief debate that we had in the committee, the Committee on the Judiciary, on this bill, there are, in fact, some manufacturers who are attempting to address concerns that the public has about gun safety. Some of them are trying to develop safety locks. Some are trying to develop computerized techniques for ownership identification.

If there is a rationale for this bill, which I do not believe there is, the rationale would be to reward those manufacturers who are acting responsibly. Unfortunately, the effect of this bill will be to reward them and incentivize them to act irresponsibly. I think that is a very, very unfortunate consequence of this bill.

On the other hand, most of the outrageous stories that we hear about irresponsibility are not necessarily about the manufacturers of guns; they are about dealers and sellers who refuse to acknowledge anything other than their own profit motives. They want, when someone walks into their store, when somebody walks into their pawnshop, when somebody approaches them with some money, they want that money and they do not care what happens after that. We have heard example after example after example of that kind of irresponsibility on the part of dealers.

Now, it is unfortunate that this bill covers not only manufacturers, it covers dealers, sellers, importers, the whole range of providers that put these guns into the stream of commerce. If there is any rationale for the bill, it is for the manufacturers.

I do not think we ought to be excusing irresponsible dealers, such as the dealer who ignored the frequent disappearance of guns from his inventory. One of hundreds of missing guns, which were never reported missing despite having been prominently displayed in the store, ends up being used in the sniper attacks in Washington. This bill would immunize that dealer from liability. That is irresponsible.

Mr. Chairman, let us have a debate about those manufacturers who are being responsible. I applaud their activities. Perhaps we could make a reasonable argument that they should be immunized from liability because they are making a product that is legal. I have heard that argument. I do not subscribe to it, but at least it has some credibility to it. But when we start immunizing everybody in the stream of commerce regardless of how responsible or irresponsible they are, that is where I draw the line.

Mr. Chairman, I would encourage a ``yes'' vote on my amendment, which limits the impact of this bill to manufacturers only.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Rush).

Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from Ohio (Mrs. Jones).

Mr. Chairman, I am prepared to close if the gentleman does not have other speakers.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the remainder of my time.

Mr. Chairman, let me say that if we want to protect dealers simply because they comply with the letter of the law, even though they know that they are making irresponsible decisions such as in the case of the officer, Officer Lemongello, who was shot by a gun that was sold by a dealer, they did follow all of the black letter of the law; but at the same time they knew that they were selling the guns not to the person who bought them, to the female person who bought the guns, but to the male person who was in there selecting the guns and identifying them. And they were so concerned that as soon as they walked out of the store they called ATF and said we have done something irresponsible, even though they had complied with the law.

Now, all we are trying to do is make dealers and everybody throughout the process be responsible. And if we want to immunize that kind of conduct, then, I mean, I guess you are going to vote for this bill. Because that is what it does. But I am telling you we are being irresponsible when we do that. And if we really want to reward people who are trying to deal with gun violence, then we cannot keep rewarding dealers who act irresponsibly knowing that they act irresponsibly, importers, sellers. Perhaps there is a rationale for protecting manufacturers who have demonstrated a willingness to try to act responsibly. Some of them are trying to do the trigger lock thing, trying to do computerized identification. I think this bill is going to set them back because basically once we pass this bill, they do not have any incentive to even continue to do that.

But if there is anybody who has a rationale, it perhaps is the manufacturers; and that is what this amendment would do, limit the effects of the bill to the manufacturers. I encourage my colleagues to support the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary for his help in bringing this bill to the floor. I also want to thank my colleagues, the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. John), the gentlewoman from Pennsylvania (Ms. Hart) and the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Boucher) for their support.

H.R. 1036, the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, as we pointed out earlier, addresses the growing concerns of junk lawsuits filed with the intention of driving the firearms industry out of business by simply attempting to hold manufacturers and dealers liable for the criminal acts of third parties who are totally beyond their control.

These suits are different from other lawsuits that affect other industries. The cities and counties are not representing specific victims nor are they claiming specific damage against city property. No, instead, they are simply suing because they happen to dislike a product, its appearance, its distribution and how it markets its product. Yet, under the Constitution, these companies have the constitutional right to manufacture these products.

Now, the previous speaker mentioned that this has been a very quick process and he thought it was extreme. That is the word he used, extreme, unprecedented. I have on this chart here 31 States which have already passed legislation that prohibits frivolous lawsuits against the firearm industry. So I would say to my colleagues, perhaps your State, when you come on the House floor, you should look at this chart to make sure before you vote whether your State has already passed a bill that has recognized the absurdity of these lawsuits. As such these States have acted to prohibit these types of suits, and H.R. 1036 is designed to simply mirror what the States have done.

The goal is to seize the attempts at regulation through lawsuits that achieve nothing except the blatant interference in a company's constitutional right to sell and market a legal product and the constitutional duty of the Congress to regulate the commerce of such product. As I stated, creative legal theory does not make good public policy.

We have seen through the course of these 30-plus suits that have come to the courts that the courts are not buying the theory either. Many of these suits have been dismissed. If my colleagues will bear with me, I will show my colleagues another chart. I have just taken a sample of the municipal lawsuits that have been dismissed, but I particularly want to highlight the city of Boston's case. Twenty-nine manufacturers and distributors and three associations were defendants. The alleged claim: negligent distribution. Very simply, negligent distribution was the claim against them, and 29 manufacturers were sued, distributors and associations. Defective design, deceptive advertising, nuisance, unjust enrichment. It was dismissed.

The city dropped its own suit saying it was too expensive for the city to do and acknowledging that, through its vigorous prosecution, the suit would need hundreds of thousands of pages of documents, would go on forever and ever, and would not be realistic and concrete in its steps to reduce illegal acquisition of firearms, and need to reduce the incidence of firearm accidents and increasing public awareness concerning the safe handling and storage of firearms. So the city of Boston voluntarily decided this is wrong. Not the courts' decision, but the city of Boston, after spending all this money.

We can go from New Orleans to Miami-Dade County. Twenty-six manufacturers, distributors, three associations, and two dealers were all sued simply because of their design, their distribution, and what they said was negligent deceptive advertising. It was dismissed at trial court and dismissed at appellate court. The Florida Supreme Court denied this petition. So it went through every one. The trial court, the appellate court, and the Supreme Court; and they all denied. So, my colleagues, this bill we have here is simply mirroring what has been done in the other 31 States.

Now, the question comes up, this bill is just a carve-out for the firearms industry. The previous speaker mentioned that, so I would like to bring to his attention other Federal legislation that protects specific industries and other cases where these industries or groups have found themselves uniquely threatened by bizarre or novel legal situations.

For example, in 1994, we passed legislation, the General Aviation Revitalization Act, which generally protects manufacturers of small planes more than 18 years old against personal injury lawsuits in both Federal and State courts.

Let us take another act, the Federally Supported Health Centers Assistance Act of 1995, which declared certain community, migrant and homeless health care center employees to be employees of the Public Health Service, thus protecting them under the Federal Tort Claims Act from malpractice lawsuits in State courts.

Another example: the Bill Emerson Good Samaritan Food Donation Act of 1996, which protects nonprofit organizations from State or Federal lawsuits arising from the nature, age, packaging or condition of apparently wholesome food received in good-faith donation to benefit the needy.

The Volunteer Protection Act of 1997 provides limited immunity from liability for volunteers acting on behalf of a nonprofit organization and preempts inconsistent State law unless such law provides additional protection.

The Biomaterials Access Assurance Act of 1998, which supersedes State law to create an exclusion from liability for manufacturers of raw materials or components of medical implants.

And let us not forget the Y2K Act of 1999, which limits punitive damages and establishes special procedures for liability in Y2K cases.

The Public Health Improvement Act of 2000, which provides Good Samaritan liability protection for users of cardiac defibrillators.

So, my colleagues, there are literally dozens and dozens of such pieces of legislation, major pieces of legislation, very similar, very like this bill that have been passed by Congress to protect and to enforce protection against nuisance lawsuits.

Basically, what we have is a bill that has been cosponsored by 250 colleagues here in the House. And the bill did not just happen to appear recently for anything like a convention of the NRA. This bill has gone through Congress. In

the 107th Congress, we had almost 240 sponsors. It went through the Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection and then the full committee and passed. It went through the appropriate subcommittee and the full Committee on the Judiciary in the 107th Congress. And we now have even more support for it, so the time is right for passage on the House floor.

My colleagues will hear a lot about victims' rights from opponents to this bill. I want to emphatically state that this bill protects victims' rights. Their right to sue is protected in this bill, relying on product defect, negligent entrustment, and industry compliance with Federal and State law. What is not protected is the use of creative legal theory to sue the deepest pockets.

My colleagues, we have a good bill here, one that 250 Members of Congress agree with. It is bipartisan, both sides. They agree that using the courts to circumvent the constitutional authority of this body to make public policy is an improper use of our judicial system.

I will close in a moment, but want to leave my colleagues with several quotes. Dave Kopel, a professor at New York University Law School, has stated that the cities do not have to win in court with these nuisance suits. All they have to do is keep suing and suing. They will kill the industry with the cost of defending the lawsuits. He has got it right.

And then I would like to give another quote here. This is from a former labor secretary in which he pointed out that if I had my way, we would have laws restricting hand guns, and we are launching here an effort to succeed where legislation has failed. The strategy may work, but at the cost of making our frail democracy even weaker. You might approve the outcome in these cases, but they establish a precedent for other cases that you might find wildly unjust.

My point is that most nuisance lawsuits are taking to the courts an attempt to bankrupt these manufacturers. It is clear the courts agree, it is clear my colleagues agree, it is clear the State legislatures agree; and so I urge my colleagues to support the bill.

Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleague, the gentleman from Utah, for yielding time to me.

Mr. Chairman, the Watt amendment is attacking the words ``used as intended'', and he has sort of indicated that those words are vague and perhaps they should be deleted because the courts could not quite understand them.

I have Black's Law Dictionary back in my office, Mr. Chairman. I went up and looked up the words. It is defined as ``the intended use doctrine,'' defined as ``The rule imposing a duty on a manufacturer to develop a product so that it is reasonably safe for its intended or foreseeable users.''

In fact, if we look up the words ``used as intended,'' for example, the words ``manufacturing defects'' or ``design defects,'' any of these terms which, at first glance, would connote some nebulous concept. Indeed, it is not a nebulous concept; there is a strict interpretation of these words in tort law.

In Westlaw, which is a commonly used legal database, if we go into that and put in the words ``used as intended,'' we come up with that it has been cited in 1,300 State cases and over 900 Federal cases come up. That is ample guidance for courts to use regarding what ``used as intended'' means in a case alleging defective design or manufacture.

The treatise American Law of Products Liability states that ``Courts have consistently refused to impose liability on manufacturers of firearms that function exactly as intended.''

Mr. Chairman, I think what I am saying is, there is ample evidence in the law, both in the Federal and in the State, where the term ``used as intended'' is clearly understood in tort law, so there is no ambiguity here.

Mr. Chairman, I would urge defeat of the Watt amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman from Tennessee for yielding to me.

I would say to the gentlewoman from Texas that I understand her feelings when she mentions she finds this bill an insult, and she sort of indicates it is perhaps because of what happened in the Committee on the Judiciary. She has mentioned that perhaps the rule, and she mentioned the NRA convention, but I still do not think that those kinds of statements necessarily apply and convince Members not to vote for this bill because, basically, H.R. 1036 already incorporates what the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Linda T. Sanchez) is providing under her amendment.

I have to be honest. I think what she is saying is praiseworthy, but the amendment is not necessary because we already have in the bill the language that is needed.

We have used the words ``negligent entrustment,'' and this is a legal term, and that term is used in the bill. Because of the way it is used in the bill, it automatically covers what the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Linda T. Sanchez) wants to put in her amendment as part of the bill, and I might read ``negligent entrustment'' just to clarify what the actual legal definition is, as defined.

It is ``supplying of a qualified product by a seller for use by another person when the seller knows or should know the person to whom the product is supplied is likely to use the product and, in fact, does use the product in a manner involving unreasonable risk of physical injury to the person and others.''

The bill already allows suits for negligent entrustment or negligence per se or where a manufacturer or seller knowingly and willfully violates a State or Federal statute applicable to the sale or marketing of the product and the violation has a proximate cause of the harm for which relief is sought.

In a nutshell, we have in H.R. 1036 all the necessary language to cover what the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Linda T. Sanchez) is talking about. So I urge my colleagues not to support the Sanchez amendment. It is unnecessary because H.R. 1036 already holds liable anyone who violates any State or Federal statute.

The Sanchez amendment also eliminates a requirement that a violation of a Federal statute must actually cause an injury before liability can attach. So I urge my colleagues to vote no on the Sanchez amendment.

Mr. Chairman, maybe I could just have a colloquy with the gentlewoman on her amendment.

Would my colleague not agree that the language dealing with negligent entrustment is not part of the bill, H.R. 1036?

I yield to the gentlewoman from California.

Would the gentlewoman not agree that that term ``negligent entrustment'' is fully understood under tort law?

But the consensus is, when we read the gentlewoman's amendment, in fact everything she has asked for is already included in our bill. So we think the amendment, as praiseworthy as it might be, in effect it is already being spoken to and clarified in our bill, so we just do not think the gentlewoman's amendment is necessary.

Can the gentlewoman define very clearly why the term ``negligent entrustment'' does not cover all that is necessary in tort law and why the gentlewoman's amendment would be needed with that already in existence?

Well, reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, I disagree. Negligent entrustment, as I read the definition earlier, it is all laid out.

Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, I urge a ``no'' vote on the Sanchez amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleague from Utah (Mr. Cannon) for yielding me time.

Let me say to my colleagues that the grievances that you have perhaps with the way the rule was developed or the procedure is really not a reason to vote against this bill. And I rise against the Watt amendment.

Local dealers or distributors are often sued simply to prevent removal of a case to a Federal court. Should trade associations be sued under conspiracy theories of industry behavior? I mean, that would create a chilling effect on advocacy of their membership, their interests, their activity, which is clearly protected by the first amendment.

The Watt amendment would allow them to be sued, local dealers, trade association. So I think it is clear, the Watt amendment would actually hurt the bill.

Let me call your attention as we conclude this debate to my chart here which shows that 31 States have recognized the absurdity of these lawsuits which are no different from the ridiculous lawsuits we saw filed against many other cases including the food industry. The goal is to cease this attempt at regulation through lawsuits, and that is why these 31 State passed pretty much the same bill that we have here on the floor today.

The second chart I will show you examples where cases are dismissed. This is just one of many charts I could have up here, 30 or 40 cases. For example, in Bridgeport where 21 manufacturers and distributors and 12 dealers and three were sued for negligent distribution, deceptive advertising, defective design, nuisance, conspiracy and unjust enrichment, unjust enrichment. Now, they proceeded but when they got not too far along, they were dismissed. And the Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed that.

So I would say to all my colleagues that the States have recognized this, and that is why there are 31 States that have supported the language in this bill.

Let me just read what the judge in the lawsuit against the firearm industry in the City of Bridgeport said. What has happened here, the people who are suing ``have envisioned the dawning of a new age of litigation.'' A new age of litigation, during which the gun industry, the liquor industry, the purveyors of junk food would follow the tobacco industry in reimbursing government expenditures. So taxpayers would have to pay at the local level, at the municipal level, at the State level to sue gun dealers, associations, gun manufacturers, all on the basis of unjust enrichment, deceptive advertising.

So I conclude, I believe this bill is responsible. Attempting to bankrupt a legal American industry through junk lawsuits is not. This bill protects legal actors while allowing suits to continue against those who break the law. It is a good balance, a fair bill; and I urge its passage.

Mr. Chairman, the bill has a number of technical problems which we have already heard discussed, including one for which I will have an amendment later in the debate. But the point I want to make here is, on page 3 of the bill, under findings, the findings have as the number one finding, citizens have a right protected by the second amendment to the United States Constitution to keep and bear arms.

It is interesting that the word is ``citizens,'' plural, not an individual has a right. Just so there is no confusion, I think it is important to get the record straight on what the second amendment says, particularly in light of the fact that the supporters of the bill on numerous occasions in committee hearings have been unable to cite a single final judgment which supports the idea that an individual has the right to bear arms under the second amendment.

This goes back to the United States v. Miller case in 1939, where the court held that for the proposition, in the beginning of the second amendment, mentioning well-regulated militia. It says that the possession of a weapon must be reasonably related to a well-regulated militia. The circuit courts have ruled on this.

The First Circuit held that the second amendment applies only to firearms having a ``reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia.'' That is a 1939 case.

In 1996, in the Third Circuit, defendant's possession of machine guns did not have a connection with militia-related activity required for second amendment protections to apply.

The Fourth Circuit, a 1995 case, stated that courts have consistently held that the second amendment only confers a collective right of keeping and bearing arms which bear a reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia.

The Sixth Circuit, in 2000, held that the lower courts have uniformly held that the second amendment preserves a collective rather than an individual right.

The Seventh Circuit, the second amendment establishes no right to possess a firearm apart from the role possession of the gun might play in maintaining a State militia. That is a 1999 case.

The Eighth Circuit stated that the purpose of the second amendment is to restrain the Federal Government from regulating the possession of arms where such regulation would interfere with the preservation or efficiency of the militia. That is a 1992 case.

The Ninth Circuit in 2002 stated that it is this collective rights model which provides the best interpretation of the second amendment.

The Tenth Circuit, a 1977 case, to apply the amendment so as to guarantee an appellant's right to keep an unregistered firearm which has not been shown to have any connection with the militia, merely because he is technically a member of the Kansas militia, would be unjustifiable in terms of either logic or policy.

The Eleventh Circuit, a 1997 case concerning motivating the creation of the second amendment, convinces us that the amendment was intended to protect only the use or protection of weapons reasonably related to a militia actively maintained and trained by the States.

I want the Record to reflect, in case someone has read the second amendment, that our record is replete with what the second amendment means.

[From the Legal Action Project]

A Sampling of Court Decisions that Support the Militia Interpretation

of the Second Amendment

u.s. supreme court

U.S. v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).

Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55 (1980).

u.s. courts of appeals

U.S. v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,

522 U.S. 1007 (1997).

U.S. v. Baer, 235 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 2000)

U.S. v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,

435 U.S. 926 (1978).

U.S. v. Swinton, 521 F.2d 1255 (10th Cir. 1975), cert.

denied, 424 U.S. 918 (1976).

U.S. v. Hancock, 231 F.3d 557 (9th Cir. 2000), cert.

denied, 121 S. Ct. 1641 (2001).

U.S. v. Finitz, 234 F.3d 1278 (9th Cir. 2000), cert.

denied, 121 S. Ct. 833 (2001).

Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98 (9th Cir.), Cert. denied, 519

Mr. Chairman, I offer amendment No. 2.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, the underlying right for redress would apply if the defendant transfers a firearm in violation of the law and is convicted of that crime. In other words, if the defendant has been convicted of an illegal transfer of a firearm, he loses the benefits of the bill.

This amendment eliminates the requirement under the bill for a conviction before a defendant can be sued, and substitutes the requirement that the defendant actually committed the crime. Requiring a conviction before a defendant can be sued for civil consequences of his unlawful acts would constitute an extraordinary change in traditional civil liability standards. Moreover, such a requirement would create bizarre results based on what a prosecutor decides to do in a particular case and when he decides to do it.

The prosecutor may choose not to prosecute a particular case for various reasons. This would preclude a claim, regardless of how egregious the injuries are or how clear the liability; or even if a case is prosecuted, the prosecutor may decide to plea bargain a case, allowing a defendant who has illegally transferred many guns to plead guilty to one transfer and drop the other cases. It would be absurd to suggest that only the victims in the case pleaded to can sue while the others cannot.

Of course, there is always a possibility the case can be thrown out because of an unlawful search or seizure, because of a coerced confession, or simply because the prosecutor is unable to prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt. The case might be lost because a jury was pretty sure the defendant was guilty, but not beyond a reasonable doubt.

Even where there is a conviction, the timing of the conviction alone might be dispositive of the claim because there is nothing in the bill or the law which tolls the statute of limitations in a civil claim pending prosecution and appeals.

Mr. Chairman, this is a dramatic departure from traditional civil proceedings. In an automobile accident, for example, one can be successful if one can prove that the defendant went through the red light. We do not lose our case because the police officer did not give the defendant a ticket, or gave him a ticket but did not get a conviction. Say one brings the witnesses to court and proves the defendant, in fact, went through the red light. Under the theory under this bill, that person would lose his case if the police officer failed to successfully prosecute the defendant.

If this amendment is adopted, even without the conviction, the unlawful transfer would still have to be proven in order to pursue the case. Under traditional civil law, we would still have to prove the defendant violated the law and that the violation was the proximate cause of the injury.

If someone's criminal activity causes injury, he should not escape civil liability merely because he was not technically convicted of that crime. So I urge my colleagues to support the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 30 seconds.

Mr. Chairman, I would just point out that without this amendment, this bill protects criminals. Without the amendment, we could have a criminal actually admitting to the crime, but unless there was a conviction, we could not use that admission in a civil case.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Watt).

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, I would ask the gentleman if he could state any other civil statute that requires a criminal conviction as a predicate. And I would point out on page 9 of the bill ``in an action in which a manufacturer or seller of a qualified product knowingly and willfully violated,'' but it does not say anything about a conviction. So the manufacturer or seller is not afforded any of those rights we just heard of. And I just want to know if there is any other civil law that requires a criminal conviction as a predicate to your right to get civil remedies.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, since the gentleman is defending the bill, I would ask him on page 8 of the bill, lines 17 through 22, whether or not the word ``transferee'' on line 22 and ``transferor'' on lines 17 and 18, whether that is a typographical error.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee).

(Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Watt).

Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for the question; and, frankly, Mr. Chairman, I do not know. You would have someone who has filed his lawsuit, gets a judgment. The underlying conviction is overturned. I do not know. Maybe the gentleman from Colorado can help answer the question. In my opening remarks I made a point that pending prosecution and all the appeals, if you start off with an acquittal, with a case thrown out and then reinstated on appeal, maybe after the statute of limitations. There is no other situation where you have to get a conviction before the civil lawsuit can go forward; and I would ask the gentleman from Colorado.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, in the bill we have the action of a manufacturer who willingly and knowingly violates a State or Federal statute and can be sued. You do not have to have a conviction.

You have to have a conviction in this situation. The gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Watt) has revealed a bazaar situation. Some people can bring a case and not bring a case depending upon whether their case was part of a plea bargain or not.

This is a major departure from any civil procedure, and if the gentleman can advise us if there is any other civil lawsuit that requires a conviction as a predicate rather than knowingly violated the statute, we would like to hear it.

Mr. Chairman, I hope we would adopt the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I apologize to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Feeney).

Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

(Ms. LINDA T. SANCHEZ of California asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mr. Chairman, H.R. 1036, the Protection of Lawful Commerce and Arms Act, seeks to prohibit civil liability actions from being brought or continued against manufacturers, distributors, dealers, or importers of firearms

or ammunition for damages resulting from the misuse of their product by others.

The bill makes certain exceptions, however, to allow lawsuits against gun manufacturers, sellers, distributors, and importers. For example, it allows a lawsuit to proceed in case of negligence per se or negligent entrustment. It also allows lawsuits for victims in certain cases where the gun seller or manufacturer knowingly or willingly broke State or Federal law.

My amendment would be one of the smaller exceptions to the ban on lawsuits. It would essentially do more than require gun sellers or manufacturers to obey the law that already exists.

Section 922 of title XVIII of the U.S. Code establishes that it is unlawful for any person to sell guns or ammunition to someone who uses or is addicted to illegal drugs or who has been adjudicated as a mental defective. Later on, the same section makes it illegal for drug users or abusers or persons with adjudicated mental problems to ship, possess or receive guns or ammunition that have been in interstate commerce.

This makes sense. Congress has decided that there are certain people who should not have access to firearms, and these are the two categories of people who are restricted.

Congress further decided that the responsibility for this restriction is on both the buyer and the seller. If the gun sellers and manufacturers are not checking to be sure that they do not sell guns to people with drug or mental problems, then how can we keep the guns out of their hands? That is why the U.S. Code specifically prohibits both the sale and the purchase.

I just want the gun sellers to do the proper background checks. If they do not and it turns out they sold weapons or ammunition to a person in one of those categories, then they should not have the benefit of immunity from the court system. As a matter of public policy, we should most definitely provide victims with an opportunity to take their case to court, and we should allow judges the opportunity to decide if what the gun seller did was a violation of the law.

Last fall, when there were suspicions that the Beltway sniper might have had a mental illness, the House rapidly passed a bill to enforce the already-existing law that requires the FBI to list any person who has been adjudicated as a mental defective on the National Instant Criminal Background Check system. It is important to note that the bill did not create this requirement; rather, it sought to provide incentive grants to encourage the use of it.

That bill unfortunately did not pass the Senate, but that does not change the fact that this requirement already exists. If we are intent on requiring that the information be listed in the system, and if we say that gun sellers must do background checks, then how can we go wrong by holding them liable if they fail to do the background check?

Having already mentioned some of my opposition to this bill, and having tried to correct one of the many, many problems with it, I would like to talk about the egregious manner the Majority has used in moving this bill through the House.

This is a fairly partisan bill, which went through a very partisan Committee, the Judiciary Committee. No hearings were held at Full Committee. Essentially, no markup occurred either. Technically, the Committee met and we started debate on what should have been 10-15 amendments. The first one was offered and withdrawn. Shortly after we began discussing the second one, offered by Mr. Watt, the Majority called the previous question. And with that, our so-called democratic debate on an important piece of legislation ended.

The Majority has since made claims that they cut off debate because no amendments were at the desk. This is patently untrue. As I said, and as the transcript from that markup shows, we were in the MIDDLE of the debate on an amendment when the previous question was called.

I realize that the Majority wouldn't have liked a lot of our amendments, in which case they would have had the freedom to vote against then. But to not even allow debate on a topic of such divergent opinions is a disgrace. We're talking about a bill that includes findings that have no basis in fact or law. A bill that makes sweeping changes to liability, thus cutting off legitimate victims' access to the court system. A bill that rewards certain shoddy gun dealers with the same immunity that it gives to honest manufacturers who have worked diligently to improve their products.

That appalling markup happened last Thursday. Now here we are today, less than a week later, debating the bill on the Floor. But one again, a true democratic effort has been thwarted, because the Majority has only permitted us five amendments. Five amendments. Again, I'm sure that the Majority didn't like all of the amendments we offered. But that doesn't mean they are non-germane. And it's no reason to cut off debate. If that's going to be the basis for how we run this body, then we should stop claiming to be a democracy.

And, frankly, the amendments allowed today don't include all of the ``heavy'' amendments we offered. Let's be honest--my amendment has a much smaller impact than some of the other ones offered today. I think it represents an important change, but I also think there were a whole host of other important changes that could have been made--had we had a full markup, or had the Rule been an open one.

I am shocked by the complete disregard to Majority has demonstrated for the democratic process. I urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to resist this kind of disintegration of our free speech and our democratic process. Otherwise, the democratic ideals our troops are fighting for in the Middle East may as well be meaningless.

I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I do not understand how my colleagues on the other side of the aisle can say that this case is clearly set forth in the proposed legislation, because the negligence, number one, the negligence per se doctrine, does not exist in every State, and I believe it is the citizens of those States who deserve the kind of protections included in this amendment.

The other exception that is stated in this bill is for knowingly or willfully violating Federal or State law, and it requires a conviction, and that does not apply here either. That implication or that state of mind, that mens rea, requires a specific mens rea, whereas my amendment here only includes a reasonable cause to believe standard.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee).

(Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee).

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I think it is important to clarify something that was stated by my colleagues on the other side of the aisle. They keep talking about negligent entrustment, but negligent entrustment liability only applies when someone knows that person is going to commit a crime. However, this amendment specifically speaks to a different type of mens rea. It speaks to the reasonable cause to believe standard. It does not require, as the current bill stands, the mens rea of knowingly or willfully, plus a conviction, in order to hold these distributors and manufacturers liable.

I think the purpose of this amendment is strictly as an incentive to make sure that sellers and manufacturers and dealers are actually doing the criminal background checks that the law already requires of them; and again, I am talking about having a reasonable cause to believe that somebody is either addicted to drugs or has been mentally adjudicated as incompetent.

I think that requiring a higher standard of proof in terms of the intent of the seller or the distributor, plus a conviction, denies legitimate plaintiffs the right to sue in civil court, and so I would urge my colleagues to please support this amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. Chairman, it is part of the bill. My understanding it is a definition in part of the bill.

Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will continue to yield, I would say no, I believe it is applied on a case-by-case basis under tort law.

Well, if the intention is to cover the incidence that I am talking about, of dealers or sellers or manufacturers who have reasonable cause to believe, why not state that intention clearly in the legislation?

My understanding is that the negligence per se definition section in the bill does not state those cases.

So we agree to disagree, in other words.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time. In closing, I just want to say that if we had had the opportunity to bring these amendments up in subcommittee and to discuss them at length, I think we probably could have come to some agreement in terms of what cases we chose to cover by this piece of legislation and which cases we did not.

However, we were not afforded that opportunity because the question was called and debate was cut off. Now we find ourselves here on the floor of the House debating amendments, a scant five, when we had 10 to 15 to offer in subcommittee. This, in essence, cuts off the democratic process, which in essence does not give us the chance to meaningfully consider the amendments as a way to improve this bill.

I urge that my colleagues vote ``yes'' on my amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

Mr. Chairman, I rise to seek the time in opposition.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I would like to first thank the chairman of the full committee for his expeditious movement of this bill through a hearing and through markup. I would also like to thank the ranking member of my Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law, the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Watt), with whom I sometimes differ, but who never, never differs without grace. I appreciate his positions.

There are a number of issues upon which we differ here. Let me just point out, the markup was shortened, to some degree, partly because it was treated as a joke. Nevertheless, this legislation has been considered in the past and was subject to a hearing.

The gentleman from North Carolina is pointing out that a number of lawsuits will be prohibited or stopped by this legislation; and the answer to that statement is yes, that is the purpose of this legislation. It is to stop lawsuits which are frivolous and intended only to destroy the manufacturers and distributors and importers of guns in America as viable commercial activities.

The gentleman also pointed out that some of these lawsuits that will be prohibited would be wrongly prohibited, and that is where we disagree. The gentleman referred to 13 recall notices. The gentleman will recall that in our hearing, we had an expert from the gun industry who said that if a weapon discharged because of a defect which was subject to a recall notice, or even if it was not subject to a recall notice, but if it discharged improperly, they would, that is the industry, the gun manufacturing industry, would still be responsible for that defect according to current law.

Now, the bill before us does not change current law. It only preempts the recent rash of frivolous lawsuits that are intended and explicitly intended by the proponents of these lawsuits to destroy the industry.

This amendment should be defeated because it would strip away from the bill an essential protection from frivolous lawsuits. The bill allows manufacturing and product defect cases to go forward provided that the product was used as intended. This phrase is vital to, for example, protect a gun manufacturer from a frivolous claim that the gun should have been designed to prevent someone from sticking a gun up his nose to scratch, with his finger on the trigger. That is clearly not what was intended for the use of the gun.

Another example, while all manufacturers under national standards voluntarily adopted by the industry design guns to be safe from firing on impact when dropped, a person who uses a pistol as a hammer should not be able to sue for defective design, which just makes sense, when the gun discharges after its foolish abuse of the design.

As one important product liability case stated, it is well settled that a manufacturer is under a duty to use reasonable care in designing his product when used in the manner for which the product was intended. The phrase ``used as intended'' is today routinely applied by courts and juries based on circumstances of the case and what the court or the jury sees as a reasonable intended use. Of course, the juries will no doubt draw extensively on, for example, the owner's manual of a firearm for guidance as to what the intended use is.

It would seem clear in most circumstances to carry a gun is an intended use and that manufacturing and design defects that cause harm when a person drops the gun during the course of its intended use properly and appropriately falls within the exceptions of the bill's provision. It would also seem clear that in most, if not all, circumstances pointing a gun at an innocent person and pulling the trigger is not an intended use. These would be fact-intensive inquiries, however, best left to the discretion of judges and juries. The phrase ``used as intended'' is by no means an unfamiliar term in the case law. The amendment should be defeated so existing case law among the States can be used to appropriately apply it on a case-by- case basis.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 15 seconds to respond to the gentleman.

We have, in fact, protected manufacturers in dozens of industries. One example is the light aircraft industry where we have set up rules so that we could actually continue, or actually re-create, our light aircraft industry in America.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Dingell).

(Mr. DINGELL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Stearns), the author of the underlying bill.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Watt), my friend, for his gracious comments.

Referring back to the prior speaker, the gentleman from Washington, he made a couple points that I think are important. This is not about the right to own a gun; this is an entirely different discussion.

I indicated, on his concern about seeing trigger locks on all guns, frankly, we need to research and improve safety devices over time. Hopefully, some of those improvements in safety will come from a healthy, robust manufacturing center in our country that can afford to develop the kinds of technologies that will keep the many police officers who are shot with their own guns safe from their own guns. That takes a robust industry to do that.

In closing, let me just point out to the gentleman, if we enter the words ``used as intended,'' ``manufacturing defect,'' or ``design defect'' into Westlaw, a commonly used database, we come up with 1,300 State cases and 900 Federal cases. We have a great deal of understanding about the concept that is being attacked in this amendment.

I encourage the Members of this body to oppose this amendment, to go with legislation that is sensible and reasonable and will improve the environment in which we have to exercise our right to keep and bear arms in America.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, the Watt amendment strikes language throughout the bill protecting dealers and importers of firearms, as well as trade associations. Under the amendment of the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Watt), only firearms manufacturers would receive protection from lawsuits based on criminal misuse of their product by a third party. This amendment would gut the bill and the firearms industry.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Weldon).

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, in response to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Rush), who calls this bill irresponsible and shameful, let me just point out that a gun dealer who does wrong things is still going to be liable under this bill. A very large majority of Members of this body have already cosponsored the bill, just in refutation.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from Wyoming (Mrs. Cubin).

Mr. Chairman, I yield to myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, in response to the gentlewoman from Ohio (Mrs. Jones), this is not about trial lawyers and their profits. That would come under the rubric maybe of asbestos where they are taking huge returns compared to the minor returns that the individuals are taking.

I yield to the gentlewoman from Ohio.

Reclaiming my time, this is not a bill that deals with that issue, let me point out for clarifications purposes, but it is about people who would destroy an industry using the thousand cuts of litigation.

Mr. John Coale, one of the personal injury lawyers suing the firearms industry, told The Washington Post: ``The legal fees alone are enough to bankrupt the industry.'' That is what is going on that we are trying to deal with here with this legislation.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 3\1/4\ minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Stearns), the author of the underlying bill.

(Mr. STEARNS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. Chairman, I have one further speaker, and then I will close.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentlewoman from Colorado (Mrs. Musgrave).

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out we have heard much characterization of the dealer who sold the gun to the person who ended up getting the gun to the criminal who shot Officer Lemongello. Let me point out that if the characterization that has been overwrought and overstated by the opposition is correct, then there is a claim under the law that is not preempted by this bill for Mr. Lemongello to seek redress.

The fact is this bill does not take away the traditional common-law claims for negligent entrustment and violations of law. It only makes it clear that frivolous lawsuits cannot proceed erratically around the country.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to read two quotes to finish up. First of all, let me point out that the industry has been responsible.

When the city of Boston voluntarily dismissed its lawsuit against the firearms industry, they said, ``During litigation the city has learned that the members of the firearm industry have a long-standing commitment to reducing firearm accidents and reducing criminal misuse of firearms.'' And they go on and make further points.

So what is this bill all about? What is the litigation all about that we are trying to deal with in this bill. It is about what John Coale said: ``The legal fees alone are enough to bankrupt the industry.''

What we want to do is protect the industry in America. I urge the Members to vote against this amendment and other amendments and support the underlying bill.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.