Providing for consideration of the bill (H.R. 2417) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2004 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.

Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I would like to clarify for the record that the provisions of H.R. 2417, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, amending the Homeland Security Act, fall within the jurisdiction of the Select Committee on Homeland Security and that their inclusion in H.R. 2417 does not create a basis for the assertion of jurisdiction over the act by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Furthermore, I would like to clarify for the distinguished chairman that the chairman of the Select Committee on Homeland Security and I have indeed agreed upon a revision of the provisions that are acceptable to both our ranking members, that is, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) and the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Turner), the gentleman's committee's ranking member. I will commit to work with the gentleman's committee and the Committee on the Judiciary for substitution of the revised language in the conference negotiations between the House and the Senate, and to that end I have also agreed to support the request of the Select Committee on Homeland Security for the appointment of two conferees on

Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I am not going to use the 5 minutes. I just want to clarify this point while the distinguished chairman of the Select Committee on Homeland Security is here that his efforts and the gentlewoman from California's (Ms. Harman) efforts to work out acceptable language had in fact transpired and we were prepared to accept an amendment to the bill to do that. There is another party involved, and we wanted to make sure that the appropriate full dialogue took place because what we are about here is really trying to plug in a Foreign Intelligence Program, which is what our portfolio is with the new efforts domestically to deal with terrorism on the homeland.

We are not interested in any territorial acquisition, as I have said many times. We are interested in plugging in the national foreign intelligence activity and capability in the right places in the right way. That will involve working with a number of committees. Fortunately, we have good Members who serve on a number of committees and we are using that expertise to make these bridging arrangements. I would like to publicly thank the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) and the gentleman from California (Mr. Cox) for their efforts to get the homeland security piece done. We have more work to do on this particular element. They have my pledge in the colloquy that we will work together to get this done properly, and I have nothing further to add to that.

I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentlewoman for yielding.

All I would say is that I was going to compliment the gentleman from California (Mr. Farr) for a very helpful, thoughtful contribution to our work product. In fact, we have been working on this subject for a number of years, which is the training question and the language question; and the gentleman has some very unique perspectives on this which have been very helpful to us. We are improved in our committee for his participation in this process. I do not believe it is necessary to offer the amendment. Apparently he has not, but I nevertheless wanted to appreciate publicly the contribution he has made.

Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

First of all, I want to congratulate the gentlewoman on an amendment that she has worked hard on and I know cares a great deal about, and I will say right up front that the amendment is acceptable to the committee. I do want to make a comment on it, though.

The amendment requires the DCI to consider whether further consolidation of the various U.S. Government terrorist watchlist databases might add to the efficiency of the watchlist system in identifying known or suspected terrorists. Absolutely a goal that we have to achieve. The question is what is the right way to do it? And the gentlewoman has raised the question properly. I commend her for it. Her dedication and expertise on counterterrorism issues I think is well known. She has served not only the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of this Congress but previous iterations of this effort on national commissions and so forth; and I think we all very much respect her judgment.

And as I said, this amendment is a good one and it brings the issue to the floor. It asks the DCI to review and determine how much more consolidation of the various terrorist watchlists is needed, but I would add the words ``if any.'' And the reason I say that is I am concerned about the potential loss of data that might result from the consolidation of all the watchlists available to the government. I do not know that that would happen. It is a question that has to be asked.

Additionally, I would think that there is one other area that I worry about a little bit, and that is sort of the idea of Big Brother. The one big unified, centralized U.S. Government computer database with all of the information available to the U.S. Government on individuals and their associates might be viewed to some as concerning, particularly those who worry about Big Brother invading their privacy.

I am not saying I have the answer; but at this stage of my thinking, I am sort of in the position to be inclined to support a network solution that virtually combines the data in various databases without actually dumping all of the information from all the databases into one big government Big

Brother database. So I would think that something on the order perhaps of Web browser or Web sniffer, some way of searching out all the databases simultaneously, using some of those extraordinary technological tools that are developed in the gentlewoman's district, the software that is out there that not only searches all of them at the same time but also crossreferences the search results in such a way that maximizes the researchers' efficiencies and at the same time gives us some of the safeguards, or the appearance of safeguards anyway, the perception that we are safeguarding better than one big database.

I do not wish to prejudge the outcome of the review. As we always do, we candidly state our positions on these things. As I said, I think the gentlewoman has raised exactly the right question. I thank her for her contribution in doing that, and I believe the amendment is worded properly so we go forward, and I will accept the amendment on behalf of the committee.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased that this amendment is before us. It is entirely consistent with the committee position, and I am very happy to accept it. I want to congratulate the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings) for his continued, persistent, effective leadership on this, along with our colleague, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes), who have both done the committee a big favor by keeping us focused on this.

The amendment directs the DCI to establish a pilot project to test and evaluate alternative and innovative methods to recruit and hire women and minorities with diverse skills, expertise, cultural, and ethnic backgrounds, and language proficiencies. That is obviously a very rich contribution to the Intelligence Community.

The pilot project would be carried out for a 3-year period, with a report on the effectiveness of the project at the end of the second year, as I understand the amendment.

The amendment also includes direction to the DCI to report to the committee by mid-February of the next calendar year on the DCI's diversity strategic plan, which is something we have been after for a while. This aspect of this amendment incorporates, in part, the amendment made to the schedule of authorizations by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes) in the committee's markup. I think they are complementary to each other. I see no conflict, and I think that combined, they are a benefit.

Both members deserve and are commended for promoting the needs of the Intelligence Community in the area of diversity of skills, expertise, languages, cultural understanding, and ethnic background, which is not a fully met need, very clearly, in the Community, as we know.

In the committee report we stated that, and I am going to quote the language, ``Diversity throughout the Intelligence Community population can pay dividends with respect to the richness it brings to the work of the IC, particularly as it relates to cultural understandings of particular target sets, increased language capabilities, and increased skills to address particular intelligence problems.'' Amen.

I believe that this project will help. I very eagerly accept the amendment without reservation, and I am pleased that the gentleman has offered it.

I yield to the gentlewoman from California.

I appreciate the gentleman yielding. I just wanted to say I was remiss in my remarks not to note the gentleman's service on the committee on this particular issue and many other issues as well. It is a pleasure to welcome you back to the debate here.

Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

I want to point out two things, and they are meant to be constructive. First of all, it is certainly true everybody in the United States counts on it being true and it is true that the Vice President and the President are responsible for the protection of the national security. The national security team involves the Vice President. The President and the Vice President are regular consumers of intelligence information, and were they not, we probably should be calling for some kind of an investigation.

I do recall it was not so long ago that one of the complaints from one of the Directors of the CIA was in fact just that, that he did not get enough quality time and enough access with the top leaders of the country and the Intelligence Community was not being well-served. That was at another time and we need not go into that.

My suggestion to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich), who I have great respect for, is that this amendment is truly not worthy of his best efforts. I do not believe the gentleman is fully informed on it. It appears that the gentleman is basing his amendment and information and his case on media. Again, at the risk of getting impaled by the media, I have this trouble with the errancy problem in the media.

Media simply does not know everything, and if they did, they would stop asking me and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) and other members of the committee questions. Believe me, the media does not know everything. They are not fully informed, and if the gentleman is using the media, the gentleman is not fully informed.

I invite the gentleman to come upstairs, sign the secrecy agreement if the gentleman has not already, and review the material. That is why we have it there. If the gentleman took advantage of that, the gentleman would be better able to understand what we are doing, and I would hope would be supportive of our efforts. Having said all that, I hope we are getting ready for a vote on this amendment.

Mr. Chairman, certainly we will publicly not commit to that. We will publicly commit to where the review of the information takes us. We have a bipartisan agreement on that. We have 20 able members who are members of good judgment and good sense who will follow the review and the material that comes in to the appropriate places.

The gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) has used the word ``unflinching.'' It is a fair word. I assure the gentleman I am going where the information takes us.

There are two reasons why this would be a difficult task to do publicly, and I would not make that broad a commitment. The first is that much of the material that the gentleman is talking about is probably classified if the gentleman is talking about the content of what may or may not be involved in calls, and I cannot go there.

The second part is the matter of Constitution which does understand that working documents and so forth of the executive are respected and privileged. That has always been the case no matter who is in the White House.

That is an option that they have and that is why I cannot make a commitment. I cannot overcome that.

Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

I have given this amendment very careful consideration, and I appreciate the effort. I do believe we have got the matter handled already in the committee, and I will tell the gentlewoman that; and I would invite the gentlewoman upstairs to talk to us about it in a classified setting if she would like to.

The reason I say that I think this is unnecessary is I think it is duplicative of work we are doing that, frankly, we are best prepared to do. But I would like to point out there are a couple of problems with the United Nations that we have been working with for quite a number of years, and I think we, frankly, have the expertise to judge better than anybody else. Perhaps our sister body in the Senate, Senate Intelligence Committee, would dispute that; but I would say that either the Senate or us are going to do a pretty good job on this, and in fact we are both working on it.

The question of how much information we shared with the U.N. is a fair question to ask, and the answer is we shared a remarkable amount, more than they could handle. It turns out as we heard from the gentleman from Nebraska's (Mr. Bereuter) comments that the U.N. inspectors were very worried about being called spies of the United States and there was quite a debate about taking any information from the United States at all lest this be a U.S.-driven thing and Hans Blix did not want that and he said so publicly a number of times and said that frankly they could do the job fine without us.

But notwithstanding, we had been working with them for some time and giving them some good information and frankly at some peril because the U.N. leaks like a sieve, and there are some things about the U.N. that are worth noting. Not all the members of the U.N. are particularly friendly to the United States of America, and that brings us to the question of do Americans want us to be sharing our crown jewels and our sovereignty with nations who may not want to be particularly helpful to us and some who may actually want to be harmful to us.

So there is a question there of whether our American constituency would like us to keep this in control in the House or get it out where some other people might want to make some mischief for the United States of America and our security. And I am very much aware of that because we have actually had problems in the past that are documented, which I am not going to go into but which are documented, where materials and information was not properly safeguarded or was willfully given to the wrong people in the U.N. That is not a good track record and I think would not be prudent of us to ignore.

I would say that for some time U.N. weapons inspectors had unprecedented access to U.S. intelligence information. Whether they used it or not or wanted to use it was their problem, including analytical reports. We obviously protected our sources. We had imagery from the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, which I think everybody knows now. Probably what some people do not know which I believe I can say is that the U.N. inspectors had the ability, the task to request how that U-2 was used. That is rather remarkable, turning over an asset like that to another country, a set of countries.

I believe everybody knows that Colin Powell played intercepts for the Security Council that are frankly things that do not happen in our committee very often. They do not play intercepts for us very often. So I would say an unusual amount of information, perhaps more than I would have approved of, was given to the U.N.

And there is a problem with the U.N. that I want to go into a little further, and it is an appearance problem; and it is one I think we are better prepared to handle in the House than an outside group trying to come in here. There is a lot of feeling, I think, that the U.N. does not always get it right in terms of our national purpose or national mission, and I would point out that the presidency of the Security Council for the month of June is the Russian Federation. I would like to also point out, and I think I can say this in a responsible way, that there are an extraordinary number of Russian espionage activities going on in our Nation's capital as I speak, even though we are on a friendly basis. Nations do spy on each other. Russians are still in a little bit of their paranoia and their conspiratorial mode that there are things to find out about us that if they just ask us, they will not believe the answer; so they have to spy on us. We have a good friendship with them, but it has got a ways to go. There is a little bit of a problem there.

There is a problem with Syria which is on our terrorist list being on the Security Council. These kinds of things lead one to pause about how we do business, and these are matters which we are well aware of on our committee. And on the Commission on Human Rights, which has recently been in the news at the U.N., it is clearly true that the U.N. took a slap at the United States by throwing us off that commission in order to put Cuba on it. That is not really great. The chairmanship of that committee, I understand, right now is Libya. Libya's human rights record is not worth commenting on, it is so terrible. Zimbabwe? Give me a break.

Mr. Chairman, when we take a look at this, the U.N. business is a complicated, complex business. We work closely with the Department of State, I&R, and others in this. We for years had a good working relationship. I do not think it is necessary for us to abandon that relationship or supplement it. So I am going to urge that we do not mess with what we have got now. If it turns out that there is a need to do that down the road, I will come back and admit it. But I do not think we are there at this point; so I will thank the gentlewoman for her amendment and the spirit in which it is offered.

Mr. Chairman, I well understand the purpose of the gentlewoman's amendment, and what I am trying to say and outline for her is that dealing with the United Nations with intelligence is an extraordinarily complex issue, and I do not think there is a particular body in Congress that has more experience than the oversight committees on intelligence, House and Senate. And I therefore say give us a chance to do our job and I think she will understand. If the gentlewoman wants to know how much intelligence has been shared with the U.N., I guarantee we can find out upstairs.

Reclaiming my time, this is not supporting or opposing the U.N. I will tell the gentlewoman flat out that I do not have the capacity to declassify information. Our committee does not. We can get involved in a process, but the declassification question is another issue which I would love to enlist her support on on how we can make it better, but that is not part of this amendment.

Announcement by the Chairman Pro Tempore

Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.

Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 295, and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate only, I yield the customary 30 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings), my colleague and friend, who I am happy to report sits on both the Committee on Rules and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence with me, pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume. During consideration of this resolution, all time yielded is for the purposes of debate only.

Mr. Speaker, the Committee on Rules has granted a modified open rule for H.R. 2417, the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 2004. This is the standard rule that we have used for many years for the consideration of the intelligence authorization. The rule is fair. It will allow ample time for consideration of all matters.

The rule provides for one hour of general debate equally divided between the chairman and ranking member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Pro forma amendments listed in the report will be debatable under the 5-minute rule.

As in past rules for this legislation, amendments were required to be preprinted. This allowed for the vetting of amendments regarding classified matters, a procedure we have found to be a very good practice, helpful to both the committee and Members.

Finally, the rule provides one motion to recommit with or without instructions, as was announced.

Mr. Speaker, as in past years, we thought it best to allow Members a good opportunity to review the bill and debate the issues that they feel are important, those particularly to our Nation's security at this time when national security is on our minds. Our classified annex and staff has been made available to any Member of Congress that was interested previously or is interested now in reviewing the underlying bill and reports.

H.R. 2417 is, in fact, must-do legislation because of the rules of the House. It authorizes appropriations for fiscal year 2004 intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System. In effect, what that is is the 15 agencies of the intelligence community.

In the nearly 2 years since the tragic terrorist attacks on September 11, the intelligence community continues to build its capabilities to combat new threats that are threats to our Nation's safety, the well- being of Americans at home and abroad. The bill authorizes resources to improve the analytical depth and capacity in all areas of intelligence, an area that has been in crying need. This will allow us to process and disseminate the information collected in a more efficient, hopefully wiser and more timely fashion, and make sure all interested parties have access.

In addition, this legislation continues the sustained effort and long-term strategy to enhance human intelligence, an area that is vital to our current war on terrorism and is essentially the core business of intelligence, plans, and intentions of the enemy. H.R. 2417 helps to improve information sharing among Federal, State, and local governments. This is an area and a desire where we have overlapping interests with other committees in the House. This bill also provides including increased training for State and local officials on how the intelligence community can support their counterterrorism efforts, again, a matter of some overlapping interest.

Mr. Speaker, these are only a few highlights from the bill that passed the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence unanimously, in the true bipartisan fashion we like to operate our House Permanent Select Committee on. I am sure a whole breadth of topics will be discussed during our general debate; and I think that we have, in this modified open rule, provided ample opportunity for all matters to come to the floor.

I noted today in earlier debate that there was focus on one issue that was not necessarily the subject that was under debate, and that was the intelligence assessments of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. Obviously, this is a topic currently under review by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and I would like all Members and all interested listeners to understand that we have been conducting a review on the House Permanent Select Committee to discharge properly our oversight responsibilities. We have been using the tools of oversight that are available to us. I think they are adequate, and I think they are being well used. I think we are using them in a thorough and in a nonpartisan manner. And, in fact, the ranking member, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), and I have taken extra steps to detail how this review will be conducted and have actually issued a public statement on that.

I think it is worth rehashing what that statement says: committee hearings, closed and open, as appropriate, that will permit Members to question senior administration officials about the prewar intelligence on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction holdings and programs, and its links to terrorism, to include questions relating to the sufficiency of intelligence collection and analytical coverage on these targets.

Granting accesses to any Member of the House who wishes, under appropriate security provisions and House rules, to review the documentation provided to the Committee by the Director of Central Intelligence in response to a May 22 letter from the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) and myself to provide information. And I am happy to report we are getting full cooperation from the Director of Central Intelligence on that.

Staff interviews of intelligence community personnel involved in drafting intelligence community analyses of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction holdings and programs and Iraqi links to terrorism.

Regular committee updates and status reports on current efforts to locate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, which, after all, is a priority, including actions of the Iraq Survey Group and other government agencies employed in that task.

And a written report suitable to the results of the committee's review, including an unclassified summary as promptly as is possible.

In fact, I would say, Mr. Speaker, the committee has taken a very important additional step in its review. We have voted to allow access to the 19 volumes that we now have on hand of information provided by the Director of Central Intelligence outlining American intelligence analysis on Iraq and the sources that supported it. I do not believe we have ever done anything that specific before.

To those who believe that the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence is not doing its job or that we are incapable of doing our job, they can come and literally read over our shoulder. I think that the committee is doing its job, and I am very proud of its members and its staff and the way it works; and I am very thankful that I have a ranking member who is anxious to preserve the nonpartisan approach that we take to the Nation's important security business.

Those who have questions about the competence of myself, my ranking member, or any of the other members on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence are welcome to express that today in a vote of no confidence; but I would urge that they not do that. We are doing our very best, and if you would like to come upstairs and help us try to do it better, we would welcome your presence.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume, and I wish to thank the gentleman for his kind remarks. I also associate myself with his remarks about Lou Stokes and Julian Dixon, as well as the efforts of the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi), when she was ranking member in the committee, to deal with the diversity issue. It is critically important. And as the gentleman from Florida knows, I am prepared to accept his amendment at the appropriate time and pleased to have his leadership.

I would also point out that I believe the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes) has shown another element that has improved our bill that we approved and were able to bring to the floor in our mark. So that is an area that has received attention because it needed attention, and I am entirely satisfied that we are taking good steps.

I would also point out for other Members that we had a number of amendments requested. I do not think any were particularly controversial as to the bill itself. We have this year, because we are dealing with standing up the Department of Homeland Security, some questions about where we plug in the intelligence piece from our foreign

intelligence community, which is a very big piece, into the homeland security apparatus. The gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) has been a leader on that and done excellent work and is working with the gentleman from California (Mr. Cox) and the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Turner), the chairman and ranking member of the Select Committee on Homeland Security.

We also, obviously, are working closely in some other areas that are a little new for us with the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Oxley), the chairman of the Committee on Commerce, because of some questions about how we deal with some of the Treasury aspects, and, additionally, how we deal with some of the judicial aspects as we respond to the challenge in this country of preventive enforcement for people who would take advantage of our hospitality here and do mischief. And regrettably, we do get the reports regularly that there are still some of those folks in our midst. So we are going to be working in that area.

Not all of that is going to come to a final conclusion today. We are going to go from here, from our authorization bill, to a conference process. I expect there will be progress made in some of these areas where there is some apparent overlap between now and conference time, and certainly everybody is going to be assured that this committee is interested only in the portfolio of intelligence. That is what we do, the Foreign Intelligence Program. The other committees of standing that have jurisdictional areas that are associated we will work with closely and on a friendly and nonterritorial basis. I wish to assure them all of that.

We had, I understand, some amendments that came in late and we had one amendment that was not germane; but otherwise, I understand that the Committee on Rules made six amendments in order. Five were Democratic amendments, one was a Republican amendment; and I believe that the Committee on Rules responded very fairly. I see no reason to oppose this rule and every reason to support it.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I just wanted to add one bit of remark with regard to some of the comment we have just heard which I thought was very helpful. We understand very clearly and the Intelligence Community understands very clearly that finding the weapons of mass destruction or what happened to them or whether there was faulty intelligence is a critical issue and that is indeed ongoing. As the gentleman from New Jersey just said, we are early in the game and we have literally thousands of pages for our staff and Members to work through.

There is one thing that has not been said very clearly yet that does need to be said. I think we all share the desire to make as much of this known as possible to the public. We want the public to understand how good intelligence is and how good it is not. Frankly, I want to do everything I can to make the American people aware as well as people overseas who might be watching what we have to say here, whether they are our friends or our enemies, that our intelligence is indeed formidable and when in fact we find a place where there is a gap in it, it will be repaired and fixed and that gap will no longer be there. I think that will be a comfort to everybody. That process is partially what this bill is about. But we are doing this as regard to the debate with the weapons of mass destruction in Iraq at a time when we desire transparency but we understand that transparency might include some people who are our enemies in the Iraq area where there is still a very dangerous and difficult operational climate as we are tragically reminded every day.

I would ask that we understand that this is not just a question of going back and reviewing material at our leisure trying to come to some Solomon decision about whether it was good or bad or where we can fix it. This is matching information that we had which was the best we had at the time as far as we know with what we are beginning to find as we are able to talk to people who are captured in Iraq and other areas who are terrorists or are associated with them, document exploitation, those types of things and match that up. This process is a process that the committee has taken on. We are not just doing the prewar analysis. We are doing the what is going on now and where is it going on a daily basis.

I hope Members can be assured, we will be in a continuous position to assess, both give a score card to the community and perhaps to come back to our colleagues here and say there are some other areas where we need to invest in the Intelligence Community because a small investment will yield a greater national security return before we are through. That is an ongoing process and charge of this committee and one we take seriously.

Mr. Speaker, I urge support of the rule.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time, and I move the previous question on the resolution.

The previous question was ordered.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume and rise in support of H.R. 2417.

First, I want to thank the chairman of our committee for the way he runs the committee. His approach is constructive, collaborative and cooperative and shows a real willingness to work with every member of the committee. I have had the privilege of serving on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence for 6 years. Chairman Goss has gracefully and competently chaired the committee since 1997 and my predecessors as ranking member during my service include the late and great Julian Dixon and our able leader the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi). The membership of our committee is truly talented, diverse and hardworking, and deeply committed to fulfilling its oversight duties and responsibilities to the House. By the way, Mr. Chairman, so is our staff. Committee members and staff worked closely together to craft a bill that provides new and better capabilities to fight the war on terrorism as well as address a range of global challenges. As we have just heard from our chairman, it is a good bill and it received the unanimous vote of our committee.

An excellent summary of the public portions of our bill has been presented by the chairman, so I will not repeat it. The committee made thorough but sensible decisions to focus resources on the highest priority intelligence collections programs and placed limitations on certain new programs until they are defined in more detail. The bill also supports the strategic vision of the committee for strengthening the Intelligence Community. It provides additional support for all- source analysis and encourages virtual reorganization for better information sharing and collaboration across the agencies.

Mr. Chairman, whatever the details of this intelligence authorization bill, we all know that it was developed at a time of heightened concern about the nature and quality of the intelligence that led to the decision to go to war in Iraq. I know that there are questions on both sides of the aisle about this intelligence, questions which our committee is already asking. While an independent commission or other mechanism might be needed at some later date, the members of our committee have now initiated an investigation and I would like to spend a few minutes discussing our effort.

As our colleagues know, I voted to authorize the use of military force against Iraq because I believed the intelligence case was compelling. The Intelligence Community judged that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and the danger, in the President's words, was grave and gathering. The aftermath of the war has revealed just how brutal Saddam Hussein's regime was. The discovery of mass graves in Iraq and the gut-wrenching grief of families victimized by the regime speak for themselves.

To date, however, coalition forces have only uncovered two suspected Iraqi mobile biological warfare agent production plants. Coalition forces have yet to uncover chemical or biological weapons or further evidence of Iraqi links to terrorism. Where are Iraq's chemical and biological weapons? Why can't our forces find them? For our committee, these questions have loomed over the preparation of this authorization bill. It has been anything but business as usual.

On May 22, Chairman Goss and I sent a letter to the Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, expressing the committee's interest in learning in detail how the intelligence picture regarding Iraq's WMD and ties to terrorism was developed. The chairman and I have also met twice with the Director on this subject. In response to our request, the Intelligence Community has provided 19 volumes of information on Iraq's WMD programs and ties to terrorism. On June 12, the chairman and I announced the bipartisan and unanimous commitment of our committee to a serious, focused, comprehensive review of the quality and objectivity of prewar intelligence. We announced that we would hold hearings, closed and open--open means public--to question senior administration and intelligence officials about the prewar intelligence on Iraq's WMD and its links to terrorism.

I think it is very important that the committee hold public hearings, and I have the gentleman from Florida's (Chairman Goss) personal commitment that we will. I hope our first hearing will occur in July. Our committee also decided to produce a written, unclassified report as promptly as possible, and in addition we agreed to give all House Members access to the materials provided by the intelligence community in response to the committee's request, under appropriate security conditions and House rules.

Last week our committee held two hearings in connection with our investigation, one examining the October, 2002, National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs and the other on the current search for Iraq's weapons. While we are still at an early stage in this investigation, I want to comment on what we have reviewed so far.

First, past possession of WMD. We know that Iraq had chemical and biological weapons in the past. In the 1980s the Iraqi military used chemical weapons against Iran and the Kurds. In the 1990s Iraq admitted to U.N. weapons inspectors that it had produced over 8,400 liters of anthrax and 3.9 tons of the chemical warfare agent VX. Drawing on both direct and circumstantial evidence collected over many years, the intelligence community also concluded that Iraq had people, planning documents, and equipment to support WMD production.

Number two, hiding WMD. The agents that comprise weapons of mass destruction are exceedingly easy to hide, a point neither the administration nor the intelligence community made adequately clear before the war in Iraq. Five hundred metric tons of bulk chemical agents would fill a backyard swimming pool. Biological agents can be hidden in small vials in private residences. But it is not so easy to hide delivery vehicles like unmanned aerial drones, missiles, or munitions. That none of these other harder-to-hide items has been found is cause for real concern.

Number three, overstating the case. When discussing Iraq's WMD, administration officials rarely included the caveats and qualifiers attached to the intelligence community's judgments. Secretary of State Powell, for example, told the U.N. Security Council that ``we know that Saddam Hussein is determined to keep his weapons of mass destruction . . . '' On the eve of war, President Bush said, ``Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised.'' And on a March 30 Sunday news show, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld said that he knew where the WMD were located. Bogus information on Iraq's alleged nuclear connection to Niger was even included in the President's State of the Union Address. For many Americans, the administration's certainty gave the impression that there was even stronger intelligence about Iraq's possession of and intention to use WMD.

Number four, circumstantial evidence. The committee is now investigating whether the intelligence case on Iraq's WMD was based on circumstantial evidence rather than hard facts and whether the intelligence community made clear to the policy-makers and Congress that most of its analytic judgments were based on things like aerial photographs and Iraqi defector interviews, not hard facts. This is an issue that we have to explore.

And, finally, number five, weak ties to al Qaeda. Iraq did have ties to terrorist groups, but the investigation suggests that the intelligence linking al Qaeda to Iraq, a prominent theme in the administration's statements prior to the war, contradictary contrary to what was claimed by the administration. Much remains to be investigated in this area.

Mr. Chairman, the highest priority of our committee, and I think of our Nation, remains finding and dismantling Iraq's WMD. It is counterintuitive to think that Iraq destroyed its weapons and did not report this to the United Nations. It is conceivable that Saddam destroyed them on the eve of or even after the start of the war once he recognized the futility of using them and the political advantage of keeping the United States from finding them; but the more likely scenario is that he buried or dispersed his weapons of mass destruction and that some may now be in the hands of terrorist groups outside of Iraq or counterinsurgents in Iraq who continue to harm and kill U.S. and British troops.

But even if Iraq's chemical and biological weapons are found tomorrow, and I hope they are, these issues warrant scrutiny by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. It is already clear that there were flaws in U.S. intelligence. Iraq's WMD was not located where the intelligence community thought it might be. Chemical weapons were not used in the war despite the intelligence community's judgment that their use was likely. I urge this administration not to contemplate military action, especially preemptive action, in Iran, North Korea or Syria until these issues are cleared up. Certainly this Member would not support such action until these matters are cleared up.

As the committee moves forward with its investigation, we need also be mindful of the burden the intelligence agencies are carrying, not only in Iraq but also in the war on terrorism in other areas of the world. Our Nation is best served by an effective intelligence community, not one hobbled by risk aversion and finger-pointing. The committee's review must be based on facts, which I and others intend to follow unflinchingly wherever they may lead.

Our Nation needs a robust intelligence budget, which this authorization bill supports. At the same time, the committee's immediate priority is to resolve the questions regarding Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and ties to terrorist groups. If the answers dictate changes in the future intelligence budgets or policy, I am committed to bringing those recommendations forward. Meanwhile, this authorization bill deserves our strong support.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes), a very valuable member of our committee.

Mr. Chairman, I would say to the gentleman, I have great faith that the WMD will be found too, and in the seriousness and responsibleness of the Members of the House.

Mr. Chairman, it is my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Boswell), who is ranking member of the Subcommittee on Human Intelligence, Analysis and Counterintelligence.

(Mr. BOSWELL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Peterson), a valued member of our committee.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Cramer), the distinguished ranking member of our subcommittee on Technical and Tactical Intelligence, TNT, who became a grandfather for the second time yesterday.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 15 seconds. The 15 seconds is to tell the prior speaker, our wonderful colleague, that I totally agree with him. As the representative from the district in America that probably makes most of our intelligence satellites and has fabulous technology, that is great; but we need more investment in human intelligence. And he is right.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Eshoo), a classmate and good friend, one of the rookies on our committee, but already the ranking member on the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Policy, and National Security.

Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for his comments. We are all proud to serve on this committee. It is now my pleasure to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger), the rookie on the committee and a rookie in Congress, but he is no rookie to these issues.

Mr. Chairman, we have no further speakers except for me and I have some brief closing remarks. So I would yield if there are speakers over there and perhaps speak just before our chairman closes this debate.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

This debate has been friendly, collaborative, supportive, not just of each other but our staffs. It is clear that committee members are putting the country first in our service on the committee. I believe that our authorization bill is putting the country first in terms of the priorities it chooses, and I believe further, Mr. Chairman, that our investigation of the quality of intelligence supporting the war in Iraq is also putting the country first.

Our investigation has a long way to go but it is serious, collaborative, and bipartisan. We will do as much as possible in public, and we will report to the public on our findings.

Should we hit the wall and fail in our endeavor, then it may be time for a commission or an alternative committee or set of committees of Congress to take over. But meanwhile, I

want to commend the Members of this committee who serve with great distinction, and I urge the passage of this authorization bill, H.R. 2417.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

Mr. Chairman, we now know that there were not vast stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq when the U.S. invaded and that, therefore, Iraq did not pose an imminent threat to the United States, as the administration claimed before the war.

The question remaining is whether the administration compelled the Central Intelligence Agency to release raw, undisseminated information they knew to be unreliable because it helped support the worst case scenario concerning Iraq's weapons program and, therefore, helped make the case, an erroneous case it turns out, that Iraq posed an imminent threat to the United States.

The administration has made numerous assertions. The President in his State of the Union said, The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa. Our intelligence sources tell us that he has attempted to purchase high strength aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production.

Number one, the claim about uranium from Africa was forged. Number two, the aluminum tubes were not suitable for a nuclear enrichment program. These assertions made by the President in his State of the Union to justify an immediate war with Iraq were false.

Did the Vice President play a role in making false information become the public reason the President went to war in Iraq? The Vice President, as reported in the Washington Post of June 5, 2003, Vice President Cheney and his most senior aide made multiple trips to the CIA over the past year to question analysts studying Iraq's weapons programs and alleged links to al Qaeda, creating an environment in which some analysts felt they were being pressured to make their assessments fit with the Bush administration's policy objectives. That is from the Washington Post on June 5, 2003.

Number two, the Vice President knew or should have known that documents purporting to show that Iraq had bought uranium from Niger were forged. On March 7, the IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei reported the following to the U.N. Security Council: These documents which form the basis for reports of recent uranium transactions between Iraq and Niger are, in fact, not authentic. We have, therefore, concluded that these specific allegations are unfounded. We have found no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons program in Iraq.

It turns out that the forgeries were crude. Anyone with an Internet search engine could determine that these documents were forgeries. Yet on March 16, nine days afterwards, the Vice President repeated the falsehood on national television. He said, We believe, and he was talking about Hussein, has in fact reconstituted nuclear weapons.

The Vice President knew 1 year earlier, it appears, that the documents were forgeries and, therefore, the allegations false. According to the New York Times of May 6, 2003, More than a year ago the Vice President's office asked for an investigation of the uranium deal. So a former U.S. ambassador to Africa was dispatched to Niger. In February 2002, according to someone present at the meetings, that envoy reported to the CIA and the State Department that the information was unequivocally wrong and that the documents had been forged.

So public reports indicate the Vice President made assertions which were unreliable, and the Vice President visited the CIA, making analysts there feel, according to the Washington Post, that a certain output was desired from here.

In summary, what this amendment seeks to do is to probe what role the Vice President played in causing the CIA to disseminate unreliable, raw, previously undisseminated, untrue information about Iraq's alleged threat to the United States.

Specifically, this amendment would direct the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency to audit all electronic and telephone communications between the Office of the Vice President and the CIA which would answer the question about how extensive the visits by the Vice President to the CIA were.

Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. Chairman, I want to point out for clarification purposes, and I thank the gentleman for yielding, that the result of this amendment would be both a count of the number of communications and an inventory of the substance of the communications. The count would establish the number of times the Vice President took the unusual step of traveling to the CIA to meet directly with CIA analysts and the inventory would establish the nature of those visits.

I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?

Mr. Chairman, just to point out to the gentlewoman that I think it would be helpful if the committee supported the amendment because, at worst, if the amendment would be repeating the work of the committee, if it would be essentially redundant, then it could not hurt, and I would also want to point out that the gentlewoman is correct.

I mean, this amendment is narrowly focused, and it is aiming specifically at obtaining information relative to the relationship between the Vice President and the CIA. I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman. Under the gentleman's logic, there would be no reason at all for any amendments to be offered from this floor. We might as well dispense with the amendment process and move to a system in which the committees of Congress report bills for a simple up or down vote from the whole House. So we might as well extend the suspension calendar for all bills.

Well, Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for continuing to yield, and I would say that, first of all, the idea that it is the committee's jurisdiction and, therefore, should be left to the committee, I do not believe the gentleman is seriously proposing what I think is an absurdity, but the argument rests on the same absurd logic. All Members of the Congress have the privilege to offer amendments, and if a majority of the House agrees with the amendment, it passes. However, I do not believe it is legitimate or logical against my amendment to say that the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence should enjoy an exemption from the amendment process.

Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will continue to yield, I would ask that the gentleman not take offense. This is certainly, I would hope the gentleman would agree, a salient issue of interest to the American people and that the public does have a right to know, and there have been published statements that provide contradictory information relative to what is really a question of a singular cause of war. So I respect the gentleman's right to make these statements, and I would ask the gentleman to respect my right as a Member of Congress to offer this amendment.

Reserving the right to object, I would be happy to grant the gentleman an additional 2 minutes if he would be happy to return the favor to me.

Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent for an additional 2 minutes.

Mr. Chairman, I want to say to my friend, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. LaHood), that I would hope the gentleman would appreciate receiving clear direction for an inquiry. I can only assume that the gentleman does not want the direction of the whole Congress to get to the bottom of the Vice President's role.

I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, I would just tell the gentleman that as a member of the Committee on Government Reform I certainly appreciate the role of government oversight, and I certainly appreciate the role of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence as well. I would say that if the gentleman did not want to get to the bottom of the role of the Vice President, which has been a matter of public contest and controversy long before I have spoken here, that would indeed be a reason to oppose the amendment; but it would not be a reason for anyone else in Congress to vote ``no'' on the amendment.

And to the Members of Congress, I say if they want to demand a thorough investigation into the role that the Vice President may have played in offering the American public discredited intelligence reports of a nonexisting Iraqi weapons program, then they should vote ``yes'' for my amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I take great pride in serving in the Congress with the gentlewoman and the gentleman. I would say, though, that I do not see this so much as being a battle over turf as I see it being an assertion of the need for pursuing the truth. And I would expect that the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence has the capability to do the job, but I also think that this particular matter is so unique that it receive the attention of the House, which is why I have offered this amendment and why I will continue to insist on it.

Mr. Chairman, I think it would be useful as we begin these debates for us to reflect on the essential constitutional role of the Congress and on the importance of separation of powers and on the cause which took a Nation into war because we are not talking about just any other matter here, we are talking about a matter that resulted in the people of this country having their sons and daughters sent to Iraq.

Nothing less than the entire involvement of this Congress will do to be able to hold safe the constitutional prerogatives of separation of powers. No congressional committee can override the requirements of the Constitution and the role of this Congress.

When Members of this Congress gave the President authority to pursue an attack against Iraq, they took upon themselves a serious and grave responsibility, and since information has been presented that raises grave questions about the cause of our action against Iraq, we have a moral obligation to get into this, and I take nothing away from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, but I would tell Members, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence should take nothing away from Members of the House.

Mr. Chairman, I would direct the gentleman from Illinois to an article in the Washington Post on June 5 which says that the esteemed chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence said there is ``no indication that analysts at DIA or CIA changed their analysis to fit what they perceived as the desire of the administration officials.''

Mr. Chairman, it goes on to say the intelligence oversight panels have received no whistleblower complaints from the CIA or other intelligence agencies on the issue. I would maintain that this would not be a subject of whistleblowing, and only the Office of Inspector General or in this case the investigative agency would have an opportunity to be able to get this in an evenhanded way, and it takes it out of politics at a time when Members suggest this is only political.

I might further add that I did not make my reputation in this House by raising partisan issues, and I do not see this as a partisan issue, I see this as justifying the administration's claim that this country had to go to war against Iraq because there was imminent threat.

The gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) is familiar with the amendment and the letter of the amendment, and I would ask if the chairman would be willing to commit the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence to seeking specifically the information that I am asking here of the Inspector General. Would the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence be willing to conduct publicly an audit of all telephone and electronic communications between the Central Intelligence Agency and the Office of the Vice President as they relate to this matter?

I would suggest to the gentleman and I would not impugn his answer by stating that his unwillingness to clearly commit to gathering this information publicly would in any way reflect a partisan position on his part, just as my desire to have the Inspector General bring that information forward is not reflective of a partisan position on my part.

Mr. Chairman, it would be more than instructive. It would be classified information if the Vice President manipulated CIA analysts to disseminate false, raw unreliable information to justify a war in Iraq. I am hopeful no one is saying that and I am not aware that the administration has asserted executive privilege in an attempt to shield such information from the Congress. I am not aware of that at all. Maybe that has happened privately, but I am not aware that such an assertion can be private and that in fact such an assertion has been made.

I would say in order for the test to be made to make the request first then imposes our responsibility as Members of Congress, and as a coequal branch of government, we are entitled to do that and the executive branch is entitled to assert executive privilege, if they so choose, and that would be illuminating, I think.

Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of H.R. 2417, a bill to reauthorize appropriations for FY 2004 for the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the U.S. Government.

It has been my honor to serve this Nation with the Central Intelligence Agency for 10 years, five of which were spend as an operations officer in Southeast Asia. For over 30 years I served on active and reserve duty as a Military Intelligence Officer and have also had the unique privilege of serving as Staff Director for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence under Chairmen Barry Goldwater and Daniel Patrick Moynihan. All this service took place at a time when our Nation was seeking to win the Cold War.

The collapse of the Soviet Union changed our world for the better, but did not eliminate the need for accurate and timely intelligence. We now face a new uncertainty and risk. Rather than focusing on one or two superpowers, we have to defend against numerous lethal covert terrorist groups.

H.R. 2417 responds to these changing threats by boosting the role of human intelligence or HUMINT gathered from human sources around the world; increases our ability to analyze material from a broad spectrum of sources; increases our capability to conduct counter terrorism; and authorizes protections and benefits for our intelligence officers at home and abroad.

Mr. Chairman, it is incumbent on this body to improve the intelligence capabilities of the Nation, to better serve as the ``eyes and ears'' of America in a difficult and dangerous world. This bill responds to this urgent requirement, and I support it completely.

H.R. 2417--Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2004, Updated June 24,

2003

floor situation

The House is scheduled to consider H.R. 2417, pursuant to a

rule, on Wednesday, June 25, 2003. On Tuesday, June 24, 2003,

the Rules Committee granted, by voice vote, a modified open

rule providing one hour of general debate equally divided and

controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. The rule provides

that the bill shall be considered for amendment under the

five-minute rule. The rule provides that it shall be in order

to consider as an original bill for the purpose of amendment

under the five-minute rule the amendment in the nature of a

substitute now printed in the bill, which shall be considered

as read. The rule waives all points of order against

consideration of the bill, and against the committee

amendment in the nature of a substitute. The rule provides

that no amendment to the committee amendment in the nature of

a substitute shall be in order except those printed in the

Rules Committee report accompanying the resolution, and all

points of order against said amendments are waived. The rule

provides that each amendment may be offered only in the order

printed in the report, may be offered only by a Member

designated in the report, shall be considered as read, and

shall not be subject to a demand for division of the question

in the House or in the Committee of the Whole. Finally, the

rule provides one motion to recommit with or without

instructions.

summary

H.R. 2417 authorizes appropriations for FY 2004 for (a) the

intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the U.S.

Government, (b) the Community Management Account, and (c) the

Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System.

The authorization level is classified. The funding levels and

personnel ceilings for most programs are outlined in a

classified annex to the committee report, which Members only

may review in the offices of the Permanent Select Committee

on Intelligence in H-405 in the Capitol.

highlights

H.R. 2417 will:

Provide full support for the Intelligence Community's

efforts in the war on terrorism;

Focus attention on the need to enhance Human Intelligence

capabilities and tools;

Authorize additional resources to improve analytical depth

in all areas of intelligence, and increase our analytical

capacity to process, exploit, and disseminate all of the

intelligence that is collected;

Posture the Intelligence Community to develop a framework

for a unified overhead imagery architecture;

Include provisions that are intended to improve the

government's ability to identify any spies that might be

working against the United States and to provide the

government additional leverage as it moves to prosecute such

traitors, such as Hanssen, Ames, and Montes;

Establish a Bureau of Intelligence and Enforcement within

the Department of the Treasury, to be headed by an Assistant

Secretary for Intelligence and Enforcement, that will enhance

the government's ability to gather and process information

about the financial support of terrorism and other illegal

activity;

Require the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to

report on lessons learned as a result of military operations

in Iraq;

Improve information sharing among Federal, State, and local

government officials; including increased training for state

and local officials on how the intelligence community can

support their counterterrorism efforts;

Require the Intelligence Community's senior leadership to

comprehensively examine (and report to Congress on) policy

and technical issues related to digital information sharing,

electronic collaboration, and ``horizontal integration''

across the Intelligence Community;

Extend the authority for the use of funds designated for

intelligence and intelligence-related purposes for assistance

to the Government of Colombia for counter-drug activities to

be used also to fund counterterrorism activities in Colombia

for each of FYs 2004 through 2005;

Provide limited immunity from tort liability to those

Special Police Officers of the Central Intelligence Agency

and the National Security Agency;

Authorize the personnel ceilings on September 30, 2004 for

the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the

U.S. Government and permit the Director of Central

Intelligence to authorize personnel ceilings in Fiscal Year

2003 for any intelligence element up to two percent above the

authorized levels, with the approval of the Director of the

Office of Management and Budget; and

Authorize $226.4 million for the Central Intelligence

Agency Retirement and Disability Fund (CIARDS) in order to

fully fund the accruing cost of retirement benefits for

individuals in the Civil Service Retirement System, CIARDS,

and other Federal retirement systems.

background

Agencies' activities affected by the Intelligence

Authorization Act of 2003, include fourteen agencies of the

U.S. government, such as: Central Intelligence Agency;

National Security Agency; Defense Intelligence Agency;

National Imagery and Mapping Agency; National Reconnaissance

Organization; FBI (Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence);

DOE; Homeland Security; and U.S. Coast Guard.

Legislative History

H.R. 2417 was introduced by Chairman Goss on June 11, 2003.

It was reported from the Select Intelligence Committee by a

vote of 16-0 on June 12, 2003 (H. Rpt. 108-163).

Cost Estimate

CBO estimates that the unclassified portions of this

measure will cost $320 million over the 2004-2008 period,

assuming appropriation of the specified and estimated

amounts. CBO also estimates the bill will affect direct

spending and receipts by an insignificant amount.

H.R. 2417 contains intergovernmental and private-sector

mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act

(UMRA), but CBO estimates that the costs of complying with

these mandates will not exceed the thresholds established by

that act ($59 million for intergovernmental mandates and $117

million for private-sector mandates in 2003, adjusted

annually for inflation).

Amendments Made in Order Under the Rule (6 amendments)

Rep. Cox will offer an amendment (#10) on Wednesday, June

25, 2003. The amendment strikes Section 336 (Improvement of

Information Sharing Among Federal, State, and Local

Government Officials) of the bill. Contact: 6-8417.

Rep. Farr will offer an amendment (#9) on Wednesday, June

25, 2003. The amendment seeks to improve the foreign language

training of the intelligence community by providing: (1)

training in the application of standardized foreign language

skill assessment mechanisms; (2) development of curriculum

for advanced proficiency intelligence community foreign

language speakers and interpreters; (3) non-degree training

for translators and interpreters; (4) training intelligence

community foreign language teachers in the use of technology

geared for teaching advanced ``critical languages;'' (5)

intensive on-site foreign language training. Contact: 5-

2861.

Rep. Harman will offer an amendment (#2) on Wednesday, June

25, 2003. It amends section (g)(1) of Section 343 of the bill

by requiring the Director of Central Intelligence to report

on whether further consolidation or elimination of watch list

databases in Federal departments and agencies would

contribute to the efficacy and effectiveness of the Terrorist

Identification Classification System in identifying known or

suspected terrorists. If passed, it would also require the

Director of Central Intelligence to report on steps required

to consolidate or eliminate such watch lists. Contact: 5-

8220.

Rep. Hastings (FL) will offer an amendment (#1) on

Wednesday, June 25, 2003. The amendment directs the Director

of Central Intelligence to establish a pilot project to

improve recruitment of ethnic and cultural minorities and

women to meet the diversity of skills, language, and

expertise required by the current mission. Contact: 5-1313.

Rep. Kucinich will offer an amendment (#8) on Wednesday,

June 25, 2003. The amendment directs the Inspector General of

the Central Intelligence Agency to conduct an audit of all

telephone and electronic communications between the CIA and

the Office of the Vice President that relate to weapons of

mass destruction obtained or developed by Iraq preceding

Operation Iraqi Freedom. Not later than one year after the

date of enactment, the Inspector General shall submit a

report to Congress on the audit conducted. Contact: 5-5871.

Rep. Lee will offer an amendment (#7) on Wednesday, June

25, 2003. The amendment requires the Comptroller General of

the United States to conduct a study to determine the extent

of intelligence sharing by the Department of Defense and

intelligence community with United Nations inspectors

searching for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq prior to

Operation Iraqi Freedom. Contact: 5-2661.