Providing for consideration of the resolution (H. Res. 557) relating to the liberation of the Iraqi people and the valiant service of the United States Armed Forces and Coalition forces.

Mr. Speaker, the measure before us contains many consentaneous American thoughts: Recognition that Saddam was a despot of tyrannical proportions; support for a process of democratic self- governance in Iraq; and, profoundly, appreciation for the sacrifice and commitment of Americans serving in our armed forces in these very troubling, indeed dangerous, times.

But as widely accepted as these notions are, care must be taken in this debate to underscore what this resolution is not. It cannot be read either as a Gulf of Tonkin-like resolution giving the Executive a blank check for future actions or considered an indication of Congressional approval of executive action to date.

Many in Congress, perhaps a majority, would be willing to vote for a more expansive resolution, but such is not before us today. Nonetheless, the subject matter of this resolution necessitates a review of what has transpired since the Congress, without my support, authorized military intervention in Iraq a year and a half ago.

All of us recognize that Iraq is a judgmental quagmire. Thoughtful Americans are conflicted. The President has a case for the actions he has taken. But I feel obliged to make clear why I continue not to find it compelling and indicate, in as constructive a way as I am able, the problems that a lengthy occupation may yield and present a theoretical framework and the case for timely disengagement.

Perspective is difficult to apply to current events or for that matter life itself. But it is important to attempt to frame the discussion of the war in which we are engaged in relation to our history, to the development of knowledge (particularly science), and to our relations with other countries.

First our history. In the broadest sense the political history of America has encompassed four great debates. The first was the question of whether a country could be established based on the rights of man. The second was about definitions: whether the concept of ``man'' included individuals who were neither male nor pale. It took over a century, a civil war and suffrage and civil rights movements to bring full meaning to the universal language of the Declaration of Independence. With courage and sacrifice Americans finally came together to embrace the democratic notion that consent of the governed lacked legitimacy unless all individuals of all backgrounds had rights of citizenship.

The third debate is about opportunity, whether individual rights can be protected if every citizen doesn't have a fair crack at the American dream. There are many on-going elements of the opportunity debate, which in the 20th century was symbolized by the New Deal initiatives of Franklin Roosevelt and the counter-weight of the Reagan revolution. But I would like to emphasize an aspect of this debate which gets little attention because it is taken for granted, and that is the role of public education. All young Americans not only have access to public education, they are required by law to attend public schools or comparable alternatives. As society becomes more complicated, educational opportunity becomes increasingly central to advancing social opportunity. And as we look at the narrow schooling provided by madrasses abroad it becomes apparent that how and what others teach has relevance to the security of Americans at home.

The fourth debate is symbolized by Hiroshima and Nagasaki and revolves around the question of whether any right can be valid if it is not underpinned by a right to peace.

In these debates the role of foreign policy is critical, and even when we've looked inward it has been with an eye to establishing a shining city-state on a hill, a beacon for all.

The greatest legislated act in American and perhaps human history is the Declaration of Independence. The universality of its principles constitutes the cornerstone of historic American idealism in foreign as well as domestic policy.

As architect of the Declaration, Jefferson--while never a member of Congress--was our greatest legislator. And as the architect of the Louisiana Purchase, he stands as our greatest

diplomat-president. The precept implicit in the Declaration and the Louisiana Purchase is the notion of individual rights and collective decision-making by a people entrusted with the capacity to make sovereign decisions.

Jefferson was the philosophical godson of John Locke, who borrowed from Thomas Hobbes the 17th century paradigm of a state of Nature where, according to Hobbes, life was nasty, brutish and short.

Hobbes had a pessimistic view of human nature. Self-centered man could not escape from the jungle of human relations. Locke, on the other hand, was an optimist. He also assumed that man was self- centered, but, unlike Hobbes, he believed that individuals were rational enough to recognize the necessity of accommodating the self- interest of others. Civil society--the condition where rules would govern disputes and third-party arbitration would exist--was thus possible as well as necessary.

Whether or not the theoretical constructs that political philosophers relied on three centuries ago have relevance to real life on the planet, then or now, the progress of science has made man's efforts to protect the rights of individuals and society more difficult today. In one of the most profound social observations of the 20th century, Einstein noted that splitting the atom changed everything save our mode of thinking.

Physics has brought us nuclear energy and perhaps a way to help live a modern life without reliance on fossil fuels. Biology has brought us the capacity to extend the life of man by several and perhaps many decades. But just as splitting the atom has a dark side--nuclear weapons--splitting genes has ominous implications, too--the ability to manufacture diseases for which there may be no antidote. Hence the obvious: at no time in human history is there a greater obligation for people in public life to appeal to the higher rather than lower angels of our nature.

This is particularly the case as the world has smallened and friction between peoples has increased in economics, politics and, most profoundly, religion.

Perhaps the most thoughtful speech ever given in Iowa was delivered four decades ago by the Oxford historian, Arnold Toynbee. A decade earlier, Winston Churchill chose a small Midwestern college in Fulton, Missouri, to warn of the dangers of Soviet expansionism; an ``Iron Curtain,'' he said, had descended on Eastern Europe. Toynbee picked Grinnell College to chastise Marxists for shallowly looking at history through the lens of economic determinism and Americans for assuming, in part because of the civil rights movement then underway, that the most contentious issues in the world related to race. Toynbee argued that at this stage in history conflict would more likely erupt because of religious differentiations than economic or racial ones. As we look at the Middle East, at Northern Ireland, at the Balkans, at the divisions between Pakistan and India, Toynbee's observation appears to be vindicated.

Expanding on Toynbee, Samuel Huntington of Harvard has propounded a theory of international relations over the past several decades that suggests that the next great wars are less likely to represent battles between countries than clashes between various civilizations.

Given Toynbee's predictions and Huntington's civilization-clash paradigm, it is appropriate to return to Jefferson, who at the public level strove assiduously to protect individual freedom of religion and at the private level believed that what mattered most was not nuanced differences between religions or denominations, but the moral threads common to all creeds. In terms of guides to individual behavior, it is impressive, for instance, that the Ten Commandments underpin Islam as well as Judaism and Christianity. And the Confucian doctrine of ``shu,'' which asserts that moral behavior should be premised on not doing unto others what one would not have done to oneself, is an inverted kind of Golden Rule.

Despite the fact that history is rife with examples where religious differentiations have caused and intensified conflicts, there is no credible substitute for the constructive role of faith-based convictions. Conflict may be envisioned, but it can be constrained if individuals are taught the most esoteric of precepts: loving, or at least not hating, one's neighbor.

Ironically, genocide, which is disproportionately a 20th century phenomenon, is about weapons of lesser lethality: machetes, bullets, poisonous gas.

But if mankind can't prevent killing up close, the question must be pondered whether there can be any optimism that the world can avoid a cataclysmic exchange from afar of weapons of mass destruction, which would make the greatest crime of mankind to date, genocide, the second- to-last crime in human history. It is simply a short stop from genocide--the killing one at a time of millions--to ``global-cide''-- the end in a single stroke of all life on the planet.

In recognition of the 20th century's experience with Holocaust and other brutal genocides, from Cambodia to Rwanda, we have no choice except to change our mode of thinking. Man's instinct to hate must be curbed and social wisdom applied to the new challenges science has thrown at man.

In this context, I want to stress a second challenge of science that has nothing to do with war and arms making but is clearly the largest foreign policy issue of our day. It is the problem of disease. In Iraq more than 500 Americans and perhaps as many as 20,000 Iraqis have been killed in the past year. But over the last two decades 20 million people have died of AIDS and 40 million are infected with HIV. In Africa, Southeast Asia, and Southern Russia, AIDS has hurdled well beyond the groups considered most vulnerable in the U.S. In many countries children are infected through mothers at birth and in several countries a 15-year-old girl is far more likely to have the disease than a 15-year-old boy. We simply must expand resources to stop this disease abroad before it stops our families at home.

Not that everything in the world is dark or unraveling. Promising political breakthroughs are occurring between India and Pakistan; in the civil war in Sri Lanka; in Libya, where Muammar Khaddafi may be giving up a quest for nuclear weapons; and even with North Korea, as six-party talks unfold. Several of these bits of good international news are developing without a central U.S. role; several will require our leadership. My only advice to the Executive is to meet every positive step of others with at least two steps of our own. Progressive change from suspect leaders cannot be sustained if peoples of various societies are not convinced that America prefers extending carrots to applying bullying tactics. We simply can't wait for tomorrow to respond to good omens today. This is especially true of a country like Libya where backsliding is so easy. It may be more difficult with the hermit country--North Korea--simply because paranoia and anti-Americanism run so irrationally deep in the people as well as the government. But constructive steps, especially of a humanitarian dimension, can be taken.

Iowa also has brought some good news to the world. In January I attended the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, and a Conference on the Prevention of Genocide in Stockholm, Sweden. In conversations with Europeans the depth of anti-American sentiment becomes quickly evident. But when asked what state I represent, I was impressed with the sincerity of the positive responses when I indicated I was from Iowa. Everyone knew of Iowa because of the caucuses. In Iowa the caucus process seems a bit mysterious. In other states it is very mysterious, and in Europe it is a full blown mystery. But people in Europe were deeply impressed that individuals seeking the most important political position in the world had to come to the homes and schools and offices of private citizens who, with real care, reviewed their credentials and platforms.

For many years I have had reservations about the caucus system because the ballot is not secret and because participation is not as large as in a traditional primary. But I feel obligated to reconsider and, as a Republican, must tip my hat to the Iowa Democrats for the thoughtfulness with which they advanced American democracy and spotlighted our values for the world. Abroad, people followed but did not necessarily identify with the individual candidates, but everyone was impressed with the process and the care with which citizens carried out their duties.

It is instructive to put the current tension in transatlantic relations in historical perspective. With regard to the profoundest issue--war and peace--attitudes on each side of the ocean have come full circle over the five centuries of interaction.

The U.S. was founded by immigrants seeking refuge from religious persecution and a spate of seemingly senseless wars among European countries and principalities. The new Americans sought to distance themselves from the violence and religious intolerance of the Continent. It was with the greatest reluctance that in 1917 a pioneer country, which had been convulsed with the magnitude of a westward moving Manifest Destiny, determined that blocking a Kaiser's ambitions called for intervention in European affairs.

In the wake of a war trumpeted to end all wars, America retreated into political isolation in the 1920's. After inspiring its creation, we refused to join the League of Nations; and after expanding trade in industrial and agricultural products, we succumbed to economic protectionism in the 1930's. Only a direct attack on our territory caused us to enter World War II.

Today, it is Europe which is looking inward, pre-occupied with its manifest destiny, political integration made feasible by a growing economic union. Increasingly secular Europeans desire to separate themselves from an America that appears to them to be too unilateralist and quick to go to war, too fundamentalist and

thus blind to tolerance, and too simplistic to realize that conflicts with religious overtones are the most traumatic to manage.

When speaking to constituents of the rationale for and against the Iraq War, I have over the past couple of years referenced a set of books that held particular currency in the 1960's: the Alexandria Quartet by Lawrence Durrell. Each of the four books describes the same set of events in inter-war Egypt from the perspective of a different character. While the events are the same, the stories that unfold are profoundly different, causing the reader to recognize that one person's perspective is at best a snapshot of reality. A clear picture cannot be pieced together without looking through the lens of a multiplicity of eyes and experiences.

The Moslem experience gives substantially less weight than the Western experience to the two cataclysmic wars of the 20th century. Despite Lawrence's involvement in Arabia and the battles between Allied forces and Rommel's tanks, the engagements in the Middle East and North Africa were skirmishes compared with the struggles in Europe and the Far East. Not only do Moslems see the 20th century differently from Westerners, but Europeans and Americans have drawn different strategic parallels in the application of common experience to current challenges in the Middle East.

In the immediate aftermath of the First World War, historians and political strategists in Europe rightly concluded that the European alliance system had been too rigid and the assassination of a relatively minor figure, an archduke, should not have precipitated a war of such devastating consequences. Hence European leaders in the 1930's falsely concluded that historical wisdom necessitated initial accommodation with Hitler's adventurism. Too little flexibility caused one war; too little spine led to Munich. In the current context, President Bush sees himself as Churchill rather than Chamberlain, but Europeans see 9/11 as more analogous to the shots fired at Archduke Ferdinand than as a cause for a doctrine of preemption or war with Iraq, a war that could too easily spring into a clash of civilizations. Second guessing is always conjectural because history gives few second chances. Unlike football, downs aren't repeated.

Accordingly, the challenge today on both sides of the Atlantic is to put debate about going to war behind and work together to figure out how we proceed from here. A lot of polite observations have been made that European leaders seem less angry about American decisions related to Iraq this year compared to the differences expressed during the pre- war buildup. This may appear that way on the surface, but my sense is that European judgment, if anything, is more solidified and definitive today. Europeans may have become resigned that events have unfolded without their concurrence. By the same token, frustration that their advice has been discounted has caused anti-American anger to metastasize into anti-American smugness. Europeans believe that their skepticism has been vindicated by events. The stark good-versus-evil clarity that Washington policy makers seek appears to Europeans to be un-nuanced, unsophisticated, and unappreciative of differing judgments.

Americans countenance criticism of our President and his policies by fellow Americans, but we are not so tolerant of foreign dissent. The assumption in Washington is that Continental leaders deliberately sought to undercut U.S. leadership in the world community and that, in particular, the refusal of the French and Germans to support the President's position in the Security Council and NATO has made matters more dangerous for our troops and reconciliation more difficult in the current post-war setting.

On our side of the Atlantic, the sense exists that French and German political judgment has not only been at variance with American ideas but that a concerted effort was made on the Continent to triangulate the terrorist challenge and take advantage of America's dilemma. By distancing themselves from Washington, Paris and Bonn are seen to be encouraging the re-direction of Moslem discord. Whereas the rhetoric of Osama Bin Laden and other extremists was initially anti-Western, it is now more exclusively anti-U.S. The opportunity to transplant America's commercial as well as political position in parts of the world consumed with anti-Americanism appears not to have been lost on the European political-industrial elite.

With all of the attention given to the new transatlantic tensions, the implications of the Iraq war on Russia have received short shrift. But the new European antagonism to America has not gone unnoticed in Moscow. The cleavage between Washington and Europe and the preoccupation of America with the Middle East clearly give Putin a freer hand to advance a less democratic and more nationalistic set of policies at home. This is one reason why it is so important that America and NATO demonstrate then can work together in such areas as Afghanistan, where strategic common ground exists.

Likewise, the priority we have given to Iraq as well as North Korea, two charter members of the so-called ``Axis of Evil,'' means that we have been implicitly forced to subordinate trade and human rights issues with China. China's support, or at least not opposition, in international strategic affairs, has become so central to Administration policy makers that Beijing has been able to downgrade U.S. concerns about the historic shifts taking place in trade terms. A Chinese trade surplus with the U.S. that now exceeds $10 billion a month and an undervalued currency pegged to the dollar that makes flexible trade adjustments impossible are simply not being given the attention they deserve.

Economics and politics have seldom been more intertwined. Yet underappreciated is the prospect that a protectionist backlash of 1930's dimensions could develop if our political policies fail and our government loses respect in the world. Analogously, a political backlash could sweep the country if Washington doesn't develop institutional reforms to protect the political system from vulnerabilities to single-issue and special-interest constituencies. At a time when our foreign policy appears too attentive to ideological forces and too prone to rely on proxy empowered corporations to advance the national interest, Congress has an obligation to aggressively provide oversight of the contracting as well as intelligence judgments advanced by the Executive. Just as committees to review a new intelligence inadequacies are in order, so is a new committee to oversee government contracting related to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The professionalism and integrity of government decision- making about issues of war and peace must be above reproach. The country can afford neither ideological posturing nor war profiteering.

As for the dilemma of the moment, policy makers have been caught philosophically short. As mistaken as the overestimation of Saddam's WMD capacities was, the greater judgmental error may relate to the political pressure applied to the intelligence community on the issue of Iraqi complicity in the plane strikes on 9/11. Initially, the CIA straightforwardly noted that there was no credible evidence of Iraqi involvement. Then, under obvious pressure, it changed its stance and in presentation after presentation to Congress ominously suggested they had an ``evolving'' view of the role of Iraq, despite, to date, producing nothing of a definitive nature to show why the community changed its initial representation. Hence, the decision to go to war was against the backdrop of public opinion polls showing 60 percent of the American people believed significant Iraqi involvement existed in the 9/11 attack.

Compounding this lack of forthrightness, where the intelligence community knew the situation but refused publicly to differ with the political decision makers, was a judgment showing doubtful understanding of Moslem attitudes. The notion that American forces would be welcomed in Iraq as a liberating force with the well- intentioned option to reshape over time Iraqi political institutions was a mistake of profound proportions. Now, given the anarchy that has mushroomed in the country, Washington is swept by occupation analogies of World War II. Japan and Germany, it is noted, were occupied for more than five years after hostilities ceased. Hence, many are suggesting, we must be prepared to stay at least this long in Iraq.

I have seldom been more apprehensive about an historical analogy. Japan and Germany were the instigators of war; their citizens understood this. Iraqis don't see it this way. They see the U.S. as the aggressor. Images form Al-Jazeera portray a country under siege. In the Moslem world Iraq looks more like a police-cordoned West Bank than a great and ancient society on the move to a better life. Outsiders are viewed as unwanted intruders acting out of great power self-interest, unrespectful of the culture and values of the country being occupied. The irony that it is Shi'a clerics, not American statesmen, who are pushing for democratic elections at this time is not lost on the Iraqis or the Moslem world.

More profoundly, I am amazed that pundits haven't caught on to the possibility that the only thing worse than being wrong in our intelligence assessments of Iraqi WMD would have been if we had been right and thereby taken the risk of precipitating a retaliatory BW attack against Israel or possibly an American city. Biological weapons in the control of petty potentates is mad science in the hands of mad men. To go to war against a country with BW weapons, especially if the initiator has no knowledge where they are, is to hazard more than a clash of civilizations; it is to instigate a potential challenge to the maintenance of civilization itself.

In any regard, if a WMD rationale for intervention can't be established, we must not allow the democracy case to founder. To authorize an additional $80 billion for Iraq and

not be able to find the means to conduct timely elections is preposterous.

Legitimacy is critical for all countries. There may be times and circumstances in which the U.S. national interest requires action without a U.N. sanction. But the U.N. is ignored at great risk, especially when the international community is at odds with a nation state's policies. The U.N.'s help, for instance, could be significant at this point in facilitating elections and helping legitimize new governing structures. If a commitment to a time frame for democratic elections isn't soon forthcoming, the Administration may see an escalation of violence in Iraq led by the Shi'a in the South, thus adding to the traumas precipitated by Saddam's old henchmen and foreign trouble makers in the Sunni triangle to the north, where disorder is so prevalent today.

The judgment call Washington must make is whether to employ something closer to a ``get in/get out'' strategy or one of prolonged occupation. Each approach caries risk, with the likelihood of a certain amount of disorder developing whenever the American presence is reduced. Whether that disorder becomes less deep with time or whether time allows anarchist forces to organize more vigorously and lay claim to a legitimizing nationalist mantle is conjectural.

In the realm of policy timing can often be as important as substance. Just as Senator Dirksen once noted that a billion dollars here and a billion dollars there and pretty soon you're talking about real money, in foreign affairs a week here and a week there can soon add up to a policy dilemma.

The difficulty of timing was underscored this week when some in Washington charged the newly elected Spanish Government with ``appeasement'' for its announced intention to withdraw its forces from Iraq in the wake of last week's bombings in Madrid unless the U.N. role in Iraq is broadened. The language of appeasement may appropriately describe the lack of resolve of Western leaders when they refused to stand up to Hitler's growing power in the 1930s, but it may not be as fair to apply such a term to Spanish policy today. Indeed, doing so may carry irresponsible implications because fear of its connotations may make disengagement more difficult if the country or forces of an occupying power are ever under attack. For instance, if ``appeasement'' is considered the dominant potential issue, U.S. policy makers relinquish their sovereign discretion and instead could give terrorists the determinative say when we will disengage from Iraq. A few radicals could with relative ease launch a steady dose of terrorist attacks on our civilian and armed services personnel and ``force'' us to stay or then be in a position to argue when we eventually leave that they forced us out. That is why it is so critical that we lay out a basis for withdrawal that has nothing to do with the terrorist behavior of Iraqi radicals and everything to do with the establishment of a freely elected leadership.

On the issue of the timing of the hand-over of civil authority I give less judgmental weight in the Iraqi circumstance to historical analogies to the post-war occupation of Japan and Germany and more to a personal anecdote about the manner the Vietnam war came to be concluded. Early in my career in Congress, I was invited to the Library of Congress to join a small group of historians to listen to a lecture by Henry Kissinger about the negotiations that led to the end of that war. The night before the lecture, I perused one of Secretary Kissinger's autobiographic tomes and came across a paragraph that so startled me that I asked him about it in the seminar that followed the lecture. Kissinger wrote that in December 1968, shortly after Richard Nixon had asked him to be his National Security Council director, he met with the President-elect to discuss the direction of the new administration's foreign policy. They determined together, he noted, that their policy would be to get out of Vietnam. So I asked him why they didn't just proceed to do that. Kissinger looked at me for a moment and then uttered words I will never forget. ``Young man,'' he said, ``we meant with honor.'' I then asked him if ``honor'' required escalation. ``Absolutely,'' he responded.

In governance, judgment to be good must be timely. The course of history and attitudes toward America would be very different today if the Nixon administration had acted forthrightly on its own judgment. In Iraq, where we are fast becoming a magnet of instability rather than a force of stability, we must not hesitate. If the issue is democracy, let's hold elections with dispatch and use the democratic transition as the rationalization for deep troop reductions.

If we maintain a heavy presence much longer our president could find himself in a dilemma of the kind Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon came to know too well. There are circumstances in life where the small can humble the powerful. This has the makings of one. Despite the overwhelming nature of our military victory and the courageous commitment and sacrifice of our armed forces, policies can fail if the timing of disengagement is wrong.

This is why clarity of purpose and flexibility of response are so crucial. And why the neo-con mantra--``we must see this through''-- deserves review. Hasty withdrawal is problemsome; orderly, philosophically cogent decisions to wind down the military dimension of our presence in Iraq should, however, be our highest national interest priority. Democratic elections are the key. They can be held in relatively short order (at least by year's end; preferably earlier) if there is a will and commitment to do so. But the longer we heed the advice of those who want to hold onto power in Iraq, the harder it will be to avert increased terrorism here and abroad.

Here I would like to return to what in most contexts must be considered a rather esoteric paradigm: the Hobbesian notion of a state of nature. Terrorism is a military or, more precisely, militant tool of anarchy. It is the desire of terrorists to make Iraqi society a social jungle, a state of nature where anarchy rather than law rules. Legitimacy of government in this setting can perhaps be precipitated but it cannot be imposed from the outside. Outside pressure is less convincing when it appears to be presented by a singular authority-- i.e., the United States. One of the reasons so many countries prefer a strong U.N. role is that such a role not only provides greater legitimization of intervention but greater legitimization of processes leading to a new government. U.S. slighting of the U.N. undercuts governmental legitimizing efforts and causes the entirety of the Moslem world to become more antagonistic to our country.

For our part, we have gotten caught in a web of events we can influence but not control. In the end, legitimacy of any new government in Iraq will depend on consent of the governed. The only wise U.S. policy is to steamroll ahead with a constitutional framework of democratic elections with a pre-announced strategy of large-scale troop withdrawals commencing somewhat before or just after elections are held.

In conclusion, let me suggest a corollary to Lord Acton's maxim that power corrupts and absolute power tends to corrupt absolutely. The Leach corollary is that military power tempts and excessive power tends to tempt excessively. America's enormous military strength is critical at this stage in history. But while we are obligated to recognize that its maintenance is imperative, we must also realize that its utilization may not fit, and may indeed be counter-productive, in certain strategic settings. We have to use more than just our own eyes and rely on more that just our own expertise if in turbulent times we are to manage prudently the affairs of state.

Analogies between all wars exist, but comparisons between Iraq and Vietnam are frail. What must be understood is not that Iraq could be as bad as Vietnam; rather, that it could be far worse. Vietnam, after all, involved no WMD issues; and while the North was predominantly Buddhist and the South Catholic, there were no implications of a world-wide religious struggle; nor of a conflict that might last many decades, if not centuries. The issue at the time was Communism and fear that if Vietnam fell, neighboring governments would topple like dominoes. In retrospect, the real domino lesson of Vietnam was about political decision-making. Once the patriotic flag was raised, stands taken, words uttered, one doubtful decision precipitated another, and the pride of politicians did not allow a change of course until the people demanded common sense reconsideration.

In this context, there is an aspect of this resolution that deserves reflective review. It is true, as the resolution asserts, that Iraq and the world are better off without Saddam Hussein ensconced in power. But it is not necessarily true that our country and the world are safer if the overthrow of one thug leads to the creation of millions of rebels with a cause.

It would be a mistake of historical proportions if respectful relations not only between America and the Moslem world but between America and its traditional allies were to rupture. We are obligated to see that they don't.

Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 561 and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. Speaker, for purposes of debate only, I yield the customary 30 minutes to my friend, the gentleman from Fort Lauderdale (Mr. Hastings) pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume. During consideration of this resolution, all time yielded is for the purposes of debate only.

Mr. Speaker, 1 year ago, our brave servicemen and -women began a military operation that brought freedom for tens of millions, toppled one of the most despicable regimes in the history of the world, and strengthened the national security for the American people.

Operation Iraqi Freedom was, and continues to be, a military success of the highest order. Within 4 weeks from the start of operations on March 19 of last year, the U.S. military had won unqualified victory. Saddam Hussein and his Baathist regime could no longer terrorize the Iraqi people who were finally free to act, do and say as they pleased for the first time in decades.

Mr. Speaker, there is no question that Saddam Hussein endangered world security. He posed a threat to his people, his region and the international community. Trusting the intentions of a man who started two wars, gassed his own people, and supported international terrorism would have been grossly irresponsible.

As weapons inspector David Kay has said, we know Saddam Hussein wanted weapons of mass destruction, we know he was attempting to resuscitate his illicit programs, and we know with certainty who he viewed his greatest enemy to be.

In a world where Iran can buy its way to a nuclear program with assistance from Pakistan's top nuclear scientist, combined with Saddam's access to illicit oil revenue, the fact that weapons of mass destruction have not yet been found in Iraq is hardly proof that Saddam Hussein did not want to severely hurt our country. Moreover, American national security has been solidified by the military action that was undertaken last year.

Mr. Speaker, does anyone really believe that Iran would be cooperating with international nuclear inspectors today if we had not launched this military operation? Does anyone really believe that North Korea would be engaged in six-party talks over the future of their nuclear program if the United States had not deposed Saddam Hussein? Does anyone really believe that Muammar Qaddafi, as recalcitrant in his defiance to the international community as ever a dictator has been, would have willingly come to the United States and Britain and declared that he wanted to end his illicit weapons programs had the American military not marched into Baghdad?

Mr. Speaker, Operation Iraqi Freedom sent an unmistakable signal to the rest of the world's tyrannical leaders: Either play by the rules or face the consequences.

Now, the events of September 11 taught us that we cannot allow threats to arrive on our shores before we combat them. If other Nations wish to keep their head in the sand about the dangers of proliferation and terrorism, that is their prerogative, but we cannot and could not afford to take that chance.

To those who complain of the cost of war and its aftermath, I simply will note that estimates of the cost of containing Saddam and his successors, as some have argued we should have done, are upwards of six times the dollar amount we have spent on war and reconstruction thus far, and significantly higher in terms of human lives lost.

Because of the heroic action of our military, the Iraqi threat has been mitigated efficiently and a new dawn has begun for the people of Iraq.

Earlier this month, Iraqi leaders signed the transitional administrative law into effect. It establishes an Iraqi law, a bill of fundamental human rights and paves the way for Iraqi democracy.

Perhaps more important than the signing of the law itself, was the agreement of Suni, Shiite, and Kurdish leaders to sign the document. While differences amongst them remain, and the road ahead will be difficult, it is clear they are acting with the best interests of the new Iraq and its people firmly in mind.

I should say our colleague, the gentlewoman from Ohio (Ms. Pryce) is going to, in her remarks today, tell a

very moving story about the fact that these very, very disparate groups have been able to come together sharing this pursued goal.

The Iraqi people themselves are clearly enjoying their newfound freedoms under the transitional government. Poll results released just yesterday demonstrate that not only do a significant majority of Iraqis feel they are much better off than they were under Saddam Hussein's reign, but the extremely high level of participation in the poll demonstrates their desire to exercise their right to speak their minds, something that was unthinkable under the tyranny of Saddam Hussein.

Such progress has only been possible because of the tireless commitment of our Armed Forces and those of the 34 nations assisting us to provide security on the ground in Iraq.

It is dangerous territory; and the forces of evil, whether they be Ba'athist remnants or infiltrated al-Qaeda sympathizers, are a constant threat. In the past year, we have lost over 550 of our best and brightest Americans, with another 3,190 wounded. That number, as it is in any conflict, is too high. Without question, we owe the soldiers we have lost, the soldiers who remain, and their families, an enormous debt of gratitude. Mr. Speaker, that is exactly what this resolution marking this first anniversary is designed to do. If there is any solace, it is knowing that because of their actions, America and the world are safer places today with Saddam Hussein's regime dismantled.

Because of our military, the people of Iraq have a bright future, where Sunni, Shiite, and Kurd alike can dream of being treated equally, of electing their representatives, of owning a prosperous business, and being free to say, worship, and read what they want.

Mr. Speaker, it would be all too easy for the United States to leave Iraq now and let the Iraqi people fend for themselves. Avoiding conflict is the path of least resistance and is always politically expedient. But unlike previous conflict, terrorism cannot be contained. It has no boundaries. It has no rules. One day it strikes Baghdad, the next Madrid. The only recipe for success in this war is our resolve to defeat threats where we see them and promote democracy where we can.

Mr. Speaker, true success in the war on terror is taking place right now on the ground in Baghdad and Kabul. By supporting, securing, and strengthening the democratic governments of Iraq and Afghanistan, we are promoting greater equality within those countries as well as providing forums for those who feel disaffected to air they grievances without picking up arms. As open and transparent governments spread throughout the world, the precursor ingredients for terrorism, anger, and fanaticism will dissipate. That will be the continuing legacy of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Mr. Speaker, I strongly support this rule and the underlying resolution, which not only affirms the actions that the United States undertook a year ago, but provides every Member of this body the opportunity to reaffirm their own personal commitment to winning the war against terrorism, our commitment to democracy in Iraq, and, most important, to our troops in the field.

Mr. Speaker, it is my hope that this resolution will enjoy strong bipartisan support. That is our goal. I also hope, Mr. Speaker, that as soon as we pass this resolution that we will immediately have it translated in Arabic so that Saddam Hussein can read it in his cell and be reminded constantly of what we and the victims are regularly reminded of. Thanks to our military, Mr. Speaker, Saddam Hussein does have time to read that.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute. I want to engage my colleague from Missouri in a colloquy.

There is no Member of this House who is more highly regarded in the area of national security than our friend, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton). I am privileged to be a native of the Show Me State, and he has done us all very proud.

I know at the end of the day he will want to support this resolution, Mr. Speaker, because this resolution does exactly, exactly what my friend just stated in his closing remarks: recognizing our troops.

Now, we had no intention of offending anyone in drafting the resolution. In fact, we thought it was so noncontroversial that it would be an appropriate thing to move it forward.

I yield to the gentleman from Missouri.

Reclaiming my time, Mr. Speaker, let me just say that I completely understand that he would like to have had input; and that is one of the reasons we, in fact, did provide an opportunity, which is unusual, in consideration of this rule, for a motion to recommit for Members of the minority, if in fact that was the case.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Atlanta, Georgia (Mr. Linder), my very good friend and the chairman of the Subcommittee on Technology and the House of the Committee on Rules.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

It is true that the United States of America has had a bipartisan foreign policy. This resolution is not about foreign policy. This resolution is not about foreign policy, this is a resolution that is simply designed to congratulate our troops. I do not understand why there is any controversy on it. As I said earlier and as I said in the Committee on Rules last night, we are sorry if anyone was offended over the fact that Members of the minority were not offered a chance to have input. I said to a number of my colleagues, that is one of the reasons that we have in fact made in order a motion to recommit that will allow the minority at the end of the bill an opportunity to cast a vote on that.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from Ohio (Ms. Pryce) who has done a phenomenal job of focusing on the rights of women. She chairs our Republican Conference and the Subcommittee on Legislative and Budget Process Reform for the Committee on Rules.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to simply say that again, we did not have a goal of offending Members on this. This is not about foreign policy, this is about commending our troops.

Mr. Speaker, this resolution is 2\1/2\ pages long, okay. I am going to share with our colleagues the resolved clause.

Resolved, That the House of Representatives

(1) affirms that the United States and the world have been

made safer with the removal of Saddam Hussein and his regime

from power in Iraq;

(2) commends the Iraqi people for their courage in the face

of unspeakable oppression and brutality inflicted on them by

Saddam Hussein's regime;

(3) commends the Iraqi people on the adoption of Iraq's

interim constitution; and

(4) commends the members of the U.S. Armed Forces and

coalition forces for liberating Iraq and expresses its

gratitude for their valiant service.

That is what this resolution is all about.

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from North Carolina (Mrs. Myrick), the very distinguished Chair of the Republican Study Committee.

Mr. Speaker, let me just say that my friend from California is one of the greatest patriots in this institution. I hold him in the highest regard. I believe very strongly in the need for us to pursue a bipartisan foreign policy. Let me just say that, again, we had no intention of offending anyone in the crafting of this resolution, and it should be a nonpartisan resolution itself. At the end of the day because we found that controversy came forward in the Committee on Rules last night beyond the request that was made by Chairman Hyde, we did in fact offer a motion to recommit for members of the minority.

But I do believe again that this resolution is designed to do nothing more than commend the troops and the people of Iraq. That is what it is designed to do. It has nothing to do with our foreign policy. This here marks the first anniversary of this very, very successful effort. I think that what we are trying to do here is, in a bipartisan way, acknowledges that.

Mr. Speaker, I am happy to yield 3 minutes to my very good friend from Miami, Florida (Mr. Lincoln Diaz-Balart), an able member of the Committee on Rules.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Brentwood, Tennessee (Mrs. Blackburn), a very able new Member of this body.

Mr. Speaker, I understand that there is going to be a motion for an adjournment vote here, and I just wanted to, before we proceed with that, inquire how many speakers the gentleman has remaining for the debate as we prepare to go into this.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H. Res. 557 and claim the time set aside for us under the rule, and I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, our President, having exhausted all other options, made the decision to take action against Saddam Hussein and the threat posed by his evil tyranny. During that course, the debate about that, this House was presented with an overwhelming body of evidence detailing the brutal inhumanity of Saddam Hussein and his regime, the suffering of the Iraqi people under his repressive dictatorship, the threat that Saddam presented to his neighbors and to the world, and indeed the piles of bodies in neighboring countries he left behind. Today, now that Saddam has been removed from power and the mass graves, the secret laboratories, the vast military stockpiles, missile capacities that he had, have all been exposed to the world, the world is a safer place. Certainly the Iraqi people, all Iraqi people, have a new hope for a better future today than they did just a year ago. Just a year ago. What a remarkable accomplishment by our troops and the coalition.

Yet we continue to hear claims from some that the liberation of Iraq, no matter how worthy the result, no matter how necessary to improving U.S. national security, was somehow a flawed endeavor. Yes, it was hard, but they claim it was a flawed endeavor because the intelligence that the United States had prior to the war was not perfect.

Some apparently feel that either the Intelligence Community was pressured by the administration into stating that Iraq was a threat or the Intelligence Community did not really believe Iraq was a threat but the administration misused the intelligence provided to it. The truth is neither of those are correct. But that has not deterred some conspiratorially critics from contorting themselves, trying to make both arguments simultaneously.

Looking back about a year and a half ago, while the Intelligence Community was focused heavily on Iraq, the President stated that Saddam was ``a grave and growing threat.'' And he was right. Today we have the benefit of hindsight, of a presence on the ground in Iraq, and of the thousands of hours of studying all there is to study on the prewar intelligence picture of Iraq, and we have barely begun to get that job finished.

Taking advantage of all these benefits, I would like to share my assessment so far, and I would note that the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House, and I know of the Senate also, is underway in coming forward with a formal review of all this, which I hope we will be able to share with our colleagues before too long. That is our plan.

The intelligence picture of Iraq, of the threat Iraq posed to its neighbors and to the United States, including the assessment of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, was entirely consistent over a period of almost a decade. The assessment is consistent in the finished intelligence and the daily current intelligence pieces from the mid- 1990s onward. It is consistent in the classified records that have been provided to the House Permanent Select Committee on

Intelligence over the past year. So I have to conclude on that basis alone, if the intelligence adjustments regarding Iraq were the result of political pressure or manipulation, any such machinations must have occurred in the middle of the 1990s. But I do not believe that that is the case. Therefore, if the intelligence picture is unchanging, was there a change in the substance or tone used by this administration to describe that threat? We do not need to go to the Intelligence Community or to any classified records to answer that question. We just need to compare public statements that have been made, and they are available to the world.

In 2003 President Bush said this: ``Today, the gravest danger in the war on terror, the gravest danger facing America and the world, is outlaw regimes that seek and possess nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. These regimes could use such weapons for blackmail, terror, and mass murder. They could give or sell those weapons to terrorist allies who would use them without the least hesitation.''

In 1998 then President Bill Clinton said: ``In the next century,'' which is now, ``the community of nations may see more and more the very kind of threat Iraq poses now, a rogue state with weapons of mass destruction, ready to use them or provide them to terrorists . . . who traveled the world . . . if we fail to respond today, Saddam . . . will be emboldened tomorrow by the knowledge that they can act with impunity.''

And again in 1998, then President Bill Clinton said: ``There should be no doubt, Saddam's ability to produce and deliver weapons of mass destruction poses a grave threat to the peace of that region and the security of the world . . . His regime threatens the safety of his people, the stability of his region and the security of all the rest of us.'' President Clinton, 1998.

Fast forward, 2003, President Bush: ``Some have said we must not act until the threat is imminent. Since when have terrorists and tyrants announced their intentions, politely putting us on notice before they strike . . . Trusting in the sanity and restraint of Saddam Hussein is not a strategy, and it is not an option.''

Actually, there is not a lot of difference in the leadership that was taking place in this country on the question of the threat that Saddam Hussein and his regime and weapons of mass destruction that might be at his disposal were to the rest of us. It is pretty clear that that was a consistent view.

So, were the intelligence assessments perfect? No. In fact, comparing the intelligence assessment to what has been found in Iraq today, it is clear there were insufficiencies in our intelligence capabilities and they are of concern to us, and on a bipartisan basis we are looking into that. What was the cause of these insufficiencies? Perhaps Iraq, under Saddam, was a difficult target. It was sort of a denied area. There was a ruthless security apparatus there that made information gathering inside the country extremely difficult, very dangerous. We also know that Iraq instituted a truly massive denial and deception program designed to mislead anyone attempting to learn about Saddam's weapons of mass destruction and related programs. Virtually everybody who tried found out that he was involved in denial and deception. So these factors made intelligence collection a little difficult, but it is the tough job that intelligence is there for.

So, what else? I found that cuts in intelligence resources, personnel, and political support in the mid-1990s made many aspects of the intelligence mission in Iraq even more impossible than what we are up against.

Where were these cuts most severe? In the case of Iraq, it turns out it was the decline in our intelligence capabilities that hurt the most. Human intelligence is where we get more than pictures, more than fragments. We get insight into the plans and intentions of our target. What is going on in the minds of the troublemakers? And without good human intelligence, HUMINT, as we call it, it is very difficult indeed to get an accurate picture of what an adversary is up to.

Yet from 1991 to 1998, a time of cutbacks for military and intelligence resources across the board, our human intelligence capabilities suffered dramatically. The number of officers collecting information shrank by about a quarter; the number of operating locations overseas dropped by about a third; reporting sources declined by almost 40 percent; and the number of intelligence reports produced were cut in half or thereabouts.

So we add on top of that the politically correct ``nice spies'' guidelines that were posed in 1995, the risk aversion problem, and we begin to see why information in Iraq was so hard to come by. Good information about plans and intentions, the eyes and ears, just were not sufficient.

So despite these severe limitations, I think the scorecard shows that the United States Intelligence Community provided the best assessment it could. And referring Members to the Director of Central Intelligence's recent speech at Georgetown, the assessments were not as far wrong as some critics of the war would have us believe.

In the final analysis, I think it is important that we get it right. Saddam was a threat. The United Nations believed he was a threat. The vast majority of the Western nations, even those outside of the U.S.- led coalition, believed he was a threat. The U.S. Intelligence Community assessed consistently that Saddam was a threat. The previous administration told the American people that Saddam was a threat. And it has been the official policy of the United States to seek regime change in Iraq since 1998 across two administrations. The difference between 1998 and 2003 is that President Bush took the bold action necessary to address a grave threat where others before him did not. The world is a safer place for it.

Freedom is not free. The purpose of this resolution is to recognize the hardships that the men and women who are doing the dangerous, risky work of protecting our freedoms, the people in our military services, the people in the coalition, the people who are taking risks. After a year, we are here to say, you are doing great work, keep it up, we are so grateful.

We are also including some applause for the people of Iraq who have gone through miserable times and now have some hope, and they have completed the remarkable achievement of a temporary constitution already. This is the sign of a spirited people who are looking for a better life.

This resolution simply says that and commends that. I believe we can all agree that these are the times that we can get together and say, well done, more to do, let us get on with it.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra), and chairman of one of our critical subcommittees.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Nevada (Mr. Gibbons), a member of our committee and the chairman of a subcommittee as well.

(Mr. GIBBONS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Illinois (Mr. LaHood), who is also a subcommittee chairman of the committee.

(Mr. LaHOOD asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. Speaker, I truly wish that I could support this rule. National security is a bipartisan, or actually a nonpartisan, issue. And when we commend the troops, all of us, all of us have a stake. Every congressional district has a stake in commending the troops.

As a matter of fact, small town and rural America have furnished 46 percent and 43 percent of the deaths in Afghanistan and in Iraq. So all of us, whether we are from small towns or large cities, have a stake in a resolution commending the troops, and we should have been consulted about it. I am sorry for that.

Now, more than that, while we commend the troops, I would also have, had I been consulted, recommended that we do our best to protect our troops by including more body armor and extra up-armored Humvees, of which we still do not have enough in Iraq. As a matter of fact, Mr. Speaker, I received from the United States Army a letter indicating that there are unfunded requirements for the extra up-armored Humvees and the body armor, which is so necessary.

I would also have recommended that we have complete, timely, and high-quality health care to treat the wounds and injuries for those who have served, and to recognize those who pay the sacrifice, whether it be in wounds, injuries, or, sadly, deaths.

I would also have recognized the contributions of and the sacrifices of the families of our servicemen and -women, particularly in the Guard and Reserve. I would have recognized the efforts to improve our intelligence gaps that our troops need and so that they be better protected in the future. And I would have recognized and recommended the sufficient up-front funding for our military operations so we can ensure the safety and well-being of our troops.

Mr. Speaker, I would also have included the fact that there should have been better planning for the postwar period. I sent two letters to the President, one on September 4, 2002, and another 2 days before the attack on Iraq, both of which I include in the Record.

Mr. Speaker, I think that all of us should have been at least brought to the table and all of us had an opportunity to write this resolution. I am so proud of our troops, whether they be from Missouri or Maine or wherever they are from. This is the best military our country has ever seen. And I think every Member of Congress, both sides of the aisle, should have had the opportunity to say thank you, we are proud of you, and God bless you.

Mr. Speaker, here follows the letters to which I referred earlier in my comments:

House of Representatives,

Committee on Armed Services,

Washington, DC, September 4, 2002.

The President,

The White House,

Washington, DC.

Dear Mr. President: Thank you for inviting me to the

briefing this morning. I share your concern about the

continuing threat posed by Saddam Hussein and his efforts to

produce weapons of mass destruction (WMD). I would like to

offer my assistance as the administration considers how to

deal with this threat.

Before Congress can authorize any military action that

might be part of the administration's plan, we must have

answers to more questions than were able to be raised at

today's meeting. Our constitutional duty requires us to

ensure that all implications of such action are considered in

advance. The case has not yet been fully made as to what the

threat is, why military force is an appropriate way of

addressing the threat, and why action must occur now. In

short, Congress and the American people must be clear on your

strategic vision before we can authorize a specific course of

action. I believe, like Clausewitz, that in strategy there is

an ``imperative . . . not to take the first step without

considering the last.''

Your strategy for dealing with Iraq must address the

fundamental questions of the threat, the method of acting,

and the timing. Furthermore, any strategy to eliminate Iraqi

WMD must also address several component issues, each of which

raises critical questions.

1. How to manage Iraq's transition to a stable post-Saddam

regime

As I mentioned to you this morning, this is a crucial

question for administration strategy to answer in advance of

any military action. I have no doubt that our military would

decisively defeat Iraq's forces and remove Saddam. But like

the proverbial dog chasing the car down the road, we must

consider what we would do after we caught it.

As Sun-Tzu said in the classic strategic treatise, The Art

of War, ``To win victory is

easy; to preserve its fruits, difficult.'' Military planners

and political leaders alike new this in World War II.

Planning for the occupation of Germany and Japan--two

economically viable, technologically sophisticated nations--

took place well in advance of the end of the war. The

extreme difficulty of occupying Iraq with its history of

autocratic rule, its balkanized ethnic tensions, and its

isolated economic system argues both for careful

consideration of the benefits and risks of undertaking

military action and for detailed advanced occupation

planning if such military action is approved.

Specifically, your strategy must consider the form of a

replacement regime and take seriously the possibility that

this regime might be rejected by the Iraqi people, leading to

civil unrest and even anarchy. The effort must be to craft a

stable regime that will be geopolitically preferable to

Saddam and will incorporate the disparate interests of all

groups within Iraq--Shi'a, Sunni, and Kurd. We must also plan

now for what to do with members of the Baath party that

continue to support Saddam and with the scientists and

engineers who have expertise born of the Iraqi WMD program.

All these efforts require careful planning and long-term

commitment of manpower and resources. The American people

must be clear about the amount of money and the number of

soldiers that will have to be devoted to this effort for many

years to come.

2. How to ensure the action in Iraq does not undermine

international support for the broader war on terrorism

In planning for military operations in Iraq, we cannot

ignore the lack of international support to date. Pre-emptive

action against Iraq is currently vocally opposed by many of

our allies and friends throughout the world and particularly

in the Middle East.

When we are seen as acting against the concerns of large

numbers of our friends, it calls into question the ``humble''

approach to international relations you espoused during the

presidential campaign. More than that, it has several

potentially damaging long-term consequences. First, it risks

losing the large number of partners needed to prosecute the

global war on terrorism. To ferret terrorists groups out of

their many hiding places, we must have broad allied support.

Second, it risks seriously damaging U.S. moral legitimacy,

potentially providing states like India and Pakistan with a

preemptive option that could drive long-standing conflicts

beyond containable bounds.

Finally and perhaps most dangerously, actions without broad

Arab support may inflame the sources of terrorism, causing

unrest and anger throughout the Muslim world. This dynamic

will be worse if Iraq attacks Israel--perhaps with weapons of

mass destruction--and draws them into the conflict. Iran,

which has the potential to seize a reformist path, may well

move away from the United States in the face of attacks that

could next be taken against them. Together, these dynamics

will make achieving peace in the Middle East more difficult

and may well provide the rationale for more terrorist attacks

against Americans.

These concerns do not make military action in Iraq

untenable. They do, however, highlight the depth and

importance of the issues to be addressed before we strike. We

need to ensure that in taking out Saddam, we don't win the

battle and lose the war.

3. How to ensure that the United States can execute this

operation successfully as well as its other military

missions

As you are well aware, Mr. President, the consideration of

military action against Iraq comes at a time when U.S. forces

are actively engaged throughout the world in a range of

missions. Given the operational pressures these forces

currently face, we must ask what the risks and trade-offs

will be of defeating Iraq, particularly if Iraqi forces mass

in Baghdad for urban operations. How many casualties must the

American people be prepared to take in a worst-case scenario?

What will the impact of sustained operations be on so-called

high-demand, low-density assets? What military operations

might we have to forego because of continued demands in Iraq?

Will we still be prepared for the range of other threats that

might emerge throughout the world? With little allied support

and contributions, will we still be able to maintain military

spending on transformational technologies and on sound

quality of life for our forces if we are bearing a huge

wartime cost alone? What will be the impact on the domestic

economy of these resources drains and of the long-term costs

of reconstructing Iraq? These questions must be answered

before any military action commences so that the American

people understand the risks and the sacrifices involved.

I ask these questions only to highlight the complexity of

the undertaking and the need for Congress, the American

people, and our friends around the world to understand

exactly what is at stake and why we must act now. Only such a

comprehensive strategic approach will ensure that we commit

U.S. troops consciously and with full knowledge of the range

of challenges we face--both in the initial campaign and in

the long aftermath to follow. Even a strategy that has

military action as its centerpiece will require great

diplomatic efforts to ensure its success. I look forward to

hearing the administration's answers and to working with you

to find the best course of action.

Sincerely,

Ike Skelton,

Ranking Democrat.

Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. Speaker, I would have thought it a mere courtesy of saying, Would the gentleman from Missouri like to read this over and add or make recommendations? I would love to have been there in order to support the gentleman from California.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, the resolution we are considering today is deeply flawed. The way it was handled was meant to be divisive, and it has achieved that goal. None of us in this House knows if next January we will have a Kerry administration or a Bush administration, but we do know that whoever is in the White House must ensure the success of U.S. policy in Europe. Success in time of war requires cohesion and unity. We do not need a divisive, partisan resolution. This may be the way to prepare a Republican tax bill, but it is not the way to prepare a foreign policy resolution to win broad bipartisan support.

Mr. Speaker, the conflict in Iraq should not be a partisan issue. The soldiers who are fighting in Iraq are Democrats and Republicans and Independents. The soldiers who are wounded and killed in Iraq are Democrats and Republicans and Independents. The families who grieve for their sons and daughters who died in Iraq are Democrats and Republicans and Independents. The citizens of this country who are paying for this war are Democrats and Republicans and Independents.

Mr. Speaker, it is totally unacceptable that not a single amendment to this resolution was made in order. This was a Republican resolution, drafted with partisan intent by the Republican leadership. Many of us in this House who have been committed to and who have worked for a bipartisan foreign policy for decades know that this is a slap in our face.

A resolution that commends our troops ought to receive the unanimous support of this body, but this resolution has been written specifically to prevent that result.

Mr. Speaker, war is a time for shared sacrifice, a time when we are all united in a common struggle. This is not shared sacrifice. Some Americans are being killed, some are being wounded, some are asked to leave their families and risk their lives far from home; and some at the very top of the income scale are being asked to accept massive tax cuts.

Mr. Speaker, this resolution commends the troops, but it does not acknowledge the supreme sacrifice of many who are fighting. This resolution makes no reference to the more than 550 service men and women who have died in Iraq. It makes no reference to the thousands more who have been wounded. It offers no condolences to the families of those who have been killed. It makes no reference to the sacrifices of the families whose members are away from them serving in Iraq for many months or over a year. It makes no reference to the many civilian and humanitarian workers who risk their lives daily. It makes no reference to the contribution of our allies who have thousands of troops in Iraq, and it makes no mention of the death and casualties they have suffered. And it makes no reference to the Iraqi civilians who have lost their lives and suffered injuries, including dozens who were killed today.

Mr. Speaker, there are other serious omissions in this resolution. We should spend our time today debating substantive legislation to fix these problems. The American people have not sent us here just to be an ``amen'' chorus for this administration. There are serious problems, and we should be debating serious solutions.

There is no mention in this resolution of the flawed intelligence that was the basis of the administration's argument for going to war in the first place. We should be debating the establishment of a truly independent commission to examine the shortcomings of U.S. intelligence and the way it was used.

The members of this commission must not be appointed solely by the President, and the commission should make its findings known before Election Day. Only a truly independent investigation, and an investigation that the American people perceive to be independent, can bridge the credibility

gap in our intelligence both here at home and abroad.

The failure of this Congress to deal with the problems facing our intelligence agencies will ultimately harm our national security, the war against terrorism, and our fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Mr. Speaker, we are commending our troops but we are not taking action that we can and should take to make their lives and to make the lives of their loved ones easier. The sacrifices being made by our National Guard and reservists in Iraq and elsewhere are extraordinary. Many National Guard and Reserve families have suffered serious financial losses because of the pay gap between their military pay when they are called up and their private sector pay. With longer rotations, Guard and Reserve families are facing dramatically increased financial burdens while their loved ones risk their lives far away from home. One of the consequences is a serious problem with reenlistments in the Reserves and the National Guard.

My legislation, H.R. 1345, legislation that I introduced 1 year ago this week, would fill that pay gap. My bill would ensure that government and private sector employees can continue to defend our country without being forced to worry about their families facing financial disaster.

Words of support for our troops ring hollow when substantive legislation to improve their conditions is sandbagged by the leadership on the other side.

Mr. Speaker, I very much regret that this resolution in its present form is brought before the House today. This should be a time for bipartisan unity and cohesion, not a time for partisanship. This should be a time for us to deal substantively with serious problems we face in Iraq and in our foreign policy. This should be a time for us to take serious action to help our service men and women. All of us join in commending our brave men and women of our Armed Forces.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer), our distinguished whip.

Mr. Speaker, before yielding to the gentleman from Florida, let me remind the gentleman from Wisconsin that national unity and cohesion are not matters of parliamentary procedure. They are at the core of uniting the United States and the American people at a time of war.

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Wexler), a distinguished member of the committee.

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Menendez), the distinguished chairman of the Democratic Caucus and an important member of the Committee on International Relations.

(Mr. MENENDEZ asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from New York (Mr. Ackerman), ranking member of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia of the Committee on International Relations.

(Mr. ACKERMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Brown), a distinguished member of the committee.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Sherman), the distinguished ranking member of the Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Human Rights.

(Mr. SHERMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Meeks), a distinguished member of the committee.

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Engel), a

distinguished member of the committee.

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lee), a valued member of our committee.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. Blumenauer), a valued member of our committee.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff), my colleague and a distinguished member of the committee.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/4\ minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Watson), my good friend and distinguished colleague.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/4\ minutes to the gentlewoman from Minnesota (Ms. McCollum), our last speaker.

Mr. Speaker, pursuant to the rule, I designate each of the following three Members to control \1/2\ hour of time allotted to me under the rule: \1/2\ hour for the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton), \1/2\ hour for the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), and \1/2\ hour for the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Murtha).