Recognizing 50 years of relations between the United States Government and the European Union.

Mr. Speaker, the measure before us contains many consentaneous American thoughts: Recognition that Saddam was a despot of tyrannical proportions; support for a process of democratic self- governance in Iraq; and, profoundly, appreciation for the sacrifice and commitment of Americans serving in our armed forces in these very troubling, indeed dangerous, times.

But as widely accepted as these notions are, care must be taken in this debate to underscore what this resolution is not. It cannot be read either as a Gulf of Tonkin-like resolution giving the Executive a blank check for future actions or considered an indication of Congressional approval of executive action to date.

Many in Congress, perhaps a majority, would be willing to vote for a more expansive resolution, but such is not before us today. Nonetheless, the subject matter of this resolution necessitates a review of what has transpired since the Congress, without my support, authorized military intervention in Iraq a year and a half ago.

All of us recognize that Iraq is a judgmental quagmire. Thoughtful Americans are conflicted. The President has a case for the actions he has taken. But I feel obliged to make clear why I continue not to find it compelling and indicate, in as constructive a way as I am able, the problems that a lengthy occupation may yield and present a theoretical framework and the case for timely disengagement.

Perspective is difficult to apply to current events or for that matter life itself. But it is important to attempt to frame the discussion of the war in which we are engaged in relation to our history, to the development of knowledge (particularly science), and to our relations with other countries.

First our history. In the broadest sense the political history of America has encompassed four great debates. The first was the question of whether a country could be established based on the rights of man. The second was about definitions: whether the concept of ``man'' included individuals who were neither male nor pale. It took over a century, a civil war and suffrage and civil rights movements to bring full meaning to the universal language of the Declaration of Independence. With courage and sacrifice Americans finally came together to embrace the democratic notion that consent of the governed lacked legitimacy unless all individuals of all backgrounds had rights of citizenship.

The third debate is about opportunity, whether individual rights can be protected if every citizen doesn't have a fair crack at the American dream. There are many on-going elements of the opportunity debate, which in the 20th century was symbolized by the New Deal initiatives of Franklin Roosevelt and the counter-weight of the Reagan revolution. But I would like to emphasize an aspect of this debate which gets little attention because it is taken for granted, and that is the role of public education. All young Americans not only have access to public education, they are required by law to attend public schools or comparable alternatives. As society becomes more complicated, educational opportunity becomes increasingly central to advancing social opportunity. And as we look at the narrow schooling provided by madrasses abroad it becomes apparent that how and what others teach has relevance to the security of Americans at home.

The fourth debate is symbolized by Hiroshima and Nagasaki and revolves around the question of whether any right can be valid if it is not underpinned by a right to peace.

In these debates the role of foreign policy is critical, and even when we've looked inward it has been with an eye to establishing a shining city-state on a hill, a beacon for all.

The greatest legislated act in American and perhaps human history is the Declaration of Independence. The universality of its principles constitutes the cornerstone of historic American idealism in foreign as well as domestic policy.

As architect of the Declaration, Jefferson--while never a member of Congress--was our greatest legislator. And as the architect of the Louisiana Purchase, he stands as our greatest

diplomat-president. The precept implicit in the Declaration and the Louisiana Purchase is the notion of individual rights and collective decision-making by a people entrusted with the capacity to make sovereign decisions.

Jefferson was the philosophical godson of John Locke, who borrowed from Thomas Hobbes the 17th century paradigm of a state of Nature where, according to Hobbes, life was nasty, brutish and short.

Hobbes had a pessimistic view of human nature. Self-centered man could not escape from the jungle of human relations. Locke, on the other hand, was an optimist. He also assumed that man was self- centered, but, unlike Hobbes, he believed that individuals were rational enough to recognize the necessity of accommodating the self- interest of others. Civil society--the condition where rules would govern disputes and third-party arbitration would exist--was thus possible as well as necessary.

Whether or not the theoretical constructs that political philosophers relied on three centuries ago have relevance to real life on the planet, then or now, the progress of science has made man's efforts to protect the rights of individuals and society more difficult today. In one of the most profound social observations of the 20th century, Einstein noted that splitting the atom changed everything save our mode of thinking.

Physics has brought us nuclear energy and perhaps a way to help live a modern life without reliance on fossil fuels. Biology has brought us the capacity to extend the life of man by several and perhaps many decades. But just as splitting the atom has a dark side--nuclear weapons--splitting genes has ominous implications, too--the ability to manufacture diseases for which there may be no antidote. Hence the obvious: at no time in human history is there a greater obligation for people in public life to appeal to the higher rather than lower angels of our nature.

This is particularly the case as the world has smallened and friction between peoples has increased in economics, politics and, most profoundly, religion.

Perhaps the most thoughtful speech ever given in Iowa was delivered four decades ago by the Oxford historian, Arnold Toynbee. A decade earlier, Winston Churchill chose a small Midwestern college in Fulton, Missouri, to warn of the dangers of Soviet expansionism; an ``Iron Curtain,'' he said, had descended on Eastern Europe. Toynbee picked Grinnell College to chastise Marxists for shallowly looking at history through the lens of economic determinism and Americans for assuming, in part because of the civil rights movement then underway, that the most contentious issues in the world related to race. Toynbee argued that at this stage in history conflict would more likely erupt because of religious differentiations than economic or racial ones. As we look at the Middle East, at Northern Ireland, at the Balkans, at the divisions between Pakistan and India, Toynbee's observation appears to be vindicated.

Expanding on Toynbee, Samuel Huntington of Harvard has propounded a theory of international relations over the past several decades that suggests that the next great wars are less likely to represent battles between countries than clashes between various civilizations.

Given Toynbee's predictions and Huntington's civilization-clash paradigm, it is appropriate to return to Jefferson, who at the public level strove assiduously to protect individual freedom of religion and at the private level believed that what mattered most was not nuanced differences between religions or denominations, but the moral threads common to all creeds. In terms of guides to individual behavior, it is impressive, for instance, that the Ten Commandments underpin Islam as well as Judaism and Christianity. And the Confucian doctrine of ``shu,'' which asserts that moral behavior should be premised on not doing unto others what one would not have done to oneself, is an inverted kind of Golden Rule.

Despite the fact that history is rife with examples where religious differentiations have caused and intensified conflicts, there is no credible substitute for the constructive role of faith-based convictions. Conflict may be envisioned, but it can be constrained if individuals are taught the most esoteric of precepts: loving, or at least not hating, one's neighbor.

Ironically, genocide, which is disproportionately a 20th century phenomenon, is about weapons of lesser lethality: machetes, bullets, poisonous gas.

But if mankind can't prevent killing up close, the question must be pondered whether there can be any optimism that the world can avoid a cataclysmic exchange from afar of weapons of mass destruction, which would make the greatest crime of mankind to date, genocide, the second- to-last crime in human history. It is simply a short stop from genocide--the killing one at a time of millions--to ``global-cide''-- the end in a single stroke of all life on the planet.

In recognition of the 20th century's experience with Holocaust and other brutal genocides, from Cambodia to Rwanda, we have no choice except to change our mode of thinking. Man's instinct to hate must be curbed and social wisdom applied to the new challenges science has thrown at man.

In this context, I want to stress a second challenge of science that has nothing to do with war and arms making but is clearly the largest foreign policy issue of our day. It is the problem of disease. In Iraq more than 500 Americans and perhaps as many as 20,000 Iraqis have been killed in the past year. But over the last two decades 20 million people have died of AIDS and 40 million are infected with HIV. In Africa, Southeast Asia, and Southern Russia, AIDS has hurdled well beyond the groups considered most vulnerable in the U.S. In many countries children are infected through mothers at birth and in several countries a 15-year-old girl is far more likely to have the disease than a 15-year-old boy. We simply must expand resources to stop this disease abroad before it stops our families at home.

Not that everything in the world is dark or unraveling. Promising political breakthroughs are occurring between India and Pakistan; in the civil war in Sri Lanka; in Libya, where Muammar Khaddafi may be giving up a quest for nuclear weapons; and even with North Korea, as six-party talks unfold. Several of these bits of good international news are developing without a central U.S. role; several will require our leadership. My only advice to the Executive is to meet every positive step of others with at least two steps of our own. Progressive change from suspect leaders cannot be sustained if peoples of various societies are not convinced that America prefers extending carrots to applying bullying tactics. We simply can't wait for tomorrow to respond to good omens today. This is especially true of a country like Libya where backsliding is so easy. It may be more difficult with the hermit country--North Korea--simply because paranoia and anti-Americanism run so irrationally deep in the people as well as the government. But constructive steps, especially of a humanitarian dimension, can be taken.

Iowa also has brought some good news to the world. In January I attended the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, and a Conference on the Prevention of Genocide in Stockholm, Sweden. In conversations with Europeans the depth of anti-American sentiment becomes quickly evident. But when asked what state I represent, I was impressed with the sincerity of the positive responses when I indicated I was from Iowa. Everyone knew of Iowa because of the caucuses. In Iowa the caucus process seems a bit mysterious. In other states it is very mysterious, and in Europe it is a full blown mystery. But people in Europe were deeply impressed that individuals seeking the most important political position in the world had to come to the homes and schools and offices of private citizens who, with real care, reviewed their credentials and platforms.

For many years I have had reservations about the caucus system because the ballot is not secret and because participation is not as large as in a traditional primary. But I feel obligated to reconsider and, as a Republican, must tip my hat to the Iowa Democrats for the thoughtfulness with which they advanced American democracy and spotlighted our values for the world. Abroad, people followed but did not necessarily identify with the individual candidates, but everyone was impressed with the process and the care with which citizens carried out their duties.

It is instructive to put the current tension in transatlantic relations in historical perspective. With regard to the profoundest issue--war and peace--attitudes on each side of the ocean have come full circle over the five centuries of interaction.

The U.S. was founded by immigrants seeking refuge from religious persecution and a spate of seemingly senseless wars among European countries and principalities. The new Americans sought to distance themselves from the violence and religious intolerance of the Continent. It was with the greatest reluctance that in 1917 a pioneer country, which had been convulsed with the magnitude of a westward moving Manifest Destiny, determined that blocking a Kaiser's ambitions called for intervention in European affairs.

In the wake of a war trumpeted to end all wars, America retreated into political isolation in the 1920's. After inspiring its creation, we refused to join the League of Nations; and after expanding trade in industrial and agricultural products, we succumbed to economic protectionism in the 1930's. Only a direct attack on our territory caused us to enter World War II.

Today, it is Europe which is looking inward, pre-occupied with its manifest destiny, political integration made feasible by a growing economic union. Increasingly secular Europeans desire to separate themselves from an America that appears to them to be too unilateralist and quick to go to war, too fundamentalist and

thus blind to tolerance, and too simplistic to realize that conflicts with religious overtones are the most traumatic to manage.

When speaking to constituents of the rationale for and against the Iraq War, I have over the past couple of years referenced a set of books that held particular currency in the 1960's: the Alexandria Quartet by Lawrence Durrell. Each of the four books describes the same set of events in inter-war Egypt from the perspective of a different character. While the events are the same, the stories that unfold are profoundly different, causing the reader to recognize that one person's perspective is at best a snapshot of reality. A clear picture cannot be pieced together without looking through the lens of a multiplicity of eyes and experiences.

The Moslem experience gives substantially less weight than the Western experience to the two cataclysmic wars of the 20th century. Despite Lawrence's involvement in Arabia and the battles between Allied forces and Rommel's tanks, the engagements in the Middle East and North Africa were skirmishes compared with the struggles in Europe and the Far East. Not only do Moslems see the 20th century differently from Westerners, but Europeans and Americans have drawn different strategic parallels in the application of common experience to current challenges in the Middle East.

In the immediate aftermath of the First World War, historians and political strategists in Europe rightly concluded that the European alliance system had been too rigid and the assassination of a relatively minor figure, an archduke, should not have precipitated a war of such devastating consequences. Hence European leaders in the 1930's falsely concluded that historical wisdom necessitated initial accommodation with Hitler's adventurism. Too little flexibility caused one war; too little spine led to Munich. In the current context, President Bush sees himself as Churchill rather than Chamberlain, but Europeans see 9/11 as more analogous to the shots fired at Archduke Ferdinand than as a cause for a doctrine of preemption or war with Iraq, a war that could too easily spring into a clash of civilizations. Second guessing is always conjectural because history gives few second chances. Unlike football, downs aren't repeated.

Accordingly, the challenge today on both sides of the Atlantic is to put debate about going to war behind and work together to figure out how we proceed from here. A lot of polite observations have been made that European leaders seem less angry about American decisions related to Iraq this year compared to the differences expressed during the pre- war buildup. This may appear that way on the surface, but my sense is that European judgment, if anything, is more solidified and definitive today. Europeans may have become resigned that events have unfolded without their concurrence. By the same token, frustration that their advice has been discounted has caused anti-American anger to metastasize into anti-American smugness. Europeans believe that their skepticism has been vindicated by events. The stark good-versus-evil clarity that Washington policy makers seek appears to Europeans to be un-nuanced, unsophisticated, and unappreciative of differing judgments.

Americans countenance criticism of our President and his policies by fellow Americans, but we are not so tolerant of foreign dissent. The assumption in Washington is that Continental leaders deliberately sought to undercut U.S. leadership in the world community and that, in particular, the refusal of the French and Germans to support the President's position in the Security Council and NATO has made matters more dangerous for our troops and reconciliation more difficult in the current post-war setting.

On our side of the Atlantic, the sense exists that French and German political judgment has not only been at variance with American ideas but that a concerted effort was made on the Continent to triangulate the terrorist challenge and take advantage of America's dilemma. By distancing themselves from Washington, Paris and Bonn are seen to be encouraging the re-direction of Moslem discord. Whereas the rhetoric of Osama Bin Laden and other extremists was initially anti-Western, it is now more exclusively anti-U.S. The opportunity to transplant America's commercial as well as political position in parts of the world consumed with anti-Americanism appears not to have been lost on the European political-industrial elite.

With all of the attention given to the new transatlantic tensions, the implications of the Iraq war on Russia have received short shrift. But the new European antagonism to America has not gone unnoticed in Moscow. The cleavage between Washington and Europe and the preoccupation of America with the Middle East clearly give Putin a freer hand to advance a less democratic and more nationalistic set of policies at home. This is one reason why it is so important that America and NATO demonstrate then can work together in such areas as Afghanistan, where strategic common ground exists.

Likewise, the priority we have given to Iraq as well as North Korea, two charter members of the so-called ``Axis of Evil,'' means that we have been implicitly forced to subordinate trade and human rights issues with China. China's support, or at least not opposition, in international strategic affairs, has become so central to Administration policy makers that Beijing has been able to downgrade U.S. concerns about the historic shifts taking place in trade terms. A Chinese trade surplus with the U.S. that now exceeds $10 billion a month and an undervalued currency pegged to the dollar that makes flexible trade adjustments impossible are simply not being given the attention they deserve.

Economics and politics have seldom been more intertwined. Yet underappreciated is the prospect that a protectionist backlash of 1930's dimensions could develop if our political policies fail and our government loses respect in the world. Analogously, a political backlash could sweep the country if Washington doesn't develop institutional reforms to protect the political system from vulnerabilities to single-issue and special-interest constituencies. At a time when our foreign policy appears too attentive to ideological forces and too prone to rely on proxy empowered corporations to advance the national interest, Congress has an obligation to aggressively provide oversight of the contracting as well as intelligence judgments advanced by the Executive. Just as committees to review a new intelligence inadequacies are in order, so is a new committee to oversee government contracting related to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The professionalism and integrity of government decision- making about issues of war and peace must be above reproach. The country can afford neither ideological posturing nor war profiteering.

As for the dilemma of the moment, policy makers have been caught philosophically short. As mistaken as the overestimation of Saddam's WMD capacities was, the greater judgmental error may relate to the political pressure applied to the intelligence community on the issue of Iraqi complicity in the plane strikes on 9/11. Initially, the CIA straightforwardly noted that there was no credible evidence of Iraqi involvement. Then, under obvious pressure, it changed its stance and in presentation after presentation to Congress ominously suggested they had an ``evolving'' view of the role of Iraq, despite, to date, producing nothing of a definitive nature to show why the community changed its initial representation. Hence, the decision to go to war was against the backdrop of public opinion polls showing 60 percent of the American people believed significant Iraqi involvement existed in the 9/11 attack.

Compounding this lack of forthrightness, where the intelligence community knew the situation but refused publicly to differ with the political decision makers, was a judgment showing doubtful understanding of Moslem attitudes. The notion that American forces would be welcomed in Iraq as a liberating force with the well- intentioned option to reshape over time Iraqi political institutions was a mistake of profound proportions. Now, given the anarchy that has mushroomed in the country, Washington is swept by occupation analogies of World War II. Japan and Germany, it is noted, were occupied for more than five years after hostilities ceased. Hence, many are suggesting, we must be prepared to stay at least this long in Iraq.

I have seldom been more apprehensive about an historical analogy. Japan and Germany were the instigators of war; their citizens understood this. Iraqis don't see it this way. They see the U.S. as the aggressor. Images form Al-Jazeera portray a country under siege. In the Moslem world Iraq looks more like a police-cordoned West Bank than a great and ancient society on the move to a better life. Outsiders are viewed as unwanted intruders acting out of great power self-interest, unrespectful of the culture and values of the country being occupied. The irony that it is Shi'a clerics, not American statesmen, who are pushing for democratic elections at this time is not lost on the Iraqis or the Moslem world.

More profoundly, I am amazed that pundits haven't caught on to the possibility that the only thing worse than being wrong in our intelligence assessments of Iraqi WMD would have been if we had been right and thereby taken the risk of precipitating a retaliatory BW attack against Israel or possibly an American city. Biological weapons in the control of petty potentates is mad science in the hands of mad men. To go to war against a country with BW weapons, especially if the initiator has no knowledge where they are, is to hazard more than a clash of civilizations; it is to instigate a potential challenge to the maintenance of civilization itself.

In any regard, if a WMD rationale for intervention can't be established, we must not allow the democracy case to founder. To authorize an additional $80 billion for Iraq and

not be able to find the means to conduct timely elections is preposterous.

Legitimacy is critical for all countries. There may be times and circumstances in which the U.S. national interest requires action without a U.N. sanction. But the U.N. is ignored at great risk, especially when the international community is at odds with a nation state's policies. The U.N.'s help, for instance, could be significant at this point in facilitating elections and helping legitimize new governing structures. If a commitment to a time frame for democratic elections isn't soon forthcoming, the Administration may see an escalation of violence in Iraq led by the Shi'a in the South, thus adding to the traumas precipitated by Saddam's old henchmen and foreign trouble makers in the Sunni triangle to the north, where disorder is so prevalent today.

The judgment call Washington must make is whether to employ something closer to a ``get in/get out'' strategy or one of prolonged occupation. Each approach caries risk, with the likelihood of a certain amount of disorder developing whenever the American presence is reduced. Whether that disorder becomes less deep with time or whether time allows anarchist forces to organize more vigorously and lay claim to a legitimizing nationalist mantle is conjectural.

In the realm of policy timing can often be as important as substance. Just as Senator Dirksen once noted that a billion dollars here and a billion dollars there and pretty soon you're talking about real money, in foreign affairs a week here and a week there can soon add up to a policy dilemma.

The difficulty of timing was underscored this week when some in Washington charged the newly elected Spanish Government with ``appeasement'' for its announced intention to withdraw its forces from Iraq in the wake of last week's bombings in Madrid unless the U.N. role in Iraq is broadened. The language of appeasement may appropriately describe the lack of resolve of Western leaders when they refused to stand up to Hitler's growing power in the 1930s, but it may not be as fair to apply such a term to Spanish policy today. Indeed, doing so may carry irresponsible implications because fear of its connotations may make disengagement more difficult if the country or forces of an occupying power are ever under attack. For instance, if ``appeasement'' is considered the dominant potential issue, U.S. policy makers relinquish their sovereign discretion and instead could give terrorists the determinative say when we will disengage from Iraq. A few radicals could with relative ease launch a steady dose of terrorist attacks on our civilian and armed services personnel and ``force'' us to stay or then be in a position to argue when we eventually leave that they forced us out. That is why it is so critical that we lay out a basis for withdrawal that has nothing to do with the terrorist behavior of Iraqi radicals and everything to do with the establishment of a freely elected leadership.

On the issue of the timing of the hand-over of civil authority I give less judgmental weight in the Iraqi circumstance to historical analogies to the post-war occupation of Japan and Germany and more to a personal anecdote about the manner the Vietnam war came to be concluded. Early in my career in Congress, I was invited to the Library of Congress to join a small group of historians to listen to a lecture by Henry Kissinger about the negotiations that led to the end of that war. The night before the lecture, I perused one of Secretary Kissinger's autobiographic tomes and came across a paragraph that so startled me that I asked him about it in the seminar that followed the lecture. Kissinger wrote that in December 1968, shortly after Richard Nixon had asked him to be his National Security Council director, he met with the President-elect to discuss the direction of the new administration's foreign policy. They determined together, he noted, that their policy would be to get out of Vietnam. So I asked him why they didn't just proceed to do that. Kissinger looked at me for a moment and then uttered words I will never forget. ``Young man,'' he said, ``we meant with honor.'' I then asked him if ``honor'' required escalation. ``Absolutely,'' he responded.

In governance, judgment to be good must be timely. The course of history and attitudes toward America would be very different today if the Nixon administration had acted forthrightly on its own judgment. In Iraq, where we are fast becoming a magnet of instability rather than a force of stability, we must not hesitate. If the issue is democracy, let's hold elections with dispatch and use the democratic transition as the rationalization for deep troop reductions.

If we maintain a heavy presence much longer our president could find himself in a dilemma of the kind Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon came to know too well. There are circumstances in life where the small can humble the powerful. This has the makings of one. Despite the overwhelming nature of our military victory and the courageous commitment and sacrifice of our armed forces, policies can fail if the timing of disengagement is wrong.

This is why clarity of purpose and flexibility of response are so crucial. And why the neo-con mantra--``we must see this through''-- deserves review. Hasty withdrawal is problemsome; orderly, philosophically cogent decisions to wind down the military dimension of our presence in Iraq should, however, be our highest national interest priority. Democratic elections are the key. They can be held in relatively short order (at least by year's end; preferably earlier) if there is a will and commitment to do so. But the longer we heed the advice of those who want to hold onto power in Iraq, the harder it will be to avert increased terrorism here and abroad.

Here I would like to return to what in most contexts must be considered a rather esoteric paradigm: the Hobbesian notion of a state of nature. Terrorism is a military or, more precisely, militant tool of anarchy. It is the desire of terrorists to make Iraqi society a social jungle, a state of nature where anarchy rather than law rules. Legitimacy of government in this setting can perhaps be precipitated but it cannot be imposed from the outside. Outside pressure is less convincing when it appears to be presented by a singular authority-- i.e., the United States. One of the reasons so many countries prefer a strong U.N. role is that such a role not only provides greater legitimization of intervention but greater legitimization of processes leading to a new government. U.S. slighting of the U.N. undercuts governmental legitimizing efforts and causes the entirety of the Moslem world to become more antagonistic to our country.

For our part, we have gotten caught in a web of events we can influence but not control. In the end, legitimacy of any new government in Iraq will depend on consent of the governed. The only wise U.S. policy is to steamroll ahead with a constitutional framework of democratic elections with a pre-announced strategy of large-scale troop withdrawals commencing somewhat before or just after elections are held.

In conclusion, let me suggest a corollary to Lord Acton's maxim that power corrupts and absolute power tends to corrupt absolutely. The Leach corollary is that military power tempts and excessive power tends to tempt excessively. America's enormous military strength is critical at this stage in history. But while we are obligated to recognize that its maintenance is imperative, we must also realize that its utilization may not fit, and may indeed be counter-productive, in certain strategic settings. We have to use more than just our own eyes and rely on more that just our own expertise if in turbulent times we are to manage prudently the affairs of state.

Analogies between all wars exist, but comparisons between Iraq and Vietnam are frail. What must be understood is not that Iraq could be as bad as Vietnam; rather, that it could be far worse. Vietnam, after all, involved no WMD issues; and while the North was predominantly Buddhist and the South Catholic, there were no implications of a world-wide religious struggle; nor of a conflict that might last many decades, if not centuries. The issue at the time was Communism and fear that if Vietnam fell, neighboring governments would topple like dominoes. In retrospect, the real domino lesson of Vietnam was about political decision-making. Once the patriotic flag was raised, stands taken, words uttered, one doubtful decision precipitated another, and the pride of politicians did not allow a change of course until the people demanded common sense reconsideration.

In this context, there is an aspect of this resolution that deserves reflective review. It is true, as the resolution asserts, that Iraq and the world are better off without Saddam Hussein ensconced in power. But it is not necessarily true that our country and the world are safer if the overthrow of one thug leads to the creation of millions of rebels with a cause.

It would be a mistake of historical proportions if respectful relations not only between America and the Moslem world but between America and its traditional allies were to rupture. We are obligated to see that they don't.

Mr. Speaker, I believe that when the political smoke of this great debate today clears, that this bill is going to pass with a very substantial vote. I think it is going to be passed with a substantial vote because every one of us in this Chamber wants to keep the commitment that we made several years ago after September 11, that we are going to support our troops when they are in the field, when they are at risk, when they are in harm's way.

This is just another statement, as the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Murtha) has repeatedly said today, we have spent a lot of money of American taxpayer dollars to fund the operation, and we want to make sure that our troops understand that we believe they are doing a good job, and they are. We want to let them know that they are not in harm's way in vain.

So I think the bill is going to pass with a nice vote. But do my colleagues know something? I had a chance to be the sponsor of the bill that appropriated $40 billion on September 14 of 2001. I had the privilege of being the sponsor of the supplemental that the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Murtha) talked about, that was sizable, to pay for our troops in the field and what they needed by way of equipment. But do my colleagues know something? Besides being a player to that extent, I am not offended that I was not asked to write this bill. I am very satisfied that the gentleman from Illinois (Chairman Hyde) and his committee wrote a very good bill. I am not offended that I was not asked to be the sponsor. The gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde) is the ideal sponsor, and those who did sponsor this bill.

So I think once the political smoke clears, this House is going to stand up and is going to be counted and to tell our troops in the field and to tell our troops who are recuperating in hospitals that we support what they are doing, we believe in what they are doing, and that we are here to do whatever has to be done to protect our country and our countrymen from terrorist attacks and to provide support for those who provide that kind of security for us.

I have a lot of other things I would like to say, but time is limited. So, Mr. Speaker, I will insert the balance of my statement into the Record at this point.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of House Resolution 557, which honors the valor, courage, and professionalism with which our American forces, and those of our coalition partners, have served in liberating the people of Iraq.

We consider this resolution today on the first anniversary of the initiation of military operations in Iraq. However, the difficult decisions by Congress to authorize the use of force in Iraq and the President's ultimate directive to send troops into Iraq were the culmination of more than 13 years of violence and terrorism directed at the United States and our allies throughout the world.

Saddam Hussein's movement of troops into Kuwait in 1990 threatened the freedom and security of the people of that nation who remain one of our country's staunchest allies. We responded as a Nation and in partnership with the free nations of the world in Operation Desert Storm to throw Saddam's forces out of Kuwait. Subsequently, through a series of United Nation's resolutions, we sought to monitor Saddam's activities to prevent him from again threatening the sovereignty of another ally.

Since then, as this resolution points out, Saddam Hussein and his regime have committed repeated heinous crimes against humanity, including the murder, torture, rape, and amputation of his own people. This is the regime that unleashed weapons of mass destruction against the Kurdish people, killing nearly 5,000. We have found more than 270 mass graves sites in Iraq, with the remains of more than 400,000 people. Saddam Hussein poisoned the water supply of his enemies, he even punished the Marsh Arabs by draining their marshlands, which created hundreds of thousands of refugees and created an ecological catastrophe.

This Congress responded in 1998 by adopting the Iraq Liberation Act, which made it U.S.

policy to support efforts to remove Saddam Hussein and his regime from power. President Clinton, however, after signing this act into law never followed through.

Four years later, after little or no U.S. action to rid Iraq of Saddam Hussein, the United Nation Security Council approved Resolution 1441 declaring that Iraq ``has been and remains in material breach of its obligations'' under previously adopted Security Council resolutions.

Clearly, the United States and President Bush did not start this war, just as we did not start the global war on terrorism. We responded to a series of attacks against the American people and our allies throughout the world.

Recall that on February 26, 1993, six lives were lost in the first bombing of the World Trade Center. Our response at the time was a series of harsh words and empty rhetoric.

Three years later, on June 25, 1996, 19 U.S. service members lost their lives in the bombing of Khobar Towers, outside a U.S. air base in Saudi Arabia. The response again was harsh words, empty rhetoric, and promises of a thorough investigation.

Two years after that, 259 died, including 11 Americans, in the bombing of U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The response again was more harsh words and a cruise missile attack on a pharmaceutical factory in Sudan.

Finally, feeling empowered by the continuing lack of a credible U.S. response to past attacks, terrorists bombed the USS Cole while anchored off Yemen, killing 17 U.S. sailors, and injuring countless others. The U.S. response again was harsh words of outrage and the promise of a full investigation.

The year 2001 arrived with a new President and a new set of world challenges. However, just nine months into the Bush Administration, the world changed forever on September 11, 2001. A hijacked airliner crashes into the Pentagon killing 189. Two hijacked planes crash into the World Trade Center, killing 2,801. And a hijacked plane crashes in rural Pennsylvania, killing 44.

This time it was a different President with a different response. President Bush announced that in response to these terrorist attacks on our nation and our people we will respond by seeking out those who were responsible and hold them accountable. We will respond by identifying terrorist organizations and eliminate them at their roots.

Mr. Speaker, the terrorist attacks of September 11th were a direct assault on our nation's freedom, and a test of our will to defend it. The nations of the free world wondered if we would meet the challenge, if this time our promises to strike back against the terrorists would be followed by decisive action.

Just three days after September 11th, my Committee on Appropriations and this Congress stepped forward to approve a $40 billion emergency supplemental appropriations bill to fund recovery efforts in New York City and at the Pentagon, and to take military action against the perpetrators of those despicable attacks. That was the first concrete signal to the world that this time, we as a nation were serious in backing up the words of our President. Since that day Congress and the America people have shown time and again that no matter how long it takes or where it may lead, our commitment to win this war on terrorism is unshakeable.

President Bush sent U.S. troops to Afghanistan to destroy and disrupt al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden's operations. Our forces routed the Taliban, killed many terrorists, and eliminated al-Qaeda main base of operations. They also liberated millions of men, women, and children from a cruel regime, and gave them a chance to choose their own government and enjoy the benefits of freedom. But our victory against the Taliban was not the end of the war on terrorism.

When the United Nations determined that Saddam Hussein was not living up to the Security Council resolutions, President Bush acted decisively in sending troops to Iraq.

This resolution recognizes the remarkable swiftness and precision with which our troops advanced across Iraq to remove from power the Hussein regime. The effectiveness of our Armed Forces caught the enemy by surprise. Even after the end of major combat operations in Iraq our troops have continued their mission to stabilize and rebuild that country. They have captured 45 of the 55 most wanted Iraqis, including Saddam himself, ensuring that he will never return to power. With the cooperation of Iraqi security forces, our troops have captured and killed hundreds of terrorists who sought to restore the dictator to power. The world has also seen the humanity and generosity of America, as our troops, using funds appropriated by this Congress, help restore water and electricity, provide basic health services, and bring children back to school, free from intimidation and indoctrination.

There are those in this debate today who have said that we started the war against terrorists in Afghanistan and Iraq. The truth of the matter is that the war started in 1993 with the first bombing of the World Trade Center, which was greeted with such a tepid response. Thank God that on September 11, 2001 George Bush was President and he decided that there was enough of this one-sided war against Americans and our allies. There was enough of us being on the receiving end of cowardly acts of terrorism, with the bad guys getting away with it. So yes, we did engage in combat finally to fulfill our obligation to protect our country and our people whether in their workplace, in their homes, or in their schools.

Having spent considerable time with our troops here at home and abroad, including those who have been injured in the line of duty, I can tell you that they support President Bush and their mission. These kids; and I say kids because many who are on the front lines are 18, 19, and 20 years old; are true patriots. Those who are injured are determined to get well so they can get back to the fight to finish the job they have begun. They all share a strong belief that what we are doing is right, not just for the people of Iraq, but it is right for the freedom loving people of the world.

The battle of Iraq was another critical advance in the War on Terrorism. Today we are establishing a Muslim democracy at the heart of the Middle East. Representatives from all three of Iraqi's major ethnic groups came together on march 8 to sign an interim constitution. Iraq now has an independent judiciary and will have free elections later this year. Because of the leadership of our President, the courage and determination of our troops,and the strong commitment the members of this body made to the rebuilding of Iraq, that nation is making strong progress towards freedom and prosperity.

As many of you know, my wife Beverly and I spend many hours visiting wounded soldiers and Marines at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center and the National Naval Medical Center in Bethesda, Maryland. In addition to comforting them and helping give them strength for their recovery, I always take the time to remind them that the American people are grateful for their service and their sacrifice, and proud of their achievements. Mr. Speaker, this resolution gives Members of this body the opportunity to remind all of our men and women in uniform that we are thankful for their service, and proud of their victory in Iraq.

Mr. Speaker, it was President Franklin Delano Roosevelt who in this very Chamber talked about the ``four essential human freedoms.'' He said that they are, ``The freedom of speech--everywhere in the world. The freedom of every person to worship God in his or her own way-- everywhere in the world. The freedom from want--everywhere in the world. The freedom from fear--anywhere in the world.''

President Bush has led the world-wide effort to ensure the freedom from fear, anywhere in the world, whether it be the United States, Iraq, Afghanistan, or Spain. And he has called upon the world's most powerful and best trained soldiers of peace to carry out that mission, which they have done with valor, with courage, with pride, with devotion, and with unmatched professionalism.

Mr. Speaker, with the adoption of this resolution today, we can reiterate our support for their mission which is to ensure a world where people can truly live free from fear.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H. Res. 557 and claim the time set aside for us under the rule, and I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, our President, having exhausted all other options, made the decision to take action against Saddam Hussein and the threat posed by his evil tyranny. During that course, the debate about that, this House was presented with an overwhelming body of evidence detailing the brutal inhumanity of Saddam Hussein and his regime, the suffering of the Iraqi people under his repressive dictatorship, the threat that Saddam presented to his neighbors and to the world, and indeed the piles of bodies in neighboring countries he left behind. Today, now that Saddam has been removed from power and the mass graves, the secret laboratories, the vast military stockpiles, missile capacities that he had, have all been exposed to the world, the world is a safer place. Certainly the Iraqi people, all Iraqi people, have a new hope for a better future today than they did just a year ago. Just a year ago. What a remarkable accomplishment by our troops and the coalition.

Yet we continue to hear claims from some that the liberation of Iraq, no matter how worthy the result, no matter how necessary to improving U.S. national security, was somehow a flawed endeavor. Yes, it was hard, but they claim it was a flawed endeavor because the intelligence that the United States had prior to the war was not perfect.

Some apparently feel that either the Intelligence Community was pressured by the administration into stating that Iraq was a threat or the Intelligence Community did not really believe Iraq was a threat but the administration misused the intelligence provided to it. The truth is neither of those are correct. But that has not deterred some conspiratorially critics from contorting themselves, trying to make both arguments simultaneously.

Looking back about a year and a half ago, while the Intelligence Community was focused heavily on Iraq, the President stated that Saddam was ``a grave and growing threat.'' And he was right. Today we have the benefit of hindsight, of a presence on the ground in Iraq, and of the thousands of hours of studying all there is to study on the prewar intelligence picture of Iraq, and we have barely begun to get that job finished.

Taking advantage of all these benefits, I would like to share my assessment so far, and I would note that the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House, and I know of the Senate also, is underway in coming forward with a formal review of all this, which I hope we will be able to share with our colleagues before too long. That is our plan.

The intelligence picture of Iraq, of the threat Iraq posed to its neighbors and to the United States, including the assessment of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, was entirely consistent over a period of almost a decade. The assessment is consistent in the finished intelligence and the daily current intelligence pieces from the mid- 1990s onward. It is consistent in the classified records that have been provided to the House Permanent Select Committee on

Intelligence over the past year. So I have to conclude on that basis alone, if the intelligence adjustments regarding Iraq were the result of political pressure or manipulation, any such machinations must have occurred in the middle of the 1990s. But I do not believe that that is the case. Therefore, if the intelligence picture is unchanging, was there a change in the substance or tone used by this administration to describe that threat? We do not need to go to the Intelligence Community or to any classified records to answer that question. We just need to compare public statements that have been made, and they are available to the world.

In 2003 President Bush said this: ``Today, the gravest danger in the war on terror, the gravest danger facing America and the world, is outlaw regimes that seek and possess nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. These regimes could use such weapons for blackmail, terror, and mass murder. They could give or sell those weapons to terrorist allies who would use them without the least hesitation.''

In 1998 then President Bill Clinton said: ``In the next century,'' which is now, ``the community of nations may see more and more the very kind of threat Iraq poses now, a rogue state with weapons of mass destruction, ready to use them or provide them to terrorists . . . who traveled the world . . . if we fail to respond today, Saddam . . . will be emboldened tomorrow by the knowledge that they can act with impunity.''

And again in 1998, then President Bill Clinton said: ``There should be no doubt, Saddam's ability to produce and deliver weapons of mass destruction poses a grave threat to the peace of that region and the security of the world . . . His regime threatens the safety of his people, the stability of his region and the security of all the rest of us.'' President Clinton, 1998.

Fast forward, 2003, President Bush: ``Some have said we must not act until the threat is imminent. Since when have terrorists and tyrants announced their intentions, politely putting us on notice before they strike . . . Trusting in the sanity and restraint of Saddam Hussein is not a strategy, and it is not an option.''

Actually, there is not a lot of difference in the leadership that was taking place in this country on the question of the threat that Saddam Hussein and his regime and weapons of mass destruction that might be at his disposal were to the rest of us. It is pretty clear that that was a consistent view.

So, were the intelligence assessments perfect? No. In fact, comparing the intelligence assessment to what has been found in Iraq today, it is clear there were insufficiencies in our intelligence capabilities and they are of concern to us, and on a bipartisan basis we are looking into that. What was the cause of these insufficiencies? Perhaps Iraq, under Saddam, was a difficult target. It was sort of a denied area. There was a ruthless security apparatus there that made information gathering inside the country extremely difficult, very dangerous. We also know that Iraq instituted a truly massive denial and deception program designed to mislead anyone attempting to learn about Saddam's weapons of mass destruction and related programs. Virtually everybody who tried found out that he was involved in denial and deception. So these factors made intelligence collection a little difficult, but it is the tough job that intelligence is there for.

So, what else? I found that cuts in intelligence resources, personnel, and political support in the mid-1990s made many aspects of the intelligence mission in Iraq even more impossible than what we are up against.

Where were these cuts most severe? In the case of Iraq, it turns out it was the decline in our intelligence capabilities that hurt the most. Human intelligence is where we get more than pictures, more than fragments. We get insight into the plans and intentions of our target. What is going on in the minds of the troublemakers? And without good human intelligence, HUMINT, as we call it, it is very difficult indeed to get an accurate picture of what an adversary is up to.

Yet from 1991 to 1998, a time of cutbacks for military and intelligence resources across the board, our human intelligence capabilities suffered dramatically. The number of officers collecting information shrank by about a quarter; the number of operating locations overseas dropped by about a third; reporting sources declined by almost 40 percent; and the number of intelligence reports produced were cut in half or thereabouts.

So we add on top of that the politically correct ``nice spies'' guidelines that were posed in 1995, the risk aversion problem, and we begin to see why information in Iraq was so hard to come by. Good information about plans and intentions, the eyes and ears, just were not sufficient.

So despite these severe limitations, I think the scorecard shows that the United States Intelligence Community provided the best assessment it could. And referring Members to the Director of Central Intelligence's recent speech at Georgetown, the assessments were not as far wrong as some critics of the war would have us believe.

In the final analysis, I think it is important that we get it right. Saddam was a threat. The United Nations believed he was a threat. The vast majority of the Western nations, even those outside of the U.S.- led coalition, believed he was a threat. The U.S. Intelligence Community assessed consistently that Saddam was a threat. The previous administration told the American people that Saddam was a threat. And it has been the official policy of the United States to seek regime change in Iraq since 1998 across two administrations. The difference between 1998 and 2003 is that President Bush took the bold action necessary to address a grave threat where others before him did not. The world is a safer place for it.

Freedom is not free. The purpose of this resolution is to recognize the hardships that the men and women who are doing the dangerous, risky work of protecting our freedoms, the people in our military services, the people in the coalition, the people who are taking risks. After a year, we are here to say, you are doing great work, keep it up, we are so grateful.

We are also including some applause for the people of Iraq who have gone through miserable times and now have some hope, and they have completed the remarkable achievement of a temporary constitution already. This is the sign of a spirited people who are looking for a better life.

This resolution simply says that and commends that. I believe we can all agree that these are the times that we can get together and say, well done, more to do, let us get on with it.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra), and chairman of one of our critical subcommittees.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Nevada (Mr. Gibbons), a member of our committee and the chairman of a subcommittee as well.

(Mr. GIBBONS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Illinois (Mr. LaHood), who is also a subcommittee chairman of the committee.

(Mr. LaHOOD asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter), the vice chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

(Mr. BEREUTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Cunningham), a member of the committee.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\3/4\ minutes to the gentleman from New Hampshire (Mr. Bass), a former member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the remaining 45 seconds.

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to have the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) working as the ranking member on our committee to improve our Intelligence Community and to build support for the Intelligence Community in this House. It is important that we deal with a subject like this on a bipartisan basis. I know the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) is anxious and sincere in her call for action. I am too.

I believe we did have a call for action after 9/11, and I think that call for action has led us to go forth as the United States of America and to try to do the right thing on the war on terror. And I think from time to time as we go through that war, it is fine for us to say to the troops, well done, God bless you, and it is time to say to people involved in places like Iraq, we know it is tough, thanks for hanging in there, you have a better future ahead.

That is what this is about. I thank all Members for having that kind of understanding and looking ahead. We have a lot to do; we have got to get along and get it done.

Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 561, I call up the resolution (H. Res. 557) relating to the liberation of the Iraqi people and the valiant service of the United States Armed Forces and Coalition forces, and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks and to include extraneous material on the resolution under consideration.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, this is an important moment in our history. We are in the middle of a war the like of which has not been seen in recorded history. Everybody is a combatant, and the enemy works by night and works through cowardice. We do not see them. It is not like when Hitler marched through Europe with the blitzkrieg, where you could see the enemy. The enemy extends from New York City to Madrid to Indonesia. And if ever there was a time for this country, the United States of America, to be unified, as the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Murtha) said earlier, it is now.

Now, there are two aspects to this issue that we have here today. One is the procedure by which we got here, and that is controversial and has evoked some harsh words. And the other aspect, the one that I choose to dwell on, is the substance of the resolution.

The resolution, it seems to me, is simple, straightforward and one that everybody can support. It does four things. It congratulates the Iraqi people on withstanding the torture, the brutality, and the oppression that Saddam Hussein has visited on that country for so long.

It affirms that the United States and the world has been made safer with the removal of Saddam Hussein and his regime. And I understand there are some who doubt that and wish to contest that. I would suggest to them that they look at Libya and they consider that Libya has given up its pretenses to have weapons of mass destruction, its capacity to develop nuclear weapons, and is rejoining the community of nations without a shot being fired. And anyone who doubts that that is not a direct result of our intervention in Iraq, seems to me, is not a very good logician nor a student of history.

The other two things the resolution does is commend the Iraqi people on the adoption of an interim constitution. This, Mr. Speaker, is a miracle. You have Sunnis, you have Shiites, you have Kurds who have been at each other's throats for a long, long time. You have them coming together in a period of 9 weeks reaching a constitutional document. Not perfect, but a giant leap forward from where they were. This is an immense contribution towards democratizing the volatile Middle East, and they deserve recognition.

And, of course, this resolution commends the United States Armed Forces and the Coalition for their valor and their courage in the war in the Middle East.

Now, those things, it seems to me, everybody can support. And regardless of our disagreements on process, regardless of our concerns about how we got here, I would ask, in the spirit of, dare I say, patriotism, sticking up for our country, never mind our ruffled feelings, justified or not, let us stand as one with our military people who are fighting this war, this strange, weird, deadly war, where all of us should be Americans, not Republicans and not Democrats.

Mr. Speaker, the vote in Spain was a great victory for al Qaeda, but it was simply a battle, it was not the war. The war will be a long, long war; and the voices of appeasement are being heard in Europe, but there are other voices, some from the past, voices like Churchill, voices like de Gaulle and voices like Roosevelt that caution resistance, resistance to tyranny. I would ask that Members read the resolution. It is very simple, very straightforward; read it and then put your bruised feelings aside and support it.

If we want to go into bruised feelings, both sides have ample cause, we certainly do, being called, and I say this in sorrow not anger, crooks and liars and having it suggested that the war was started by the President. Those kinds of ideas are not conducive to getting together and embracing each other in the unity that must prevail if we are to win. We do not dare lose this war. What can we do to help win it? I ask Members that, and I ask my friends on the other side of the aisle to give it heartfelt thought and support this resolution.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen).

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Harris).

(Ms. HARRIS asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds.

I would just like to comment on the use of the word ``imminent.'' I wonder when the aircraft smashed into the World Trade Center, what was imminent. That morning? The day before? See, when we are dealing with suicide bombers, ``imminence'' is a rather difficult term to apply to circumstances. Sometimes by the time one finds out it is imminent, they are dead.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentlewoman from Virginia (Mrs. Jo Ann Davis).

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I was fascinated by the remarks of the last gentleman. We have been checking records of people who have strong views on this subject, and I find the gentleman has voted 11 times to cut the intelligence budget. That is pretty consistent, and I give him an A for consistency. He also voted against the supplemental to provide the wherewithal for the troops to be fully equipped. And so, as I say, the gentleman talks a very robust military, but he does not quite follow up with supporting funding for our intelligence.

I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. Speaker, the gentleman said what is not in our resolution. I will tell the Members what is not in. The 11 votes he voted to cut funds for intelligence, his vote against the supplemental. And so to talk out of one side of his mouth for a vigorous military and that they should be supplied, and then to deny them the wherewithal to do it, it seems to me is standing on two stools. It is a great way to get a political hernia.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. Kelly).

Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 2 minutes to the learned gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Norwood).

Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the distinguished gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith).

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from California (Mr. Rohrabacher).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 minutes of my time to the gentleman from California (Mr. Hunter), the chairman of the House Committee on Armed Services, and 30 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), the chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, for purposes of control.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Flake).

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds. I think there is a little semantic difficulty on the words ``safe'' and ``safer.'' I would not say that Iraq is safe. I would not say crossing Pennsylvania Avenue in rush hour is safe. The question is, Is it safer with Mr. Saddam Hussein in a cell? Or is it less safe with him in one of his palaces plotting to amputate limbs from some of his people or to bury Kurds alive like he has done?

The world is a safer place with him in a cell because Mohmmar Qaddafi watched that and went to school on that. He decided to put his cards down and give up his nuclear pretensions.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Chabot).

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 4 minutes to the learned gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Burton).

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds.

I enjoyed listening to the last speaker tell us of his war exploits. I never tire of hearing them, and I find them quite fascinating. But I am bewildered. I do not quite understand why someone who wants to praise the military does not understand that getting rid of Saddam Hussein and trying to secure Iraq is a conquest by our military, an achievement, and that is why they are first in the four things this resolution does. And why he would want to detract from that accomplishment, that military achievement, is something that I am bewildered by.

Mr. Speaker, the last time I yielded, I did not get my time back.

Very well, Mr. Speaker. I yield back my time and I will listen again.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Pence).

(Mr. PENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the distinguished gentleman from California (Mr. Royce).

Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Smith).

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Wamp).

Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Florida (Mr. Young).

Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Washington (Ms. Dunn).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Cantor).

Mr. Speaker, really in one sense, it does not matter how people vote on this resolution because it has no effect, but some things need to be said about it.

Every Member here supports the troops. Every Member here applauds the sacrifices the men and women of our Armed Forces have made. Every Member here understands that America needs no one's permission to defend this country from attack.

But when American leaders choose to wage a preemptive war against a country that did not attack the United States, when those leaders attempt to rally the American people to their support on the basis of faulty information and bad intelligence, when that unilateral decision costs more than 500 American lives, when it costs thousands of American wounded, when it costs the lives of uncounted thousands of innocent civilians, that decision does not, despite the claims of this resolution, it does not leave us in a stronger and safer position, as this resolution falsely suggests. In fact, it could be argued it does just the opposite.

Are we really in a safer and stronger position when the world and our allies know that we went to war unilaterally on the basis of wrong intelligence? Are we really going to be in a stronger position to persuade the world to follow us the next time we tell them it is necessary to act; for example, in the case of an American conclusion that North Korea has nuclear weapons?

Are we really in a safer and stronger position in persuading more Americans to serve in the military when they see that we rushed to war before 45,000 U.S. troops were supplied with the ceramic inserts that they needed for their body armor, when they see their government did not provide the shields that protect Humvees and their occupants from roadbed explosions, or when they see that their government did not supply our troops with the electronic jammers needed to protect those troops against remotely detonated bombs and mines?

Are we really in a safer and stronger position when we are forced to police Iraq largely on our own, with little help from our allies? Have we really created a safer world when, by our actions, we have told the Indians and Pakistanis, who have been close to nuclear war with each other, that a doctrine of preemptive war is acceptable? Are we really as safe and strong as we would be if we had not diverted to Iraq key personnel and taken intelligence resources away from the crucial task of finding Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan?

Last night, many of us sang the praises of John Hume, the great Irish peacemaker. Hume said last night that there has been no war in history that has not killed more innocent civilians than it has combatants.

Are we really safer and stronger in a world where thousands of young Muslims now are being told to hate the United States because we waged a war against a Muslim country that had not attacked the U.S., rather than focusing like a laser on destroying the al Qaeda network which is the justifiable target of our rage?

Many Members who vote for this resolution today will do so despite the misstatements it contains, because it contains an expression of support for our troops. Many who vote against it will also do so because of the unwarranted assertions in this resolution that needlessly detract from our focus on the sacrifices those troops have made.

Mr. Speaker, shame on the House leadership for drafting this resolution in a way that needlessly divides us rather than unites us. By not allowing meaningful alternatives to be debated and voted on, they do not promote democracy; they mock it.

Mr. Speaker, I am inserting in the Record after my statement a copy of the resolution on which we should have been allowed to vote.

Resolution

Relating to the liberation of the Iraqi people and the

valiant service of the United States Armed Forces and

Coalition forces.

Whereas Saddam Hussein and his regime committed crimes

against humanity, systematically violating the human rights

of Iraqis and citizens of other countries;

Whereas Saddam Hussein's terror regime subjected the Iraqi

people to murder, torture, rape, and amputation;

Whereas on March 16, 1988, Saddam Hussein's regime had and

unleashed weapons of mass destruction against Kurdish

citizens, killing nearly 5,000 of them;

Whereas as many as 270 mass grave sites, containing the

remains of as many as 400,000 victims of Saddam Hussein's

regime, have been found in Iraq;

Whereas rape was used to intimidate the Iraqi population,

with victims often raped in front of their families;

Whereas the regime punished the Marsh Arabs by draining the

marshlands, which created hundreds of thousands of refugees

and caused an ecological catastrophe;

Whereas the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (Public Law 105-

338), passed by the House of Representatives by a vote of 360

to 38, made it United States policy to support efforts to

remove from power the regime headed by Saddam Hussein;

Whereas with the Iraqi regime failing to comply with 16

previously adopted United Nations Security Council

resolutions, the Security Council unanimously approved

Resolution 1441 on November 8, 2002, declaring that Iraq `has

been and remains in material breach of its obligations under

relevant resolutions, including resolution 687 (1991), in

particular through Iraq's failure to cooperate with United

Nations inspectors'; and

Whereas on October 10, 2002, the House of Representatives

passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against

Iraq Resolution of 2002 (Public Law 107-243) and on March 19,

2003, the United States initiated military operations in

Iraq: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the House of Representatives--

(1) acknowledges the belief on the part of some that the

United States and the world have been made safer with the

removal of Saddam Hussein and his regime from power in Iraq

and the belief that a final judgment on the value of

activities in Iraq cannot be made until Iraq is stable and

secure;

(2) commends the Iraqi people for their courage in the face

of unspeakable oppression and brutality inflicted on them by

Saddam Hussein's regime;

(3) commends the Iraqi people on the adoption of Iraq's

interim constitution;

(4) commends the members of the United States Armed Forces

and Coalition forces for liberating Iraq and expresses its

gratitude for their valiant service; and

(5) urges the President--

(A) to take all steps necessary to ensure that all members

of the United States Armed Forces serving in Iraq receive the

best force protection equipment available, including

protective body armor and extra-armored wheeled vehicles

capable of providing better protection against explosive

devices;

(B) to ensure that all members of the Armed Forces who

suffer wounds or other injuries, or who incur illness, while

serving in Iraq receive complete, timely, and high-quality

health care to treat the short-term and long-term

consequences of such wounds, injuries, and illnesses;

(C) to recognize the key contributions made by members of

the reserve components of the Armed Forces, and their

families, in Operation Iraqi Freedom, and, in consultation

with Congress, to address immediately the disparity that

exists for many Reserve and Guard personnel between the pay

they receive in civilian life and the military compensation

they receive when ordered to active duty;

(D) to acknowledge that there were serious deficiencies in

United States pre-war intelligence on Iraq, particularly in

light of the failure to find any evidence of significant

weapons of mass destruction programs, and to take steps now

to improve intelligence so that United States troops are

better protected and future United States national security

strategies are better informed;

(E) to request sufficient funding immediately to fully

support United States military operations in Iraq and the

surrounding region in order to ensure the safety and well-

being of United States troops deployed to Iraq and the

surrounding region;

(F) to obtain far-reaching international participation in

the securing, reconstruction, and political development of

Iraq so that the United States can reduce the number of its

troops in Iraq, and reduce the size of its financial

commitment to Iraq operations; and

(G) to take steps to correct the failure of the United

States Government to plan adequately for the post-war

occupation of Iraq, including the failure to integrate

internal United States Government studies and outside expert

opinions that predicted the onset of guerrilla activity and

described how to promote effective reconstruction,

democratization, and civil society development activities,

and the failure to apply those studies and opinions today in

order to improve current United States reconstruction efforts

in Iraq;

(6) expresses deep sorrow and regret for the deaths of more

than 550 and the wounding of more than 3,500 members of the

United States Armed Forces in Iraq and extends support to

their families; and

(7) expresses sorrow and regret for the deaths in Iraq of

United States civilians, Untied Nations personnel, unknown

numbers of Iraqi civilians, and other noncombatants.