Providing for consideration of the bill (H.R. 10) to provide for reform of the intelligence community, terrorism prevention and prosecution, border security, and international cooperation and coordination, and for other purposes.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

The final report of the 9/11 Commission made recommendations on how best to confront the threat of terrorism in the 21st century. Of these 44 recommendations, one-third of them fell within the jurisdiction of the House Committee on International Relations.

H.R. 10 will prepare us to better respond to this threat using all available tools as recommended by the commission, including diplomacy, public diplomacy, international cooperation, foreign aid, sanctions, covert action, security enhancement, and military force when necessary. H.R. 10 goes beyond the mere urging of the issuance of a report or a ``sense of Congress'' as many of the other legislative initiatives propose.

It offers practical, focused, and concrete initiatives that take effect immediately. Although some foreign policy issues are addressed in the Menendez substitute, it mainly addresses only intelligence reform efforts while H.R. 10 delves more deeply into foreign policy and diplomacy efforts which, I might add, were developed in a bipartisan fashion with my good friend from California, the ranking member of the House Committee on International Relations.

For example, I refer Members to the response to the commission's recommendation to define and defend our ideals abroad. H.R. 10 places the emphasis on training, language proficiency, and a creative recruitment process to fulfill our various public diplomacy needs. The Menendez substitute has no comparable provisions.

The commission remarked on the need to develop a comprehensive coalition strategy against Islamist terrorism. The Menendez substitute offers no comparable response, while H.R. 10 has a series of provisions to strengthen the capabilities of the State Department to engage in multilateral diplomacy and to build working relationships with like- minded democratic nations.

Another difference between H.R. 10 and the Menendez substitute is how we propose to deal with countries that provide sanctuary for terrorists. H.R. 10 requires the President to develop a strategy to eliminate terrorist sanctuaries and, most importantly, requires that U.S. exports be regulated to countries that act as sanctuaries. The Menendez substitute includes no such provision.

Another example of how H.R. 10 translates the broad recommendations of the 9/11 Commission into concrete action is the creation of a terrorism interdiction initiative modeled after the successful proliferation security initiative, and the establishment of regional counterterrorism centers and terrorism prevention teams. The Menendez substitute contains no such provisions.

The commission could not have been clearer that targeting travel is at least as powerful a weapon against terrorists as targeting money. H.R. 10 includes specific language which expands two important programs that screen passengers and inspect passports and visas of U.S.-bound visitors prior to their departure at foreign airports. The Menendez substitute has no comparable provisions.

H.R. 10 also increases staffing and improves training of our consular officers who are the first line of defense in screening out potential terrorists. In addition, it increases penalties for convictions involving fraudulent government-issued visas and passports. Again, the Menendez substitute is silent.

In line with the 9/11 Commission's recommendations, H.R. 10 explicitly requires the State Department to make denial of terrorist mobility a top priority of the Department's chief counterterrorist official. No similar provision exists in the other legislative option.

With regard to Afghanistan, which is just 2 days away from its first national elections, the provisions included in H.R. 10 are far superior to those in the Menendez substitute. The commission concluded that the allocation of reconstruction funds in Afghanistan was too compartmentalized. We have solved that problem with the appointment of a coordinator tasked with broad authority. H.R. 10 also restates our commitment to the rule of law and vital education programs in Afghanistan.

Mr. Chairman, although the Menendez substitute represents a serious effort to address a few of the problems posed by terrorists to the security of this country, its unspoken premise is that difficult problems can be easily solved by the simple act of throwing money at them. In the final analysis, we cannot substitute money for careful thought, nor can we buy our way out of the difficult task of crafting wise and effective policies. H.R. 10 does not just throw money at the problem, it defines priorities by which to eliminate fragmented management and operations structures, redirecting resources to where they are most necessary in order to build intelligence capabilities to counter terrorist threats through the best possible means, exactly as the commission recommended. It is time to enact these concrete solutions to confront the threat head-on.

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States criticized the United States Government on is fragmented management and operations structures and questioned its ability to direct resources where necessary to best build intelligence capabilities to counter terrorist threats or to address broader issues of national security challenges. The final report issued 44 recommendations on how to best confront this threat. Of these 44 recommendations, one-third of them, or fifteen, fall within the jurisdiction of the House International Relations Committee.

In sum, these recommendations suggest that the United States use all tools available to respond to this threat, including: diplomacy, public diplomacy, international cooperation and coordination, foreign aid, sanctions, covert action, security enhancement and military force when necessary. With each of these instruments, the United States should focus its efforts on attacking terrorists and their organizations, preventing the continued growth of terrorism, and protecting against and preparing for future attacks.

H.R. 10 goes beyond the mere urging of the issuance of a report or a ``Sense of Congress,'' as many of the other legislative initiatives propose. It offers practical, focused and concrete initiatives that take effect immediately, rather than waiting for another study to determine whether the full recommendation of the Commission should be implemented. To put it simply, the authors of H.R. 10 did not stop reading the Commission's report halfway through, but instead, crafted thoughtful solutions to the tough recommendations. We took the abstract and made it concrete.

Although some foreign policy issues are addressed in the Menendez Amendment, it mainly addresses the first ``track'' on the intelligence reform efforts, while H.R. 10 delves more deeply into foreign policy and diplomacy efforts. In fact, many of the provisions of H.R. 10 were developed in a bipartisan fashion, gaining the expertise and guidance of my dear friend from California, the Ranking Member of

the House International Relations Committee, Tom Lantos.

For example, I refer you to the response to the Commission's recommendation to ``define and defend our ideals abroad,'' or conduct better public diplomacy. H.R. 10 places the emphasis on training and the creative recruitment process to find the skill-set needed, such as language proficiency, for the various public diplomacy needs. The Menendez Substitute does not offer anything more than reporting requirement or non-binding ``Sense of Congress'' language. H.R. 10 directs the State Department, in coordination with other government agencies involved with communications or public outreach, to collaborate on a strategic plan and conduct annual assessments to measure progress.

Expanded broadcasting to the Muslim world is too new to fairly evaluate. Sufficient time is necessary to determine the appropriate course corrections, if any. However, I recognize that professional, contemporary communications are ``a must'' as we compete against satellite networks feeding misleading news to the region.

The Commission remarked on the need to engage other nations in developing a comprehensive coalition strategy against Islamist terrorism. The Menendez Substitute offers virtually no response to this suggestion, while H.R. 10 has a series of provisions designated to specifically strengthen the capabilities of the State Department in the multilateral arena. It addresses the systemic weaknesses of the Department on the multilateral front by increasing training and education. H.R. 10 also addresses the importance of building working relationships with like-minded democratic nations through the work of such organizations as the Community of Democracies and through the establishment of a democracy caucus at the United Nations.

Another difference between H.R. 10 and the Menendez Substitute is how we propose to deal with countries that provide sanctuary to terrorists. H.R. 10 provides a clear policy statement on terrorist sanctuaries, requires the President to develop a strategy to address and eliminate terrorist sanctuaries and, most importantly, requires that U.S. exports be regulated to countries that are found to be terrorist sanctuaries. This provision puts meat on the bones. It directly implements the 9-11 Commission charge to ``use all elements of national power'' by saying that if a foreign country provides sanctuary for terrorists, then we will condition the trade of our goods and services with that country. There is no such provision in the Menendez Substitute. It contains only identical findings, non-binding policy language and a one-time report.

Another example of how H.R. 10 translates the broad recommendations of the 9-11 Commission into concrete actions is the creation of a Terrorism Interdiction Initiative, modeled after the successful Proliferation Security Initiative. The 9-11 Commission calls for expanded collaboration with other governments on terrorism. Other legislative initiatives only have ``Sense of Congress'' provisions suggesting the establishment of a contact group. By contrast, H.R. 10 mandates the negotiation, on a bilateral basis, of international agreements to secure global support, cooperation and coordination, and to maximize and integrate resources for attacking terrorists and terrorist organizations. It establishes specific requirements for these agreements under the Terrorism Interdiction Initiative which include ``Interdiction Principles;'' establishment of Regional Counter- terrorism Centers; and establishment of Terrorism Prevention Teams to address current and emerging terrorist threats.

On the important question of curtailing terrorist travel, the Menendez Substitute falls short of the provisions contained in H.R. 10. The Commission could not have been clearer that ``targeting travel is at least as powerful a weapon against terrorists as targeting money.'' H.R. 10 includes specific language which expands two important programs that screen passengers and inspect passports and visas of U.S.-bound visitors prior to their departure from foreign airports. This keeps terrorists away from our shores, and perhaps most importantly, it prevents those who want to do us harm from even boarding flights headed for the United States. The Menendez Substitute has no comparable provisions.

H.R. 10 also increases staffing and improves training of our consular officers who are the first line of defense in screening out potential terrorists. In addition, the legislation increases penalties for convictions involving fraudulent, government-issued visas and passports, Again, the Menendez Substitute does not address these problems.

In line with the 9-11 Commission's recommendation, H.R. 10 explicitly requires the State Department to make denial of terrorist mobility a top priority of the Department's chief counterterrorist official. No similar provision exists in other legislative options.

With regard to Afghanistan, which I might add is just two days away from its first national elections, the provisions included in H.R. 10 are far superior to the Mendendez Substitute. The Commission concluded that the allocation of reconstruction funds in Afghanistan was too compartmentalized. We have solved that problem with the appointment of a coordinator tasked with broad authority. H.R. 10 also restates our commitment to the rule of law and vital educational programs in Afghanistan.

Mr. Chairman, although the Mendendez Substitute represents a serious effort to address a few of the problems posed by terrorists to the security of the United States, its unspoken premise is that difficult problems can be easily solved by the simple act of throwing money at them. We have no shortage of examples of government programs were this approach has not only failed, but actually rendered our problems worse. Here, the greatest danger stems from the complacency that will result from our merely having increased spending while congratulating ourselves for having taken swift action.

In the final analysis, we cannot substitute money for careful thought, nor can we buy our way out of the difficult task of crafting wise and effective policies. H.R. 10 doesn't just throw money at the problem. Instead, it defines priorities by which to eliminate fragmented management and operations structures, redirecting resources to where they are most necessary in order to build intelligence capabilities to counter terrorist threats through the best possible means--exactly as the Commission recommended. It is time to enact these concrete solutions to confront the threat head-on.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith).

Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from California (Mr. Royce).

Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding me this time. I commend the chairman and the ranking member for their leadership.

I rise today in opposition to H.R. 10, a partisan and wholly inadequate bill, a pale shadow of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. It does not come close to addressing many of the key issues raised by the Commission. I should underscore that this is not an academic exercise, this is not about boxes on a bureaucratic organization chart, Mr. Chairman; these are life and death issues, as the families of more than 100 9/11 victims would attest.

Let us remember why we are here. There are well-publicized failures and shortcomings in our intelligence, failures of intelligence agencies to communicate in the days and months leading up to 9/11, absence of anyone coordinating activities, absence of self-criticality, accepting and perpetuating unfounded reports of weapons in Iraq. That is what we are trying to address.

But this legislation does not give the intelligence director the personnel and budgetary authority to coordinate activities or to direct communications. There is nothing in here to guarantee that the intelligence community does not, once again, fall victim to false assumptions and group think.

Furthermore, H.R. 10 includes other changes unjustified by the 9/11 Commission or by the committee's own findings.

I am grateful that the Committee on Rules has allowed the amendment of my colleague, the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Menendez) to come to the floor. It is clearly a superior alternative to H.R. 10 for many reasons, not the least of which it rejects the noxious provisions of H.R. 10 that would mindlessly shred civil liberties while sanctioning the outsourcing of torture of unconvicted terrorist suspects by transferring them to other countries with deplorable human rights records.

I urge my colleagues to reject H.R. 10 and to vote for the Menendez substitute.

Our constituents have asked Congress to reform the intelligence community because of a self-evident lack of coordination among agencies, a confirmed failure to communicate critical threat information, and repeated instances of the use of questionable assumptions and faulty conclusions in key intelligence assessments. The bill before us addresses none of these deficiencies in a meaningful way, and in many cases does not address the key problems at all.

With regard to this legislation's proposed budget and personnel authorities for the National Intelligence Director, I share the view expressed by 9/11 Commission chairman Tom Kean (Washington Post, October 1): ``This is not an area where one can compromise,'' he said. ``If you're not going to create a strong national intelligence director, with powers both appointive and over the budget, don't do it.''

serious flaws with h.r. 10

The bill before this House would also add other changes unjustified by the 9/11 Commission or by the committee's own findings. H.R. 10 fails to address the ongoing problems in the intelligence community with regard to information sharing. Congress must craft specific legislative language--not simply vague guidance to the executive branch--to create a mechanism for ensuring the sharing of information. I posed an amendment that would have done that by implementing the thoughtful, bipartisan solution incorporated in the Collins-Lieberman bill.

H.R. 10 also ignores the need for Congress to create an independent capability for judging the veracity of both finished assessments--be they NIE's or PDB's--and the sources that underpin those assessments. The executive branch's past failures in the area of ``Red Teams'' or ``Team B's'' have been well documented, including by the 9/11 Commission in its final report. Omitting this glaring necessity is simply irresponsible.

House Intelligence Committee Markup-up of H.R. 10: Bipartisan In Name

Only

With very few exceptions, H.R. 10 was not drafted in a bipartisan manner. During September's House Intelligence Committee mark-up of H.R. 10, a number of amendments offered were in the spirit of strengthening H.R. 10 and strengthening our capabilities against terrorists.

To be accurate, the Committee approved 3 amendments in a bipartisan fashion.

The Gentlelady from California, Jane Harman's amendment to add an independent Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, similar to a provision of S. 2845, passed on a bipartisan vote of 16-3. An amendment by Representative Gibbons to increase budget-reprogramming authority, modeled on the Intelligence Transformation Act (H.R. 4104), passed 12- 7. The Committee also accepted on a voice vote an amendment by U.S. Representatives Peterson and Boswell to strike a provision in Title V of H.R. 10 that would have allowed the President to ignore statutory direction and reorganize the Intelligence Community with only an up-or- down vote from Congress. Such a provision could conceivably be used to erase the reorganization of the intelligence community in Title I. It would also have undermined by HPSCI's oversight of intelligence community reorganization.

I note for the record that when the amended H.R. 10 went before the Rules Committee, these bipartisan provisions were stripped out, thus demolishing any claims that H.R. 10 was a bipartisan bill.

An independent bipartisan commission has determined that systemic problems across multiple agencies contributed to the 9/11 catastrophe, in particular, and that the essential problems that led to 9/11 remain unaddressed. The executive branch has not cleaned up its act. I certainly heard nothing in the multiple hearings in the HPSCI to convince me that the major problems have been solved.

Also, H.R. 10 makes no effort whatsoever to reform how the Congress handles our oversight functions in the national security arena. The Menendez substitute does begin to take some steps in this direction, but I hope my colleagues on both sides of the aisle understand that we have much more work to do in this area, as the Commission has made very clear in its final report.

Mistakenly, H.R. 10 provides new authority allowing the President to completely undo the intelligence reforms mandated by Congress. Under this provision a presidential plan to reorganize the intelligence community would be guaranteed an up or down vote, with no amendments, within 90 days of submission to Congress.

backsliding on human rights

Clearly, supporters of this bill learned nothing from the Abu Chraib prison debacle that stained our efforts in Iraq, when disclosed less than 6 months ago. H.R. 10 makes an exception to America's legal obligations under the U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment for some aliens as well as terrorists and criminals. Indeed, I have introduced a bill (H.R. 4951) that would allow independent monitoring and mandate that interrogations of prisoners and detainees in the war on terrorism be video recorded, something that I understand that Pentagon has finally started doing, albeit on a limited basis. This proposal in H.R. 10 to potentially sanction further abuse in third world countries is simply unconscionable and it should be categorically rejected by both the House and the Senate.

more erosion of civil liberties and personal privacy

H.R. 10 would allow the U.S. government to spy on individuals without proving they are connected to a foreign government or terrorist group. Since when did we decide to bring back the ``good old days'' of allowing our intelligence community to spy on Americans without impunity? We know what happened the last time we allowed our intelligence community to run amok here at home: spying on anti-war groups whose only agenda was to end

our nightmare in Vietnam and make the government accountable to the people it was created to serve. This is a back-door effort to create a domestic spy agency without any genuine public debate or examination of the perils of such a proposal, and it too should be roundly rejected.

collins-lieberman-mccain and shays-maloney: real bipartisan reform

Let me turn now to a more positive, bipartisan alternative to H.R. 10.

In my view, the Collins-Lieberman-McCain bill provides the best available vehicle for strengthening the intelligence community, and I support Mr. Memendez's substitute which is based on that. The 9/11 Commission and the 9/11 families have endorsed this approach and it was reported unanimously out of the Senate Government Affairs Committee, and our Senate colleagues are on the verge of passing that bill as we speak. The Administration also released a Statement of Administration Policy supporting that bill, albeit with some caveats.

The Menendez substitute to H.R. 10 establishes a National Intelligence Director with strong authorities over the Intelligence Community's budget and a decisive role in appointing the heads of all elements of the Intelligence Community. In this way, it is consistent with the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. The creation of a strong National Intelligence Director with strong authorities over budgets and agency heads was also the number one recommendation of the bipartisan, bicameral Congressional Joint Inquiry into 9/11.

If the National Intelligence Director is going to have real power, he or she must have stronger budget and hiring authority than H.R. 10 proposes. The only way to get a dozen intelligence agencies to work together to help defeat the violent, extremist Islamic insurgency we are facing is to have a single director with real power.

The Menendez substitute also has the advantage of being a ``clean'' bill. It focuses exclusively on the 9/11 Commission's recommendations. In contrast, H.R. 10 is a 543-page bill loaded with provisions unrelated to the 9/11 Commission's recommendations. H.R. 10 makes changes to immigration laws that have nothing to do with the 9/11 Commission's recommendations, and are bad policy. Our legislative purpose must be to make American safer--not to undermine civil liberties, expand authorities for domestic spying, or erode the rights of immigrant communities.

Finally, the Collins-Lieberman-McCain bill is genuinely bipartisan, and thus the Menendez substitute is, by extension, bipartisan. Making America safer is not a Republican issue or a Democratic issue--it is an American issue. As my colleague, the Gentlelady from California, Ms. Harman, has observed on numerous occasions, terrorists are not going to check our party labels before they attack us.

I understand that the American Civil Liberties Union and other civil rights advocacy groups expressed concern about the Collins-Lieberman measure that was passed by the Senate. Specifically, the ACLU stated that ``senators failed to address concerns about the creation of an ``Information Sharing Network,'' a system that the ACLU said lacks privacy and civil liberties safeguards.'' I understand and share their concerns, but I believe the Menendez substitute--which does create a civil liberties board--addresses this issue. I will also encourage the House-Senate conferees on this legislation to strengthen these provisions as well.

I want to close by appealing to my colleagues to remember why we're here: to pass legislation that implements the recommendations of a bipartisan commission that was created out of both the pain and the hopes of the families of 9/11. Those families have endorsed the Collins-Lieberman Bill. They will freely admit it is not perfect, a sentiment I share. But they know, as I do, that it is a far superior proposal to the one we're debating today and it is for those reasons I urge my colleagues to support the Menendez substitute to H.R. 10.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 10. On September 11, 2001, foreign terrorists attacked the United States without provocation in a failed effort to crush our spirit and our resolve.

In the last 3 years Congress has taken bold bipartisan steps to strengthen the ability of the law enforcement intelligence community to protect the American people against future terrorist attacks. The Committee on the Judiciary has played a central role in addressing vulnerabilities that the terrorists exploited on 9/11.

Bipartisan passage of the PATRIOT Act, the Barbara Jordan Immigration Reform and Accountability Act, the Homeland Security Act, and other legislation have made America safer; but there is still much more work to be done.

In November of 2002 President Bush created the bipartisan 9/11 Commission. I supported the President's creation of this independent commission, and I am pleased that this bill implements and addresses its recommendations and findings. H.R. 10 provides specific legislative substance to those recommendations. First, the creation of the National Intelligence Director, then the establishment of a National counterterrorism Center in title I are reforms that will ensure that the wall of separation between intelligence and law enforcement is never again exploited by terrorists. In addition, section 1112 codifies the laudable efforts of the FBI to better assist and thwart terrorist attacks before they occur.

The Judiciary sections in title II enhance penalties for terrorism hoaxes; increase penalties for supporting, financing, or cooperating with terrorist organizations; expand the scope of laws that prohibit the shipments or use of weapons of mass destruction; provide additional funding to combat terrorist financing; and enhance the use of biometrics to reduce terrorist threats against air travel.

Several 9/11 hijackers either should not have been admitted to the United States or violated the terms of their visas. Title III of the legislation contains important provisions to enhance border security and reduce opportunities for terrorists who enter and stay in the United States. As the 9/11 staff report on terrorist travel declared, ``The challenge for national security in an age of terrorism is to prevent the people who may pose overwhelming risk from entering the United States undetected.''

The Judiciary sections of title III require Americans returning from most parts of the Western Hemisphere to possess passports; require Canadians seeking entry into the United States to present a passport or other secure identification; authorize additional immigration agents and investigators; reduce the risk of identity and document fraud; provide for the expedited removal of illegal aliens; limit asylum abuse by terrorists; and streamline the removal of terrorists and other criminal aliens. These provisions reflect both commission recommendations and

legislation that was pending in the House.

Finally, I am pleased that this legislation safeguards the privacy and civil liberties of all Americans. These provisions establish a privacy officer in the office of the NID; require Federal agencies to prepare a privacy impact analysis during rulemaking process; and direct the head of each Federal agency with law enforcement or antiterrorism functions to appoint a chief privacy officer.

The bill reflects careful, thoughtful and principled consideration of the 9/11 Commission's bipartisan recommendations and staff report. Unlike some other proposals, this legislation does not merely transcribe sometimes vague proposals. Rather, it does the hard work of implementing the 9/11 Commission's recommendations with the legislative clarity and depth they deserve.

H.R. 10 also received the full committee deliberation that the House committee process provides. The committee process greatly enhanced the quality of this legislation.

America has so far been spared another large-scale attack within our border since 9/11. Yet the terror in Beslan, Russia, just weeks ago chillingly reminds us that the global threat of terrorism has not receded nor has the need for vigilance and foresight.

While much has already been done, much remains to be done. Passage of H.R. 10 will make America safer still, and I urge my colleagues to support this legislation.

I am also happy to put in the Record, a letter dated October 7, 2004, from the 9/11 Families for a Secure America that states, ``we strongly support H.R. 10 and oppose all the alternatives that have been proposed. The reason is simple: H.R. 10 is the only bill that addresses the recommendations on pages 385-390 of the 9/11 Commission's report.'' I would include this letter in the Record at this point.

9/11 Families for a Secure America,

New York, New York, October 7, 2004.

Dear Members of the House of Representatives: Over the past

few weeks, several articles in the press and statements from

individuals have implied falsely that the families of victims

of the September 11, 2001, attacks support alternatives to

H.R. 10. Our organization, 9/11 Families for a Secure

America, represents hundreds of families of those murdered on

9/11, and we strongly support H.R. 10 and oppose all the

alternatives that have been proposed. The reason is simple:

H.R. 10 is the only bill that addresses the recommendations

on pages 385-90 of the 9/11 Commission's report.

Family members of 9/11 victims worked long and hard to have

an independent commission appointed to investigate the

attacks. Now that the Commission has completed its task and

presented Congress with its recommendations, we believe that

Congress must address all of the 41 recommendations,

including those relating to immigration policy. We will be

satisfied with nothing less.

All of the 9/11 family members with whom we have been in

contact agree that immigration reform is a key component of

the implementation of the Commission's recommendations.

Sadly, some of our elected officials have misled 9/11

families by convincing them that no legislation will pass

this year if we insist that immigration reform be part of it,

because immigration is simply ``too controversial.'' We are

appalled that any public official would suggest that national

security is ``too controversial'' to be addressed.

We applaud the House Leadership for making security their

top priority and we strongly urge all Members of the House to

support H.R. 10. We have read the immigration provisions in

H.R. 10, and we have compared them to the Commission's

recommendations. The provisions some have labeled

``extraneous and unrelated'' are, in fact, clearly and

directly related to the Commission's findings and to

preventing terrorist attacks in this country. The simple fact

is that if the 9/11 terrorists have not been able to enter

the United States and operate freely in our country--to

obtain driver's licenses (over 60 licenses for 19 hijackers),

open bank accounts, rent homes and cars, and board

airplanes--they would not have been able to murder our loved

ones. To pretend otherwise is hypocritical; but more

importantly, it is an invitation to future terrorist attacks.

Members of Congress have promised us repeatedly over the

last three years that they would honor our loved ones who

were murdered by implementing the reforms needed to ensure

that Americans will never again face the same horror we live

with every day. We ask you to stand by your promise and pass

H.R. 10, rather than dishonoring us and our loved ones to

protect a status quo that aided the murderers who tore apart

our families on September 11, 2001.

9/11 FSA Board of Directors

Peter & Jan Gadiel, Kent, CT, Parents of James, age 23.

Will Sekzer, Detective Sgt (ret'd) NYPD, Sunnyside, NY,

Father of Jason, age 31.

Diana Stewart, New Jersey, only wife of Michael Stewart.

Bill Doyle, Staten Island, NY, Father of Joseph.

Joan Molinaro, Staten Island, NY, Mother of Firefighter

Carl Molinaro.

Bruce DeCell, Staten Island, NY, Father in law of Mark

Petrocelli, age 28.

Sally Regenhard, Al Regenhard (Det. Sgt. NYPD, Ret'd),

Parents of Firefighter Christian Regenhard.

Grace Godshalk, Yardley, PA, Mother of William R. Godshalk,

age 35.

April D. Gallop, Virginia, Pentagon Survivor.

Lynn Faulkner, Ohio, Husband of Wendy Faulkner.

Colette Lafuente, Poughkeepsie, NY, Wife of Juan LaFuente,

WTC visitor.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Green), my colleague.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Chabot), chairman of the Subcommittee on the Constitution.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Smith).

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time to close.

Mr. Chairman, I have been listening to this debate since it began several hours ago. And those who are promoting the Menendez substitute, time and time again, criticize the base bill, H.R. 10, for extraneous and unrelated issues. Mr. Chairman, let me be blunt. Many of these extraneous and unrelated issues are designed to prevent terrorists from coming to our borders; or, if they get inside the United States, making sure that they do not game the system to be able to stay here and have the time to plot to do ill to America and its people and its values.

I would like to talk about a couple of these issues. First of all, aliens who apply for American drivers' licenses will have to present a passport. We know that the driver's license is the type of ID that is used at airports and other transportation facilities, as well as to prove a person's age when they are buying alcohol or tobacco. If the driver's license that is issued by a State Department of Motor Vehicles is based on phony and unsecure identification, then that person can use the result of the use of the phony and unsecure identification to be able to do a lot of things, including hijack airplanes and get on them and fly those airplanes into buildings.

We have heard a lot about some of the changes in the immigration law that are contained in the base bill but not in the Menendez substitute. Let me say that those changes in the immigration law are designed to get at people

who are criminals, and not United States citizens, and deal with them, like the deportation of criminal aliens and those that wish to use the asylum laws to game our system, like Sheikh Rahman did when he was plotting the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993.

There is a difference between illegal aliens who wish to game the system and those that overstay their visas and those people from other countries who wish to come here to live legally and peacefully. And unless we tighten up the system, it is this latter group that are going to end up being tarred with the sins of the former group. The provisions in the base H.R. 10 bill that deal with expedited removal, et cetera, are designed to protect legal immigrants to the United States so that they do not have to pay for the sins of those who wish to commit crimes and acts of terrorism. That is why those provisions ought to stay in this bill and not be stricken out during the amendatory process.

The base bill is a good bill. It makes America safer than the Menendez substitute and the Senate-passed bill and ought to be approved.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong support of H.R. 10, the 9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act. The purpose of this landmark legislation is to address the problems and weaknesses identified by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States by improving the intelligence and security operations of the Federal Government.

I am proud of what we have achieved in this legislation on behalf of the American people, who understandably are clamoring for change. It accomplishes the goal of revamping our intelligence network and makes other

changes necessary to protect our national security.

I would like to elaborate on a few of the provisions of the larger bill that fall within our jurisdiction at the Committee on Government Reform and why we believe they are critical to this effort.

One is executive reorganization authority for intelligence agencies. H.R. 10 would give the President the power to submit reorganization plans, limited to the intelligence community, to Congress for a guaranteed up-or-down vote.

We cannot afford to assume this legislation is a panacea that will somehow be the last word on intelligence reform. Reorganization authority is authority every President had government-wide from 1932 to 1984. It enables the executive branch to come forward with a plan that would come to Congress for an up-or-down vote without amendment. The President should have the ability to make further tweaks to the organization without having to worry about his proposal getting watered-down or just plain blocked in Congress over petty jurisdictional fights between committees. Congress, of course, retains the ultimate say.

We have enhanced information-sharing. This legislation would task the President with establishing a trusted and secure information-sharing environment to promote the sharing of intelligence information and to change the culture in the Federal Government from a ``need to know'' to a ``need to share'' basis. This initiative is the result of collaborative efforts of multiple committees of jurisdiction.

The rationale for this language is straightforward. As a Nation, we must be able to identify terrorist threats and defeat them. Our success depends on collecting, analyzing, and appropriately sharing information found in data bases, transactions, and other sources.

Streamlined financial disclosure for appointees in the intelligence community. Just about anyone who studies the Presidential appointments process realizes that it is broken. It takes too long to confirm individuals to key positions, and the process itself often drives away some of those best qualified to serve. Financial disclosure requirements are supposed to protect against conflicts of interest concerns; but they have become proxy statements for a nominee's net worth, with more detail than is necessary, extending the vetting process so that nominees cannot even move forward to Senate confirmation. This legislation would return to the original intent of financial disclosures.

An improved security clearance process. This legislation would assign security clearance management and oversight to the Office of the National Intelligence Director. The NID would set uniform standards and policies and require reciprocity among agencies. This would enable an individual with a top secret clearance at, say, Treasury to retain that clearance should he or she move to another agency.

Previous efforts to enforce reciprocity have failed, but this legislation finally addresses this important part of the process by putting an end to the time and money-wasting practice of redundant security clearance investigations and adjudications. This redundancy drives up the cost of doing business, and this cost is ultimately passed on to the taxpayers.

New Federal standards for identification cards and birth certificates. We need to have confidence that when someone shows a State driver's license to board a plane or a State birth certificate to get a passport, that the ID is valid. We need to know that people are who they say they are.

Is this a national ID card? No. We are simply saying the Federal Government must have documents that it can trust, and it is perfectly within its right to establish minimum standards for Federal acceptance.

This important provision would provide grant money to help States meet the new Federal guidelines and gives them 3 years to comply. Though States have made strides in improving the security of driver's licenses and identification since 9/11, the commission outlined the need to establish minimum standards as a framework for improvement.

This language was crafted with the assistance of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and the National Association For Public Health and Information Systems who administer these programs for the States. They have been hard at work developing studies, best practices and guidelines on this issue, especially since the terrorist attacks on our Nation; and this legislation closely follows those recommendations for action. Importantly, this provision is also strongly supported by the 9/11 victims' families.

A revitalized FBI workforce. H.R. 10 would provide for retention bonuses and critical pay authorities to help the FBI improve its intelligence directorate. It also would allow for delays in mandatory retirements and the creation of a Reserve Service so the agency can reactivate retired employees with very specialized skills.

The improvements to the operations of the Federal Government that are included in H.R. 10 are essential to making this country safer. I urge my colleagues to support this carefully crafted legislation.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Souder), an able member of our committee.

(Mr. SOUDER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. Chairman, I am happy to yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Michigan (Mrs. Miller), the former Secretary of State of the State of Michigan.

Mr. Chairman, I would just say to my friend, unfortunately, other committees shared jurisdiction on this, so when the Committee on Rules wrote it, we did not get our committee language.

Mr. Chairman, I am happy to yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr. Lewis), the distinguished chairman of the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 30 seconds.

What abrogates our responsibility is taking the substitute that is offered by the other side. Basically we are saying to the other body, we are going to take your version and adopt your version. We have a lot of good ideas that emanate from this side of the Capitol. Those ideas will then go into a conference, and we can take the best of both.

The Congress does not abrogate their responsibility by allowing the President to submit for an up-or-down vote, the changes they wish to make in the intelligence community; we get to vote them up or down. But we do circumvent some of the jurisdictional battles that so often prolong these fights and make us very inefficient. I might add, this is authority that we had for Presidents for 50 years prior to 1984.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time as I have the right to close.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, first of all, let me thank my friends on the other side in the committee for working cordially with us to improve this legislation. I know we have some disagreements.

I want to take up just a minute to correct what I think is misinformation about this legislation, namely, that some of the sections of this are not within the scope of the 9/11 Commission's report. I want to walk through the provisions that were added at the request of our committee. All of these initiatives were things that the committee had been working on to make our country safer prior to the release of the report, but they can also be traced to report language.

Our language on identity security, for example, is identified as an urgent need on page 309 of the report, where it says, ``The Federal Government should set standards for the issuance of birth certificates and sources of identification such as driver's licenses. Fraud in identity documents is no longer just a problem of theft. At many entry points to vulnerable facilities, including gates for boarding aircraft, sources of identification are the last opportunity to ensure that people are who they say they are and to check whether they are terrorists.''

Our language on appointments reform is in direct response to a finding in the report on page 422: ``Since a catastrophic event could occur with little or no notice, we should minimize as much as possible the disruption of national security policymaking during the change of administrations by accelerating the process for national security appointments.''

Our security clearance language is based both on work that we have been doing in the committee and the commission's report which said on page 422 that the Federal Government needs uniform application investigation in adjudication procedures, a single database to store clearance information, and an expedited clearing process for Presidential transition team personnel.

Our language to revitalize the FBI workforce responds to a finding in the report on page 425, where it says ``a specialized and integrated national security workforce should be established at the FBI consisting of agents, analysts, linguists, and surveillance specialists who are recruited, trained, rewarded, and retained to ensure a deep expertise in intelligence and national security.''

And our language on information-sharing and security addresses the commission's finding on page 400 that we need to unify the many participants in the counterterrorism effort and their knowledge in a network-based information-sharing system that transcends traditional governmental boundaries.

As you can see, Mr. Chairman, all of these provisions that were marked up by our committees and included in the version on H.R. 10 today are direct responses to problems or weaknesses identified by the 9/11 Commission.

I take exception to Members who think the other body had thorough knowledge and exhausted all of the ideas on this.

We look to a good conference where we can iron out some of these, but more importantly I think we thoroughly address some of the concerns raised by the commission. At a time when the terrorists are moving dollars electronically and communicating in nanoseconds, we have to give the executive branch a rapid response for additional reorganization changes as well.

I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 10 and reject the Menendez substitute.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of H.R. 10. In fact, I think one of the most important parts of this legislation deals with aviation security. We have worked very hard over the past 2 years to try to come up with bipartisan solutions, things that really would make a difference. Many of those recommendations are contained in the 9/11 report.

Now, the 9/11 report is not perfect. It is put together by 10 people, and it does have some flaws in it. I want to talk about, unfortunately, the adoption and anatomy of adopting one of those flaws in the Menendez substitute which weakens the provisions of H.R. 10.

First of all, the Menendez substitute would strip vital provisions from H.R. 10. We have $60 million in mandatory funding for checkpoint explosive detection devices. Nothing is more important or no greater risk.

Actually, there are two risks. One is someone walking through a 1950s metal detector technology, metal detectors we have at our airports, with explosives strapped to themselves, and those metal detectors will not detect that. We need to deploy them now. The Menendez amendment strips that.

Second is biometric identification. We cannot tell today Mohammad Atta from Sam Hill. We need a biometric identification provision. We have a bipartisan provision, which the Menendez substitute drops from this bill.

Another potential threat is shoulder-launched missile nonproliferation programs. We have worked hard in a bipartisan fashion to eliminate that threat, and we have a four-part, well-thought-out, well-reasoned approach to dealing with that threat. Again, the Menendez substitute weakens and destroys things that we have been working on.

We have improvements in arming our pilots, one of the most effective protective measures, and secondary cockpit barriers. We paid attention to looking at those weaknesses. And also the Menendez substitute weakens international air marshal deployment.

So, again, I rise in strong support of the provisions of H.R. 10.

One of the things that I wanted to address tonight, and, unfortunately, it has even reached the presidential debates, to those uninformed candidates and some of my colleagues on this floor who continue to try to scare the traveling public to suggest that our air cargo carried in on a passenger aircraft is not screened and that we must take extreme measures and build a bureaucracy and march forward in different directions. As a result, they have put forward proposals that are not only unworkable, but would bring this Nation's economy to a grinding halt.

In fact, the facts are that we have a risk-based system in place now. Is it flawless? No. The facts are that building a larger TSA bureaucracy is not going to solve the problem. In fact, it will make the problem worse. The facts are that scaring people and running around the country and saying ``the sky is falling'' is just wrong and irresponsible.

Let us talk about the Menendez amendment and how it deals with hardened containers. Let me give you the anatomy of the development. Turn to page 393 of the report and see what the Commission recommended. Our committee has worked on these issues day and night, weekends, tirelessly, and our staff, since September 11, and even before that, on aviation security issues.

The Commission recommends, ``The TSA should require that every passenger aircraft carrying cargo must deploy at least one hardened container to carry any suspect cargo.''

That is not our recommendation. We met with these folks. Who in their right mind would allow suspect cargo on an aircraft? We have provisions already that do not allow ``suspect cargo'' on an aircraft. They also put ``one hardened container.'' What a goofy idea. ``One hardened container.''

First of all, the current law that we have a definition of and we have used again to define what we want is ``blast resistant container.'' So they just copied a recommendation without actually having it make sense.

Now, most of our aircraft that you fly on, a 737 that I fly on usually, an Airbus, regional jets that are our biggest proliferation of new aircraft, do not have aircraft containers. So what are we going to have to do, build one to put on there? They do not have containers. 737s have a container.

Think of how goofy this is. A 737, I am told, has 30 containers, so which container are we going to make blast resistant and allow suspicious cargo in violation of our current rules that do not even allow that? We are going to do ``eenie, meenie, minie, moe, in which one would the explosive cargo go?''

And I am pleased that the gentle-lady from California, Ms. Millender- McDonald, whose district includes the manufacturer of these containers, supported the testing proposal when it was unanimously approved by the Transportation Committee.

TSA is currently drafting new, comprehensive standards for air cargo security, which should be finalized in the next several weeks. TSA has in place risk based, layered air cargo security system.

These directives include key components on the Known Shipper Program, the Indirect Air Carrier Program, the Freight Assessment Program and other increased oversight initiatives.

In addition, the airline industry has taken steps to upgrade their extensive ``known shipper'' program, which is currently the basis for air cargo screening procedures.

Right now we have a risk-based security system that targets high-risk shipments for additional screening, and combines layers of security along the supply chain.

Contrary to rhetoric, the Department of Homeland Security pre-screens 100 percent of all cargo that comes into the United States and conducts 100 percent inspections of high-risk shipments.

Rushing ahead without carefully considering all the risks and all the implications of security mandates would be destructive to ongoing efforts and have far-reaching and damaging implications.

The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) has warned that some mandates could ``damage their efforts to provide security in the aviation environment and ensure the smooth flow of legitimate goods and people.''

DHS has also warned that due to ``significant technology limitations,'' ``. . . there is no practical way to achieve 100 percent manual screening and inspection of all air cargo.''

Only with technology can we effectively screen air cargo. Why do we not have that technology--I ask Senator Patty Murray who in 2002 diverted R&D funds.

Therefore, given the lack of technology for screening air cargo, any mandate to screen 100 percent of cargo on passenger aircraft would require actual physical inspection of each piece of cargo placed aboard a passenger aircraft.

Now I know that my colleagues from the other side of the aisle would like this approach, because then we could hire thousands more screeners to do this work. According to the IG manual screening for weapons and explosives is the least effective means of detection.

This type of requirement would grind the transportation of air cargo to a virtual halt, or it would also result in a situation where passenger carriers would be denied the ability to transport cargo and guarantees the final nail in the bankruptcy coffin of our ailing major airlines.

Just as important, communities who rely on air cargo to receive much needed supplies, medicines, food, mail, and other necessities of life will be left high and dry.

We've spent $10 billion dollars since 9/11--just for passenger screening. And $6 billion of that on labor-costs alone--48,000 Federal screeners. All for a screening system that the DHS Inspector General reports fails to detect the most dangerous items most of the time.

We let the Fear-mongers push an unworkable deadline for baggage screening. Consequently, in our haste, we've wasted billions on ineffective, labor-intensive stand-alone and ineffective manual trace systems. If we had done it right in the first place, we would already have highly effective and highly efficient systems for passengers, baggage and cargo.

You would think that we would have learned from our mistakes--and not react in a knee jerk fashion. We need to be smarter about where we place our scarce and limited resources.

We must find the proper balance between enhancing air cargo security while ensuring that the flow of air commerce is not disrupted.

The Department of Homeland Security is doing all it can to find additional ways to enhance air cargo screening while technology catches up.

TSA budgeted about $55 million for fiscal year 2004 for research and development projects to enhance air cargo security.

Projects being funded include a pre-screening system to identify high-risk cargo, and technology and equipment to screen containerized air cargo and mail.

TSA also budgeted an additional $45 million in fiscal year 2004 for key initiatives in air cargo security oversight, including known shipper enhancements, canine explosives detection and 100 additional cargo inspectors.

And, both the House and the other body have allocated $75 million in research and development funds for air cargo security in fiscal year 2005.

Clearly air cargo security is being given much attention by both the Congress and the Administration.

Bottom line, the Department of Homeland Security is the proper entity to lead this effort and Congress should refrain from micro-managing this process.