A bill to authorize the President to waive the application of certain requirements under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 with respect to India.

Mr. President, I want to thank the managers of the resolution for providing me with a few minutes to discuss my introduction today of the Sustainable Solvency for Social Security Act. In introducing this legislation, I am under no illusion that there will be a rush to enactment, but do believe this is an appropriate time to draw attention to this issue and the broader issue of entitlement spending as we consider the budget resolution for fiscal year 2007.

Yesterday, we had a close vote on an amendment to reinstitute pay-as- you-go rules for spending increases and tax reductions. I opposed that amendment because a vote for it was, in essence, a vote for automatic tax increases on the American taxpayer. A more honest approach would have been to ask the Senate to adopt an amendment that required 60 votes to pass any legislation that would prevent the expiration of any tax provision that would, if allowed to expire, result in a tax increase on individual taxpayers.

I mention this because I do believe that we need fiscal discipline. We do need to collect higher revenues, but collecting higher revenues does not mean that you need to impose higher tax rates on capital or labor. Even if the sponsors of pay-go had prevailed, the real issue would be--once again--ignored.

The loaded gun held to the heads of American taxpayers is entitlement benefits that have been promised, but cannot be paid for under any realistic scenario. Economic growth can help solve or mitigate many fiscal challenges, but it cannot overcome the twin realities of demographic destiny or benefit structures that are simply unsustainable.

Today, four items--Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid and interest-- consume just under 10 percent of our Gross Domestic Product. If we do nothing we will see expenditures for the three programs increase to almost 20 percent of GDP. That is simply unsustainable.

Over the past year, I spent a great deal of time talking to members on both sides of the aisle, as well as the administration, about ways to begin addressing this looming crisis. 'started with Social Security. Some asked, ``Why start with the smallest problem?'' The answer was simple. If we can't come together on a problem that can be fixed by aligning benefits with program income, how can we ever expect to come together on more difficult issues like Medicare reform.

In the case of Social Security, we can quibble about exactly when, but at some point between 2042 and 2052, the program will be unable to pay benefits called for under current law and benefits will be reduced automatically to match program income with program outlays.

As I said, I have no illusion that the legislation I am introducing today will be enacted this year, but I offer it for my colleagues' examination and suggestions.

This legislation does not include personal accounts of any shape or form. It focuses exclusively on the goal of making Social Security solvent. And it does so without any increases in taxes or increases in the payroll cap.

Presently, the Social Security system faces an actuarial deficit of 1.92 percent of payroll. According to the Chief Actuary at Social Security, 1.60 percent of this deficit is related to the Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) program--what we traditionally think of as Social Security. The remaining 0.32 percent is attributable to the disability insurance program. As I discussed this issue with many of my colleagues and with others, it was clear that there was a broad consensus that the disabled should be held harmless. It was also clear that there was little or no support for the proposition that retirement program beneficiaries should subsidize the disability program. Therefore, this legislation does not touch the present disability program and leaves open the question of how to address the disability program deficit. Additionally, there was broad agreement that current retirees and those nearing retirement, born before 1950, should not have their benefits affected.

This legislation focuses solely on the 1.60 percent actuarial deficit in the OASI program. It achieves sustainable solvency for Social Security's OASI program through two primary policy tools: progressive price indexing and longevity indexing. Those reforms would slow the projected real rate of increase in future retirement benefits to a more sustainable level, while protecting low-wage-earners, the disabled, and their dependents. It also modestly accelerates the timetable for the transition under current law to a normal retirement age of 67, and it ensures sufficient backup general revenue funding to maintain a contingency reserve in the Old Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance (OASDI) trust fund.

My proposal for sustainable solvency has been scored by the office of the actuary at the Social Security Administration. The effects of its provisions affecting retirement benefits, progressive indexing, accelerated NRA 67, and longevity indexing, would eliminate entirely the OASI program actuarial deficit of 1.60 percent of payroll that is projected under current law.

Progressive indexing would not begin until 2012. First, it is important to note the beneficiaries, and Social Security programs to which progressive indexing would NOT apply. It would not apply to any current or future retiree born before 1950. Its provisions also would not apply to any worker in the future whose Social Security earnings history was in the lowest 30 percent of career earnings for workers becoming eligible to retire in a given year.

Progressive indexing essentially slows the future growth rate of benefits for higher-earning workers. Their initial retirement benefits will grow more In line with price growth, rather than the even-higher rate of increase pegged to wage growth under current law.

Under current law, retirement benefits are calculated under a ``wage indexing'' formula that will help propel them to levels significantly higher than the payroll tax revenue available to pay for them. The formula uses the average rate of growth of wages within the economy, rather than changes in the cost of living, to adjust, or ``index'', the past earnings of a worker that are used to determine the worker's initial benefit level at retirement. Because average wages generally grow faster than prices over time, the current benefit formula essentially guarantees that future retirement benefit levels will grow faster in ``real'' dollar value from generation to generation. Under this proposal, the individuals in the lowest 30 percent of all wage earners retiring in a given year would continue to have their past wages, and resulting benefit levels, indexed according to wage growth, while those at the top of the wage distribution would have their past wages indexed for changes in prices. Those falling in between would have their past wages indexed based upon a ``progressive blend'' of wage and price changes. In short, future benefit levels for workers who earned higher wages over their working career would not rise as much as benefit levels for workers with lower lifetime earnings, but those workers most dependent on social security for retirement income would be protected from such changes.

This blended version of progressive price indexing targets the sustainable levels of revenue that will be available for future Social Security benefits under current law in a manner that ensures that those retirees that will be most in need are treated the most generously. It builds on the underlying progressive structure of the current benefits formula that replaces lower levels of career earning with a relatively higher share of retirement benefits. The real purchasing power of future OASI benefits will continue to

grow, but not as much, in future decades for higher wage workers.

Longevity indexing recognizes that future retirees will live longer and, accordingly, receive inflation protected levels of their initial retirement benefits for longer periods of time than prior retirees. Absent any adjustment for changes in life expectancy beyond the age of retirement, longer lifetimes in retirement would mean increasingly greater dollar amounts of lifetime Social Security retirement benefits in future decades.

Under present law, the retirement age is scheduled to increase incrementally to age 67 beginning in 2022, the normal retirement age gradually increases for workers born in 1960 and later years, by two months each year starting in 2022 until it reaches age 67 in 2027. Under this proposal, the move from age 66 to age 67 would begin in 2012. The Normal Retirement Age or NRA would be increased by two months each year until the NRA reached age 67 in 2017. After that date, initial monthly benefits for future retirees would be periodically adjusted by the Social Security Administration to account for changes in the expected average lifetimes of future retirees.

Because it does not change current-law benefits for disabled beneficiaries, my bill does not address the remaining actuarial deficit for the DI program under current law, which amounts to another .32 percent of payroll. Accordingly, it does not close the larger overall actuarial deficit for the combined OASDI programs. The latter is 1.92 percent of payroll under current law, and would be substantially reduced to only .28 percent of payroll under my bill.

My plan's provisions that reduce OASDI benefit obligations first begin to operate in 2012, and they then improve annual unified budget balances for that year and all subsequent years within the standard 75- year projection period used by the Social Security Administration.

Several other measures demonstrate the improved solvency for the overall OASDI programs under my bill. The net cash flow from the OASDI Trust Funds to the general fund is improved by $3.6 trillion in present value. The OASDI Trust Fund exhaustion date would be extended from 2041 until 2056.

Until we can find further support for dealing with the remaining solvency problems in the DI program, we should at least ensure that sufficient resources are committed to prevent sudden across-the-board reductions in OASDI benefit levels in later decades. Therefore, my bill provides budget authority for general fund transfers as needed to maintain a 100 percent OASDI trust fund ratio in later years. Those general fund transfers are estimated by the SSA actuaries to amount to $0.6 trillion, in present value, over the next 75 years. This provision ensures solvency for the combined OASDI program through that period. After 2080, additional general revenue transfers are not expected to be necessary, and annual program cash-flow balances are projected to be improving and approaching positive annual balances beyond that year.

I also think it is important to point out that this legislation recognizes that changes in economic conditions have an impact on the actuarial balance of the program. Greater economic growth can improve but not alone restore the program's solvency; recessions can significantly worsen that financial position. Some expressed concern early in discussions on this legislation that we might be going too far, that some of the changes might prove unnecessary. For that reason I have included a provision that will allow for the administrative ``turning off' if you will of the progressive indexing or longevity indexing if the program comes into actuarial balance prior to those provisions being fully phased in.

In conclusion, this legislation would substantially reduce the mountain of unfunded debt projected for the Social Security program in the decades ahead. It does so in a manner that gradually and sensibly reduces the formula-driven increases in real retirement benefits under current law for future retirees, while protecting low-wage workers and the disabled. We could do more, but this bill would do a lot. At other times, I have proposed separate provisions to enhance overall retirement security, such as through the option of personal accounts funded partly from current payroll taxes and partly from additional personal saving. I have also proposed reforms in pension policy to encourage automatic enrollment in employer plans, provide better access to standard investment options, and stimulate increased saving by workers. But I have left those issues for another debate and focused on the solvency of the retirement program.

I offer this legislation as a starting point. I remain, as I have been over the past year, open to suggestions or modifications that can lead to bipartisan reform that will insure the permanent solvency of the Social Security system. We cannot afford to ignore this issue any longer. Burying our heads in the sand will only magnify the folly of inaction.

I ask unanimous consent that a section-by-section analysis of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, on March 1, 2006 Evert Meiners of Billings, MT pled guilty to distributing child pornography over the Internet. A search of his computer by the FBI turned up more than 12,000 images of child pornography.

Mr. Meiners had the child pornography images on his website, which he operated from his home in Billings. But authorities across the world were able to access the pictures. Law enforcement in New York, Illinois, Maryland, and even Germany, reported that Mr. Meiners distributed and solicited pornographic images in their jurisdictions.

The Internet has proved to be a powerful tool for both good and evil. Criminals operating from around the world can now prey on children in our own backyards. We used to worry what could happen to our kids on their way home from school. Now parents have to worry about their kids even in the safety of their own homes.

Since 1995 the FBI has tracked down over 11,000 unique web addresses that solicit and market child pornography.

The danger posed by these graphic web sites to our children demands action. That is why I will introduce the ``Cyber Safety for Kids Act'' today. As a general matter the legislation seeks to create a zone for all sexually explicit material that parents can easily block their children from visiting.

Specifically, the bill would do the following: First, the Cyber Safety for Kids Act would require the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers to designate a top level domain name for web sites with sexually explicit materials harmful to minors. The domain name would be titled dot XXX, rather than dot Com.

Next, within six months of the launch of the .XXX domain name, all web sites that contain sexually explicit materials harmful to minors would be required to adopt the dot XXX domain name.

Finally, if a web site that contains sexually explicit material harmful to minors fails to use the dot XXX domain name, the web operator would be subject to civil penalties set by the Department of Commerce.

I know that some people believe that my legislation goes too far. Others believe that it does not go far enough. For example, some argue that all pornography over the Internet should be banned. That would certainly be effective, but would unquestionably be overturned by the Supreme Court. On numerous occasions, the Supreme Court has struck down laws that prohibit the broadcast of pornographic images.

On the other hand, I have heard from some that believe my legislation is too restrictive. I am a strong defender of the Constitution's protection of speech. But we cannot bury our heads in the sand and pretend that the problem of children viewing harmful material over the Internet will go away.

We must do what we can do to help parents protect their kids. My legislation aims to follow the successful efforts by States and localities to zone adult book and movie theaters in one part of a city or town.

In Renton v. Playtime Theaters the Supreme Court specifically upheld a city zoning ordinance that prohibited adult motion picture theaters from locating within 1,000 feet of any residential zone, single- or multiple-family dwelling, church, park, or school.

Likewise, my legislation creates a zone for all sexually explicit material that is harmful to minors on the Internet. Parents could easily install filters on their computer to keep their kids from visiting the dot XXX neighborhood.

There is no silver bullet that will stop sick adults from trafficking and

soliciting child pornography. But my legislation offers an important first step.

I look forward to working with my colleagues to move this legislation forward. I am also appreciative of Senator Pryor's leadership on this issue in the Commerce Committee. I am glad to say that Senator Pryor has agreed to be the lead co-sponsor of my legislation.

I urge Congress to support my legislation, and have it on the President's desk as soon as possible. American parents have asked for our help, it's our duty to act.

Mr. President, today I am introducing legislation to make America more competitive by increasing savings. The bill encourages savings at work, and requires that the Government consider the Nation's savings in the budget process.

That great American philosopher Yogi Berra once said: ``If you see a fork in the road, take it.''

Well, we are at that fork in the road. Private savings are at an all time low. And the government just spoons out more and more red ink. If America does not change its ways, we will find ourselves on the wrong fork.

For the past 10 months, I have been talking about competitiveness. I have been talking about the steps that we must take to keep this country strong. And I have been talking about the steps that we must take to make it stronger.

One key component of my competitiveness agenda is savings. We must improve our national savings rate because capital is critical to growth. And continued deficits lead ultimately to a downward spiral.

The 2005 personal savings rate was negative--minus 0.5 percent. Taxpayers have joined their government in engaging in deficit spending. We have to turn our savings rates around. The question is how to do it.

With regard to Federal Government budget deficits, we have talked a lot over the last few days about the need for a pay-as-you-go process. We all know that it is important. The only question is whether we are willing to take the tough steps that pay-go requires, and not leave the burden to our children and grandchildren.

Pay-go does not necessarily mean tax increases. It could mean collecting the taxes that are already owed. The most recent IRS estimate of the tax gap--the difference between what taxpayers owe and what they pay on time--is $350 billion each year.

Collecting that difference would pay for a lot of the Government. Several times, the Senate has passed legislation that would close corporate loopholes and other abuses that contribute to the tax gap. Instead of looking for additional taxes, we should work with our Colleagues in the House to enact proposals like these that will simply get taxpayers to pay what they already owe.

Today, I want to focus on the lack of personal savings for retirement. We all know it is inadequate. And we must address this problem if American workers are to be able to retire with confidence that they can maintain their living standards.

The ``Savings Competitiveness Act,'' which I introduce today, will make it easier for millions of workers to save for retirement. It will create an automatic opportunity for workers to have savings withheld from their paychecks.

We cannot improve the personal savings rate by providing tax incentives that simply shift savings from one type of account to another, or from one investment to another. We can improve the personal savings rate only by creating new savings, especially savings by workers who would otherwise not save. I believe that this bill will do just that.

Data on retirement savings show that workers who can save at work through payroll deduction arrangements--such as 401(k) plans--usually take advantage of the opportunity to save. About two-thirds of eligible workers contribute to a 401(k) plan. That percentage jumps dramatically--to more than 80 percent--if eligible workers are automatically enrolled in these plans. Automatic enrollment makes saving the default. Workers can opt out. But those who do not opt out, start saving.

In November, we passed the pension bill by an overwhelming margin-- 97-to-2. That bill included provisions to encourage opt-out 401(k) and 403(b) plans, instead of opt-in plans. This is a very important first step. Separate bills introduced by Senators Bingaman and Snowe, and Senators Conrad and Smith were the basis for the Senate provisions. And I applaud their efforts to move these ideas along. Since the House also included automatic enrollment language in its bill, I expect that the final conference bill will take this dramatic step toward increasing savings.

That, however, is just a first step. Automatic enrollment in 401(k) and 403(b) plans will help only those who are eligible to join an employer-sponsored plan. That is about 60 percent of working Americans. Unfortunately, that leaves 40 percent of workers out in the cold. For small employers, the situation is worse. More than half of workers with small employers--those with fewer than 25 employees--have no employer- sponsored retirement plan. And for firms with fewer than 10 employees, only 16 percent of workers participate in an employer-sponsored plan.

Those who have no employer-sponsored retirement program are far less likely to save for retirement than those who do; 85 percent of workers eligible for an employer-sponsored plan are actually earning benefits in those plans. But less than 20 percent of eligible taxpayers contribute to an IRA.

Many more own IRAs--because funds from employer plans have been rolled over to an IRA. But the truth is, most retirement savings came from employer-based retirement plans.

The high participation rates in employer-sponsored 401(k) plans, and the

low rates for IRAs, leads to a clear conclusion. We can increase retirement savings--create new savings--by making payroll deduction retirement savings available to more workers.

This is not a new idea. President Clinton's USA accounts were one attempt to bring retirement savings to all working Americans. Senator Bingaman first proposed universal access to retirement savings in his Secure Retirement for America Act in the 107th Congress. But it is time that we stopped talking. It is time that we started doing something to change the direction of the personal savings rate.

Access to payroll savings is important, but it is not enough. The Savings Competitiveness Act that I introduce today will expand savings opportunities and more.

This bill helps workers by providing an opportunity to save for retirement through payroll deduction at work. Employers are not required to contribute. Employers just withhold contributions and forward them to an IRA. We provide a modest credit to help small employers with the start-up costs.

This bill helps children by allowing Young Saver's Accounts to be used for kid's savings.

This bill helps small employers who want to contribute toward employees' retirement savings get started with a 3-year start-up credit for 50 percent of contributions to workers who are not highly compensated. And small employers who use ``SIMPLE'' plans can share the profits in a good year by making discretionary contributions to employees' SIMPLE IRAs.

This bill helps lower-income taxpayers by replacing the current Saver's Credit with a refundable credit, deposited to the taxpayer's retirement savings account. Families earning up to $50,000 would be eligible for a 50 percent credit. Those earning up to $60,000 would be entitled to a portion of the credit. Low-income savers would not be penalized by losing eligibility for food stamps and other benefits.

This bill helps retirees with modest savings by exempting $50,000 of their savings from minimum distribution requirements.

This bill removes traps for the unwary by simplifying distribution rules. It would conform 401(k) and IRA penalties so that workers who do not have advisers to lead them through a series of hoops do not get hit with excise taxes that those with a guide can avoid.

This bill takes some of the guesswork out of choosing an IRA. It would create a seal of approval for IRAs that have investment options similar to those in the Thrift Savings Plan and modest fees.

The Senate's automatic enrollment provisions are not law yet. So I have also included them in this new legislation.

I encourage my Colleagues to join with me to provide workplace savings opportunities for working Americans that now have none and to stop the unlimited growth of the deficit by adopting a pay-as-you-go requirement. I ask you to support the Savings Competitiveness Act.

Mr. President, I seek recognition today to introduce a bill to regulate electronic surveillance programs designed to gather intelligence for national security purposes.

On Friday, December 16, 2005, the New York Times reported that in late 2001, President Bush signed a highly classified directive that authorized the National Security Agency to intercept communications between people inside the United States and terrorism suspects overseas. And so the debate began. Did the President have the authority to authorize this program? Did it violate the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act--or FISA? Had Congress independently granted the President this authority? Did he have these inherent powers under the Constitution? Lawyers and laymen throughout our country have debated the issue. The Senate Judiciary Committee initiated two hearings on the legality of the NSA program and, pursuant to our oversight function, brought in Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and seven leading scholars and experts to testify. After questioning General Gonzales for some 7 hours, and the panel of scholars for hours more, we were still left troubled by two competing concerns.

On the one hand, we are a Nation at war. On September 11 we suffered the worst attack on civilians in our country's history by an enemy like none we had faced before. The more we learn about this enemy, the more we learn about a cruel and brutal opponent who will stop at nothing to terrorize and harm our country. This is an enemy that knows no honor. It seeks to inflict ever-escalating violence on defenseless civilians. This is an enemy that knows no mercy. It beheads innocent aid workers and journalists and proudly broadcasts these murders for the world to see. This is an enemy that knows no bounds of decency. It recruits women and children to strap bombs to their bodies and blow themselves up, knowing that American soldiers are likely to come close to help them. This is an enemy that is patient. It infiltrates our borders and waits quietly for an opportunity to attack. Most frighteningly, this is an enemy that is capable. It roams the globe, organizing terrorist cells along its path. It has the ability to master and exploit modem technology and organize attacks on America from anywhere on the globe.

On the other hand, we are a Nation that believes in the rule of law. We are a people that hold dear the rights and liberties enshrined in our Constitution. Although we recognize the threat we face, we are not willing to sacrifice our rights and live in a state of perpetual fear. Our enemy is the enemy of freedom, and we will not give that enemy the satisfaction of making us give up the very freedom we cherish.

The question remains, what is a society like ours to do?

I do not agree with those who contend that the current FISA law is just fine. When the FISA bill was enacted in 1978, we faced a very different enemy. That enemy did not attack on our soil; that enemy was organized into nation states that we could negotiate with; that enemy did not use terrorist tactics on our civilian population. And in 1978, we were grappling with very different technologies. We were worried about telephone and telegraphs, not e-mail, cell phones, handheld computers, and Internet chat rooms. Accordingly, the Congress passed a law in 1978 that required case-by-case warrants; warrants that identified individual persons and places; warrants a lot like those a prosecutor would seek in a routine criminal investigation. These case- by-case warrants, however, simply may not be sufficient today, when we are in a time of war and we need to track an amorphous enemy that moves quickly and is often able to evade detection.

At the same time, I do not agree with those who insist that we are facing an entirely new situation, and that the checks and balances our nation has long embraced are now outdated. I think these advocates are wrong when they insist that the best we can do is to give the Executive Branch a blank check and hope that it will do the right thing.

I believe that there is a middle ground. I believe it is possible to provide the President with the flexibility and secrecy he needs to track terrorists, while providing for meaningful supervision outside of the Executive Branch. It may be surprising to some, but I think we can get some insight from, of all places, a Senate hearing.

Let's step back and survey the situation. The country had recently discovered that the NSA had secretly worked with major communication companies for years. We learned that initially the program focused on certain foreign targets, but it grew to cover communications from U.S. citizens. Amid accusations that the President had violated the Constitution and Federal statute, a Senate Committee called the Attorney General to testify and address the ``serious legal and constitutional questions . . . raised by the program.''

If this sounds familiar, it should. It is what took place in November 1975, when the nation discovered a secret NSA program to monitor telegraph messages, and a special Senate Committee called Attorney General Edward Levi to testify.

That hearing, like the hearing the Senate Judiciary Committee held last week, elicited discussions on the importance of preserving civil liberties and upholding the Bill of Rights, and the need to protect national security and preserve secrecy in foreign intelligence. That hearing also elicited a possible solution.

During his testimony to the Church Committee on U.S. Intelligence Activities, Attorney General Levi suggested that one method for granting the President the needed flexibility, while maintaining supervision by the courts, was to give a special court the power to issue broader, program-wide warrants. Attorney General Levi reasoned that for programs ``designed to gather foreign-intelligence information essential to the security of the Nation,'' the court should have the power to approve

a ``program of surveillance.'' He explained that the traditional warrant procedure works only when surveillance ``involves a particular target location or individual at a specific time.'' While this procedure was fine for routine, criminal investigations, the Nation needed a different solution for enemies that require ``virtually continuous surveillance, which by its nature does not have specifically predetermined targets.'' Attorney General Levi suggested that in approving a surveillance plan, the court should determine whether the program ``strikes a reasonable balance between the government's need for the information and the protection of individuals' rights.''

Unfortunately, we did not follow Attorney General Levi's suggestion. It is not too late to do so, however. The National Security Surveillance Act of 2006 seeks to pick up where the Congress of 1978 left off.

I believe that the National Security Surveillance Act sets forth workable and effective procedures for the FISA Court to evaluate surveillance programs. Its procedures, in fact, are very similar to those Attorney General Levi advocated thirty years ago.

First, in order to continue the NSA program, or any similar programs, the Attorney General must apply to the FISA court for permission to initiate a surveillance program and then seek re-authorization of that program every 45 days. The Attorney General must explain his legal basis for concluding that the surveillance program is constitutional. He must also provide a good deal of information to the court. He must: identify or describe the foreign country or terrorist group he seeks to monitor; provide enough facts to indicate one of the parties on the line is a member of that foreign country or terrorist group or has had communications with it; identify the steps he is taking to make sure that innocent Americans are not being swept into the surveillance program; determine that at least one of the parties is in the U. S.; estimate the number of communications to be monitored; and provide data so the FISA court can evaluate the program, including information on how long the program has existed and what type of intelligence it has uncovered.

The Attorney General should feel no concern in sharing information about the program with the FISA court. The FISA court has proven that it is capable of maintaining the secrecy with which it has been charged and that it possesses the requisite expertise and discretion for adjudicating sensitive issues of national security.

The FISA court must then determine whether approving the program is consistent with the U.S. Constitution. It must also balance the interests at stake and decide whether to approve the program. Specifically, the court must: determine whether probable cause exists to authorize the surveillance; evaluate whether historically the government has implemented the electronic surveillance program in accordance with its proposals; determine that at least one of the participants to the electronic communication is a member of the foreign country or terrorist group that the Attorney General has identified; consider the privacy costs of the program as measured by the number of communications subjected to the electronic surveillance program, the length of time the electronic surveillance program has been in existence, and the effectiveness of the minimization procedures; and consider the benefits of the program as measured by the intelligence information obtained or the number of plots uncovered or cells disrupted.

The Attorney General must resubmit the program to the FISA court every 45 days. In the event the FISA court refuses to approve the electronic surveillance program, that does not end the matter. The Attorney General may modify the program and then submit a new application, until the FISA court concludes that the program satisfies the Constitution and the standards set forth in this bill. In the alternative, the Attorney General may conclude that implementing an amended program is inappropriate in light of the FISA court's concerns. The FISA court would itself be required to notify Congress of its decision with respect to the proffered program's constitutionality. Finally, the bill requires the Attorney General to submit information on the program's scope and effectiveness to the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Senate and House Intelligence Committees every 6 months.

In the case at hand, the Attorney General would be required to justify the NSA surveillance program to the FISA court, which would, in turn, determine whether the program met all constitutional and legal requirements. The court would be required to consider, for example, whether members of Al Qaeda were appropriately targeted, whether proper minimization techniques were being followed, and whether the program satisfied the demands of the Fourth Amendment.

There are those who will say that we should not act. That currently, things are fine. I would remind my colleagues that our enemies are not so content to sit still. A country that does not understand that our enemy has changed since the 1970s will come to regret it. And a Congress that pauses when it should act, denies its duty to adapt to the enemy we currently face. But, ultimately, the enemies of democracy win when civil liberties are lost. We must maintain our democracy and defeat our enemies.

This legislation does both and I urge my colleagues to support it.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, I wish to make an important note regarding a provision in the conference agreement on H.R. 5682, the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006.

The conferees on this legislation believe that one of the most important aspects of renewed nuclear cooperation with India will be the new safeguards agreement it enters into with the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, that would apply to its expanded list of declared civilian nuclear sites, facilities, and locations.

The administration's original legislation concerning India, which I introduced as S. 2429 on March 16, 2006, stated with regard to this matter that the President had to determine that ``an agreement has entered into force between India and the IAEA requiring the application of safeguards in accordance with IAEA practices to India's civil nuclear facilities.''

As a part of the committee's consideration of the administration's proposal, I asked a number of questions for the record regarding this new safeguards agreement. Secretary Rice stated in response to a question asked in April of this year regarding India's new safeguards agreement that:

This Initiative will only allow for nuclear cooperation to

proceed with civil facilities and programs that are

safeguarded by the IAEA. The Government of India has agreed

that these safeguards will be in place in perpetuity. Under

the Initiative, India has committed to place all its current

and future civil nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards,

including monitoring and inspections. These procedures are

designed to detect--and thereby prevent--the diversion to

military use of any nuclear materials, technologies, or

equipment provided to India's civil nuclear facilities. India

has also committed to sign and adhere to an Additional

Protocol, which provides for even broader IAEA access to

facilities and information regarding nuclear related

activities.

In March of this year, Senator Biden asked Under Secretaries Robert Joseph and Nicholas Burns how they interpreted certain Indian statements regarding their new safeguards agreement, specifically India's contention that it will be ``India-specific.'' They stated:

``It will be incumbent on India to clarify what it means by

`India-specific' safeguards in the context of its

negotiations with the IAEA. In our view, the safeguards

agreement for India will be unique to India because India

presents a unique set of circumstances. India has agreed to

place all its civil nuclear facilities under safeguards in a

phased manner, along with future civil facilities, but India

is not an NPT party and will have non-civil facilities and

material outside of safeguards. However, there is an accepted

IAEA framework for safeguards (INFCIRC/66) that pre-dates the

NPT and is suited to safeguarding material in a non-NPT party

without full-scope safeguards. In its separation plan, India

has committed to safeguards in perpetuity.''

In November 2005, I asked Under Secretary Joseph what kinds of safeguards will be applied to India's declared civil sites, facilities, and locations. He responded that:

``Safeguards agreements are modeled after INFCIRC/153 (the

NPT safeguards agreement) or INFCIRC/66 (the Agency's

safeguards system predating the NPT). India will not likely

sign a safeguards agreement based strictly on INFCIRC/153, as

this would require safeguards on India's nuclear weapons

program. NPT-acknowledged nuclear weapon states have so-

called `voluntary' safeguards agreements that draw on

INFCIRC/153 language, but do not obligate the IAEA to

actually apply safeguards and do allow for the removal of

facilities or material from safeguards. We heard from other

states at the recent NSG meeting that they would not support

a ``voluntary offer'' arrangement as, in their view, it would

be tantamount to granting de facto nuclear weapon state

status to India. We have similarly indicated to India that we

would not view such an arrangement as defensible from a

nonproliferation standpoint. We therefore believe that the

logical approach to formulating a safeguards agreement for

India is to use INFCIRC/66, which is currently used at

India's four safeguarded reactors. For the most part,

INFCIRC/66 and INFCIRC/153 agreements result in very similar

technical measures actually applied at nuclear facilities.''

In view of these responses, and since S. 2429 contained similar language, the Senate's India bill, S. 3709, specified with regard to India's safeguards agreement, and the determination the President had to make regarding it, that ``an agreement between India and the IAEA requiring the application of safeguards in perpetuity in accordance with IAEA standards, principles, and practices to civil nuclear facilities, programs, and materials . . . has entered into force and the text of such agreement has been made available to the appropriate congressional committees.''

The conference agreement before us today does not include the language from the S. 3709 regarding this element of the Presidential determination required to use the waiver authority we grant. Rather, the conference agreement provides in section 104(b)(2) that ``India and the IAEA have concluded all legal steps required prior to signature by the parties of an agreement requiring the application of IAEA safeguards in perpetuity in accordance with IAEA standards, principles, and practices, (including IAEA Board of Governors Document GOV/1621 (1973)) to India's civil nuclear facilities, materials, and programs . . . including materials used in or produced through the use of India's civil nuclear facilities.''

The conferees were assured by administration officials that the language referring to ``all legal steps'' includes approval by the IAEA Board of Governors. The conferees understand that safeguards agreements are signed after Board of Governors' approval, but that entry into force can take additional time. Since Board of Governors' approval would mean that the text of the safeguards agreement would be final, and it is unlikely that either the IAEA or India would sign an agreement that is not final, conferees agreed to this language. The conferees' intent was to secure as final a text as possible for congressional review since the text of the new Indian safeguards agreement would be submitted to Congress as a part of the Presidential determination and waiver authority contained in section 104 of this conference agreement. It is the view of the conferees that this language means that Congress will receive the final text of such an agreement as a part of the President's determination.

(At the request of Mr. Reid, the following statement was ordered to be printed in the Record.)

Mr. President, today the Senate passes H.R. 5682, the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act.

This agreement is the most important strategic diplomatic initiative undertaken by President Bush. By concluding this pact and the far- reaching set of cooperative agreements that accompany it, the President has embraced a long-term outlook that seeks to enhance the core strength of our foreign policy in a way that will give us new diplomatic options and improve global stability.

The Committee on Foreign Relations undertook an extensive review of this agreement. We held 4 public hearings with testimony from 17 witnesses, including Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. We received a classified briefing from Under Secretaries of State Nick Burns and Bob Joseph. Numerous briefings were held for staff with experts from the Congressional Research Service, the State Department, and the National Security Council. I submitted more than 170 written questions for the record to the Department of State on details of the agreement and posted the answers on my web site.

The agreement allows India to receive nuclear fuel, technology, and reactors from the United States--benefits that were previously denied to India because of its status outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, (NPT). This pact can be a lasting incentive for India to abstain from further nuclear weapons tests and to cooperate closely with the United States in stopping proliferation, and our legislation further strengthens this situation.

The conference agreement before us is an important step toward implementing the nuclear agreement with India, but we should understand that it is not the final step. This legislation sets the rules for subsequent Congressional consideration of a so-called 123 agreement between the United States and India. A 123 agreement is the term for an agreement for civil nuclear cooperation arranged pursuant to the conditions outlined in section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

I am pleased to note that the conference agreement does not restrict nor does it predetermine congressional action on the forthcoming 123 agreement. Unlike the administration's original legislative proposal, this bill preserves congressional prerogatives with regard to consideration of a future 123 agreement. Under the administration's original proposal, the 123 agreement would have entered into force 90 days after submission unless both Houses of Congress voted against it and with majorities that could overcome a likely Presidential veto. I am pleased the administration changed course on this matter and agreed to submit the 123 agreement with India to Congress under existing procedures in the Atomic Energy Act. This means that both the House and the Senate must cast a positive vote of support before the 123 agreement can enter into force. In my view, this better protects Congress's role in the process and ensures congressional views will be taken into consideration. In addition, it does not limit our actions to a single ``no'' vote, which could have severe consequences for United States-India relations. It would be particularly risky if that were the only course available to Congress, no matter what its concerns may be.

Title II of this conference agreement contains legislation on the U.S. Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency AEA. President Bush called on the Senate to ratify this important agreement on February 11, 2004, and the Senate did so on March 31, 2004. This conference agreement contains important implementing provisions for our Additional Protocol that the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations has been working on for more than 2 years. This legislative measure is critical because our Additional Protocol is not a self-executing agreement, and passage of implementing legislation completes Congressional action and permits the agreement to come into force. Our action today will allow the President to complete U.S. ratification and make this Nation a party to this important IAEA safeguards measure. U.S. ratification and implementation of the Additional Protocol will give Secretary Rice and our representative to the IAEA in Vienna, Austria, an important diplomatic tool in the battle against proliferation as we maintain our longstanding leadership and support for the IAEA safeguards system. Our Additional Protocol is one part of that support, just like our annual voluntary contributions to the IAEA, and they involve significant congressional oversight and involvement. Approval of this legislation today is good news because it shows that Congress supports the critical nonproliferation work of the

The Senate will shortly take a momentous step in U.S.-India relations by passing the conference report on H.R. 5682, the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006. Enactment of this legislation brings us much closer to the day when India will resume peaceful nuclear commerce, despite its status as a state that has nuclear weapons and has never been a state party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It will help bring India into the global nuclear nonproliferation system. It also helps to remove a major irritant in the relations between our two countries.

This bill is a tremendous victory for U.S.-India relations. And it increases the prospect for stability and progress in South Asia and the rest of the world.

It has become cliche to speak of the U.S.-India relationship as a bond between the world's oldest democracy and the world's largest democracy--but this cliche is also a fact. Shared political values are the foundation for our relationship, a firm belief in the dignity of man and the consent of the governed.

Senator Lugar and I yield to no one in our commitment to nuclear nonproliferation. We have taken great care, in this legislation, to protect the role of Congress and of the international institutions that enforce nuclear nonproliferation.

This legislation was the result of hard compromises--compromises between our two countries and between Congress and the executive branch. The end result, however, was overwhelming bipartisan support, in both the House and the Senate. That level of broad, solid, bipartisan buy-in was absolutely essential when crafting legislation with such long-term impact on vital American interests.

I want to pay special tribute tonight to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Lugar of Indiana, for his tremendous contribution to securing that broad, bipartisan consensus. The administration originally proposed legislation that would have effectively taken away the power of Congress to review an agreement for nuclear cooperation with India, and Senator Lugar was under great pressure to accept that proposal. He did not do that. Instead, he held four hearings--three open and one closed--that allowed all sides to express their views and that enabled Senators from both parties to raise their concerns with the approval procedure that the administration had proposed. Then he and I worked to craft a Senate bill that passed by a vote of 16-2 in committee and 85-12 on the floor of the Senate.

Senator Lugar performed a signal service to our country when he added title II to this legislation, the implementing legislation for the U.S. Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency. It is fitting that this legislation has been combined with the India nuclear bill, since part of the nuclear deal is for India to negotiate its own Additional Protocol with the IAEA. It will also be a notable benefit to U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy when the United States finally ratifies its Additional Protocol, giving our country greater credibility as it presses other countries to allow the IAEA to increase its inspections of their nuclear programs. Ratification of the U.S.- IAEA Additional Protocol was long delayed, and Senator Lugar's leadership on this issue was absolutely vital to this final, successful conclusion.

In conference with the House of Representatives, Senator Lugar and I once again worked for a measure that could gain broad support from the Senate. We worked with the House conferees to craft a bill that embodied the best ideas from each house of Congress. At the same time, we worked with the Administration to reach agreement on a wide range of issues, without sacrificing the principles that each house had written into its legislation. We and the other conferees chose substance over rhetoric. The result is a conference report that will command the same broad, bipartisan support today that was demonstrated in the Senate 3 weeks ago.

I would like also to acknowledge the staff members who have contributed to the success of this legislation. On the Senate side, the Foreign Relations Committee was most ably served by Ken Myers III, Thomas Moore, Edward Levine and Brian McKeon. Mr. Stephen Rademaker of the majority leader's staff was also an important contributor to our efforts. On the House side, the conferees were most ably served by Douglas Seay, David Fite and David Abramowitz, among others.

The U.S.-India agreement is much more than just a nuclear deal. I believe historians will see this as part of a dramatic and positive departure in the U.S.-India relationship that was begun by President Clinton and continued by President Bush.

In a time when relationships between states are critically important in shaping the world in which we live, no relationship is more important than the one we're building with India. There is still much to be done in India, as a stable and secure India is very much in America's national interest. We should work to help India increase its energy production, combat terrorism, and guard against epidemics of infectious diseases. We should help both India and Pakistan to ease tensions between their countries and, someday, to walk back from the nuclear precipice. And India should continue its progress toward the front rank of world leaders, and especially of leaders in combating the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Enactment of this bill today helps both countries to keep moving on the path of cooperation for a better world.

In conclusion, I would like to turn to an issue raised recently by some experts, whether the legislation before us, by citing a particular IAEA document, might undermine the principle of perpetuity of safeguards in India. My view is that the IAEA document makes a real contribution to our understanding of safeguards perpetuity.

The document cited by this legislation appears in section 104(b)(2), the second determination that the President will have to make when submitting a U.S.-India agreement for nuclear cooperation to the Congress. It is an IAEA Board of Governors memo cited as GOV/1621 of 20 August 1973. We have been given permission to publish this document, so I will ask that it be printed in the Record at the end of these remarks.

The Board of Governors memo makes clear that safeguards on nuclear material will extend until that material no longer has any possible nuclear weapons use, or until it is exchanged with an equal amount of previously unsafeguarded material, or until it leaves the country--in which case safeguards may continue elsewhere. In other words, if you move some imported fuel or equipment to a new location, that location becomes subject to safeguards.

The memo also makes clear that safeguards on ``nuclear material, equipment, facilities or non-nuclear material'' supplied to a nuclear facility will apply as well to fissile material ``produced, processed or used in or in connection with'' a safeguarded facility. In other words, any fissile material produced by a safeguarded facility becomes subject to safeguards even after it leaves that facility. Until that output no longer has any possible nuclear weapons use, safeguards follow it; that is a real example of perpetuity of sanctions.

At the same time, perpetuity does not mean that a facility will be subject

to safeguards until the end of time. A facility can be decommissioned so that it, too, no longer has any possible nuclear weapons use. Or, if the only reason for safeguards is that the facility has imported equipment or material, removal of all such equipment or material from the facility could render it eligible for removal from safeguards. Thus, India's reprocessing plant is safeguarded when it handles spent fuel from imported uranium, but not when India is using it to reprocess spent fuel made from domestic uranium. That is the way safeguards have worked for years in India.

The Government of India has announced that eight more of its existing power reactors will be declared as civil and opened to IAEA inspection. India would gain great credibility if it were to let those reactors be inspected even if they use domestic nuclear fuel. Indian officials have suggested, however, that they may insist upon the right to remove those reactors from safeguards if foreign fuel supplies are cut off, and the safeguards agreement that India negotiates with the IAEA may allow for that. There is precedent for such an arrangement, in states that do not have full-scope safeguards, and it would be up to the IAEA Board of Governors, of which the United States is a member, to decide whether that arrangement was permissible in this case. It would be up to Congress and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, of course, to consider whether that sort of safeguards arrangement was sufficient to warrant authorizing peaceful nuclear commerce with India. And it would be up to the executive branch to determine whether to authorize a particular export to India, in light of the safeguards that would govern the facility for which the export was requested.

India has also said that many new power reactors will be put under IAEA safeguards. If those reactors are foreign-built, like the Tarapur reactor, there will be no way that they can be withdrawn from safeguards unless they are decommissioned. If they are domestic designs but use some foreign equipment, there will be no way to withdraw them from safeguards without first removing the foreign equipment. And if foreign equipment should be used in one of the eight domestically built reactors that are put under safeguards, then that equipment, too, would have to be removed before that reactor could be removed from safeguards.

As a matter of principle, then, perpetuity in safeguards applies more to material and equipment than it does to a whole facility, unless that facility is foreign-built. In practice, however, the only reactors that India might pull out of its safeguards regime would be the eight newly- safeguarded ones, and I believe that the only time that this might occur would be if India were to come under sanctions because of improper nuclear activities or weapons proliferation. In such a case, the regime for nuclear cooperation with India would likely be collapsing anyway.

The material follows.