To amend chapter 35 of title 28, United States Code, to provide for a 120-day limit to the term of a United States attorney appointed on an interim basis by the Attorney General, and for other purposes.

Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 580) to amend chapter 35 of title 28, United States Code, to provide for a 120-day limit to the term of a United States attorney appointed on an interim basis by the Attorney General, and for other purposes, as amended.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on the bill under consideration.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, the measure before us today has been introduced by the gentleman from California, a ranking member of the committee and a subcommittee Chair, Howard Berman. It is intended to restore the historical checks and balances to the process by which interim U.S. Attorneys are appointed. It will repair a breach in the law that has been a major contributing factor in the recent termination of eight able and experienced United States Attorneys and their replacement with interim appointments. It has gathered much attention across this Nation, and not just in government and legal circles.

The full circumstances surrounding these terminations are still coming to light, but what we know is already very troubling. The reports about these terminations are particularly troubling in that the United States Attorneys are among the most powerful government officials we have. They have the power to seek convictions and bring the full weight of the United States Government against any citizen or company that they deem important and eligible for prosecution. They can negotiate plea agreements. They can send people to prison for years and years. And frequently, the mere disclosure of a criminal investigation can destroy reputations and careers.

These are awesome powers. And so we on the Judiciary Committee consider it absolutely essential that the American people have full confidence in those entrusted to exercise these powers and that they do so with complete integrity and free from political influence of any kind.

The committee's investigation into these troubling circumstances is continuing. The longer time goes on, the more we know; and the more we know, the more we are troubled about what has been going on in the Department of Justice. It has already become abundantly clear that the gaping vulnerability in the law, which has placed the independence and integrity of our prosecutorial system in jeopardy, needs to be repaired as quickly as possible; and that is what we are here to do today.

What helped bring these troubling circumstances about, what helped make it possible for high-level Justice Department and White House officials to even entertain the notion that they could, as appears to be the case, target certain U.S. Attorneys for an unprecedented mid- course purge was an obscure provision adequately and anonymously slipped into the USA PATRIOT Reauthorization Act conference report in March of 2006. Without any debate, let alone the benefit of a single hearing in either body, this provision, added at the behest of the Justice Department's top political appointees to significantly enhance the power to appoint interim U.S. Attorneys without having to subject their appointments to customary safeguard of Senate confirmation. It was a middle-of-the-night insertion, and we are here to correct that.

Indeed, the administration's plan to exploit the new provision to bypass the Senate confirmation process is now well documented. As bluntly explained

by internal e-mails we received, and they now number in the hundreds, although we get them late on Friday nights, by the Attorney General's then-chief of staff, for example, discussing their plan to install the former Republican National Committee political operative, the new provision would enable them to ``give far less deference to home State Senators and thereby get our preferred person appointed and do it far faster and more efficiently at less political cost to the White House.''

This is outrageous. The Senate has already acted. The time is now. We need to move as rapidly as we can to correct this very serious error that casts a question upon the integrity of a very, very important part of our government, the Department of Justice.

Speaker, the bill before us today, introduced by my friend Howard Berman, will restore the historical checks and balances to the process by which interim U.S. Attorneys are appointed. It will repair a breach in the law that has been a major contributing factor in the recent termination of eight able and experienced United States Attorneys and their replacement with interim appointments.

The full circumstances surrounding these terminations are still coming to light, but what we know already is very troubling.

In one instance, the primary apparent qualification for the President's chosen replacement was that he had been an aggressive political operative at the Republican National Committee, thereby putting himself on Karl Rove's A list. In several other instances, the U.S. Attorney was in the midst of a sensitive public corruption investigation, and there were reportedly complaints from Republicans that the investigation was being pursued too aggressively against a fellow Republican, or was not being pursued aggressively enough against a Democrat.

The reports about these terminations are particularly troubling in that U.S. Attorneys are among our most powerful government officials. They not only have power to seek convictions and negotiate plea agreements that can send people to prison for years. The mere disclosure of a criminal investigation can destroy reputations and careers.

These are awesome powers, and it is absolutely essential that the American people can have full confidence those entrusted to exercise these powers do so with complete integrity and free from improper political influence.

The Committee's investigation into these troubling circumstances is continuing, and we will know more, and we will leave extended discussion of them for another day. But it has already become abundantly clear that the gaping vulnerability in the law, which has placed the independence and integrity of our prosecutorial system in jeopardy, needs to be repaired as quickly as possible. And that is what we are here to do today.

What helped bring these troubling circumstances about--what helped make it possible for high-level Justice Department and White House officials to even entertain the notion that they could, as appears to be the case, target certain U.S. Attorneys for an unprecedented mid- course purge--was an obscure provision quietly and anonymously slipped into the USA PATRIOT Reauthorization Act conference report in March 2006.

Without any I debate, let alone the benefit of a single hearing in either body, this provision was added at the behest of the Justice Department's top political appointees, to significantly enhance their power to appoint interim U.S. Attorneys, without having to subject the appointments to the customary safeguard of Senate confirmation.

Indeed, the Administration's deliberate plan to exploit the new provision to bypass the Senate confirmation process is now well documented. As bluntly explained in an internal e-mail by the Attorney General's then chief of staff, for example, discussing their plan to install the former RNC political operative, the new provision would enable them to ``give far less deference to home-State Senators and thereby get (1) our preferred person appointed and (2) do it far faster and more efficiently, at less political cost to the White House.''

Traditionally--since the Civil War--whenever a U.S. Attorney left office, and until the Senate could confirm a replacement, the local federal district court has appointed someone to fill the position on an interim basis. This was a neutral means of ensuring that permanent appointments remained the shared responsibility of the President and the Senate--to encourage the President to send a nomination to the Senate promptly, and to encourage the Senate to act promptly on the nomination.

In 1986, at the request of Attorney General Ed Meese, the law was modified to authorize the Attorney General to make short-term interim U.S. Attorney appointments, for up to 120 days. But if a permanent U.S. Attorney had not been confirmed by the end of that 120 days, the district court retained authority to make the appointment for the remainder of the interim period. This procedure, codified in 28 U.S.C. Sec. 546, preserved the incentives on the Executive and Legislative Branches to work together on the nomination and confirmation of a permanent replacement.

That balanced approach was unceremoniously jettisoned a year ago, and with it respect for the Senate's role in ensuring that the President's power to hire and fire U.S. Attorneys at will was not abused at the expense of prosecutorial integrity.

The stealth provision in the 2006 USA PATRIOT Reauthorization Act completely removed the district court as a backstop in the interim appointment process, turning over sole power to the Attorney General, to unilaterally make interim appointments, for an unlimited time, with no obligation to involve the Senate, or the Judicial Branch, or anyone else.

H.R. 580 will restore the checks and balances that have historically provided a critical safeguard against politicization of U.S. Attorneys. First, it repeals the 2006 change to section 546, keeping the Attorney General's interim appointment role, but limiting it to 120 days, as it was before.

Second, the bill clarifies that section 546 is the only way to make interim U.S. Attorney appointments. This additional change has become necessary in light of indications, documented by the Congressional Research Service, that the Justice Department has used, and could again use, the Federal Vacancies Reform Act to evade the intent of a tightened section 546.

Mr. Speaker, this bill is an important step in restoring legal safeguards against abuse of Executive power to politicize core government functions that need to be above political calculations in their execution. I urge my colleagues to support this important legislation.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 15 seconds only to say, Mr. Howard Coble, I recognize you as a sincere and experienced and valued member of this committee, and I appreciate the circumstances that you are in this evening.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the subcommittee chairwoman, Linda Sanchez of California, and I thank her for the excellent job that she has done.

Mr. Speaker, I recognize Howard Berman, the senior member on the Judiciary Committee, and thank him for his authorship of the measure that brings us to the floor this evening. I yield to him 5 minutes.

Mr. Speaker, how much time remains on either side?

I recognize the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. Blumenauer) for 1 minute.

The gentleman from Washington (Mr. Inslee) is recognized for 2 minutes.

(Mr. INSLEE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentlewoman from Texas, Sheila Jackson-Lee, 1 minute.

(Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mr. Speaker, Members of the House, the American people must have full confidence in the integrity and the independence of the United States Attorneys in charge of Federal prosecutions throughout the country, in every State. While they owe the President their appointments, once they are in their jobs their enforcement decisions must be unquestionably above politics; and that is why we are here today.

Senate confirmation is required for each one of them in an open and public process, and it is a critical safeguard against politicization of our prosecutorial system. This safeguard has been severely compromised by the secret change that has been referred to, and this bill restores the safeguards.

I ask my colleagues to fully support this measure on both sides of the aisle.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished gentleman, and I rise with sadness to support this legislation that clears up the obviously ongoing abuse and disrespect of the integrity of the three branches of government.

We passed the PATRIOT Act that some of us did not support, but we did not intend for it to be used to avoid the constitutional Senate confirmation process. That is what has happened. We understand now that the Attorney General unfortunately may have been in meetings, may have been informed of issues dealing with the termination of U.S. Attorneys without providing that direct information to the United States Congress.

This legislation again sets the Constitution back on its feet. It allows for Senate confirmation for U.S. Attorneys, and it puts back on track the integrity in terms of the respect and integrity that is necessary for the judiciary and legal system that the American people have come to understand and believe. I believe we should support this bill, and I hope we will get back on track with the relationship between Congress, the executive, and the judiciary.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 580, which amends chapter 35 of title 28 of the United States Code to restore the 120-day limit on the term of a United States Attorney appointed on an interim basis by the Attorney General. The shocking disclosures of the last few weeks provide all the justification needed to adopt this salutary measure promptly and by an overwhelming margin. Our friends in the other body passed companion legislation last week by a vote of 94-2.

Mr. Speaker, United States Attorneys are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Each United States Attorney so appointed is authorized to serve a 4-year term but is subject to removal by the President without cause. The Senate's advise and consent process formally checks the power of the President by requiring the United States Attorney nominee to go through a confirmation process. In addition, Senators also play a particularly influential informal role in the nomination of United States Attorneys.

Typically, a President, prior to appointing a new United States Attorney, consults with the Senators from the State where the vacancy exists if they are members of the President's political party. The President usually accepts the nominee recommended by the Senator or other official. This tradition, called ``senatorial courtesy,'' serves as an informal check on the President's appointment power.

Since the Civil War, the judiciary has been empowered to fill vacancies in the office of the United States Attorney. In 1966, that authority was codified at 28 U.S.C. Sec. 546. When a United States Attorney position became vacant, the district court in the district where the vacancy occurred named a temporary replacement to serve until the vacancy was filled. In 1986, in response to a request by the Attorney General that its office be vested with authority to appoint interim United States Attorneys, Congress amended the statute to add former section 546(d).

Pursuant to this authority, the Attorney General was authorized to appoint an interim United States Attorney for 120 days and, if the Senate did not confirm a new United States Attorney within such period, the district court was then authorized to appoint an interim United States Attorney to serve until a permanent replacement was confirmed. By having the district court play a role in the selection of an interim United States Attorney, former section 546(d) allowed the judicial branch to act as a check on executive power. In practice, if a vacancy was expected, the Attorney General would solicit the opinion of the chief judge of the relevant district regarding possible temporary appointments.

Twenty years later, section 546 was amended again in the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005. This legislation amended section 546(c) to provide that ``[a] person appointed as United States attorney under this section may serve until the qualification of a United States Attorney for such district appointed by the President'' under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 541. The extent of the legislative history of this provision is one sentence appearing in the conference report accompanying the act: ``Section 502 [effecting the amendments to section 546] is a new section and addresses an inconsistency in the appointment process of United States Attorneys.''

Although the legislative purpose is unclear, the practical effect is not. The act amended section 546 in two critical respects. First, it effectively removed district court judges from the interim appointment process and vested the Attorney General with the sole power to appoint interim United States Attorneys. Second, the act eliminated the 120-day limit on the term of an interim United States Attorney appointed by the Attorney General. As a result, judicial input in the interim appointment process was eliminated. Even more problematic, it created a possible loophole that permits United States Attorneys appointed on an interim basis to serve indefinitely without ever being subjected to a Senate confirmation process, which is plainly a result not contemplated by the Framers.

Mr. Speaker, excluding changes in administration, it is rare for a United States Attorney to not complete his or her 4-year term of appointment. According to the Congressional Research Service, only 54 United States Attorneys between 1981 and 2006 did not complete their 4- year terms. Of these, 30 obtained other public sector positions or sought elective office, 15 entered or returned to private practice, and 1 died. Of the remaining eight United States Attorneys, two were apparently dismissed by the President, and three apparently resigned after news reports indicated they had engaged in questionable personal actions.

Mr. Speaker, in the past few months disturbing stories appeared in the news media reporting that several United States Attorneys had been asked to resign by the Justice Department. It has now been confirmed that at least seven United States Attorneys were asked to resign on December 7, 2006. An eighth United States Attorney was subsequently asked to resign. They include the following: H.E. Cummins, III, U.S. Attorney, E.D. Ark.; John McKay, U.S. Attorney, W.D. Wash.; David Iglesias, U.S. Attorney, D. N.M.; Paul K. Charlton, U.S. Attorney, D. Ariz.; Carol Lam, U.S. Attorney, S.D. Calif.; Daniel Bogden, U.S. Attorney, D. Nev.; Kevin Ryan, N.D. Calif.; and Margaret Chiara, W.D. Mich.

On March 6, 2007, the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law held a hearing entitled, ``H.R. 580, Restoring Checks and Balances in the Confirmation Process of United States Attorneys.'' Witnesses at the hearing included six of the eight former United States Attorneys and William Moschella, Principal Associate Deputy Attorney General, among other witnesses.

Six of the six former United States Attorneys testified at the hearing and each testified that he or she was not told in advance why he or she was being asked to resign. Upon further inquiry, however, Messrs. Charlton and Bogden were advised by the then Acting Assistant Attorney General, William Mercer, that they were terminated essentially to make way for other Republicans to enhance their credential and pad their resumes. In addition, Messrs. Iglesias and McKay testified about inappropriate inquiries they received from Members of Congress concerning pending investigation, which they surmised may have led to their forced resignations.

Mr. Speaker, the USA PATRIOT Act Reauthorization provision on interim U.S. Attorneys should be repealed for two reasons. First, Members of Congress did not get an opportunity to vet or debate the provision that is current law. Rather the Republican leadership of the 109th Congress slipped the provision into the conference report at the request of the Department of Justice. Not even Senate Judiciary Chairman Arlen Specter, whose chief of staff was responsible for inserting the provision, knew about its existence.

Second, it is now clear that the manifest intention of the proponents of the provision was to allow interim appointees to serve indefinitely and to circumvent Senate confirmation. We know now, for example, that in a September 13, 2006 e-mail to former White House Counsel Harriet Miers, Attorney General Chief of Staff Kyle Sampson wrote:

I strongly recommend that, as a matter of Administration

policy, we utilize the new statutory provisions that

authorize the Attorney General to make U.S. Attorney

appointments.

Mr. Sampson further said that by using the new provision, DOJ could ``give far less deference to home-State Senators and thereby get (1) our preferred person appointed and (2) do it far faster and more efficiently, at less political cost to the White House.''

Regarding the interim appointment of Tim Griffin at the request of Karl Rove and Harriet Miers, Mr. Sampson wrote to Monica Goodling, Senior Counsel to the White House and Liaison to the White House on December 19, 2006 the following:

I think we should gum this to death: ask the Senators to

give Tim a chance, meet with him, give him some time in

office to see how he performs, etc. If they ultimately say,

`no never' (and the longer we can forestall that, the

better), then we can tell them we'll look for other

candidates, and otherwise run out the clock. All of this

should be done in `good faith,' of course.

Finally, we now know that after gaining this increased authority to appoint interim U.S. Attorneys indefinitely, the administration has exploited the provision to fire U.S. Attorneys for political reasons. A mass purge of this sort is unprecedented in recent history. The Department of Justice and the White House coordinated this purge. According to an administration ``hit list'' released on Tuesday, U.S. Attorneys were targets for the purge based on their rankings. The ranking relied in large part on whether the U.S. Attorney ``exhibit[ed] loyalty to the President and Attorney General.''

Mr. Speaker, until exposed by this unfortunate episode, United States Attorneys were expected to, and in fact did exercise, wide discretion in the use of resources to further the priorities of their districts. Largely a result of its origins as a distinct prosecutorial branch of the Federal Government, the office of the United States Attorney traditionally operated with an unusual level of independence from the Justice Department in a broad range of daily activities. That practice served the Nation well for more than 200 years. The practice that has been in place for less than 2 years has served the Nation poorly. It needs to end.

Mr. Speaker, during the full committee markup of H.R. 580, I brought to my colleagues' attention the value of including in the bill or committee report the core congressional findings that forms the justification for this legislation. Briefly stated, those findings are as follows:

The Congress finds as follows:

(1) That United States Attorneys are ``inferior officers'' and therefore are subject to the Constitution's discretionary appointment provisions authorizing the Congress to vest the appointment power in the President alone or the judiciary.

(2) Vesting the authority in the United States Attorney General to appoint an interim United States Attorney to serve an indefinite term undermines the confirmation process of the United States Senate and removes a legislative check on executive power.

(3) Vesting residual power to appoint an interim United States Attorney in the Federal district court in which the vacancy occurs constitutes an important judicial check on executive power.

Mr. Speaker, H.R. 580 is a thoughtful and well crafted legislative measure which will restore public confidence in the process by which interim United States Attorneys are appointed. I strongly support the bill and urge all Members to do likewise.

Madam. Speaker, due to events in my district, I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 42: Passage of H. Res. 475. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yes.''

January 22, 2007

Madam Speaker, due to events in my district, I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 43: Table the appeal of the ruling of the Chair for H. Res. 476. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yes.''

Madam Speaker, due to events in my district, I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 44: Motion to Suspend the Rules and Agree to H. Res. No. 52. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yes.''

Madam Speaker, due to events in my district, I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 45: Motion to suspend the rules and Agreed to H.R. 390. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yes.''

Madam Speaker, due to events in my district, I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 46: Motion to Suspend the Rules and Agree to H. Res. 29. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yes.''

February 8, 2007

Madam Speaker, due to events in my district, I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 87: Agreeing to the Amendment of H.R. 547, and amendment to include language which encourages the Assistant Administrator to utilize Land Grant Institutions, Historically Black Colleges and Universities, Hispanic Serving Institutions and other minority serving institutions among other resources to undertake research for programs covered by the bill. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yes.''

Madam Speaker, due to events in my district. I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 88: Agreeing to the Amendment of H.R. 547, an amendment to add a new paragraph to section 3, Biofuel Infrastructure and Additives Research and Development, to include issues with respect to where in the fuel supply chain additives optimally should be added to fuels. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yes.''

Madam Speaker, due to events in my district, I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 89: Agreeing to the Amendment of H.R. 547, an amendment to add a new paragraph to section 3 which includes issues with respect to certification by a nationally recognized testing laboratory of components for fuel dispensing devices that specifically reference compatibility with alcohol blended and biofuels that contain greater than 15 percent alcohol. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yes.''

Madam Speaker, due to events in my district, I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 90: Agreeing to the Amendment of H.R. 547, an amendment to add a new section 7 entitled Additional Funding. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yes.''

Madam Speaker, due to events in my district, I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 91:

the Motion to Recommit with Instructions of H.R. 547. Had I been present, I would have voted ``no.''

Madam Speaker, due to events in my district, I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 92: Passage of H.R. 547. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yes.''

February 28, 2007

Madam Speaker, due to events in my district, I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 111: Motion to Suspend the Rules and Agree on H. Con. Res. 52. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yes.''

March 12, 2007

Madam Speaker, due to events in my district, I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 136: Motion to Suspend the Rules and Pass, as Amended on H.R. 85. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yes.''

Madam Speaker, due to events in my district, I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 137: Motion to Suspend the Rules and Agree on H. Res. 136. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yes.''

Madam Speaker, due to events in my district, I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 138: Motion to Suspend the Rules and Agree on H. Res. 89. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yes.''

Madam Speaker, due to events in my district, I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 187: Motion to Suspend the Rules and Pass, as amended on H.R. 802. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yes.''

Madam speaker, due to events in my district, I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 188: Motion to Suspend the Rules and Pass, as Amended on H.R. 137. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yes.''

Madam Speaker, due to events in my district, I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 189: Motion to Suspend the Rules and Pass, as Amended on H.R. 580. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yes.''

May 14, 2007

Madam Speaker, due to events in my district, I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 342: Motion to Suspend the Rules and Pass on H.R. 1124. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yes.''

Madam Speaker, due to events in my district, I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 343: Motion to suspend the rules and agree to H. Res. 223. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yes.''

Madam Speaker, due to events in my district, I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 344: Motion to Suspend the Rules and Agree (H. Res. 385). Had I been present, I would have voted ``yes.''

May 16, 2007

Madam Speaker, due to events in my district, I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 358: Call in Committee Quorum. Had I been present, I would have voted ``present.''

Madam Speaker, due to events in my district, I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 359: Motion that the Committee Rise (H.R. 1585). Had I been present, I would have voted ``no.''

June 11, 2007

Madam Speaker, due to events in my district. I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 448: Motion to Suspend the Rules and Pass on H.R. 2356. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yes.''

Madam Speaker, due to events in my district, I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 449: Motion to Suspend the Rules and Agree on S. 676. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yes.''

Madam Speaker, due to events in my district. I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 450: Motion to Suspend the Rules and Agree on H. Res. 418. Had I been present I would have voted ``yes.''

July 23, 2007

Madam Speaker, due to events in my district, I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 687: Motion to Suspend the Rules and Pass H.R. 404, as amended. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yes.''

Madam Speaker, due to events in my district, I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 688: Motion to suspend the rules and agree to H. Res. 553. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yes.''

Madam Speaker, due to events in my district, I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 689: Motion to suspend the rules and agree to H. Res. 519. Had I been present I would have voted ``yes.''

Madam Speaker, due to events in my district, I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 690: On ordering the previous question on H. Res. 558. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yes.''

August 1, 2007

Madam Speaker, due to events in my district, I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 781: Motion to adjourn. Had I been present. I would have voted ``no.''

september 4, 2007

Madam Speaker, due to events in my district, I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 847: Motion to Suspend the Rules and Pass H.R. 694, as amended. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yes.''

Madam Speaker, due to events in my district, I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 848: Motion to Suspend the Rules and Pass H.R. 3020, as amended. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yes.''

Madam Speaker, due to events in my district, I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 849: Motion to Instruct Conferees on H.R. 2669. Had I been present, I would have voted ``no.''

september 17, 2007

Madam Speaker, due to events in my district, I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 867: Motion to Suspend the Rules and Pass H.R. 3246, as amended. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yes.''

Madam Speaker, due to events in my district, I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 868: Motion to Suspend the Rules and Pass H.R. 1657, as amended. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yes.''

Madam Speaker, due to events in my district, I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 869: Motion to Suspend the Rules and Pass H.R. 3527. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yes.''

october 1, 2007

Madam Speaker, due to events in my district, I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 924: Motion to Suspend the Rules and Agree on H. Res. 185. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yes.''

Madam Speaker, due to events in my district, I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 925: Motion to Suspend the Rules and Pass H.R. 2276. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yes.''

Madam Speaker, due to events in my district, I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 926: Motion to Suspend the Rules and Pass H.R. 3325. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yes.''

october 15, 2007

Madam Speaker, due to events in my district, I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 961: Motion to Suspend the Rules and Agree on H. Res. 738. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yes.''

Madam Speaker, due to events in my district, I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 962: Motion to Suspend the Rules and Pass H.R. 2089. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yes.''

Madam Speaker, due to events in my district, I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 963: Motion to Suspend the Rules and Pass H.R. 20, as amended. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yes.''

October 17, 2007

Madam Speaker, due to events in my district, I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 980: Passage of H.R. 2095. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yes.''

october 29, 2007

Madam Speaker, due to events in my district, I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 1010: Motion to Suspend the Rules and Pass H.R. 3224, as amended. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yes.''

Madam Speaker, due to events in my district, I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 1011: Motion to Suspend the Rules and Agree on H. Res. 573, as amended. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yes.''

Madam Speaker, due to events in my district, I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 1012: Motion to Suspend the Rules and Agree on H. Res. 747. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yes.''

November 5, 2007

Madam Speaker, due to events in my district, I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 1034: Closing Portions of the Conference on H.R. 3222. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yes.''

Madam Speaker, due to events in my district, I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 1035: Motion to Suspend the Rules and Pass H.R. 513, as amended. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yes.''

Madam Speaker, due to events in my district, I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 1036: Motion to Suspend the Rules and Agree on H. Res. 744. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yes.''

november 7, 2007

Madam Speaker, due to events in my district, I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 1058: Motion to Suspend the Rules and Agree on H. Con. Res. 236, as amended. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yes.''

november 13, 2007

Madam Speaker, due to events in my district, I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 1082: Motion to Suspend the Rules and Pass H.R. 3315. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yes.''

Madam Speaker, due to events in my district, I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 1083: Motion to Suspend the Rules and Pass H.R. 1593, as amended. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yes.''

Madam Speaker, due to events in my district, I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 1084: Motion to Suspend the Rules and Pass H.R. 3403, as amended. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yes.''

Madam Speaker, due to events in my district, I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 1085: Motion to Suspend the Rules and Pass H.R. 3461, as amended. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yes.''

november 14, 2007

Madam Speaker, due to events in my district, I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 1095: Motion to Adjourn. Had I been present, I would have voted ``no.''

december 6, 2007

Madam Speaker, due to events in my district, I was unable to vote on rollcall No. 1141: Motion to Suspend the Rules and Pass H.R. 2085. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yes.''

Mr. Speaker, I strongly support S. 214, which is the Senate version of H.R. 580, which the Judiciary Committee favorably reported on March 15, 2007. This much needed and timely legislation amends chapter 35 of title 28 of the United States Code to restore the 120-day limit on the term of a United States Attorney appointed on an interim basis by the Attorney General. The shocking revelations regarding the unprecedented firings of several United States Attorneys provide all the justification needed to adopt this salutary measure promptly and by an overwhelming margin.

United States Attorneys are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Each United States Attorney so appointed is authorized to serve a 4-year term but is subject to removal by the President without cause. The Senate's advise and consent process formally checks the power of the President by requiring the United States Attorney nominee to go through a confirmation process.

In addition, Senators also play a particularly influential informal role in the nomination of United States Attorneys. Typically, a President, prior to appointing a new United States Attorney, consults with the Senators from the State where the vacancy exists if they are members of the President's political party. The President usually accepts the nominee recommended by the Senator or other official. This tradition, called ``Senatorial courtesy,'' serves as an informal check on the President's appointment power.

Since the Civil War, the judiciary has been empowered to fill vacancies in the office of the United States Attorney. In 1966, that authority was codified at 28 U.S.C. Sec. 546. When a United States Attorney position became vacant, the district court in the district where the vacancy occurred named a temporary replacement to serve until the vacancy was filled. In 1986, in response to a request by the Attorney General that its office be vested with authority to appoint interim United States Attorneys, Congress amended the statute to add former section 546(d).

Pursuant to this authority, the Attorney General was authorized to appoint an interim United States Attorney for 120 days and, if the Senate did not confirm a new United States Attorney within such period, the district court was then authorized to appoint an interim United States Attorney to serve until a permanent replacement was confirmed. By having the district court play a role in the selection of an interim United States Attorney, former section 546(d) allowed the judicial branch to act as a check on executive power. In practice, if a vacancy was expected, the Attorney General would solicit the opinion of the chief judge of the relevant district regarding possible temporary appointments.

Twenty years later, section 546 was amended again in the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005. This legislation amended section 546(c) to provide that ``[a] person appointed as United States attorney under this section may serve until the qualification of a United States Attorney for such district appointed by the President'' under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 541. The extent of the legislative history of this provision is one sentence appearing in the conference report accompanying the Act: ``Section 502 [effecting the amendments to section 546] is a new section and addresses an inconsistency in the appointment process of United States Attorneys.''

Although the legislative purpose is unclear, the practical effect is not. The Act amended

section 546 in two critical respects. First, it effectively removed district court judges from the interim appointment process and vested the Attorney General with the sole power to appoint interim United States Attorneys. Second, the Act eliminated the 120-day limit on the term of an interim United States Attorney appointed by the Attorney General. As a result, judicial input in the interim appointment process was eliminated. Even more problematic, it created a possible loophole that permit United States Attorneys appointed on an interim basis to serve indefinitely without ever being subjected to Senate confirmation process, which is plainly a result not contemplated by the Framers.

Mr. Speaker, excluding changes in administration, it is rare for a United States Attorney to not complete his or her 4-year term of appointment. According to the Congressional Research Service, only 54 United States Attorneys between 1981 and 2006 did not complete their 4- year terms. Of these, 30 obtained other public sector positions or sought elective office, 15 entered or returned to private practice, and one died. Of the remaining eight United States Attorneys, two were apparently dismissed by the President, and three apparently resigned after news reports indicated they had engaged in questionable personal actions.

Mr. Speaker, in the past few months disturbing stories appeared in the news media reporting that several United States Attorneys had been asked to resign by the Justice Department. It has now been confirmed that at least seven United States Attorneys were asked to resign on December 7, 2006. An eighth United States Attorney was subsequently asked to resign. And we learned on May 10, the day the Attorney General testified before the House Judiciary Committee, we learned that a ninth United States Attorney had been asked to resign as part of the purge. The names of the fired United States Attorneys are as follows:

H.E. (``Bud'') Cummins, III, U.S. Attorney (E.D. Ark.); John McKay, U.S. Attorney (W.D. Wash.); David Iglesias, U.S. Attorney (D. N.M.); Paul K. Charlton, U.S. Attorney (D. Ariz.); Carol Lam, U.S. Attorney (S.D. Calif.); Daniel Bogden, U.S. Attorney (D. Nev.); Kevin Ryan, U.S. Attorney (N.D. Calif.); Margaret Chiara, U.S. Attorney (W.D. Mich.); and Todd P. Graves, U.S. Attorney (W.D. Mo.).

Mr. Speaker, on March 6, 2007, the Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law held a hearing entitled, ``Restoring Checks and Balances in the Confirmation Process of United States Attorneys.'' Witnesses at the hearing included six of the eight former United States Attorneys and William Moschella, Principal Associate Deputy Attorney General, among other witnesses.

Six of the eight former United States Attorneys testified at the hearing and each testified that he or she was not told in advance why he or she was being asked to resign. Upon further inquiry, however, Messrs. Charlton and Bogden were advised by the then Acting Assistant Attorney General William Mercer that they were terminated essentially to make way for other Republicans to enhance their credential and pad their resumes. In addition, Messrs. Iglesias and McKay testified about inappropriate inquiries they received from Members of Congress concerning pending investigation, which they surmised may have led to their forced resignations.

Mr. Speaker, the USA PATRIOT Act Reauthorization provision on interim United States Attorneys should be repealed for two reasons. First, Members of Congress did not get an opportunity to vet or debate the provision that is current law. Rather, the Republican leadership of the 109th Congress slipped the provision into the Conference Report at the request of the Department of Justice. Not even Senate Judiciary Chairman Arlen Specter, whose chief of staff was responsible for inserting the provision, knew about its existence.

Second, it is now clear that the manifest intention of the provision was to allow interim appointees to serve indefinitely and to circumvent Senate confirmation. We know now, for example, that in a September 13, 2006 e-mail to former White House Counsel, Harriet Miers, Attorney General Chief of Staff, Kyle Sampson wrote:

I strongly recommend that, as a matter of Administration

policy, we utilize the new statutory provisions that

authorize the Attorney General to make U.S. Attorney

appointments.

Mr. Sampson further said that by using the new provision, DOJ could ``give far less deference to home-State Senators and thereby get (1) our preferred person appointed and (2) do it far faster and more efficiently, at less political cost to the White House.''

Regarding the interim appointment of Tim Griffin at the request of Karl Rove and Harriet Miers, Mr. Sampson wrote to Monica Goodling, Senior Counsel to the White House and Liaison to the White House on December 19, 2006 the following:

I think we should gum this to death: ask the Senators to

give Tim a chance, meet with him, give him some time in

office to see how he performs, etc. If they ultimately say,

`no never' (and the longer we can forestall that, the

better), then we can tell them we'll look for other

candidates, and otherwise run out the clock. All of this

should be done in `good faith,' of course.

Finally, we now know that after gaining this increased authority to appoint interim United States Attorneys indefinitely, the administration has exploited the provision to fire United States Attorneys for political reasons. A mass purge of this sort is unprecedented in recent history. The Department of Justice and the White House coordinated this purge. According to an administration ``hit list'' released in March of this year, United States Attorneys were targets for the purge based on their rankings. The ranking relied in large part on whether the United States Attorneys ``exhibit[ed] loyalty to the President and Attorney General.''

Mr. Speaker, until exposed by this unfortunate episode, United States Attorneys were expected to, and in fact did exercise, wide discretion in the use of resources to further the priorities of their districts. Largely a result of its origins as a distinct prosecutorial branch of the Federal Government, the office of the United States Attorney traditionally operated with an unusual level of independence from the Justice Department in a broad range of daily activities. That practice served the Nation well for more than 200 years. The practice that has been in place for less than 2 years has served the Nation poorly. It needs to end. That is why I vote to report H.R. 580 favorably to the House. That is why I will vote for S. 214. I urge all Members to do likewise.

Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the Senate bill (S. 214) to amend chapter 35 of title 28, United States Code, to preserve the independence of United States attorneys.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to revise and extend my remarks and to give all Members 5 legislative days to include extraneous material on the bill under consideration.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to describe this measure, Senate bill 214, as an important one that will restore historical checks and balances to the process by which interim U.S. attorneys are appointed. It will repair a breach in the law that has been a major contributing factor to the recent termination of at least nine talented and experienced United States attorneys and their replacement with interim appointments.

The full circumstances surrounding these terminations are still coming to light. It is a process being given much attention by the Committee on the Judiciary. But much of the information is well known, and is also considerably troubling. One U.S. attorney was fired to make way for a political operative who endeared himself to Mr. Karl Rove doing opposition research in the Republican National Committee. Others were apparently fired because they were not sufficiently partisan in the way they used these powers to investigate and prosecute alleged voting fraud. Now, I don't need to tell anybody in this body how important voting is to the democratic process.

These reports are particularly troubling because of the awesome power the United States attorneys, 93 of them in total, are entrusted with. They seek convictions. They negotiate plea agreements. They can send citizens to prison for years. They can tarnish reputations. They can destroy careers with the mere disclosure that a person is under criminal investigation. We, in this country, must have full confidence that these powers are exercised with complete integrity and free from improper political influence. Unfortunately, sometimes this is not the case.

These troubling circumstances that have been revealed were made possible by an obscure provision, quietly and secretly slipped into the PATRIOT reauthorization conference report in March of last year at the behest of the Justice Department's top political appointments, to enable them to appoint interim temporary U.S. attorneys without the customary safeguard of Senate confirmation.

Mr. Speaker, what this measure does is restore the checks and balances that have historically provided a critical safeguard against politicization of the Department of Justice and the United States attorneys, limiting the Attorney General's interim appointments to 120 days only, then allowing the district court for that district to appoint a U.S. attorney until the vacancy is filled, with Senate confirmation required, as historically has been the case.

Now, Members of the House, we have already passed similar legislation. While I would prefer to see our version enacted into law, we are taking up the Senate-passed version in order to expedite the enactment of this important step in restoring legal safeguards against the abuse of executive power to politicize the Federal prosecutorial function in the Department of Justice.

I wanted to single out my colleague from California, Howard Berman, a senior member of the committee, for his role in fashioning not only the original version, but the one that we have before you to agree upon.

Mr. Speaker, at this point, I would reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I am proud to introduce and give as much time as he may consume to the chairman of the Intellectual Property Subcommittee on the Judiciary Committee, Mr. Howard Berman.

Mr. Speaker, I am proud to yield such time as she may consume to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Zoe Lofgren) a subcommittee chair of the Judiciary Committee.

Mr. Speaker, I was hoping that our colleague from the Judiciary Committee, the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Artur Davis, would be able to join us in this debate because he worked very diligently with Mr. Berman and Ms. Lofgren.

Mr. Speaker, while United States attorneys owe their appointments to the President, once they are appointed, their enforcement decisions must be unquestionably above politics. This is an irony that exists, but it is something that must be zealously complied with if we are to have a law enforcement system that can be regarded as faithful to the Constitution and to the laws of the land and to protect the American people.

The Senate confirmation in an open and public process is one way we safeguard against politicizing the prosecutors in the Department of Justice. That safeguard was severely compromised by the secret change in section 546. What we will do now is restore that safeguard and honor the system of checks and balances.

Mr. Speaker, I am confident that my colleagues on both sides of the aisle will support this important consideration.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.