To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to provide for relief to surviving spouses and children.

Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Madam Speaker, after nearly a year of delays and months of negotiations, the House today will finally vote on compromise legislation that gives our intelligence community the tools that it needs to protect America. I join my colleague, Mr. Hoekstra, ranking member of the Intelligence Committee, and Chairman Reyes, as an original cosponsor of this compromise bill.

America's enemies take on many forms, terrorist groups, foreign governments and spies who all pose serious threat to America and its allies. Last August, Congress passed the Protect America Act which provided a temporary solution to the problem. The PAA expired in February. As a result, our intelligence community could not gather two- thirds of the foreign intelligence they needed to protect American lives.

From day one, we insisted that any legislation passed by Congress must not interfere with our fundamental ability to collect foreign intelligence. This legislation accomplishes that goal. H.R. 6304 does not extend constitutional protections to foreign terrorists and other foreign targets overseas. The bill does allow the intelligence community to target a foreign person overseas without a court order if critical intelligence would be lost or not collected in a timely manner.

We insisted that any legislation passed by Congress include strong liability protections for telecommunications carriers that assisted the government following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, as well as protections for their assistance in the future. H.R. 6304 provides these important protections.

We insisted that Congress enact long-term FISA legislation. The bill we have before us today will not sunset until the end of 2012. This compromise legislation also provides strong civil liberties protections for Americans both within the United States and abroad. And it mandates congressional oversight and detailed reports to the House and Senate Judiciary and Intelligence committees and requires a review by the Inspectors General of the Department of Justice and the intelligence agencies. This compromise is long overdue. It is supported by both the Department of Justice and the intelligence community.

Madam Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this bill.

Madam Speaker, I submit the following letter for the Record:

June 19, 2008.

Hon. Nancy Pelosi,

Speaker, House of Representatives,

Washington, DC.

Dear-Madam Speaker: This letter presents the views of the

Administration on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act

of 1978 (``FISA'') Amendments Act of 2008 (H.R. 6304). The

bill would modernize FISA to reflect changes in

communications technology since the Act was first passed 30

years ago. The amendments would provide the Intelligence

Community with the tools it needs to collect the foreign

intelligence necessary to secure our Nation while protecting

the civil liberties of Americans. The bill would also provide

the necessary legal protections for those companies sued

because they are believed to have helped the Government

prevent terrorist attacks in the aftermath of September 11.

Because this bill accomplishes these two goals essential to

any effort to modernize FISA, we strongly support passage of

this bill and will recommend that the President sign it.

Last August, Congress took an important step toward

modernizing FlSA by enacting the Protect America Act of 2007.

That Act allowed us temporarily to close intelligence gaps by

enabling our intelligence professionals to collect, without

having to first obtain a court order, foreign intelligence

information from targets overseas. The Act has enabled us to

gather significant intelligence critical to protecting our

Nation. It has also been implemented in a responsible way,

subject to extensive executive, congressional, and judicial

oversight in order to protect the country in a manner

consistent with safeguarding Americans' civil liberties.

Since passage of the Act, the Administration has worked

closely with Congress to address the need for long-term FISA

modernization. This joint effort has involved compromises on

both sides, but we believe that it has resulted in a strong

bill that will place the Nation's foreign intelligence effort

in this area on a firm, long-term foundation. Below, we have

set forth our views on certain important provisions of H.R.

6304.

i. title i--foreign intelligence surveillance

Title I of H.R. 6304 contains key authorities that would

ensure that our intelligence agencies have the tools they

need to collect vital foreign intelligence information and

would provide significant safeguards for the civil liberties

of Americans.

Court Approval. With respect to authorizations for foreign

intelligence surveillance directed at foreign targets outside

the United States, the bill provides that the Foreign

Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) would review

certifications made by the Attorney General and the Director

of NationaI Intelligence relating to these acquisitions, the

reasonableness of the procedures used by the Intelligence

Community to ensure the targets are overseas, and the

minimization procedures used to protect the privacy of

Americans. The scope of the FISC's review is carefully and

rightly crafted to focus on aspects of the acquisition that

may affect the privacy rights of Americans so as not to

confer quasi-constitutional rights on foreign terrorists and

other foreign intelligence targets outside the United States.

We have been clear that any satisfactory bill could not

require individual court orders to target non-United States

persons outside the United States, nor could a bill establish

a court-approval mechanism that would cause the Intelligence

Community to lose valuable foreign intelligence while

awaiting such approval. H.R. 6304 would do neither and would

retain for the Intelligence Community the speed and agility

that it needs to protect the Nation. The bill would establish

a schedule for court approval of certifications and

procedures relating to renewals of existing acquisition

authority. A critical feature of the H.R. 6304 would allow

existing acquisitions, which were the subject of court review

under the Protect America Act or will be the subject of such

review under the H.R. 6304, to continue pending court review.

With respect to new acquisitions, absent exigent

circumstances, Court review of new procedures and

certifications would take place before the Government begins

the acquisition. The exigent circumstances exception is

critical to allowing the Intelligence Community to respond

swiftly to changing circumstances when the Attorney General

and the Director of National Intelligence determine that

intelligence may be lost or not timely acquired. Such exigent

circumstances could arise in certain situations where an

unexpected gap has opened in our intelligence collection

efforts. Taken together, these provisions would enable the

Intelligence Community to keep closed the intelligence gaps

that existed before the passage of the Protect America Act

and ensure that it will have the opportunity to collect

critical foreign intelligence information in the future.

Exclusive means. H.R. 6304 contains an exclusive means

provision that goes beyond the exclusive means provision that

was passed as part of FISA. As we have previously stated, we

believe that the provision will complicate the ability of

Congress to pass, in an emergency situation, a law to

authorize immediate collection of communications in the

aftermath of an attack or in response to a grave threat to

the national security. Unlike other versions of this

provision, however, the one in this bill would not restrict

the authority of the Government to conduct necessary

surveillance for intelligence and law enforcement purposes in

a way that would harm national security.

Oversight and Protections for the Civil Liberties of

Americans. H.R. 6304 contains numerous provisions that

protect the civil liberties of Americans and allow for

extensive executive, congressional, and judicial oversight of

the use of the authorities. The bill would require the

Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence to

conduct semiannual assessments of compliance with targeting

procedures and minimization procedures and to submit those

assessments to the FISC and to Congress. The FISC and

Congress would also receive annual reviews relating to those

acquisitions prepared by the heads of agencies that use the

authorities contained in the bill. Congress would receive

reviews from the Inspectors General of these agencies and of

the Department of Justice regarding compliance with the

provisions of the bill. In addition, the bill would require

the Attorney General to submit to Congress a report at

least semiannually concerning the implementation of the

authorities provided by the bill and would expand the

categories of FISA-related court documents that the

Government must provide to the congressional intelligence

and judiciary committees.

Title I also includes provisions that would protect the

civil liberties of Americans. For instance, the bill would

require for the first time that a court order be obtained to

conduct foreign intelligence surveillance outside the United

States of an American abroad. Historically, Executive Branch

procedures guided the conduct of surveillance of a U.S.

person overseas, such as when a U.S. person acts as an agent

of a foreign power, e.g., spying on behalf of a foreign

government. Given the complexity of extending judicial review

to activities outside the United States, these provisions

were carefully crafted with Congress to ensure that such

review can be accomplished while preserving the necessary

flexibility for intelligence operations. Other provisions of

the bill address concerns that some voiced about the Protect

America Act, such as clarifying that the Government cannot

``reverse target'' without a court order and requiring that

the Attorney General establish guidelines to prevent this

from occurring. We believe that, taken together, these

provisions will allow for ample oversight of the use of these

new authorities and ensure that the privacy and civil

liberties of Americans are well protected.

ii. title ii--protections for electronic communications service

providers

Title II of the bill contains, among other provisions,

vital protections for electronic communications service

providers who assist the Intelligence Community's efforts to

protect the Nation from terrorism and other foreign

intelligence threats. Title II would provide liability

protection related to future assistance while ensuring the

protection of sources and methods. Importantly, the bill

would also provide the necessary legal protection for those

companies who are sued only because they are believed to have

helped the Government with communications intelligence

activities in the aftermath of September 11, 2001.

The framework contained in the bill for obtaining

retroactive liability protection is narrowly tailored. An

action must be dismissed if the Attorney General certifies to

the district court in which the action is pending that

either: (i) the electronic communications service provider

did not provide the assistance; or (ii) the assistance was

provided in the wake of the September 11 attack and was the

subject of a written request or series of requests from a

senior Government official indicating that the activity was

authorized by the President and determined to be lawful. The

district court would be required to review this certification

before dismissing the action, and the provision allows for

the participation of the parties to the lawsuit in a manner

consistent with the protection of classified information. The

liability protection provision does not extend to the

Government or to Government officials and it does not

immunize any criminal conduct.

Providing this liability protection is critical to the

Nation's security. As the Senate Select Committee on

Intelligence recognized, ``the intelligence community cannot

obtain the intelligence it needs without assistance from

these companies.'' That committee also recognized that

companies in the future may be less willing to assist the

Government if they face the threat of private lawsuits each

time they are believed to have provided assistance. Finally,

allowing litigation over these matters risks the disclosure

of highly classified information regarding intelligence

sources and methods. As we have stated on many occasions, it

is critical that any long-term FISA modernization legislation

contain an effective liability protection provision. H.R.

6304 contains just such a provision and for this reason, as

well as those expressed with respect to Title I above, we

strongly support its passage.

III. Title III--Review of Previous Actions

Title III would require the Inspectors General of the

Department of Justice, the Office of the Director of National

Intelligence, and of certain elements of the Intelligence

Community to review certain communications surveillance

activities, including the Terrorist Surveillance Program

described by the President. Although improvements have been

made over prior versions of this provision, we believe, as we

have written before, that it is unnecessary in light of the

Inspector General reviews previously completed, those already

underway, and the congressional intelligence and judiciary

committee oversight already conducted. Nevertheless, we do

not believe that, as currently drafted, the provision would

create unacceptable operational concerns. The bill contains

important provisions to make clear that such reviews should

not duplicate reviews already conducted by Inspectors

General.

IV. Title IV--Other Provisions

Title IV contains important provisions that will ensure

that the transition between the current authorities and the

authorities provided in this bill will not have a detrimental

effect on intelligence operations.

Title IV also states that the authorities in the bill

sunset at the end of 2012. We have long favored permanent

modernization of FISA. The Intelligence Community operates

more effectively when the rules governing our intelligence

professionals' ability to track our enemies are firmly

established. Stability of law also allows the Intelligence

Community to invest resources appropriately. Congress has

extensively debated and considered the need to modernize FISA

since 2006, a process that has involved numerous hearings,

briefings, and floor debates. The process has been valuable

and necessary, but it has also involved the discussion in

open settings of extraordinary information dealing with

sensitive intelligence operations. Every time we repeat this

process it risks exposing our intelligence sources and

methods to our adversaries. Although we would prefer that

H.R. 6304 contain no sunset, a sunset in 2012 is

significantly longer than others that were proposed and it is

long enough to avoid impairing the effectiveness of

intelligence operations.

Thank you for the opportunity to present our views on this

crucial bill. We reiterate our sincere appreciation to the

Congress for working with us on H.R. 6304, a long-term FISA

modernization bill that will strengthen the Nation's

intelligence capabilities while respecting and protecting the

constitutional rights of Americans. We strongly support its

prompt passage.

Sincerely,

Michael B. Mukasey,

Attorney General.

J.M. McConnell,

Director of National Intelligence.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Madam Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Forbes), a member of the Judiciary Committee and the Armed Services Committee.

Madam Speaker, I will yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Pence) who is a member of the Judiciary Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee as well.

(Mr. PENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Madam Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Boehner) who is the distinguished Republican leader of the House.

Madam Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Franks) who is a member of the Judiciary Committee and a ranking member of the Constitution Subcommittee.

Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Issa) who is a member of the Judiciary Committee and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence as well.

(Mr. ISSA asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Daniel E. Lungren), a senior member of the Judiciary Committee and the Homeland Security Committee.

I yield the gentleman 1 additional minute.

Madam Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Madam Speaker, H.R. 6304 may well be one of the most important pieces of legislation we pass this Congress.

For 4 months America has been more vulnerable to attacks by our enemies, because of the refusal by some to bring a commonsense bill to the floor to help the Intelligence Community protect Americans.

Many of us would have preferred the bill passed by the Senate. Although this bill may not be ideal, it does represent a compromise between House and Senate Republicans and Democrats. This compromise preserves our ability to conduct a strong, effective foreign intelligence program.

I urge my colleagues to support this legislation.

Madam Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

I thank the distinguished chairman.

Madam Speaker, I rise to say that we did have legislation that would protect the Constitution and provide the security for our troops and those in the intelligence community, and that was the RESTORE Act. Today I rise in enormous opposition to H.R. 6304 because, frankly, Madam Speaker, it's very difficult to put lipstick on a pig.

What we have here is the opportunity for the government to conduct mass, untargeted surveillance of all communications coming into and out of the United States without any individual review and without any finding of wrongdoing.

What Americans don't know is that this government can now surveil you for 7 days without any approval. Then if the court denies the application, while the application is being appealed from the denial, you can be surveilled for 60 days.

This is not constitutional protection. As it relates to the idea of those who are now in court on warrantless searches, now the courts have no authority over that, and your cases will be dismissed.

I ask my colleagues to oppose this because ``significant purpose'' has been taken out of this legislation.

Madam Speaker, I rise today in opposition to H.R. 6304, the ``FISA Amendments Act of 2008''. This body has worked diligently with our colleagues in the Senate to ensure that the civil liberties of American citizens are appropriately addressed. Sadly, this compromise bill falls short of that aim. I will support no bill that fails to protect American civil liberties, both at home and abroad.

I am unable to support this bill that will overhaul how the Government monitors foreign terrorist suspects. I will not support any legislation that grants legal immunity to telecommunications companies that provide information to Federal investigators without a warrant.

Madam Speaker, this administration has the law to protect the American people. When Americans are involved, the Bill of Rights, the fourth amendment, and our civil liberties must be adhered to. This legislation does not go far enough to ensure that American rights are protected.

The original legislation offered by the House Majority gave the Administration everything that it needed, but today, after months of negotiation, if we endorse H.R. 6304, which grants sweeping wiretapping authority to the Government with little court oversight and ensures the dismissal of all pending cases against the telecommunications companies, we are eviscerating the Constitution.

Let me explain my objections to H.R. 6304. It permits the Government to conduct mass, untargeted surveillance of all communications coming into and out of the United States, without any individualized review, and without any finding of wrongdoing.

H.R. 6304 permits minimal court oversight. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA Court) only reviews general procedures for targeting and minimizing the use of information that is collected. Under these circumstances, the court may not know what will be tapped and where it will occur.

Furthermore, the bill contains a general ban on reverse targeting, but not the strong language I worked so diligently to include in the FISA legislation that had passed previously in the House. In my view, the RESTORE Act is far superior to this piece of legislation. I wish to take a few moments to discuss the improvement that I offered to the RESTORE Act in the full Judiciary Committee markup, and which was sent over to the Senate for consideration last year.

My amendment made an essential contribution to the RESTORE Act by laying down a clear, objective criterion for the administration to follow and the FISA court to enforce in preventing reverse targeting.

Reverse targeting is the practice where the Government targets foreigners without a warrant while its actual purpose is to collect information on certain U.S. persons. My language included clear statutory directives regarding whom the government should return to the FISA court and obtain an individualized order if it would like to continue listening to an Americans' communications.

One of the major concerns that libertarians and classical conservatives, as well as progressives and civil liberties organizations, have with this legislation, as they did with its successor, the Protect America Act, is that the temptation of national security agencies to engage in reverse targeting may be difficult to resist in the absence of certain safeguards in the law to prevent it.

My amendment attempted to produce such safeguards. My amendment reduced even further any such temptation to resort to reverse targeting by requiring the administration to obtain a regular, individualized FISA warrant whenever the ``real'' target of the surveillance is a person in the United States.

The amendment achieved this objective by requiring the administration to obtain a regular FISA warrant whenever a ``significant purpose of an acquisition is to acquire the communications of a specific person reasonably believed to be located in the United States.''

It is far from clear how the operative language ``reasonably designed to ensure that any acquisition authorized . . . is limited to targeting persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States; and prevent the intentional acquisition of any communication as to which the sender and all intended recipients are known at the time of acquisition to be located in the United States.''

Yes. It is true that H.R. 6304, the compromise legislation, attempts to ensure that American civil liberties are protected, but the operative language in the legislation does not provide a paradigm for consistency. This is so because it does not provide an objective criterion. H.R. 6304 does not go as far as the legislation that the House sent over to the Senate a few months ago. H.R. 6304 does not retain the objective standards contained in my amendment.

The language used in my amendment, ``significant purpose,'' is a term of art that long has been a staple of FISA jurisprudence and thus is well known and readily applied by agencies, legal practitioners, and the FISA Court. Thus, the Jackson-Lee amendment provided a clearer, more objective criterion for the administration to follow and the FISA court to enforce to prevent the practice of reverse targeting without a warrant, which all of us can agree should not be permitted.

A FISA order should be required in those instances where there is a particular, known person in the United States at the other end of the foreign target's call in whom the Government has a significant interest such that a significant purpose of the surveillance has become to acquire that person's communications. This protection has been stripped from H.R. 6304. I fought hard to keep this language in the bill because it is important to me; and it should be very important to members of this body and to all Americans. It is important that we require what should be required in all cases--warrant any time there is specific, targeted surveillance of a United States citizen.

Madam Speaker, I have more objections to H.R. 6304 which I will quickly note. H.R. 6304 contains an ``exigent'' circumstances loophole that thwarts the judicial review requirement. The bill permits the Government to start a spying program and wait to go to court for up to seven (7) days every time ``intelligence important to the national security of the U.S. may be lost or not timely acquired.'' The problem with H.R. 6034 is that court applications take time and will delay the collection of information. Therefore, it is possible that there will not be resort to prior judicial review.

Under H.R. 6304, the Government is permitted to continue surveillance programs even if the application is denied by the court. The Government has the authority to wiretap through the entire appeals process, and then keep and use whatever it gathers in the meantime.

I am also troubled by H.R. 6304's dismissal of all cases pending against telecommunication companies that facilitated the warrantless wiretapping program over the last 7 years. The test in the bill is not whether the Government certifications were actually legal--only whether they were issued. Because it is public knowledge that they were, all the cases seeking to find out what these companies and the Government did without communications will be dismissed. Under this bill, we will start as a tabula rasa. Telecommunications companies will be prevented from having their day in court and we, the American people, will never have a chance to know what the companies did and what information is collected. I am deeply troubled by this, and frankly, you should be, too.

Madam Speaker, it is important to point out that the loudest demands for blanket immunity did not come from the telecommunications companies but from the administration, which raises the interesting question of whether the administration's real motivation is to shield from public disclosure the ways and means by which Government officials may have ``persuaded'' telecommunications companies to assist in its warrantless surveillance programs.

Madam Speaker, let me be clear in my opposition. Nothing in the Act or the amendments to the Act should require the Government to obtain a FISA order for every overseas target on the off chance that they might pick up a call into or from the United States. Rather, what should be required, is a FISA order only where there is a particular, known person in the United States at the other end of the foreign target's calls in whom the Government has a significant interest such that a significant purpose of the surveillance has become to acquire that person's communications.

Nearly two centuries ago, Alexis de Tocqueville, who remains the most astute student of American democracy, observed that the reason democracies invariably prevail in any martial conflict is because democracy is the governmental form that best rewards and encourages those traits that are indispensable to martial success: initiative, innovation, resourcefulness, and courage.

As I wrote in the Politico, ``the best way to win the war on terror is to remain true to our democratic traditions. If it retains its democratic character, no nation and no loose confederation of international villains will defeat the United States in the pursuit of its vital interests.''

Thus, the way forward to victory in the war on terror is for the United States country to redouble its commitment to the Bill of Rights and the democratic values which every American will risk his or her life to defend. It is only by preserving our attachment to these cherished values that America will remain forever the home of the free, the land of the brave, and the country we love.

Madam Speaker, FISA has served the Nation well for nearly 30 years, placing electronic surveillance inside the United States for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes on a sound legal footing, and I am far from persuaded that it needs to be jettisoned.

However, I know that FISA as outlined in this bill, H.R. 6304, attempts to curtail the Bill of Rights and the civil liberties of the American people. I continue to insist upon individual warrants, based upon probable cause, when surveillance is directed at people in the United States. The Attorney General must still be required to submit procedures for international surveillance to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court for approval, but the FISA Court should not be allowed to issue a ``basket warrant'' without making individual determinations about foreign surveillance.

In all candor, Madam Speaker, I must restate my firm conviction that when it comes to the track record of this President's warrantless surveillance programs, there is still not enough on the public record about the nature and effectiveness of those programs, or the trustworthiness of this administration, to indicate that they require a blank check from Congress.

The Bush administration did not comply with its legal obligation under the National Security Act of 1947 to keep the Intelligence Committees ``fully and currently informed'' of U.S. intelligence activities. Congress cannot continue to rely on incomplete information from the Bush administration or revelations in the media. It must conduct a full and complete inquiry into electronic surveillance in the United States and related domestic activities of the NSA, both those that occur within FISA and those that occur outside FISA.

The inquiry must not be limited to the legal questions. It must include the operational details of each program of intelligence surveillance within the United States, including: (1) who the NSA is targeting; (2) how it identifies its targets; (3) the information the program collects and disseminates; and most important (4) whether the program advances national security interests without unduly compromising the privacy rights of the American people.

Given the unprecedented amount of information Americans now transmit electronically and the post-9/11 loosening of regulations governing information sharing, the risk of intercepting and disseminating the communications of ordinary Americans is vastly increased, requiring more precise--not looser--standards, closer oversight, new mechanisms for minimization, and limits on retention of inadvertently intercepted communications.

Madam Speaker, I encourage my colleagues to join me in opposition to H.R. 6304, as it grants sweeping wiretapping authority to the Government with little court oversight and ensures the dismissal of all pending cases against the telecommunications companies. In my view, this is wrong and unacceptable.

Madam Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 1285, I call up the bill (H.R. 6304) to amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 to establish a procedure for authorizing certain acquisitions of foreign intelligence, and for other purposes, and ask for its immediate consideration in the House.

Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on the bill under consideration.

Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Members of the House, several months ago on October 16, 2007, to be exact, the House passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act legislation, known as the RESTORE Act. In the view of this Member, the RESTORE Act was a reasonable and balanced one giving the administration the power it needs to combat terrorism while protecting our precious rights and liberties.

The legislation before us today, which I concede includes significant improvements over the Senate legislation, goes beyond what I think was a reasonable bottom line in the form of the RESTORE Act.

Title I of the bill continues the House approach by providing mechanisms to ensure that FISA's longstanding exclusivity is crystal clear. It states only a new statute directly addressing the executive branch's foreign intelligence surveillance authority can modify FISA. Secondly, it provides sunshine by requiring that the government requests to private parties for surveillance assistance must actually cite the statutory authority under which they're issued.

Now in earlier versions of FISA reform, the administration claimed that prior court approval of procedures for overseas surveillance would hurt national security. This matter is now laid to rest with the consensus that upfront court review is indeed appropriate. The requirement for individual warrants and probable cause determinations for Americans overseas is an improvement over even the original FISA legislation. There is a provision in the legislation that permits the Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence to begin surveillance prior to seeking court approval for the necessary procedures in exigent circumstances. This is intended to be used rarely, if at all, and was included upon assurances from the administration that agrees that it shall not be used routinely.

The measure before us further requires extensive oversight by Congress and the independent Inspectors General to prevent abuse. It mandates guidelines for targeting minimization and to prevent reverse targeting and tasks the Inspector General to monitor compliance with those protections.

Now title II of the legislation concerning telecom liability raises the most serious concerns in my view. In the past, I have said I would be open to developing a set of procedures that allow both plaintiffs and defendants to make their case. Unfortunately, this bill goes well beyond that and changes the substantive standard for legal liability by the telecom community, by the telecom companies and does so on a retroactive basis, retroactive immunity. And so I appreciate that the final bill does not send the matter to a new secret court and does grant the court a meaningful role in the determination. Unfortunately, these improvements do not redeem the overall provision.

Title III of the bill will also ask the Inspector General to conduct independent investigations into the President's warrantless wiretapping program. This inquiry will help uncover the truth for the American people, hopefully, about the President's activities. And then there is a part in here about an emergency provision any U.S. citizen can be wiretapped. And I strenuously object to that.

Six years ago, the Administration unilaterally chose to engage in warrantless surveillance of American citizens without court review. We are now restoring the balance through enhanced Congressional oversight, Inspector General investigations, and procedures to ensure that FISA remains the exclusive means for authorizing electronic surveillance.

This bill continues the House approach by providing mechanisms to ensure that FISA's longstanding exclusivity is crystal clear. First, it states that only a new statute directly addressing the executive branch's foreign intelligence surveillance authority can modify FISA. Secondly, it provides sunshine by requiring requests for assistance to cite the statutory authority under which they are issued. A conforming amendment to Title 18 Section 2511(2)(a) is meant to underscore the need to specify the specific statutory language being relied on, and must be read in conjunction with the entirety of Sec. 102 of the legislation. It should not be read to imply that assistance may be sought for electronic surveillance, as defined in the statute, which is not specifically authorized by statute.

In earlier versions of FISA reform, the Administration claimed that prior court approval of procedures for overseas surveillance would hurt national security. This matter is now laid to rest, with a consensus that up-front court review is in fact appropriate. The requirement for individual warrants and probable cause determinations for Americans overseas is an improvement over even the original FISA legislation.

There is a provision in the legislation that permits the Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence to begin a surveillance prior to seeking court approval for the necessary procedures in ``exigent circumstances.'' This is intended to be used rarely, if at all. In the normal course of events the DNI will have ample time to submit such procedures to the FISA court for its approval before initiating a particular surveillance.

The Congress provided this authority at the request of the DNI to meet unforeseen and extraordinary circumstances, and the Administration agrees that it may not be used routinely. The Administration understands that the Congress expects its use to be very rare if it is used at all.

The oversight committees will be informed of any use of the exigent circumstances provision and are committed to effective oversight to insure that it is not used to avoid the requirement to secure court approval of the procedures in advance in all but the most extreme circumstances. The exception must not swallow the rule.

The bill requires extensive oversight by Congress and the independent Inspectors General to prevent abuse. It mandates guidelines for targeting, minimization, and to prevent reverse targeting, and tasks the Inspectors General to monitor compliance with those protections.

``Reverse targeting'' is specifically prohibited in Section 702(b)(2). The Intelligence Community agrees that this language prohibits the targeting of one or more persons overseas for the purpose of acquiring the communications of a specific is person reasonably believed to be in the United States. Thus, Section 702(f) requires the government to adopt guidelines to insure that this abuse does not occur and the FISA court must review and approve these guidelines and assure that they are consistent with the Fourth Amendment. The oversight committees of the Congress intend to conduct rigorous oversight to insure that these provisions are faithfully observed. In this connection the Committee attaches particular importance to the required annual review and the reporting in that review of the number of disseminated reports which contain a reference to the identity of a US person.

There is currently ongoing multi-District litigation in which a federal District Court is conducting a review of the telecom carriers' activities and the lawfulness of the President's warrantless wiretapping program. This bill does not strip jurisdiction on that Court and provide blanket immunity, as many wanted.

Instead, in cases where the program was actually designed to detect or prevent a terrorist attack, the Court will assess an Attorney General certification that can assert--among other reasons for dismissal--that the carriers got certain requests and directives from the Administration. The Court will look to see if the Attorney General's certification is backed up with substantial evidence. That means not only the underlying directives and requests, but supplemental materials as well. And in cases where the Government claims that the company did not provide the alleged assistance, a bald assertion is not ``substantial evidence''--the Government will have to back up its claims to the Court's satisfaction.

That Title II of this bill provides procedures for assessing lawsuits relating to warrantless surveillance since 9/11 does not imply that such surveillance was lawful or that the Congress as a whole believes that the service providers acted lawfully in providing assistance. Nor can the provision remove the power of the courts hearing the cases to determine if this provision is constitutional.

No company or private citizen asked by the executive branch to provide assistance in securing the private information of Americans without authority of law should read this language as implying that Congress will act in the future to provide such a grounds for dismissing a lawsuit. On the contrary, companies should be on notice that the Congress is very reluctantly providing this defense as a one- time action in an extremely unusual circumstance. It expects private citizens and companies to provide assistance only when specifically authorized by law.

For over 30 years we have mandated that telecommunications carriers not be a merely unquestioning partner to surveillance activities. This bill provides many ways for the companies to question or challenge directives or requests for assistance, and we expect these to be used any time there is something unusual or novel being requested.

Today's compromise will give the District Court direction and procedures for handling the pending lawsuits. However, it is important to note that the question of whether FISA's existing security procedures at 50 U.S.C. 1806(f) preempt the state secrets privilege is still being litigated in the courts in a case against the Government. Nothing in this bill is intended to affect that litigation, or any litigation against the Government or Government employees.

Today's vote is not the end of the matter. The bill provides for a 4- year sunset, but this doesn't mean we cannot or should not revisit these issues in the next congressional session. We will conduct vigorous oversight, and will be monitoring the program through the reports and audits. We will be keeping a close eye on the development and implementation of reverse targeting, minimization, and targeting procedures, in order to not only make sure that they are followed, but to inform us as we consider what improvements need to be made to this legislation.

On that note, I will reserve the balance of my time.

Madam Speaker, is it true that I have 10 minutes remaining?

I am going to recognize Mr. Nadler, Ms. Lofgren, Mr. Scott, Ms. Jackson-Lee, Mr. Holt, Ms. Lee, Mr. Capuano, Mr. Kucinich and Mr. Inslee. A couple of them will get 1\1/2\ minutes.

The first one to be recognized is the chairman of the Crime Subcommittee, the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Scott), for 1\1/2\ minutes.

Madam Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Zoe Lofgren), the Chair of the Immigration Subcommittee.

Madam Speaker, I would like now to yield to the chairman of the subcommittee on the Constitution and the Judiciary, the gentleman from New York, Jerry Nadler, 1\1/2\ minutes.

Madam Speaker, I would like to yield now to a senior member of Judiciary, Sheila Jackson-Lee of Texas, 1 minute.

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to yield to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Holt), a distinguished member of the Intelligence Committee, 1 minute.

Madam Speaker, I am pleased now to yield to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lee), cochair of the Progressive Caucus and a leader in the Congressional Black Caucus, 1 minute.

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to yield to the gentleman that has more measures in the Judiciary Committee than anybody else in Congress, Dennis Kucinich, the distinguished gentleman from Ohio, 1 minute.

Madam Speaker, I would like now to recognize the distinguished gentleman from Washington, Jay Inslee, for 1 minute.

Madam Speaker, I will take this time to use the remaining time that is allotted me.

I would like to point out that the grant of retroactive immunity to the telecoms is inconsistent

with our basic principles because we are breaking with a very proud tradition of intervening for the first time in a pending court decision in an effort to reach a preordained legal outcome. This is a bad precedent.

And may I point out, too, that we are in a period in which the executive branch has been deemed by many constitutional authorities to be very near the description of an imperial Presidency. We've gone too far.

I hope that we will get a strong vote against this because the struggle for restoring our precious rights and liberties must continue.

I return all time that may be remaining on our side.

Madam Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

(Mr. REYES asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Madam Speaker, I rise today as a sponsor of H.R. 6304, the FISA Amendments Act of 2008. This bill represents the culmination of more than a year's work by the members and staff of the House Intelligence Committee, together with our colleagues on the Judiciary Committee, to bring to the floor a bill that modernizes our surveillance authorities while protecting the constitutional rights of Americans.

I want to thank Chairman Conyers for his efforts to strengthen this bill. As always, I greatly appreciate my good friend's commitment to protecting our country and the principles that we hold so dear. I also want to thank the respective ranking members and all that worked so hard to bring this bill to the floor today.

This bill, Madam Speaker, enjoys wide support inside the Democratic Caucus. It has been endorsed by our Democratic whip, by our Democratic Caucus chair, by the Blue Dog Coalition, the New Democratic Caucus and by a number of our colleagues. For that, I want to thank in particular our majority leader, Mr. Hoyer, for leading the effort towards a bipartisan compromise. This bill is a far better deal than the Protect America Act. And it is far better than the Senate bill that passed earlier this year.

Madam Speaker, intelligence is the first line of defense in our Nation's effort to prevent terrorism and to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This legislation strengthens the ability of our intelligence agencies to conduct lawful surveillance of foreign targets. But this legislation also serves another very important and vital function. It strengthens the constitutional rights of Americans, protects them from unlawful surveillance and it stops this President, or any President, for that matter, from invoking executive power to conduct warrantless surveillance of Americans.

This bill does more than just retain the original FISA requirements for an individual warrant based upon probable cause for surveillance targeting Americans here in the United States. For the first time ever, this bill requires in statute warrants for Americans anywhere in the world. It also requires the government to establish clear guidelines to ensure that no American is the target of any surveillance without a warrant. It clarifies that FISA and Title 18, the Criminal Code, are the exclusive means by which the government may conduct domestic surveillance.

It will prohibit any unlawful, warrantless wiretapping, the kind we saw under this administration. It provides accountability by requiring the inspectors general of various agencies to compile a comprehensive report on the President's surveillance program and that review must be given to Congress. It requires prior court approval of the procedures used to conduct surveillance of foreign targets, except in an emergency, similar to the current FISA law.

This legislation, Madam Speaker, also addresses the issue of lawsuits against telecommunications companies that comply with directives from our government. This bill does not grant immunity to any government official who might have violated the law, and this bill does not grant automatic immunity to telecom companies, as the Senate bill would have.

Under this legislation, a Federal District Court will review the evidence submitted by the Attorney General and then the court will decide whether to grant civil liability and protection to a company that provided post-9/11 assistance to the government. This bill does not grant immunity. Congress isn't deciding the question of immunity; the District Court will.

Finally, Madam Speaker, this bill will sunset in 4\1/2\ years, ensuring that the next administration will be in a position to assess and review the effectiveness of this legislation.

This legislation represents a bipartisan compromise, and, as such, both sides got less than they wanted. But it is a product of a good faith effort by both Republicans and Democrats to give our intelligence agencies the tools necessary to keep America safe, while protecting our Constitution and our civil liberties.

I strongly urge my colleagues to vote for this very important piece of legislation.

In addition, Chairman Reyes submitted the following views for the Record:

Exigent Circumstances

Prior court review is an absolutely integral part of this

bill, but we have also crafted an ``exigent circumstances''

circumstances provision that allows the Administration to

commence surveillance immediately in an emergency. This

provision should be invoked rarely, if at all. In the normal

course of events, the Attorney General and the Director of

National Intelligence will have ample time to submit

applications for surveillance to the FISA Court for its

approval before initiating a particular surveillance.

When used, this exception should be for purposes of a true

emergency, involving unforeseen or extraordinary

circumstances. I consider this to be limited to situations

where the intelligence sought would serve a critical function

in protecting national security and where the failure to act

immediately would result in the loss of what might be the

only opportunity to collect the information in question.

The Intelligence Committee intends to engage in regular and

vigorous oversight of these new authorities and, in

particular, the use of the ``exigent circumstances''

exception to ensure that the important protections in this

bill are not circumvented.

``Reverse Targeting''

The FISA Amendments Act of 2008 regularly uses the term

``targeting.'' We intend this term to mean more than simply

the process of selecting a telephone number or an e-mail

address to surveil. Rather, it is meant to describe the

process of purposely acquiring communications of or

information about a specific individual.

It is in this context that Section 702(b)(2) prohibits what

is generally referred to as ``reverse targeting.'' In our

discussions with the intelligence agencies, they have agreed

that this language prohibits the targeting of one or more

persons overseas where the purpose is to acquire the

communications of or information about a U.S. person or any

specific person reasonably believed to be inside the United

States. Accordingly, Section 702(f) requires that the

government adopt guidelines to ensure that this does not

occur.

Inadvertent Collection of U.S.-Person Information

Because of the nature of the new surveillance authorities

granted under this bill, we were particularly concerned about

the potential for a significant increase in the inadvertent

collection of U.S.-person communications and information. For

that reason, we have adopted several oversight provisions

that require the Intelligence Community to report to Congress

on the number of targets later determined to have been

located inside the United States, the number of disseminated

intelligence reports that contain U.S.-person information,

and the number of disseminated intelligence reports that

contain information identifying specific U.S. persons. The

Intelligence Committee plans to conduct vigorous oversight

of the reports.

Exclusivity

The exclusivity provision of this bill is extremely

important. This language is designed to prevent any future

efforts to conduct surveillance that is not authorized by

statute. The bill not only establishes that FISA and Title 18

are the exclusive means of conducting surveillance, it

requires that any future authorization for surveillance must

be explicitly established in statute. The language should in

no way be read to imply that there is an inherent power to

conduct surveillance beyond what is expressly authorized by

statute.

In particular, the language in Section 102(c)(l)(ii) should

be read to require citation to specific statutory authority

in all certifications for assistance in conducting electronic

surveillance issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

Sec. 2511(2)(a)(ii)(B).

Sunset

This bill is set to expire on December 31, 2012. During the

next four years, Congress will continue to assess the

surveillance activities of the U.S. Government and assess

whether additional changes need to enacted before the sunset

date to correct any deficiencies or problems that arise.

Civil Liability Provisions

The provisions in title II of this bill establish a

meaningful court review to determine whether

telecommunications companies should be protected from civil

liability for assistance provided to the government. It is

important to state that these provisions are not intended to

imply in any way that the President's conduct in connection

with the President's warrantless surveillance program was

lawful or to excuse the conduct of any government official

that might have violated the law.

Further, no telecommunications company should interpret

these provisions to imply that Congress will act in the

future to seek the dismissal of any other lawsuits charging

improper conduct in connection with surveillance activities.

Rather, Congress considers the tragic events of 9/11 to be a

unique set of circumstances that require special

consideration. As a general matter, we expect companies and

private citizens to respect the rule of law and to require

the same of its government.

With respect to the applicable legal standard, we intend

``substantial evidence'' to apply not only to a finding that

assistance was provided in response to a request that

meets the standard of this bill. That standard should also

apply where the court is asked to determine that the alleged

assistance was not provided. A simple declaration from the

Government or the defendant that the alleged assistance did

not occur should be deemed insufficient where there is

sufficient evidence to the contrary.

Similarly, when the Government alleges that a surveillance

program was ``designed'' (as opposed to ``intended'') to

detect and prevent terrorism, the court should examine the

evidence to assess the scope of the program and determine,

where appropriate, that indiscriminate surveillance that

acquires the communications of millions of Americans is not

truly ``designed'' to detect or prevent terrorism.

Finally, these provisions should also not be interpreted to

remove the power of the courts to review the

constitutionality of the process this bill establishes.

Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Madam Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton), the chairman of the Armed Services Committee.

I grant the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.

Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentlewoman from California, Ms. Jane Harman, who is the former ranking member of the Intelligence Committee.

(Ms. HARMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Madam Speaker, may I inquire as to how much time remains on all sides.

Madam Speaker, I now would like to yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger) who serves as the chairman of our Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical Intelligence on our Intelligence Committee.

Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Rhode Island (Mr. Langevin), a valued member of our Intelligence Committee.

(Mr. LANGEVIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

I grant the gentleman another 15 seconds.

Madam Speaker, it is now my pleasure to yield 1 minute to our esteemed Speaker of the House, Ms. Pelosi.

Madam Speaker, how much time remains?

Madam Speaker, it is my privilege to yield 1 minute to our distinguished majority leader, Mr. Hoyer, who in this case deserves MVP status for having the wisdom of Solomon and the patience of Job.

Madam Speaker, I yield myself the balance of the time.

I just wanted to thank everyone again, as Mr. Hoyer indicated. I believe every Member in this body cares about our national security, and I also believe that this is a good bill, a good compromise and is worthy of supporting.

Madam Speaker, I yield back the remainder of our time.

I thank my friend, the chairman of the Intelligence Committee. I thank the Speaker. I thank the Speaker not only for giving me the responsibility for trying to work with some extraordinarily talented people but also for having the courage to lead and the courage to express her convictions.

And I want, at the outset, to share her view that every Member who has spoken on this floor has spoken out of a sense of conviction and out of a sense of responsibility to the Constitution of the United States and to the protection of our great Nation and our great people.

Mr. Reyes, Mr. Conyers, Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Smith have all worked to come together, realizing that there were significant differences. Those four have been assisted by some extraordinary people, and at the outset, I want to mention them.

First of all, I want to mention my own staff without whom I think we would not be at this day. She sits on the floor. She worked for my colleague and dear friend Senator Paul Sarbanes for a number of years. One of the benefits of Senator Sarbanes retiring was that she came to my staff. Mariah Sixkiller has expended too much time, perhaps, but with great talent and great ability to reach this day. Thank you, Mariah Sixkiller.

I want to thank Chairman Conyers because Chairman Conyers, as you've heard on the floor, has been conflicted but he has been focused on the necessity to respond to issues that are real and also to help us move forward so that we did not, in the minds of many of us, have a bill pass that we thought was unacceptable, a bill passed by the Senate with 68 of 100 votes. We would not be here, in my opinion, without Chairman Conyers' leadership, not because he supports this alternative, but because he saw the ability to work together.

I want to thank his staff, Lou DeBaca, Perry Apelbaum. And Lou DeBaca, in particular, who sat for hours and hours and hours in a room trying to reach agreement as we made compromises. Mr. Reyes' staff, Mike Delaney, the staff director. Jeremy Bash. Jeremy Bash did extraordinary work. Jeremy Bash was hired by the former Chair of the Intelligence Committee, Jane Harman.

Jane Harman is probably as knowledgeable as almost anybody on this floor, other than perhaps the Speaker who served on the Intelligence Committee longer than anybody in this House. Jane Harman's leadership, concern, focus on constitutional rights, focus on the security of our country, was outstanding. She played a significant role in trying to get us to this day.

Eric Greenwald of Mr. Reyes' staff also played a significant role.

Without Mike Sheehy and Joe Onek of the Speaker's staff, we would not be here today. We would not have reached the good compromises that we reached. Joe Onek and Mike Sheehy, if they were writing this bill, would have written a different bill, much closer to what we passed on our side of the aisle and sent to the Senate, which they rejected. Mike Sheehy has served the House and the Speaker for a very long time in the intelligence field.

I want to thank Senator Rockefeller. We would not be here today on this floor if it were not for Senator Rockefeller. Senator Rockefeller very early on had discussions with me about what could they do to try to move towards the bill that we passed. He made some suggestions. Those suggestions are in this bill today. He facilitated our actions. Andy Johnson, Mike Davidson, Alissa Starzak of his staff were very, very helpful.

Senator Bond, Senator Bond and I did not see necessarily eye-to-eye on these issues as we began, but at the end, we came to an agreement. Louis Tucker and Jack Livinston of his staff were very helpful.

Chairman Hoekstra, or former Chairman Hoekstra, now Ranking Member Hoekstra, I want to thank Chairman Hoekstra, but particularly, I want to thank Chris Donessa who was very helpful, gave us great assistance and advice.

Lamar Smith and Caroline Lynch of his staff, thank you very much for your efforts as you sat in that room, as we all sat around, every one of the committees sat around the table, as we came to the final agreement.

Then I want to thank, of course, Jen Stewart and the minority leader, without whom we could not have gotten to this day.

Lastly, I want to thank my friend. There's an article going to be written. It's going to speculate whether or not he and I hurt one another by saying the other is his friend. I don't think that's the case. I said that Roy Blunt and I often disagree on substantive issues, but what we agree on very strongly is that this House needs to sit down and talk to one another and try to reach resolution on difficult issues, not hard-to-reach compromise on easy issues. It's on the difficult issues.

Roy Blunt is a man of this House, who cares about this House, who cares about this country. And he cares about drafting legislation that can be agreed upon by a broad section of this House and the American people. He has an extraordinary staff of Brian Diffell, who I want to thank for his efforts, but in particular, I want to thank Roy Blunt for his friendship, for his integrity, and for his willingness to take risks to reach compromise. Thank you, Roy.

Madam Speaker, today we conclude one step in a long, continuing process. Just under a year ago, the House came under great pressure from the administration and the Senate to pass the Protect America Act, a bill I could not support and spoke out against for its lack of civil liberties protections.

Since then, there have been other attempts to modernize the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: first, the RESTORE Act passed by the House last November with my strong support, with Mr. Conyers' strong support, Mr. Reyes' strong support, and the support of this House; that was followed by the Senate bill which passed, as I said earlier, with 68 votes in February; and most recently, the FISA Amendments Act, passed by the House last March. I supported that bill as well. I think it was a better bill. It would be my alternative. It was our alternative on this side of the aisle, but it was not the consensus alternative, and we needed to reach consensus to move forward.

I was proud to support the two House bills, which I believe struck the right balance between giving our intelligence community the tools to go after those who seek to harm and protecting the constitutional rights of American citizens.

Today, I stand in support of a different kind of bill, a compromise. To be clear, this is not the bill that I would have written or that perhaps anybody individually on this floor would have written. However, in our legislative process, no one gets everything he or she wants. Different parties, often with deeply competing interests, come together here to produce a consensus product, where each side gives and takes. I don't believe we've given on the ultimate principles on either side.

Over the past few months, I've been involved in almost daily discussions with the stakeholders on this important issue, Members in both Chambers, in both parties, as well as outside organizations and experts. I want to thank all of the outside organizations, whether they agree with our product or do not. Their contribution has been an important one. I particularly want to thank those who take very unpopular

positions to protect the rights of perhaps just one of us among the 300 million, who in the land of the free and the home of the brave deserve to have that one individual right protected, and I appreciate their efforts to ensure that that country remains that kind of country.

Together, we have worked to develop a bill that strikes a sound balance. This measure provides the intelligence community with the strong authority to surveil foreign terrorists who seek to harm this country and our people. As the Speaker said, that is our responsibility, and we intend to meet it.

It provides for enhanced civil liberties protections for Americans and insists on meaningful judicial scrutiny.

It includes critical new oversight and accountability requirements that both address the President's warrantless surveillance program and ensures that any surveillance going forward comports with the fourth amendment and will be closely monitored by the Congress.

Of vital importance, my colleagues, this legislation makes clear that FISA is the exclusive means by which the government may conduct surveillance, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Contrary to the administration's previous actions, in which it did not comply with the FISA statute, this statute makes it very clear, this and this alone is the process through which we will intercept communications, an issue of great importance to the Speaker, as she has said.

Notably, this bill does not address or excuse any actions by the government or government officials related to the President's warrantless surveillance program, nor does it include any statement by the Congress or conclusion on the legality of that program.

Indeed, it mandates for the first time ever a robust accounting by the Inspectors General of the warrantless surveillance program, which Congress will receive and act on.

Madam Speaker, in closing, let me say again, this bill is a compromise, but in my opinion, it is a compromise worth supporting. And the conclusions drawn by editorials in the New York Times, Wall Street Journal and Washington Post over the last 2 days reflect this compromise.

Today, for example, the Washington Post recognized that this is a reasonable effort to strike a compromise, stating: ``Striking the balance between liberties and security is never easy, and the new FISA bill is not perfect. But it is a vast improvement over the original law and over the earlier, rushed attempts to revise that law.''

As I said at the beginning, this bill is one step in a long, continuing process of updating this critical legislation, ensuring that our national security and our civil liberties are both protected.

This legislation sunsets at the end of 2012, and it's imperative that we scrutinize its implementation in the future and make any necessary changes. I believe we have the best bill before us that we could possibly get in the current environment. It is a significant improvement over the Senate-passed bill and, I suggest, existing law.

I look forward to working with my colleagues in the years ahead to ensure that both our national security and our civil liberties are protected. That is our responsibility. That is our pledge to our constituents. I urge passage of this legislation.