Transparency and Accountability in Intelligence Contracting Act of 2009

Madam Chairman, I yield myself as much time as I shall consume.

Madam Chairman, annual Intelligence authorization bills should be bipartisan legislation designed to address critical national security issues and deal in a deliberate and considered way with legislation affecting the intelligence community, the personnel within the intelligence community. Unfortunately, this bill does neither. I'm forced to rise in strong opposition.

When this bill was first reported almost 8 months ago, the bill failed to address critical national security issues such as Guantanamo detainees, attempts by this administration to convert intelligence and counterterrorism into matters of criminal law and meaningful reforms to the congressional notification process.

In the nearly 8 months since this bill was reported out of committee, our country has suffered two major terrorist attacks and a significant number of near misses. During that time, the majority took no time and no action to bring this bill to the floor.

In 8 months nothing was done to fix the flaws in our intelligence community that were apparent to every American in the wake of the first attack at Fort Hood and, later, the Christmas bombing attack on an American airliner.

In 8 months, nothing was done to clarify who is in charge of interrogation of high-value terrorist detainees, these people that are captured around the world who want to do harm to America.

In 8 months, nothing was done to provide a long-term renewal of our critical intelligence authorities under the USA PATRIOT Act.

In 8 months, nothing was done to, once and for all, stop hard-core, radical jihadist terrorists from being brought into the United States, despite the clear opposition that has arisen to this ill-considered idea from average Americans across the country.

In 8 months, nothing has been done to clarify how covert actions should be conducted or authorized when they could have deadly effects on American citizens. Nothing has been done.

Then, you go through and you take a look at the amendments that we wanted to propose that would have addressed these issues, and all of these were thrown out by the majority, an amendment that would direct the DNI to establish a panel to review the intelligence relating to weapons of mass destruction programs of Iran. Politically speaking, our intelligence community is now to the left of the United Nations as to our assessment of what Iran's capabilities are, to the left of the ill- fated National Intelligence Estimate that came out under the previous administration.

We've asked for an independent panel of experts to give us a red team review. Our colleagues on the other side of the aisle said, no, that's not necessary.

We asked for an amendment that would require the CIA to release publicly unclassified versions of documents relating to the use of enhanced interrogation techniques, this controversial background as to who knew what when, including some of the leading Members of this body. We asked for those documents to be released. The majority said no.

We asked for the prohibition of funds to bring Guantanamo detainees into the United States. The majority said, we won't even debate it. We won't consider it. We won't allow for an amendment that would do just that.

We asked for a report requiring the DNI to submit a report detailing steps taken to fix problems identified in the President's Fort Hood intelligence review prior to December 25. Why? Because the incident on November 5 had striking parallels to what happened on December 25, and we thought it was fair to ask the question and ask the Director of National Intelligence: With the information that you gained on November 5, what actions did you take that might have helped prevent what happened on Christmas Day? And the answer was, no, we don't think that that would be a worthwhile effort to ask the intelligence community those kinds of tough and difficult questions and be held accountable to this body.

And then we said we had another amendment that said, Don't we think it would be appropriate that we actually establish a process for the authorization and the notification of covert actions that may result in the death of a targeted U.S. citizen? It doesn't get into a debate as to whether that is appropriate, an appropriate course of action. It just says, don't we think that the intelligence community and the executive branch should have in place a detailed process of how these decisions are made, how they are authorized, and when Congress would be notified? And the answer from the majority was no. A process that would give us an idea as to how the administration would authorize and notify Congress when they took actions that might result in the death of a targeted U.S. citizen, a targeted U.S. citizen.

And these are just the amendments that were not considered, substantive, serious issues that the majority is unwilling to debate, to discuss and to address.

Later on, as we go through the day and as we take a look at the manager's amendment and the other amendments, we'll take a look at the striking contrast between what the majority is willing to debate and discuss and to act on, and what they are unwilling to debate and discuss. And it has a direct impact on the safety of each and every American.

Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Madam Chairman, at this time I would like to yield 4 minutes to a member of the committee, Mr. Thornberry from Texas, who will talk about the continued efforts by this administration in what appears to be a war on the intelligence community, a legal war on our intelligence community, the brave men and women in that community.

I yield the gentleman an additional 2 minutes.

I would like to yield 4 minutes to my colleague from Michigan, a strong defender of the Intelligence Committee, Mr. Rogers.

I yield my colleague 1 more minute.

At this time, I'd like to yield 2 minutes to my colleague from Texas (Mr. Burgess).

I yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.

Madam Chair, how much time do we have remaining on each side?

I would like to reserve my time until we are more equal.

Madam Chair, I yield myself 1 minute.

I hope that as we have the general debate on this bill right now that we have at least one person who will come up on the other side and explain exactly what is in the McDermott amendment, what it means and what the implication will be to our men and women in the intelligence community. We hear over and over again how ``we support the intelligence community''--without a single hearing.

Perhaps with about 1 minute of debate on the manager's amendment that has been allotted to that McDermott amendment, we will fundamentally change the nature of the intelligence community, how they work and how they operate by creating new criminal statutes, not a minute of hearings in this committee, and all of a sudden it appears out of nowhere in a manager's amendment.

Would someone on the other side please explain the rationale for bringing that in this bill with having no hearing when it will have a fundamental impact on the intelligence community? What is the rationale, and why was the majority unwilling to have hearings on this issue? Why were they unwilling to debate this issue, and why did they bury it into a manager's amendment with 22 other amendments?

I thank my colleague from California for coming down and explaining her amendments. These are issues that we have talked about in the past, and congratulations for having them included in the manager's amendment. I support those kinds of amendments, because they have been discussed and they have broad bipartisan support.

There are other parts of the manager's amendment which I am strongly opposed to because they haven't even had any dialogue, debate or hearings on that.

To discuss one of those, I yield 2 minutes to my colleague from Texas (Mr. Thornberry).

Madam Chair, I would like to yield 2 minutes to my colleague from Michigan (Mr. Rogers).

Madam Chair, I yield myself 1 minute.

There are a lot of things in this bill that are not addressed, that were not

allowed to be put in order as we went through the rules process. One of those things is how we are going to deal with the detainees from Guantanamo.

You know, at one time they were going to be moved into Kansas; the people in Kansas stood up and said no. They then were going to moved to Michigan, and the people in Michigan stood up and said no. They then were going to be moved to South Carolina, and the leadership in South Carolina said no. Now it is the people in Illinois that are fighting the valiant battle and saying, no, we don't want them in our State either.

There has been a fundamental problem in each case where the administration has proposed moving these individuals into a State; there has been absolutely no transparency. People in Michigan, people in Illinois, people in South Carolina and Kansas have all asked for the fundamental information: Who are these individuals? Why are they in Guantanamo? What did they do to deserve to be there? What has their behavior been while they have been in Guantanamo? In each case, for each of those States we've said, before the States make up their mind as to whether they are going to accept these individuals or not, share these individuals with the policymakers and the decision-makers in that State.

I yield my colleague from Texas (Mr. Thornberry) 1\1/2\ minutes.

Madam Chair, I am going to be the last speaker, so we only have one speaker left.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Madam Chair, my colleague on the other side of the aisle, Chairman Reyes, has said now is not the time to talk about Gitmo. Obviously, the majority has also said now is not the time to talk about getting an independent assessment of what is going on in Iran. Now is not the time to talk about the release of unclassified versions of documents related to the use of enhanced interrogation techniques. Now is not the time to talk about bringing the Gitmo folks here. Now is not the time to talk about the time lapse between Fort Hood and Christmas Day and what did and did not happen during that period of time. Now is not the time to talk about a process for the authorization and notification of covert actions that may result in the death of a targeted U.S. citizen.

So it is not time to talk about any of those or to debate any of those issues which are absolutely critical to the effectiveness of our intelligence community and to keeping America safe.

Interestingly enough, it is the day not to talk about but to bury into a manager's amendment 22 different amendments, including one that will fundamentally change the way our intelligence community has to do business. No hearings. No discussions. No debate. Buried in there is the McDermott amendment. We are now limited to, at most, 10 minutes per side to talk about 22 amendments in the manager's amendment, which will come up immediately following this general debate. Yet it is interesting that, in the discussion of general debate, not one person on the other side was willing to defend this amendment and the process by which it was included--meaning no discussions, no debate--or to defend the content of what is included in the manager's amendment.

Is this what the process in the House has now come down to, that we bury these critical amendments between 22 other amendments? If we split up the time equally, let's see. We have 22 amendments divided by 20 minutes. We will, maybe, have 1 minute of debate. We will have 1 minute of debate on this amendment. It will be interesting when our folks in the intelligence community see what our friends on the other side of the aisle have done to them today, our friends on the other side who talk about how they so strongly defend our intelligence community. When they go visit them in the field, I would guess that they are going to get a very cold reception.

The other thing that they are going to do is they are going to have questions, and they are going to expect the majority to explain how they did this with no hearings. They are going to have to explain exactly, Now, what does this amendment do? How does it impact us? What does it mean? How is it operational?

I assume you knew that before you voted on it on the floor of the House, and my answer is going to be, I don't think they do.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Madam Chair, I claim time in opposition.

I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Since the other side doesn't want to talk about this amendment, I find myself having to come back and, once again, bring up the McDermott amendment. I would just appreciate, since there have been no hearings on this and it has slipped into this in the dead of night, just some answers to questions that maybe someone on the majority side can answer.

Remember, we are in a community now where the people at the front lines realize, when they have been asked by Congress and the President to do something, that, 3 or 4 years later, they may be prosecuted for those very activities by following the requests of this Congress.

We are talking about enhanced interrogation techniques. The record indicates that even people as high as the Speaker of this House knew about it. Yet this House is supporting those efforts to perhaps go back and prosecute this. Now we open up a whole new set of legal risk for our people in the intelligence community. I wish this thing just said, ``Follow the rules,'' but it doesn't. It's 11 pages of legalese, creating all types of new and ambiguous rules for our people in the intelligence community.

Would someone please answer the question: Why did we never have any hearings on this? Why no discussion? Why no debate? Why does this amendment define a criminal offense that only intelligence community personnel would be guilty of? This only applies to intelligence community personnel. Answer the question.

The amendment would make it a crime for depriving the individual of necessary food, water, sleep, or medical care. How does the bill define ``necessary''? How will we explain that to the people in the intelligence community?

The amendment would make it a crime to require someone to participate in acts intended to violate the individual's religious beliefs. Is there any objective standard to define that term or is it a subjective standard? Is there any requirement of reasonableness?

The amendment would make it a crime to exploit phobias of the individual. Phobias? Could you explain why this would be a criminal offense for a member of the intelligence community but not a criminal offense for a prosecutor who threatens a detainee with increased jail time if he does not cooperate?

These are just some simple questions--questions that I would think people in the intelligence community would ask the next time someone from this body comes and visits with them and tells them how much we support them and how great of a job we think they're doing. I would think they would hold this amendment up and say, Sir, Madam, did you vote for this? Did you understand what it meant when you voted for it? Could you explain it to me? Somebody please answer these questions.

We sure didn't have the opportunity to ask this in committee, to get any briefings on this, to have any hearings, for someone to explain this to us. But, no, if the other side has its way, soon this will be law.

Madam Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.

Madam Chair, I yield 2 minutes to my colleague from Michigan (Mr. Rogers).

Madam Chair, I yield 1 minute to my colleague from Texas (Mr. Thornberry).

Madam Chair, I yield myself 1 minute.

I wish it were plain and simple. It's 11 pages, 11 pages dropped in in the middle of the night. No debate, no discussion, just inserted.

If it's already a crime, why are you putting it in here?

We haven't answered all the questions that we asked before. I notice that the sponsor of the amendment, who was here for an extended period of time, I'm not sure if he wanted to speak on the amendment or not but obviously wasn't given the opportunity to speak on the amendment if he wanted to. It's too bad because I think there's legitimate need for discussion and debate because I don't think it's at all clear that this is just a restatement of current law.

Answer the questions. The amendment would make it a crime to exploit phobias of the individual. Why is this a criminal offense for a member of the intelligence community but for no one else, not a criminal offense for a prosecutor? Why didn't we ever talk about this in committee? Why didn't we ever debate it?

Madam Chair, I reserve the balance of my time

Madam Chair, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to my colleague from Michigan (Mr. Rogers).

I yield myself the balance of my time.

Thank you.

Madam Chair, my colleague on the other side of the aisle is exactly right. The people in the intelligence community are watching exactly what we are doing. And actions do speak louder than words. The actions that they have seen, their colleagues were asked by this Congress, including, the record shows, the leadership of this House and the former administration, to do things on their behalf to keep America safe, and they see their colleagues now potentially being prosecuted because the rules changed under this administration.

As they see the rules changed for them and perhaps their colleagues being prosecuted, they see a global justice initiative coming out of the FBI where we are reading Miranda rights to our enemies on the battlefield in Afghanistan. They see the actions and they see the actions are very, very different.

They see that we are moving KSM from Gitmo to trial in New York City. Thankfully, the people in New York City are saying no way, we are not doing it. And at the same time that KSM is being promised a trial in civilian courts in the United States, they are seeing 11 pages of new vulnerabilities being placed on them after no hearings and no debate.

Yes, our men and women in the field are seeing a real difference. They are seeing a real difference in actions by this Congress and by this administration. They see that they have become kind of a target of this administration, that this is now not about keeping America safe, it is about putting them into a legal framework, an ugly legal net.

Madam Chair, I rise in strong opposition to this bloated Manager's Amendment. Its flaws powerfully demonstrate how the Intelligence Committee is failing to do its work and has in fact become counterproductive to the work of the intelligence community.

This amendment is everything that is wrong with intelligence policy in 2010. It is politicized, it fails to recognize or act on the serious threats that we continue to face as a nation, and it puts off the tough decisions indefinitely. Where it does take a substantive action, instead of taking meaningful steps to fix the problem it blames the men and women of the intelligence community for failing to follow a politically correct policy, even though that policy was ratified by Members of Congress at the highest levels. I think we have heard this story before.

The Managers Amendment contains the text of 22 Democratic amendments, and no Republican amendments. The Committee minority was not consulted on a single one of these amendments--in fact, one of them continues to reverse a bipartisan agreement on notification reform from last year.

Instead of taking meaningful steps to address critical national security problems such as the threat posed by bringing Guantanamo detainees to the United States, the flaws revealed in our intelligence sharing by the Fort Hood and Christmas attacks, and the issues posed by American citizens who join terrorist groups abroad, it would require 16 new reports, to bring the total for the bill to at least 57 new reports. And instead of supporting the men and women of our intelligence community, it would create a new criminal offense that not only would duplicate an existing law--it would apply only to our intelligence personnel. How's that for gratitude?

Instead of trying to provide proper procedures are in place to govern the conduct of covert action activities that could impact American citizens, the Majority believes it is more important to order yet another duplicative report on foreign language proficiency when the Committee is already briefed regularly and repeatedly on the efforts that are ongoing in this area.

Instead of trying to fix the intelligence sharing problems that were laid bare at the Fort Hood shooting and shown to be critical during the Christmas bombing attack, the Majority has instead chosen to put its head in the sand and order up a report on events in Argentina between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s.

Instead of resolving the serious problems in coordinating the interrogation of the high-value detainees that became apparent when Miranda rights were read to a foreign radical jihadist, the Majority has chosen to require the intelligence community to write up not one, but two new reports and a ``Task Force'' on cybersecurity even though the Committee is in the middle of a series of comprehensive briefings and hearings on the subject and has conducted repeated oversight.

Madam Chair, I can't think of a single terrorist plot that has ever been disrupted by a report to Congress.

In addition to these more fundamental issues, I need to note for the record some specific serious problems with this amendment.

First, the amendment does even further damage to the bipartisan agreement that had been reached on reform of congressional notification. Instead of providing a mechanism that respects the separation of powers and the various equities of the President and the Congress, this amendment has ceded the decision of which Members of Congress will be briefed on sensitive covert actions entirely to the President, apparently to avoid the White House's veto threat on the bill. That is ironic for a majority who has claimed so long and so loud--despite clear records and the recollection of others to the contrary--that it was never briefed on intelligence policies that they explicitly helped to ratify on a bipartisan basis.

Second, the amendment does even further damage to years of carefully developed practice and procedure for how the congressional intelligence committees conduct oversight by attempting to cede its responsibility to the GAO. The original bill was flawed because it would have provided the GAO with virtually unfettered authority to insert itself into intelligence community matters without applying

the same rules that govern the congressional intelligence committees or limiting the dissemination of any work product to protect sources and methods.

It was so bad that even the Obama administration objected that the bill ``would fundamentally shift the longstanding relationship and information flow between the IC and intelligence committee members and staff.'' This Managers Amendment makes these problems even worse by allowing the Comptroller General to unilaterally develop procedures for handling of highly sensitive material with no requirement that it follow House or Committee rules, and in fact would allow committees other than the intelligence committees to request GAO review of the intelligence community.

This is contrary to the Rules of the House and the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. How many times do we have to learn the simple lesson that intelligence oversight is most effective when it is conducted by the intelligence committees--at least when those committees do more than just require new reports.

Third, buried deep within the 22 amendments contained in this Managers Amendment is an extraordinary provision that would create a new criminal offense that would only apply to the men and women of the intelligence community. Title 18 of the U.S. Code, section 2340A, already gives effect to the Convention Against Torture and makes torture a criminal offense in the United States. Torture is already against the law.

Apparently, that's not enough for the Majority--it has to have a special offense that would apply only to the men and women of the Intelligence Community--just as Attorney General Holder has appointed a special prosecutor to investigate them. There is no legal reason to do this--it apparently exists only to make a political statement. The intelligence operatives on the front lines deserve our thanks and our support for doing hard things in hard places, like the men and women who made the ultimate sacrifice this year in Khost, Afghanistan. They do not deserve to be singled out for special criminal offenses. I believe that this is wrong.

Madam Chair, I strongly oppose this amendment.

Madam Chair, I demand a recorded vote.

I have an amendment at the desk.

Madam Chair, I would like to yield myself as much time as I may consume.

Madam Chair, this is a very straightforward amendment. I thank the Rules Committee for making it in order. It basically says that for not later than 30 days after the enactment of this act, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall make publicly available an unclassified version of the report of the Inspector General entitled ``Procedures Used in Narcotics Airbridge Denial Program in Peru.''

Many of you may remember that this was a very tragic incident where, with the assistance of our intelligence community, two of my constituents were tragically killed in Peru, shot down by the Peruvian Air Force. We need an unclassified version of this report being made available to the public, and more importantly, to the families, the families of those who were killed.

You know, it wasn't that long ago, it was within the last month that there was a discussion about an accountability review. Almost 9 years after that tragic shoot-down, there was an Accountability Board that had been convened. And its results have been made or were reported to our committee. Roughly 4 weeks ago I asked the Director of the CIA whether the families of those killed would be briefed on what was found in the Accountability Board and the accountabilities that were put in order. To date I am yet waiting for an answer.

This has been unfair to these families, it has been unfair to the American public that when we have had such a tragic failing in the intelligence community, which included, from my perspective, an attempted coverup by the previous administration or by the intelligence community as to exactly what happened, how it happened, and how these Americans were killed, that we have been so closed in sharing that information with the American public and the families.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Madam Chair, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

I would like to thank my colleagues on the other side of the aisle and the chairman for accepting the amendment, my colleague from California for the kind words that she had to say. We worked on this program for a number of years together. And it has taken us such a long period of time to get the answers that help understand but do not explain what happened.

This amendment is intended to get more information to the American people, more information to the families. I do hope that over the coming days that the Director of the CIA, that the people in the intelligence community decide to give the families full access to the Accountability Board.

I appreciate the support of the chairwoman of the subcommittee, Ms. Schakowsky from Illinois. This is a case where we have worked uniquely in a bipartisan way to address failings within the intelligence community, to try to right those wrongs, and to try to move us forward in a constructive and positive way. I thank my colleagues who have enabled that process to work and to work effectively.

Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.

Madam Chairman, I'd like to claim the time in opposition, although I will not be opposed to the amendment.

I would like to recognize my colleague from Texas (Mr. Thornberry) for 1 minute.

Madam Chairman, I yield myself the balance of the time.

Madam Chairman, I will not oppose the amendment. I support the amendment. I think the report on highlighting the progress that we have made or that we may not have made toward our objectives of increasing the diversity within the intelligence community is something that is needed and something that my colleague has been championing for all the years that we have served on the committee together. I support the amendment and urge my colleagues to support it as well.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Madam Chair, I rise to claim the time in opposition.

Madam Chair, I will not oppose the amendment. Although, I do believe, and I would hope that my colleague from Michigan would agree that, perhaps, when we are talking about the scope of this amendment, it is broader than what is just written here.

One of the things that we are very, very concerned about which, I believe, should be included in this--because, like you, I believe, if the intelligence community had worked properly, perhaps we could have stopped this attack; but this is not just a matter of connecting databases and those types of things. It is also about missing clues that we had that were highlighted before Christmas Day.

What am I talking about?

We have known for quite some time that Awlaki was a concern. We saw kind of a mirror image of what happened on Christmas Day a couple of months earlier at Fort Hood, where 14 Americans were killed and where 14 Americans died in a tragic terrorist attack, linked to Awlaki, linked to al Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula.

I had an amendment that went along those lines, but it was not accepted by the majority, and I think it may well have fallen within the scope of the amendment of yours, Mr. Schauer, which you are offering, which says:

If we had had these insights into al Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula, if we had had these insights into Awlaki's involvement with Major Hasan, if we had had these insights into the communications, the emails, between Hasan and Awlaki, what did we do between November 5 and Christmas Day to target Awlaki, to target al Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula and to use this information that these individuals and this group might be targeting the U.S. and whether we missed opportunities in those 2 months to identify the threat and respond to it?

Are those the kind of questions that you might see which could also be addressed in this or are these outside of the scope of what you are looking for?

I yield to my colleague from Michigan.

Reclaiming my time, I thank my colleague for that clarification because I think that is probably the bigger untold story here of how much and how many insights we might have had into al Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula and how we failed to act on that intelligence and how we failed, as we've now been saying for a long period of time, to connect those dots, to be able to put in preventative measures and to actually have stopped Awlaki and al Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula from carrying out this attack on Detroit and on the State of Michigan.

With that, I reserve the balance of my time.

Madam Chair, I will not oppose the amendment. As a matter of fact, I will support the amendment in its larger context, recognizing that this report by the DNI has to include the time prior to Fort Hood, the Fort Hood attack, and then the time from Fort Hood until Christmas Day. That is the area that we have been trying to get information on from the intelligence community over the last 3 or 4 months, and it has been the area that they have been most reluctant to provide us information on.

As a matter of fact, when I was in Yemen on New Year's Day, less than 2 months ago, I was specifically prohibited from getting information on exactly those kinds of questions as to what did the intelligence community know about Awlaki, about al Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula. The individuals both in the intel community and with the Ambassador were specifically instructed not to share that information, which tells me that there is some information there, and for some reason, they have not wanted to share that information with us.

So, with the understanding that that type of information will be shared with Congress in this report, also then recognizing that this may end up being a classified report which you may not have access to unless the committee agrees to provide you access to it, I support the amendment. I look forward to the DNI's completing this report and to his submitting it to the committee.

With that, I yield back the balance of my time.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Madam Chair, I am proud to rise today in support of H.R. 2701, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. This is an unusual time of the year for us to be considering this legislation. However, it is and remains a very important bill which addresses critical national security issues, and one that we ultimately need to see enacted.

As chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, my most important job is to guide the committee in providing appropriate tools, resources, and authorities to aid the dedicated men and women of the intelligence community in keeping our Nation safe. I believe that H.R. 2701 does just that.

First and foremost, this bill authorizes the activities and the funds for the 16 agencies of the intelligence community. It is difficult to talk about their roles and their missions in the open, but in some ways it is probably one of the most important things that we do on the Intelligence Committee. In addition to providing authorization for intelligence activities, this bill takes the initial important steps to improve congressional oversight of that intelligence community.

I want to highlight two legislative provisions from this year's bill that I believe will significantly improve oversight.

When this bill was marked up in committee, we made significant changes to the so-called ``Gang of Eight'' procedures. As Members know, the President has had the statutory authority to limit briefings to the Gang of Eight when they involve sensitive covert actions. It was the sense of the committee that the Gang of Eight statutory authority had been overused, and that, on matters of critical importance, the committee as a whole should have been informed. For that reason, that earlier version of the bill removed the statutory authority for limiting briefings to the Gang of Eight.

Last July, the administration issued a statement of policy on H.R. 2701 that included a veto threat with respect to the provisions that would modify the Gang of Eight notification procedures. I believe that some level of concern at that point was justified, and I have been working with the administration over the past several months to resolve those differences. Since July, there have already been noticeable improvements in the way the administration and the intelligence community are communicating and briefing Congress.

Accordingly, the manager's amendment I will offer includes a revised provision on Gang of Eight reform. I know that many Members have strong feelings about this issue on both sides of the aisle. The provision that is in the manager's amendment is intended to be a strong and significant step towards better oversight which still respects the constitutional authorities of the President. It recognizes that both elected branches have a role in national security.

I fully expect that once we pass this bill we will then revisit this issue during conference between the House and the Senate. And I am happy to work with Members to seek improvements at that time. Through this process, we will be able to find a workable solution to a problem that has persisted over the past several years, if not longer.

Another provision that I think is absolutely critical establishes a statutory Inspector General for the intelligence community. This provision will eliminate waste, fraud, and abuse, and it will also help keep a close eye on the protection of the rights of Americans.

This year's bill is truly a product of many hands. The Inspector General provision, which I just spoke about, in large part is due to the efforts of Ms. Eshoo, the chair of the Intelligence Community Management Subcommittee. The vice chairman of the full committee, Mr. Hastings, has offered an amendment to include critical provisions on our shared interest in promoting diversity as a mission imperative. He has been working at this long and hard for many, many years. Our newest majority member, Mr. Boren, has worked hard to develop a pilot program to improve language capability in African languages.

The chairman of the Technical and Tactical Subcommittee, Mr. Ruppersberger, has worked hard on the classified annex to make sure our approach to acquisitions and our most technical programs make good sense. He has been a pivotal part to the committee's oversight process in these very important areas.

The bill includes several provisions offered by Ms. Schakowsky, the chairwoman of the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, which relate to

her longstanding interest in appropriately monitoring and managing contractors in the intelligence community.

Mr. Holt, the chairman of the Select Intelligence Oversight Panel, advocated for a provision addressing the videotaping of interrogations and another on intelligence information on the health risks faced by Desert Storm veterans.

Mr. Thompson of California, another subcommittee chairman, has worked hard on this bill as well. He pushed successfully for the inclusion of a provision to study the benefits paid to the families of the men and women of the intelligence community who have made the ultimate sacrifice. I am proud to support that as well.

We also received important input from the committee's minority members. Mr. Kline of Minnesota offered an excellent amendment, which we were pleased to accept, that requires the National Reconnaissance Organization to rewrite its charter to meet its current missions. Mr. Conaway's personal interest in auditable financial statements led to a provision in the bill that requires the intelligence community to focus on its internal financial management and to provide a system that achieves auditability.

Madam Chair, I believe that this bill will provide the resources and the tools that the intelligence community needs to do its important work in keeping our Nation safe. That includes collection and analysis of human intelligence, signals intelligence, and geospatial intelligence.

It includes funds to detect and disrupt terrorist plots, to provide for intelligence support to the warfighters in Iraq and Afghanistan, and also improves the recruitment and training of a diverse and capable workforce.

During my time on this committee, I've had the good fortune to be able to travel and to meet the brave men and women of the intelligence community, both uniformed and civilian, and I am continually impressed and in awe of the great work that they do and the great morale that they have. They are dedicated, professional and highly skilled patriots, and I'm proud to offer a bill that supports them and all that they do for our great Nation.

This past December, we lost seven of those brave men and women in the attack in Khost, Afghanistan. It is for them, and for those who carry on their mission, that I proudly submit this bill today.

Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Madam Chairman, now it's my privilege to yield 3 minutes to my good friend and chairman of the Armed Services Committee, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton), who actually has jurisdiction over some of the issues that the ranking member mentioned just a couple of minutes ago.

It's now my pleasure to yield 1\1/2\ minutes to my good friend and former member of the House Intelligence Committee who still is a valued resource for us, Mr. Boswell from Iowa.

Madam Chair, I am happy to oblige my good friend, Mr. Boswell.

You are correct, Mr. Boswell.

Having had the opportunity to visit Drake University with you, you are correct.

I yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.

Madam Chair, I don't quibble with the opinions that my friends on the other side of the aisle have. It's just facts that don't support those opinions that I quibble with. They're not entitled to their own facts.

I now yield 1\1/2\ minutes to a new member of our committee, the gentleman from Oklahoma (Mr. Boren), a valued member of our committee.

I yield the gentleman an additional 15 seconds.

Madam Chair, just so we are clear, it doesn't appear that some members of the other aisle realize how important the rules are. The rules of the House apply to everyone on a bipartisan basis. The information he sought was denied from our committee because it didn't fit the criteria and the rules of the House.

With that, I now yield 2 minutes to my friend from the Armed Services Committee, chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee, and a new member of our House Intelligence Committee this year, Mr. Smith of Washington.

Madam Chair, I now yield 2 minutes to the chairman of the Terrorism-HUMINT, Analysis and Counterintelligence Subcommittee, my good friend from California (Mr. Thompson).

Madam Chair, I am now pleased to yield 2 minutes to the chair of the Homeland Security Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment, and our former ranking member of the House Intelligence Committee, Ms. Harman of California.

Madam Chair, I now yield 2 minutes to the chairwoman of the Subcommittee on Intelligence Community Management, a valued member of my committee, Ms. Eshoo from California.

I yield the gentlelady 15 additional seconds.

Madam Chair, it is now my privilege to yield 2 minutes to the chairman of the Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical Intelligence, the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger).

Madam Chair, it is probably a good point that the ranking member makes that there should be a debate on Guantanamo; unfortunately, this is not the right bill to have that debate on.

I now yield 2 minutes to the chairman of the Select Intelligence Oversight Panel, and a member of the House Intelligence Committee, a valued member, Mr. Holt from New Jersey.

Madam Chair, may I inquire of the time remaining on both sides?

Madam Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.

Madam Chair, I now yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the chairwoman of the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, the gentlewoman from Illinois (Ms. Schakowsky).

Madam Chair, I yield 1 minute to a valued member of our committee, the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff).

Madam Chair, I understand the frustration on the minority side. As an Army veteran, as a veteran of Federal law enforcement for 26\1/2\ years, I understand and value the United States Constitution. I understand and value that we have to live by the rules. I understand and value the fact that we are a global leader that is much respected.

The gentleman talks about one amendment, and that amendment simply says, Follow the rules. Follow the law. Follow the principles that have made this country great. I understand that.

Apparently, the minority does not understand that, and I feel for them because, in the final analysis, I have been with members of the intelligence community in faraway places around the world. I have been with them and their families at Bethesda when they were recuperating from the attack in Khost. I have been to the ceremony at the CIA. I understand what they go through. This is a good bill. It deserves everybody's support.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.

I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Madam Chair, the manager's amendment includes a number of revisions to H.R. 2701 along with a number of technical changes. I would like to highlight several of these key provisions.

The manager's amendment makes significant changes to the underlying bill's reforms to the process for notifying Congress on sensitive covert actions.

As my colleagues know, the National Security Act requires that the President inform Congress through the intelligence committees about all significant intelligence activities including covert actions.

In very limited circumstances, it allows the President to limit briefings on certain highly sensitive covert actions to the Gang of Eight--the leadership of the Intelligence Committees and the leadership of both Houses.

Over the past several months, we have carefully considered the administration's objections to the reforms that the committee included in the underlying bill. The manager's amendment is a product of that work.

The bill, as amended, would require the President to maintain a record of all Gang of Eight briefings. It also requires that the full committee be notified every time that a Gang of Eight briefing is conducted and be provided with general information regarding that briefing.

In the event the President decides that a briefing must be limited to the Gang of Eight, the manager's amendment also requires that he submit a certification stating that extraordinary circumstances require the briefing to be limited.

In the case of a limited briefing, the DNI will have to reissue that certification every 180 days or open the briefing to all members of the committee.

This reform is a substantial improvement over the language we included in previous authorization bills and which some of my colleagues still support. This earlier language would have actually expanded the President's authority to conduct restricted briefings, going so far as to include all intelligence activities, not just covert actions. It would also result in more restricted briefings and not fewer.

I am interested in passing laws that reform the notification process, not, as some would say, in sending political messages.

The manager's amendment also includes a number of provisions proposed by my colleagues. These include an amendment by Mr. Bishop, which would require the DNI and the Attorney General to provide Congress with a strategy on balancing intelligence collection needs with the interests of the United States in prosecuting terrorist suspects.

The questioning and prosecution of terrorist suspects has been the subject of some controversy in recent weeks, and I believe that Congress could benefit from understanding how the administration plans to handle such cases in the future.

A second provision included in the manager's amendment was proposed by Mr. Marshall of Georgia. It requires the DNI to study the best practices of other foreign governments to combat violent domestic extremism.

A number of our allies, including the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, have established programs to stop individuals from turning to terrorism. This is a growing problem here in the United States, and we could benefit from learning how our friends and allies have dealt with this problem.

Madam Chair, I urge the passage of the manager's amendment.

At this point, I reserve the balance of my time.

Madam Chair, I now yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Rhode Island, and a valued member of our committee, Mr. Langevin.

(Mr. LANGEVIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Madam Chair, it is now my privilege to yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Richardson), who is a member of the Homeland Security Subcommittee on Emerging Threats.

I am happy to oblige.

I believe that the Homeland Security Committees have an important role to play in congressional oversight of national security matters and that the committee should be briefed on national security matters that fall within its jurisdiction.

Madam Chair, I yield myself 2 minutes.

The manager's amendment includes language originally proposed by Mr. McDermott that reiterates existing law on torture and provides statutory criminal penalties for individuals who knowingly commit an act of cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment. Torture is a reprehensible and counterproductive practice. The U.S., as we all know, has no business engaging in that. The language in the manager's amendment simply reasserts existing law.

Executive Order 13491 prohibits interrogators from engaging in any of the activities highlighted in the manager's amendment language. This Executive Order limits interrogations to the interrogation techniques that are authorized by the Army Field Manual. It also spells out the terms of Common Article 3 and relevant provisions of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment as the minimum standard for the United States to follow.

The language in the manager's amendment restates existing criminal law prohibitions like those in the Detainee Treatment Act and clearly establishes that the United States will adhere to the rule of law. It provides a specific criminal penalty for those who knowingly cause the death of a detainee. It is already a crime for an interrogator to knowingly murder a detainee. This provision merely adds a concrete statutory penalty to that conduct.

This language does not, does not, give terrorists greater rights than ordinary criminals.

We cannot afford another Abu Ghraib, and the language in the manager's amendment simply reasserts these important provisions already codified in law, plain and simple.

Madam Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.

Madam Chair, I now yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Barrow).

Madam Chair, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

I rise to inform my colleagues on the other side that the men and women protecting this country are clear about their duties. They are focused on keeping us safe. They are not concerned about the political spin here. They are not concerned about the rhetoric that they hear. But they do appreciate actions more than rhetoric.

I know because I have been around the world visiting them. I have been to talk to various groups in the intelligence community. They know that we appreciate the work that they do each and every day to keep us safe. And they are not going to be fooled, like the American people are not going to be fooled, by the rhetoric that comes up, the spin that they try to put on the manager's amendment, and in particular the reiteration of something that is fundamentally American, and that is we have a Constitution. We have rules that we all have to live by. We understand the law. And we have to have respect for that law. It does not undermine any of that.

It is a good manager's amendment. I urge the adoption of the manager's amendment.

I would like to claim the time in opposition, even though I am not opposed to it.

I yield such time as she may consume to my friend from California (Ms. Harman).

Madam Chairwoman, I am prepared to accept the amendment, and want the record to reflect that Ms. Schakowsky from Illinois is very much in agreement with Mr. Hoekstra.

I yield back the balance of my time.

I just want to thank the vice chair of our Intelligence Committee for his hard work. I know he's worked ever since he's been on the committee on this very important issue that keeps, I think, the face of the intelligence community reflecting the face of this Nation.

Madam Chair, I rise to claim time in opposition to the Burton amendment, even though I am not opposed to the amendment.

Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Madam Chair, I want to tell the gentleman I appreciate him wanting to honor the personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency. As I have said many times on the floor, I have had the privilege of visiting with members of the CIA and members of their families, members of the CIA throughout the world under probably the most difficult of circumstances. I understand the hardships that they face.

Most recently, I was with family members and survivors of the Khost bombing, which illustrates the danger they put themselves in willingly to protect our country. I would also remind the gentleman that we should not mix and compare apples to oranges. There is a big difference between a training exercise that simulates waterboarding and waterboarding an individual for 183 times. That's a huge difference.

The other thing I would point out is that when the last administration decided to take us down that road, that enhanced interrogation techniques would be authorized and approved. There has been a great amount of disagreement in terms of the legal authorization of these techniques, considered torture by most anybody's standards. I would also remind us that the CIA did not have any expertise in waterboarding. They had to actually go out and contract DOD personnel to be able to acquire that technique. It puts them in a tough situation.

I will tell you what I hear from the men and women of the Central Intelligence Agency. They understand the difference between politics and bad policy. They understand the difference between doing the kinds of things that they are expected to do to keep our country safe and responding to the kind of political spin that, unfortunately, we hear about their work.

But, the one thing that comes across when I hear from them is they appreciate the support that they receive from the Congress. They appreciate the fact that regardless of what side of the aisle we sit on, we respect the work that they do.

We, despite all of the arguments that are proffered here in this great Chamber, in the final analysis they know that they have a job to do. They know that they have a duty to perform. They know that they are committed professionals and that they expect and deserve the support of every member of this Chamber. That's why I appreciate the gentleman's sponsoring this amendment.

That's why I think we ought to accept it. I accept it. I think we ought to leave it at that and leave the politics and leave the rhetoric and remind ourselves that the message we need to send them is that we support their work. The message we should send them is that we honor them for their service to this great country.

The message that we deliver to the families of those victims of the Khost bombing is that we will support them. We will have our differences politically, we will articulate those differences, but we will never stop supporting the great work that the men and women of the Central Intelligence Agency do for all of us.

With that, I yield back the balance of my time.

Madam Chair, I want to say I appreciate the amendment and the gentleman's interest.

This amendment would require the director of the DNI to submit to the Intelligence Committees a report on the attempted bombing of Northwest Airlines Flight No. 253.

This report would provide an assessment on any failures to share information within or between elements of the Federal Government and the measures that the intelligence community has taken or will take to prevent such failures in the future.

This report also covers issues such as analytic tradecraft, watch listing procedures, technical deficiencies, training database management. Many of the elements of this report mirror portions of the review of the DNI, which they are currently doing.

Requiring the DNI to provide this report will allow the Intelligence Committees to conduct rigorous oversight on this important national security concern.

Additionally, this amendment requires the DNI to submit responses to any findings or recommendations made by the Intelligence Committees.

With that, Madam Chair, I fully support this amendment.

Madam Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.

I can't tell you how disappointed I am in this bill for all that is at stake in the country.

When there was a switch in debate about how we approach the war on terror, that's a legitimate argument, a legitimate debate to have, and we should do it under the light of day with all of the sets of consequences that come with any change of policy about how we go after terrorists overseas. And the notion that was brought out that, gee, if we just treat this like a law enforcement environment, if we treat it the way we would treat the average American citizen and extend the rights and the privileges to foreign-trained terrorists, the world will like us, the world will be a better place, we will have no more problems, they're going to go away, we will get them in the courtrooms of America, there is a fundamental flaw with doing this.

In order to fully function as a law enforcement effort, the administration has sent FBI agents overseas into the battlefield to read Miranda rights to tell foreign-trained terrorists who probably couldn't find, some of them, America on a map that you have the right to remain silent; if you can't afford a lawyer the United States will appoint one for you; we will pay for it.

The fact that if they get to the airport and stand in line with an explosive device next to you or your children or a family member or some other American citizen, we will catch them then, and we will put them in trial and read them their Miranda rights even though they were recruited overseas, trained overseas, in many cases surreptitiously moved to different parts of different countries in order to get every aspect of their training. And they're taught that they are on a combat mission. That is what they're taught, that your goal in this event is to go cause harm and casualties and chaos to Americans on American soil or to our allies on their soil. So they look at this as they have when they've declared war numerous times. They have declared war on the United States, and they're ready to kill Americans to prove their point.

So some notion that by the time they get to the airport or board the plane we've been successful because we've had the opportunity to read them the Miranda rights is fundamentally flawed, and that is a fight that we will lose. We're going to lose that fight. You can't hire enough TSA agents. You can't hire enough domestic FBI agents. You can't send enough FBI agents into the battlefield to read Miranda rights to stop their effort.

When you treat them like a criminal and read them their rights, you allow a defense attorney to start the negotiations about how much they will or will not cooperate. That starts. That happens. Clearly, the Christmas Day bomber enjoyed that same benefit.

And I'll tell you, that first 24 to 48 hours is critically important in the intelligence community because of a small thing. This guy isn't going to be able to give you all of the layout of al Qaeda and all of their financing and all of their logistical movements, but he could have given us incredibly valuable information--maybe the name of another airline that may have been targeted on that day that we didn't know about, maybe the name or the description of a bad guy who trained in how to use that explosive device or a place or a town or a person that they may have seen in their training cramp. To most people, that wouldn't mean a lot. To trained professionals in the intelligence business, it means the difference between stopping them and them being successful. That little, small piece of information can save lives.

They made a fundamental shift, from proactive intelligence overseas to find them where they train, to where they finance, to where they recruit, to a law enforcement effort to bring them back to the United States. We're bringing foreign-trained terrorists to the United States and putting them in mainstream courtrooms. We're prosecuting CIA officers for following legal advice from the Department of Justice in interrogation. So we're treating CIA officers like criminals, and we're treating foreign-trained terrorists like Americans with all of the benefits and the privileges therein.

You almost couldn't make this up. You couldn't come to this conclusion. And with it, we've got consequences.

When you look at the series of events from the Fort Hood shootings to the Christmas Day bomber and the mistakes that were made and the lost opportunity for disruption, we all ought to sit down and work this out and get us back to where we're putting the interests of Americans first versus the interests of the rights of terrorism before the safety and security of the United States.

I strongly urge a rejection of this bill.

I, too, along with my colleague from Texas, and certainly the ranking member from Michigan, want to bring to the attention of this body just how dangerous the amendment is that says this, ``Any officer or employee of the intelligence community who, in the course of or in anticipation of a covered interrogation, knowingly commits, attempts to commit or conspires to commit an act of cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment.'' And it goes on to talk about infringing on their religious beliefs by any notion whatsoever that isn't defined in the bill.

Sleep--it talks about lack of sleep. As a matter of fact, the interrogators are probably getting a lot less sleep than actually the terrorists they are interrogating because they also process the information before and after the interrogations.

You have created a whole new direction to go after the very people who are interrogating people trying to kill Americans, and you are saying we are going to put you in jail if you push your limits. And by the way, torture is already against the law. Nobody, and I mean nobody, is pushing torture. What we're saying is, you cannot make this so unreasonable that they won't do it. And if you don't think that this will have an impact on an agent making the determination, should I or shouldn't I, you know what? I was hoping to turn around and find 300 screaming, cheering Americans saying thank you for your patriotism and your service, not 25 Justice Department lawyers with subpoenas.

You will absolutely freeze the intelligence community's ability to go out and get information that they need, and it is absolutely naive to believe that they're going to do it anyway. I'm sorry, that's not the way it works. These folks want to follow the law; they want to follow the Constitution. And guess what? At the end of the day, they're willing to risk their lives to protect their country and their fellow Americans, and this is the treatment that we give them.

This one provision alone will disrupt I can't tell you how many operations worldwide and is worthy of our rejection of this direction in the intelligence community.

Madam Chair, just to further again tell you how dangerous the amendment is on making it a criminal act for CIA officers to try to conduct interrogations, again I just want to read-- this goes after specifically any intelligence officer or employee of the intelligence community. So saying we're just restating law simply isn't true. And then it goes on to say ``interrogation knowingly commits, attempts to commit, or conspires to commit an act of cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment.'' ``Degrading,'' of course, is undefined.

But think of this: It goes on to explain at a further portion in their language ``if you seek to blaspheme his or

her religious beliefs.'' Now, we know that al Qaeda through their training always says when you're caught by the United States, allege abuse. It shuts the system down. Guess what we just did. Does that mean a Jewish FBI official is no longer able to go in and conduct an interview? I don't know. Does it mean that if an uncovered woman goes in to conduct an interview, we've blasphemed their beliefs and their religion? I don't know. But we've certainly made it easier to make the allegation, haven't we? We have made it almost impossible for them to do what we have to have them do, and that's extract information that's going to save lives. I mean you could go on to any sector of any religion that has become radicalized and understand it's impossible to meet that standard. Impossible. We are hugely restricting and handcuffing our intelligence community from doing what they need to do, and that's to get information, without torture, that keeps Americans safe and alive.

And, again, al Qaeda, Madam Chair, uses the technique, and we know this through a whole series of sources, to allege abuse. They use it in their media campaign, and they know it makes us chase our tail for weeks on end. This only enhances, this only strengthens their cause and al Qaeda's operational tactic to slow us down in the obtaining of that information.

I can't tell you how serious this amendment is with no debate and no discussion. It's dangerous. I urge rejection on this alone.

Madam Chair, it's not that you're giving terrorists better rights than Americans. It's the fact that you're extending to foreign terrorists, foreign nationals, foreign-trained individuals coming here to commit acts of violence and kill civilians the same rights as Americans. That's wrong. They are enemy combatants.

You say, well, we can't have Abu Ghraib. You're right; we can't. Torture is illegal. It was illegal then, and guess what? It was investigated and they have been prosecuted, rightly so. They abused people. Wrong. They go to jail. That's what happens in this system.

What you're doing now is interjecting mass confusion into the people who are going to try to conduct debriefings all over the world, and they're going to go to dangerous places, and guess what? You've engaged one of the worst parts of the al Qaeda playbook that says, remember, when Americans are shooting at themselves and chasing their tail, they are not shooting at us. Allege abuse. You've just put 11 confusing pages right into the hands of our enemy to say, make it really hard on the folks who are risking their lives to save Americans so that we can continue to do what we do, and that's plan, train, recruit, and we will send people to America to kill American civilians.

This is a dangerous, dangerous, dangerous step that you take. No debate. No discussion. Lots of confusion. Don't do this to the men and women who risk their lives every day to protect the United States of America.

Madam Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.

Madam Chairman, it's with a heavy heart I rise with this amendment. This has been a bipartisan issue for, I hate to say it, going on 5 years where the Director of the FBI implemented a new policy, and the policy was designed to try to get a different talent pool of individuals to come to Washington, D.C. to be supervisors in their new bureaucracy of the intelligence community, if you will. They were having a difficult time doing it.

So what they ended up doing is they forced supervisors in the field. These are FBI experts in a whole variety of fields--it could be white- collar crime, it could be organized crime, it could be foreign counterintelligence, could be counterterrorism efforts--and arbitrarily said, after 5 years you're done. You either have to step down, you have to come to Washington, D.C. and apply to be an ASAC or other job, or you have to move on. You can either leave the Bureau, you can step down and go back to the ranks of what we used to call a brick agent in the

Seeing there's no further speakers, I would just urge the body's quick support and, again, hopefully we can stand with the men and women who have stood with us in difficult times across the country. I yield back my time.

Madam Chairman, I want to thank my good friend, Ms. Eshoo from California. You know, sometimes you can get ahead of a problem. We don't often do that in Congress. I think this is a great way to get ahead of a problem.

Given the fact that these individuals who have, who are doing great things for their country, we're thankful for it, takes sometimes a piece of intellectual property that really belongs to the people of the United States, and some of it is very sensitive, very compartmentalized. It's information that is shared with very few. So it is an incredible responsibility. And for us not to have a policy on how we make sure that those people don't use that information for personal gain on the outside of that community, especially the intelligence community, I think is wrong. And I think this is a good measure that puts some really basic protections, not only for them, but for the intelligence community and the people of America.

And I want to commend the gentlelady for her work and effort on this. And I wholeheartedly support this effort.

Madam Chairman, I appreciate the distinguished ranking member yielding to me.

In many ways, this bill is a tale of two bills. Part of this bill is the classified annex where specific dollar amounts are allocated to various programs. And the classified annex, I'm happy to report, is a bipartisan product. And I appreciate the chairman of this committee, Subcommittee Chairman Ruppersberger, and others working with Republicans compromising from both sides, but having a bipartisan product that has the support, I believe, of the full Intelligence Committee and should have the support of the full House. Unfortunately, that is not the case with the other provisions of this bill, the policy provisions of this bill, which are deeply disturbing.

As the ranking member has indicated, a number of key issues, whether it's Guantanamo, to reading Miranda Rights, have not even been allowed to be debated and voted on on the floor of the House. Those issues have been shoved aside.

Instead, what we have in the underlying bill are 41 new reports, plus an additional 17 more reports that would be required of the intelligence community in the manager's amendment. But deeply buried within the blizzard of all those reporting requirements is something that is deeply disturbing, and that is a new criminal part of the statute that would apply only to the intelligence community when they try to elicit information from a terrorist that can prevent future terrorist attacks.

And I think it would be helpful for all our Members to just remember a bit of the history here. Last year the Obama administration released a number of classified memos detailing interrogation techniques, despite the appeal of five former CIA directors not to do it, because doing so would harm our efforts against a terrorist. They did it anyway.

Then, secondly, last year, the administration decided that they would re-investigate CIA personnel who were involved in interrogations, even though it had been thoroughly investigated and there was no basis found for any sort of prosecution. Instead, the Obama administration decided they wanted to appoint a special prosecutor to go after those people again.

Third, there's an effort to bring lawyers up on ethics charges because some people disagree with the legal opinion that they reached. And, of course, just recently we found that that effort has failed.

Fourth, last year, the Speaker, under pressure from questions about what she knew about these interrogations, alleged that the CIA lies all the time, despite the considerable evidence that she had been fully briefed about the interrogations. And the Speaker's charge was so indefensible that this bill got postponed for 7 months and couldn't even come to the floor, in order to protect her.

So you see that string of going after the intelligence community of making accusations against them. And then what we find in the manager's amendment is this provision that creates new crimes only for the intelligence community when they try to illicit information. It is rather remarkable.

Anywhere in America, if a prison guard tries to wake a prisoner up, it's okay; it's part of the prison routine. Under this provision, if a terrorist does not get a proper amount of sleep, the intelligence community can be prosecuted and sent to jail for 15 years.

Anywhere in America there is a criminal investigation, it might be pointed out to a criminal suspect that it would be better to cooperate or the death penalty could be a potential punishment for his crime. It is against the law under this McDermott provision for an intelligence professional to in any way threaten physical harm or coercion against a terrorist in order to get information. In other words, what goes on every day all across America in the criminal justice system would be prohibited in this provision in the manager's amendment.

It is in many ways unthinkable. In many ways, it's topsy-turvy land where we forget who the good guys are, who the guys trying to keep us safe are, and who the bad guys are. It's all turned upside down.

We all remember the photos of abuses from Abu Ghraib in Iraq. They were deplorable. The people responsible were prosecuted under the criminal law, as they should have been. But to extrapolate from that, the source of restrictions here starting on page 33 of the manager's amendment is, I think, indefensible.

Intelligence is a serious business. The people who are involved in it risk their lives to keep us safe. And to threaten, as this law would, to put them in jail for 15 years if they don't give somebody, whatever the terrorist says is part of their individual religious beliefs, I think, is dangerous, irresponsible. And it tells the intelligence community that we talk so much but we're not going to back up our words; in fact, we're going to prosecute you. That's a mistake.

I am deeply disturbed by some of the trends in this bill, and I hope that the manager's amendment will not be adopted, and if it is, this bill should certainly be rejected.

Madam Chair, I agree with much of what has been said on the other side of the aisle about the good provisions in this bill. I am also disappointed, as the ranking member talked about, that a number of substantive issues were not even allowed to be discussed and voted on.

But in my mind all of that is dwarfed by the provisions in the last section of the manager's amendment beginning on page 32, and I would recommend every Republican and Democrat in this House read for him- or herself this language, because it is a devastating blow to the professionals in our intelligence community who we ask to keep us safe. This language delineates a number of specific acts that it says by law are cruel and degrading treatment. One of those acts is prolonged isolation.

As I mentioned earlier, any prison or county jail anywhere around the country sometimes has to put a prisoner into solitary confinement. But under this law, if an intelligence community professional does that, he is liable for up to 15 or more years in jail for prolonged isolation.

If he does anything that would blaspheme a terrorist's religious beliefs, or cause him to participate in action intended to violate his individual religious beliefs, he is guilty of violating a criminal statute and that intelligence professional whom we count on to keep us safe goes to jail--not the terrorists, but the guy or lady that we are counting on to keep us safe.

There is provision after provision, whether it's deprivation of sleep, even threatening to use force, the religious provisions, as I mentioned, or any act that is the equivalent of this laundry list-- sensory deprivation--the terrorists who would be captured would be treated more gingerly than any criminal in any county jail or any prison across the country. This is wrong, and it's reason enough to reject the bill.

Madam Chair, our colleague on the Intelligence Committee from New Jersey talked about the importance of interrogations. It is absolutely true that much of the information that the United States has received since 9/11 which has prevented further successful terrorist attacks on our homeland has come from interrogations. That is why it is so important that we maintain that tool done by professionals in the right way, absolutely. But to tie their hands and allow those professionals conducting interrogations of terrorists even less latitude than the county sheriff or the FBI investigating a bank robbery have just seems to me to be madness. And yet the manager's amendment, which has traditionally been used for technical-type corrections, less controversial sorts of issues, the manager's amendment on this bill includes an amazing expansion of criminal liability only for those in the intelligence community.

It seems to me that before we start prosecuting members of the intelligence community for not giving terrorists the amount of sleep they ask for or for doing something that may violate whatever they describe as their religious beliefs, we ought to think twice about it.

It is important to say there is no reasonableness standard to say what is reasonably your intelligence belief or a reasonable amount of sleep; this is all at the discretion of the terrorist. We are jumping to their tune under this language. It is dangerous, and it should be rejected.

Madam Chair, a few moments ago, a Member stated that the McDermott language only restates what's in current law. I would be very interested for any Member who can come to the floor and tell me where in current law it says any officer or employee of the intelligence community who forces an individual to be naked goes to jail for 15 years. Sometimes there's a good reason to ask someone to take their clothes off--to make sure they don't have bombs strapped around their waist. And yet an intelligence officer who does that under the McDermott language is liable for 15 years in jail.

The McDermott language says an officer or employee in the intelligence community who deprives an individual of necessary sleep goes to jail for 15 years.

Now, I cannot believe the many good Members on both sides of the aisle who are concerned about prosecuting terrorists, about keeping the country safe, have thought through the implications of this language. And to have it included in a manager's amendment along with 20 other amendments is just amazing to me.

I strongly encourage every Member of the House to read this language and be careful before you vote on it.

The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings) has been a forceful and eloquent advocate for greater diversity in the intelligence community. And he's exactly right: we will be more effective when we have greater diversity in the intelligence community. We're more effective human collectors when we look like those from whom we are collecting. We will be more effective when we have a greater range of language talents including dialects. All of that is absolutely true.

My point, in addition, however, is that it's not just getting them into the intelligence community. It's how we treat them once they're hired. And some of the recent actions over the last year, whether it's a special prosecutor to go after, again, interrogators after they have already been investigated, or whether it's releasing classified

memos, even though five CIA directors recommend not having it done, that cuts against the ability to keep these qualified people in government service after we have them hired. And I can think of nothing worse than to threaten these people with 15 years of prison if they stray across the line in an interrogation as far as encouraging our intelligence professionals to stay with the government.

I seek to claim the time in opposition to the amendment.

I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Madam Chair, I don't think anyone in this House can deny the importance of cybersecurity. Certainly the Intelligence Committee is devoting a great deal of time and effort to understanding the threat to our potential responses and how we go about it. I am perhaps, however, a lonely voice expressing caution about the number of reports that accumulate on top of one another year after year after year and weigh down our intelligence community.

I mentioned earlier that there are 41 new reports of one kind or another that are in the underlying bill. The manager's amendment, which we've debated, has at least 17 more reports on top of that. And I believe, if you look at all of the 20, 21 provisions of the manager's amendment, there are at least two reports on cybersecurity plus a task force.

Now, the issue is important, but surely the goodness--we have some responsibility in Congress to pay attention to the cost in terms of dollars, the cost in terms of manpower to do all of these reports that get added on top of the intelligence community but often never go away, that just stack on top of each other year after year.

So I appreciate the gentleman's interest in cybersecurity. I share that, by the way. I think the gentleman's right on the importance of it. But I would just encourage him and all Members, before you come demanding another report of one sort or another, maybe it would be good to inquire as to what it would take to actually complete that report, how much money that costs the taxpayers. If we do, I think we are going to be a little more hesitant to stack report upon report upon report.

With that, I would yield back the balance of my time.

I have an amendment at the desk.

First of all, Madam Chair, I want to thank the

Rules Committee for making this amendment in order. It is a very straightforward amendment, and it's one that I think is very, very important because the CIA has been under such intense criticism over the last several months--maybe the last few years--that it's time to let them know and the people of this country know that we really appreciate what they're doing to secure the safety of this country.

What the bill does is:

It honors the Central Intelligence Agency for its contributions to the security of the United States and our allies;

It recognizes the Central Intelligence Agency's unique role in combating terrorism;

It praises the Central Intelligence Agency for its success in foiling recent terrorist plots and capturing senior members of al Qaeda;

It thanks the Central Intelligence Agency for its crucial support of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq;

It commends the men and women who gave their lives defending the U.S.--named and unnamed; and, finally,

It urges the Central Intelligence Agency to continue its dedicated work in the field of intelligence gathering in order to protect the people of the United States.

I believe that all of us would agree with everything that is in this amendment. But I'd like to add just a couple of things that I've been watching during this debate that really concerns me.

There is language in here that is going to, I think, have an adverse impact on the Central Intelligence Agency's agents who are out in the field and doing their job and are trying to protect us against the terrorists. You know, some of the things that they say may be abrasive or objectionable to some of the people they are interrogating. The way this language reads, it could be interpreted to mean that they are guilty of not following the intent of the law in dealing with the terrorists.

Also, there are prison sentences for people who are involved in terrorist or torturous activities such as ``waterboarding.'' I would like to point out to my colleagues, many of whom don't know this, waterboarding has been a technique that has been used in the training of U.S. Navy SEALs and our Special Forces people over the years.

Now, let me say that one more time. Waterboarding and other techniques have been used in the training of our Navy SEALs so they would know how to deal with an enemy if they were captured, and it's been used by Special Forces military personnel in their training. So it has never been considered torture by our own military personnel.

Now, we have three Navy SEALs right now that are being court- martialed, and they are being court-martialed because they captured an al Qaeda terrorist in Fallujah in Iraq. And this al Qaeda terrorist took four American contractors, tortured them, dragged them through the streets, burned their bodies and hung them from a bridge.

He also cut off the head of a leading person that was over there gathering news and information for the news media. This guy is really an out-and-out horrible terrorist. Now, when he was captured he was turned over to the Iraqi military for 2 days, and he came back and he said that he had been hit in the stomach and they split his lip, and because of that these three Navy SEALs are being prosecuted. They are being prosecuted in a court martial.

What kind of a message does that send to our Navy SEALs, to the people in the field who are capturing and fighting these al Qaeda and Taliban terrorists? What kind of a message does that send? We are trying to send the same kind of message to the CIA operatives who are out there trying to get information that will protect this country and protect the American people around the world against these people who want to destroy us and want to destroy our way of life.

It really bothers me, and I do appreciate the House approving this amendment that I have introduced. Obviously it's something that I think is very important. But, in addition to that, I don't believe we ought to be sending a message to the CIA or the Navy SEALs or our Special Forces men and women in the field that we are not going to back them up when they go out and get a terrorist or extract information from them that is vital in securing the safety of the people of this country.

One of the al Qaeda terrorists they are going to bring to New York. The main al Qaeda terrorist that was involved in the 9/11 attack, after he was waterboarded about 80 times, and he wouldn't give up information, he finally did. He said that there was an attempt going to be made to fly a plane into a building in Los Angeles. Had he not choked up and given that information, we might have lost another 2,000 or 3,000 people like we did on 9/11.

It just seems silly to me and crazy to me that we are not going to allow our intelligence-gathering operatives to do their job. We ought to be supporting them completely day and night in anything they do to protect this Nation.

[From the National Review Online, Feb. 25, 2010]

While You Are Distracted by the Summit, Obama Democrats Are Targeting

the CIA

(By Andy McCarthy)

The Obama Democrats have outdone themselves.

While the country and the Congress have their eyes on

today's dog-and-pony show on socialized medicine, House

Democrats last night stashed a new provision in the

intelligence bill which is to be voted on today. It is an

attack on the CIA: the enactment of a criminal statute that

would ban ``cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.''

The provision is impossibly vague--who knows what

``degrading'' means? Proponents will say that they have

itemized conduct that would trigger the statute (I'll get to

that in a second), but it is not true. The proposal says the

conduct reached by the statute ``includes but is not limited

to'' the itemized conduct. (My italics.) That means any

interrogation tactic that a prosecutor subjectively believes

is ``degrading'' (e.g., subjecting a Muslim detainee to

interrogation by a female CIA officer) could be the basis for

indicting a CIA interrogator.

The act goes on to make it a crime to use tactics that have

been shown to be effective in obtaining life saving

information and that are far removed from torture.

``Waterboarding'' is specified. In one sense, I'm glad

they've done this because it proves a point I've been making

all along. Waterboarding, as it was practiced by the CIA, is

not torture and was never illegal under U.S. law. The reason

the Democrats are reduced to doing this is: what they've been

saying is not true--waterboarding was not a crime and it was

fully supported by congressional leaders of both parties, who

were told about it while it was being done. On that score, it

is interesting to note that while Democrats secretly tucked

this provision into an important bill, hoping no one would

notice until it was too late, they failed to include in the

bill a proposed Republican amendment that would have required

full and complete disclosure of records describing the

briefings members of Congress received about the Bush CIA's

enhanced interrogation program. Those briefings, of course,

would establish that Speaker Pelosi and others knew all about

the program and lodged no objections. Naturally, members of

Congress are not targeted by this criminal statute--only the

Madam Chair, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

I agree with what the gentleman said about our wounded warriors and how we ought to be giving them all the support that we possibly can, but the reason I took this time in opposition is because the chairman and I couldn't reach an agreement to discuss one of the provisions in the bill.

I sincerely feel, Madam Chairman, that we are endangering our capability of getting information from terrorists because we are limiting our CIA and our intelligence officials with this legislation and these procedures that they can use to elicit that information. I know there are some differences of opinion, and I know we have in our hearts the best security that we can think of for the American people, but the one thing that really, really bothers me is we're telling CIA officials--and some of our military people in the field, not with this bill--but we are telling a lot of our intelligence officials and people in the field that they have to be very, very careful and walk on eggs when they are trying to get information from a terrorist, al Qaeda or Taliban terrorist, to make sure that we aren't violating or torturing them in any way.

The American people certainly don't want torture, and there is a big difference of opinion on whether or not water boarding, for instance, is torture. But the fact of the matter is if we have another major attack like the one we had on 9/11, the American people are going to come down like a ton of bricks on the people in this House that put restrictions on our intelligence-gathering capability. They're going to say, why didn't you do whatever it took to secure the safety of the people of this country? And because we are putting this language in this bill, we are saying to the CIA and the other intelligence agencies, you've got to be real careful; you've got to make absolutely sure you don't do something that might get you in trouble and might even put you in jail.

And when you say things like that to the people that are out there in the field risking their lives, what you do is you intimidate them, maybe not intentionally, but you intimidate them and you stop the possibility of getting all the information that we need to protect this country.

Now, I know there is a disagreement; I just talked to some people on the other side. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was water boarded 80-something times, I think, or something like that; and when he first started out, he said, well, you'll find out what's going to happen. And later, after he was water boarded, he said, yes, there was going to be a plane that was going to fly into a building in Los Angeles. Well, that plane, had it flown into a building in Los Angeles, might have killed another 2,000 or 3,000 people.

And so the only reason I came here is to just say, let's don't break the legs of our intelligence officers who are trying to protect this country. It's just too important. We ought to be doing everything we can to back them up to make sure this country is safe. Our intelligence people are telling us right now we're likely to have another attack within the next 6 months or 1 year. So we ought to be giving every intelligence agency and every officer we possibly can all the support they need to stop that.

With that, I thank you very much for yielding and yield back the balance of my time.