Thank you, Mr. Visclosky. Mr. Chairman, I urge a ``no'' vote on the amendment. Why? Because it restates current law, and current law has been interpreted by the administration in a way that is,…
Thank you, Mr. Visclosky.
Mr. Chairman, I urge a ``no'' vote on the amendment. Why? Because it restates current law, and current law has been interpreted by the administration in a way that is, frankly, contrary to the intent of the crafters of the PATRIOT Act.
Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act says that you can obtain information that is relevant to a national security investigation.
Now, what has happened since Congress enacted that provision? It is a low bar, but under the NSA's interpretation, it is no bar at all. Because, as has been widely reported, they are collecting the information about every phone call made by every American. Clearly, that is not relevant to a terrorist investigation.
I think it is important to note that business records that are the subject of 215 include a lot of sensitive information. What are business records? phone records? Internet records? credit card records? medical records? Are these things that we would voluntarily give up to the government? No. They are incredibly sensitive, and that's why they are being sought.
I do think it is important to note that the amendment that will follow after this one doesn't end the ability of the government to pursue terrorism. We are all for that. It merely requires that the government adhere to the law, which requires that there be relevance to a terrorist investigation.
I certainly do not challenge the motivation of the gentleman who has offered this amendment, but I do think if you think that this provides a remedy, then you are wrong. This provides a fig leaf.
We should vote against it, and I hope that we will move on to the Amash amendment and solve the problem today.
I want to talk about the much ballyhooed oversight.
Every year, there is a report to the Judiciary Committee, an annual report, on section 215. This year, the report was eight sentences--less than a full page. To think that the Congress has substantial oversight of this program is simply incorrect. I cannot match Mr. Sensenbrenner's brilliant remarks; but I do agree that when we wrote the PATRIOT Act relevance had a meaning.
Madam Chair, I submit for the Record a letter to Mr. Sensenbrenner from the Department of Justice, which basically says, because 300 inquiries were made, the records of every single American became relevant. That's a joke.
U.S. Department of Justice,
Office of Legislative Affairs,
Washington, DC, July 16, 2013.
Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.,
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Representative Sensenbrenner: This responds to your
letter to the Attorney General date June 6, 2013, regarding
the ``business records'' provision of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. Sec. 1861,
enacted as section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act.
As you know, on June 5, 2013, the media reported the
unauthorized disclosure of a classified judicial order issued
under this provision that has been used to support a
sensitive intelligence collection program. Under this
program, which has been briefed to Congress and repeatedly
authorized by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
(FISC), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) obtains
authorization to collect telephony metadata, including the
telephone numbers dialed and the date, time and duration of
calls, from certain telecommunications service providers. The
National Security Agency (NSA), in turn, archives and
analyzes this information under carefully controlled
circumstances and provides leads to the FBI or others in the
Intelligence Community for counterterrorism purposes. Aspects
of this program remain classified, and there are limits to
what can be said about it in an unclassified letter.
Department of Justice and Intelligence Community staff are
available to provide you a briefing on the program at your
request.
In your letter, you asked whether this intelligence
collection program is consistent with the requirements of
section 215 and the limits of that authority. Under section
215, the Director of the FBI may apply to the FISC for an
order directing the production of any tangible things,
including business records, for investigations to protect
against international terrorism. To issue such an order, the
FISC must determine that (1) there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the things sought are relevant to an authorized
investigation, other than a threat assessment; (2) the
investigation is being conducted under guidelines approved by
the Attorney General under Executive Order 12333; and (3) if
a U.S. person is the subject of the investigation, the
investigation is not being conducted solely upon the basis of
First Amendment protected activities. In addition, the FISC
may only require the production of items that can be obtained
with a grand jury subpoena or any other court order directing
the production of records or tangible things. Finally, the
program must, of course, comport with the Constitution.
The telephony metadata program satisfies each of these
requirements. The lawfulness of the telephony metadata
collection program has repeatedly been affirmed by the FISC.
In the years since its inception, multiple FISC judges have
granted 90-day extensions of the program after concluding
that it meets all applicable legal requirements.
Of particular significance to your question is the
relevance to an authorized international terrorism
investigation of the telephony metadata collected through
this program. First, it is critical to understand the program
in the context of the restrictions imposed by the court.
Those restrictions strictly limit the extent to which the
data is reviewed by the government. In particular, the FISC
allows the data to be queried for intelligence purposes only
when there is reasonable suspicion, based on specific facts,
that a particular query term, such as a telephone number, is
associated with a specific foreign terrorist organization
that was previously identified to and approved by the court.
NSA has reported that in 2012, fewer than 300 unique
identifiers were used to query the data after meeting this
standard. This means that only a very small fraction of the
records is ever reviewed by any person, and only specially
cleared counterterrorism personnel specifically trained in
the court-approved procedures can access the records to
conduct queries. The information generated in response to
these limited queries is not only relevant to authorized
investigations of international terrorism, but may be
especially significant in helping the government identify and
disrupt terrorist plots.
The large volume of telephony metadata is relevant to FBI
investigations into specific foreign terrorist organizations
because the intelligence tools that NSA uses to identify the
existence of potential terrorist communications within the
data require collecting and storing large volumes of the
metadata to enable later analysis. If not collected and held
by NSA, the metadata may not continue to be available for the
period that NSA has deemed necessary for national security
purposes because it need not be retained by
telecommunications service providers. Moreover, unless the
data is aggregated by NSA, it may not be possible to identify
telephony
metadata records that cross different telecommunications
networks. The bulk collection of telephony metadata--i.e. the
collection of a large volume and high percentage of
information about unrelated communications--is therefore
necessary to identify the much smaller subset of terrorist-
related telephony metadata records contained within the data.
It also allows NSA to make connections related to terrorist
activities over time and can assist counterterrorism
personnel to discover whether known or suspected terrorists
have been in contact with other persons who may be engaged in
terrorist activities, including persons and activities inside
the United States. Because the telephony metadata must be
available in bulk to allow NSA to identify the records of
terrorist communications, there are ``reasonable grounds to
believe'' that the data is relevant to an authorized
investigation to protect against international terrorism, as
section 215 requires, even though most of the records in the
dataset are not associated with terrorist activity.
The program is consistent with the Constitution as well as
with the statute. As noted above, the only type of
information acquired under the program is telephony metadata,
not the content of any communications, not the identity,
address or financial information of any party to the
communication, and not geolocational information. Under
longstanding Supreme Court precedent, there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy with respect to this kind of
information that individuals have already provided to third-
party businesses, and such information therefore is not
protected by the Fourth Amendment. See Smith v. Maryland, 442