Floor Statements

Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.

Chairman Frelinghuysen, thank you for the constructive conversation that we had earlier today about this amendment. I regret that we weren't able to come to some solution to the problem that it's meant to address, but I appreciate your time and your sensitivity to the needs of coastal communities.

The amendment before us would increase the Army Corps of Engineers' Flood Control and Coastal Emergencies account by $10 million. It would do so by moving the same amount from the Department of Energy's Fossil Energy Research and Development account.

The Flood Control and Coastal Emergencies account provides communities across the Nation with the funds that are necessary to prepare for floods, hurricanes, and other natural disasters. It also provides support for emergency operations, repairs, and other activities in response to those disasters.

Currently, the committee has requested that we fund this important account by only $28 million. My amendment would increase that amount by approximately one-third. The Fossil Energy Research and Development account does what its name implies; it conducts research pertaining to the extraction and processing and use of mineral substances.

Unlike the Flood Control and Coastal Emergencies account, this one will be funded at $450 million, almost $30 million above the President's request. My amendment would simply reduce this account by only 2 percent, while still allowing for a $20 million increase above the President's request for that account.

We as a body have tried the sequestration approach. We have axed accounts evenly across the board, but that's not an approach that our constituents favor. It is incumbent upon us to make rational choices at some point to prioritize funding for those items that are most important to our constituents and to America.

Madam Chair, this is what a rational approach looks like. Fossil fuels don't need a subsidy. Oil is selling at over $100 a barrel. Oil companies have more than enough profits with which to conduct their own research. In contrast, there is no profit to be had for communities in disaster preparation--merely self-preservation. These are the efforts that demand our time and our attention and that demand taxpayer funds. The cost of recovering from natural disasters is only increasing. A rational approach to the problem is to put more effort into preparing for them and mitigating the results.

As a Member from a State that has a tropical storm scheduled to make landfall this weekend, I hope that this body will support not only my amendment but the Flood Control and Coastal Emergencies account as well.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Offered By: Mr. Grayson

Amendment No. 36: At the end of the bill (before the short

title), insert the following:

Offered By: Mr. Grayson

Amendment No. 40: At the end of the bill, (before the short

title), insert the following:

Offered By: Mr. Grayson

Amendment No. 14: At the end of the bill (before the short

title), add the following new section:

Offered By: Mr. Grayson

Amendment No. 15: Page 6, line 15, after the dollar amount,

insert ``(increased by $10,000,000)''.

Page 29, line 21, after the dollar amount, insert

``(reduced by $10,000,000)''.

Offered By: Mr. Grayson

Amendment No. 24: At the end of the bill (before the short

title), insert the following:

Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.

Mr. Chairman, this is a simple savings clause amendment of the kind that we include typically, frequently, in almost every bill that's a major bill that passes this House. It says as follows:

Nothing in this Act and the amendments made by this Act

affects the right and power of each State to prohibit

management, leasing, developing, and use of lands beneath

navigable waters, and the natural resources within such

lands, within its boundaries.

The simple purpose of this is to avoid any implication by this statute that it is taking away any rights of any State, including my State of Florida, where drilling rights are a matter of extreme controversy.

Now, why do we do this? Because of the Constitution, because the supremacy clause in the Constitution says the Federal law is the highest law of the land. And whenever we're dealing with any area, any area at all of the law, where there are states' rights and there are Federal rights, it's incumbent upon us to explain that we are preserving those State rights, not just in this bill but in every bill.

In fact, we are shoring up the provision that exists already in 43 U.S.C. 1311, entitled ``Rights of States.''

And why do we need to do that?

Because this is a comprehensive scheme to regulate offshore drilling in this country, and when you establish any comprehensive scheme, you run the risk that a court will determine that you have obliterated, you have annihilated, you have eliminated states' rights. That is what happens when you pass a law that is a comprehensive Federal scheme.

Now, yesterday, we had a similar amendment come up. In that case the vote was a very exciting 213-213 tie vote. And the arguments that were made against the amendment yesterday today simply do not apply.

Yesterday, if you may recall, Mr. Chairman, a map was provided by the opposition to that amendment. The map pointed out that the drilling in that area was limited to offshore drilling on the U.S.-Mexico border.

Well, today, we're dealing with drilling from sea to shining sea, dealing with all of our shores. So that limitation that was promoted yesterday doesn't apply.

Yesterday, there was an argument made at the last minute that, somehow or other, the definition of States in this amendment applied to Mexican states, which was absurd and ridiculous, and yet, it was made against that amendment. All you had to do is look at the definition, not just in the title, but in the chapter and the subchapter of the word ``States,'' and you would see that the word ``States'' is defined as limited to the United States of America.

Now, today's bill provides a much greater threat to Federal preemption of State law than yesterday's bill did. In fact, this bill explicitly entangles Federal and State law together in this area under section 1344(a)(2)(F) of this bill. This actually establishes a consultation regarding the States which could be construed as being in lieu of and extinguishing states' rights.

It's a clear error in the drafting of this bill, and my amendment is necessary to protect it. My amendment is necessary to prevent a preemption, through this bill, of states' rights.

This bill clearly, as drafted, conflates Federal and states' rights and would lead to a disastrous preemption of states' rights based upon section 1344(a)(2)(F) alone.

Now, today we have new arguments that have been made against this simple savings provision, and neither one of those arguments carries any weight. One argument that we've already heard is that this bill couldn't possibly preempt states' rights.

Well, in fact, it could possibly preempt states' rights. I've explained to you how that could happen. Any Federal court could look at this bill, reach the conclusion, particularly with regard to the presence of 1344(a)(2)(F), that this is a comprehensive Federal scheme, and it preempts states' rights.

We've never heard any explanation from anyone opposing this amendment as to how it could not preempt states' rights.

Secondly, we've heard an argument which, respectfully, verges on the specious, that this amendment somehow would negate individual rights, and that is completely false, completely without any merit.

In fact, I would venture to say that there has never been a case where a statute or an amendment or a bill that contains the phrase ``Nothing in this Act affects the right and power of each State''--I don't know how that could ever be construed as somehow negating individual rights.

Clearly, on its own terms, explicitly, this amendment simply preserves states' rights.

We are in a fundamentally different situation today than we were yesterday because of the presence of section 1344(a)(2)(F) in this bill. There is a far greater need today than there was yesterday with the tie vote to have this amendment here as a savings clause.

I would call, respectfully, upon the chairman of the committee to agree to this amendment today and let us move on.

Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

Mr. Speaker, I have an amendment at the desk.

I want to thank the Rules Committee for ruling that this amendment is in order. I want to also thank the committee chair for giving me the opportunity to discuss this with him briefly before this matter came up before the House.

This amendment should not be controversial. It reads as follows:

Nothing in this Act and the amendments made by this Act

affects the right and power of each State to prohibit

management, leasing, developing, and use of lands beneath

navigable waters, and the natural resources within such

lands, within its boundaries.

This language may sound familiar to those who are familiar with the current division of authority between, on the one hand, the Federal Government and, on the other hand, the States. It's a reaffirmation of 434 U.S.C. 1311(a), and 43 U.S.C. 1311 has a very notable title. It's called, ``The Rights of the States.'' That is the guarantee and purpose of the amendment before us today: to make sure and to reaffirm the rights of the States.

The concept is simple. If land, or resources within those lands, falls within a State's boundaries, that State should have the right to manage that land and those resources in a manner that it sees fit. This is a principle that we in Florida hold dear, and it's an important principle in every State, and, in fact, an important principle to federalism itself.

This principle has been enshrined in law since 1953, when the House passed H.R. 5134 to amend the Submerged Lands Act. A majority of Democrats supported that bill, as did an overwhelming majority of the Republicans. The final vote within the Republican caucus that year was 191 in favor and only 12 opposed. It's my hope that we'll see similar bipartisan support--in fact, overwhelming support--today for this amendment to simply reaffirm that principle.

As a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, I support transboundary agreements in general, and I hope that any dispute between the United States and any adjoining neighboring nation can be settled peacefully.

This bill could be misconstrued without our amendment as potentially disturbing states' rights under the status quo. It calls for the ``expeditious . . . development . . . of domestic mineral resources,'' on page 3, and limiting the ``authority to stop work on any installation . . . attached to the seabed of the United States,'' including those erected ``for the purpose of resource exploration, development, or production activities'' to ``inspection staff'' at the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, which is on page 6 of the bill. Without our amendment, a future court that is unfamiliar with this subject might wrongly conclude that this statute has, in fact, curtailed State prerogatives.

I don't believe that it was ever the intention of the Natural Resources Committee to make such a dramatic change to the status quo, to the detriment of the States and to states' rights. Therefore, this amendment today should not be controversial. It's merely a reaffirmation of existing law--a section of the United States law entitled, ``Rights of States''--and it's an effort to ensure that the States can choose to do within their own boundaries, and that that which they choose to do is that which will happen.

I reserve the balance of my time.

I appreciate the comments of the committee chair, but I must respectfully disagree with him on the merits.

First, with regard to the Gulf of Mexico, the restrictions on current development stretch 100 miles off the shores of Florida, a matter that is of great import in my State. Furthermore, the fact is that we cannot specifically restrain a future court from deciding contrary to the gentleman's opinion unless we do so in this bill.

Now, we've already had the experience this week that, on Tuesday, a certain number of Members of this body were disappointed by a Supreme Court decision; and on Wednesday, other Members were disappointed by a Supreme Court decision. Both of those decisions had to do with federalism; both those decisions had to do with the construction of legislation. If we want to ascertain and commit to the fact that we're not changing current law, the only way to do that is to say that we are not changing current law. By not doing so, we would be giving, in effect, a hostage to future courts for the end of time.

It's in the nature of the supremacy clause that unless we say we are not taking away states' rights, we might do so inadvertently. And that's exactly what this amendment would prevent.

Now, with regard to the second point, I don't know what foreign law may provide with regard to States, but I do know what American law provides. In fact, not only in this title, not only in this chapter, but in this subchapter there's a definition of ``state,'' and that

definition is as following--this is 43 U.S.C. 1301, under the heading Definitions, and that says, G: ``The term 'state' means any state of the union.''

Now, while I respect the gentleman's opinion, it's clear--from a clear and plain reading of the statute that we are amending--that in fact his position has no merit. Therefore, I urge the adoption of this amendment so that we can protect states' right, and in particular the rights of coastal States.

Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

Mr. Speaker, I rise to extend my earlier remarks describing the intent of Congress with regard to H. AMDT. 124 to H.R. 2217, the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2014. My amendment reads as follows: ``None of the funds made available by this Act may be used in contravention of the First, Second, or Fourth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.''

The Department of Homeland Security, all of its officials, and all contractors and subcontractors working on its behalf or operating under inherently governmental functions shall respect anonymous speech. No funds shall be used to attempt the unmasking of anonymous speakers, unless two conditions are met. One, there must be probable cause that an anonymous speaker is engaged in criminal activities and two, a warrant from a court with jurisdiction over domestic matters must be issued. Warrants from the FISA court do not serve this purpose, as those courts have jurisdiction over foreign and not domestic matters.

It is the intent of Congress that the Department of Homeland Security, all of its officials, and all contractors and subcontractors working on its behalf or operating under inherently governmental functions respect the freedom of the press, defining press as ``every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion'' (per Justice Charles Evans Hughes). In any granting of press privileges, DHS is prohibited from distinguishing between media businesses with established track records and citizen publishing vehicles or blogs with partisan, noncommercial, or advocacy missions. DHS shall under no circumstances engage in prior restraint and shall respect the precedential value of New York Times Co. v. United States (1971). No citizen exercising first amendment rights shall be prohibited from publishing information by the use of funds appropriated in this bill.

It is the intent of Congress that a search under the Fourth Amendment is neither reasonable nor constitutional if, as the Supreme Court noted in Katz v. United States, (1) a person expects privacy in the thing searched and (2) society believes that expectation is reasonable. Considering the advances in electronic storage and retrieval technology, as well as the general trail of electronic residue left by any citizen using email, search engines, most forms of banking and commerce, VoIP, or use of the internet or mobile phones, it is the intent of Congress that the Department of Homeland Security, all of its officials, and all contractors and subcontractors working on its behalf or operating under inherently governmental functions should go beyond the so-called ``third party doctrine'' in protecting fourth amendment rights. Any examination without a person's consent to the Government (not a private party) of search engine records, e-mail, internet records, phone records, or information produced in the course of ordinary business is considered a search of that person's ``papers and effects.'' The Department of Homeland Security, all of its officials, and all contractors and subcontractors working on its behalf or operating under inherently governmental functions are prohibited from using appropriated funds to engage in such searches.

It is not the intent of Congress that every form of surveillance that is technically feasible should be performed. Nor is it the intent of Congress that every form of surveillance that is somehow arguably within court precedent or some strained interpretation of a relevant statute should be performed. On the contrary, statutory authority for surveillance is to be construed narrowly, because all forms of government surveillance implicate and potentially impair or even destroy our privacy rights. It is never the intention of Congress that security concerns override constitutional rights--on the contrary, we take an oath of office to defend those rights. The Fourth Amendment makes it clear, not only by its wording but by its very existence, that the right to privacy is a fundamental part of the American experience. We cannot protect our liberty by snuffing it out--we cannot destroy our village in order to save it.

Mr. Speaker, I introduced the amendments in the Veterans-Military Construction and Homeland Security appropriations bills that forbid contracting with offerors who have been indicted for, or convicted of, fraud or similar egregious acts, all of which establish a categorical, unequivocal and definitive lack of present responsibility. The intent of Congress with regard to these provisions, and other such provisions, is as follows: These provisions are to be construed broadly, not only for the sake of ensuring confidence in government contracting, but also to protect the public fisc. No exceptions of any kind are intended.

The terms ``embezzlement, theft, forgery, bribery, falsification or destruction of records, making false statements, tax evasion, violating Federal criminal tax laws, or receiving stolen property'' and other such terms in these provisions are intended to be construed as broadly as possible. They extend to any offense that refers or relates to such offenses, whether Federal, State, county, municipal or tribal.

The term ``offeror'' includes all affiliates of any kind, including but not limited to parent companies, sister companies, subsidiaries and commonly controlled entities. The term is to be construed broadly.

To the extent feasible, this prohibition extends to the exercise of contract options in contracts that have already been awarded, and to contract modifications that increase or may increase contract price or cost.

It is the sense of Congress that these provisions, specifically including the prohibition on contract awards to indicted contractors, comport with due process and all other constitutional standards. Among other reasons, this is because of the due process protections preceding an indictment, the opportunity to challenge an indictment immediately in court, and both constitutional and statutory rights to a speedy trial. No contractor should have standing to challenge this prohibition based on an indictment without first exhausting legal challenges to the indictment. An indicted contractor that fails to exploit any provision providing for a speedy trial waives the right to challenge this prohibition.

If an offeror should make the certification in question but fails to do so, or an offeror falsely certifies, then any resulting contract has been procured by fraud, and no future payments thereunder are permitted, and all past payments constitute false claims, regardless of whether any work has been done or deliverables accepted. A false certification shall be actionable under Section 1001 of the U.S. Criminal Code, and other applicable law, and any resulting indictment or conviction shall qualify for the prohibition within these provisions. Any request for payment under a resulting contract shall qualify as both a criminal false claim and a civil false claim.

Mr. Chair, according to the Constitution Project, there are at least 77 fusion centers active in the United States today. Fusion centers are essentially information-sharing hubs designed to pool the knowledge and expertise of state, local and federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies, and, in some instances, other government agencies, military officials and private sector entities. They operate primarily on state funding, though they generally receive federal funds and work closely with federal agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Justice (DOJ). As a general matter, fusion centers are not established pursuant to specific state legislation or state executive orders, but rather derive their authority from general statutes creating state police agencies or memoranda of understanding among partner agencies. Many fusion centers simply represent extensions of existing intelligence units in state law enforcement agencies.

Congress shares the serious constitutional concerns that have been raised after several fusion centers issued bulletins that characterize a wide variety of peaceful religious and political groups as threats to national security. In some instances, state law enforcement agencies that funnel information to fusion centers have improperly monitored and infiltrated anti-war and environmental organizations. Moreover, the manner in which fusion centers amass and distribute personal information raises the concern that they are keeping files--perhaps containing information that is sensitive or concerns constitutionally protected activities--on American citizens in the United States without proper justification. With the interconnected system employed by fusion centers, even those with the best civil liberties practices can inadvertently perpetuate or exacerbate the problematic activities of other fusion centers or law enforcement agencies. The breadth of the fusion center network also means that inaccurate or problematic information can be distributed widely across government databases, and perhaps even to private businesses, with potentially disastrous consequences for the constitutional rights of individuals. Finally, without proper safeguards, links between fusion centers in different states might allow ``forum-shopping'' law enforcement officials to evade the privacy and domestic surveillance restrictions of their own states by accessing information obtained by fusion centers in other jurisdictions. All of these risks are potentially compounded by the limited transparency and accountability of these institutions.

Recent reports from across the country bear testament to the potential for constitutionally

problematic profiling at fusion centers, particularly regarding bulletins and intelligence reports circulated by fusion centers. These are a few examples:

The February 2009 ``Prevention Awareness Bulletin,'' circulated by a Texas fusion center, described apparently peaceful Muslim lobbying groups as ``providing an environment for terrorist organizations to flourish'' and warned that ``the threats to Texas are significant.'' The bulletin called on law enforcement officers to report activities such as Muslim ``hip hop fashion boutiques, hip hop bands, use of online social networks, video sharing networks, chat forums and blogs.''

A Missouri-based fusion center issued a February 2009 report describing peaceful support for the presidential campaigns of Ron Paul or third party candidates, possession of the iconic ``Don't Tread on Me'' flag, and anti-abortion activism as signs of membership in domestic terrorist groups.

The Tennessee Fusion Center listed a letter from the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) to public schools on its online map of ``Terrorism Events and Other Suspicious Activity.'' The letter had lawfully advised schools that holiday celebrations focused exclusively on Christmas were an unconstitutional government endorsement of religion.

The Virginia Fusion Center's 2009 Terrorism Risk Assessment Report described peaceful student groups at Virginia's historically black colleges as potential breeding grounds for terrorism and characterized the ``diversity'' surrounding a military base as a possible threat.

Additional allegations of monitoring of constitutionally-protected speech, including by DHS Megacenters, were revealed by FOIA requests made by the PCJF. Just a few of many examples are included below:

An October 5, 2011 document reflects that the DHS Philadelphia Megacenter was monitoring the OWS demonstration in New York, titled ``Demonstration-Peaceful/Planned,'' and reporting on assembly and movements ``peacefully protesting union solidarity issues.''

An October 30, 2011 document shows DHS' Battle Creek Megacenter also reporting that a ``peaceful/unplanned'' ``Occupy Wall Street demonstration [was] taking place in Ilus W. Davis Park in Kansas City,

Mr. Chair, I rise to describe the intent of Congress with regard to H. AMDT. 124 to H.R. 2217, the ``Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2014''. My amendment reads as follows:

``None of the funds made available by this Act may be used in contravention of the First, Second, or Fourth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.''

The intent of Congress is to prohibit the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) from contravening First, Second, or Fourth Amendment constitutional rights. Congress intends to prohibit DHS from cooperating with any public or private entity, organization, or agency of any kind to violate those constitutional rights, including, but not limited to, those agencies that are within the DHS structure: U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Citizen and Immigration Services, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Coast

Guard, Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Secret Service, Transportation Security Administration, Federal Protective Service; in addition, those agencies that are signatory partners of the National Response Plan: Department of Agriculture, Department of Commerce, Department of Defense, Department of Education, Department of Energy, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Department of the Interior, Department of Justice, Department of Labor, Department of State, Department of Transportation, Department of the Treasury, Department of Veterans Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency, Environmental Protection Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Federal Communications Commission, General Services Administration, National Aeronautic and Space Administration, National Transportation Safety Board, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Personnel Management, Small Business Administration, Social Security Administration, Tennessee Valley Authority, U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Postal Service, American Red Cross, Corporation for National and Community Service, and National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster. In addition, Congress intends to include the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the National Security Agency in this non-exclusive list of prohibited agencies.

Congress intends there be a cognizable informational privacy interest, derived from, but not limited to, the Fourth and First Amendments and Due Process rights, held by individuals in data that records, observes, catalogs and/or monitors persons' lawful acts, transactions, associations, beliefs and/or communications.

Congress intends that racial, religious, gender, language, and national origin profiling be deemed unconstitutional.

Congress intends that the collection of multiple individual points of data about a person, as well as the aggregation and storage of such data, creates an intimate mosaic about a person's actions and psychology of such a significantly intrusive nature as to violate fundamental privacy interests. The intent of this legislation is to prevent the Department of Homeland Security from collecting, storing, procuring, or using any information generated by a citizen of the United States while located in the United States, including telephone records, internet records, and physical location information, without probable cause of a terrorism or other criminal offense related to action or conduct by that citizen, or without the consent of that citizen.

The intent of Congress is to protect the interest in informational privacy. This interest is especially significant where information and data collected by the government relates to First Amendment protected activities. The contravention of these rights and interests creates an injury of constitutional and other dimensions and also threatens the underpinnings of a constitutional democracy.

The intent of Congress with this legislation is to place an absolute prohibition on any DHS involvement of any type or to any degree with any surveillance of Americans without specificity or without probable cause, such as the National Security Agency's recently revealed surveillance program. This prohibition includes any communication, cooperation, funding, assistance, or other association with another organization, agency, company, or other entity of any kind that has any involvement of any kind with such programs. The intent of Congress is for any private company engaged in surveillance or data collection on Americans, or serving in a role supportive of such efforts in any manner or to any degree, to be ineligible for any contracts or other payment from DHS. For example, due to its role in the NSA spying on Americans, Booz Allen Hamilton is ineligible.

Congress intends to prohibit the ``Threat Management Division'' of the DHS, or any other department, office, or any other entity within DHS, from including reports on ``Peaceful Activist Demonstrations,'' or reports on any other constitutionally-protected speech activities. Congress recognizes that monitoring and documenting constitutionally protected speech activity by law enforcement and intelligence agencies including DHS result in a chilling effect on speech and a violation of fundamental privacy interests, and should be prohibited under all circumstances. The intent of Congress with this bill is to reinforce the nation's proud history of petition and protest, and Congress intends to encourage this essential form of democratic participation, by eliminating any surveillance or documentation of such legal activity by DHS or other law enforcement agencies.

This prohibition is urgently needed, as redacted documents released pursuant to a FOIA request by the Partnership for Civil Justice Fund (PCJF) show that the DHS ``Threat Management Division'' directed Regional Intelligence Analysts to provide a ``Daily Intelligence Briefing'' which includes a category of reporting on ``Peaceful Activist Demonstrations,'' alongside their reports on ``Domestic Terrorist Activity.'' The documents also showed involvement of the DHS National Operations Center (NOC) in monitoring peaceful, lawful protest activities. The NOC is, according to the DHS, ``the primary national- level hub for domestic situational awareness, common operational pictures, information fusion, information sharing, communications, and coordination pertaining to the prevention of terrorist attacks and domestic incident management. The NOC is the primary conduit for the White House Situation Room and DHS Leadership for domestic situational awareness and facilitates information sharing and operational coordination with other federal, state, local, tribal, non-governmental operation centers and the private sector.'' DHS improperly and unconstitutionally conducted surveillance of peaceful, constitutionally-protected protests in cities that include, among others: Asheville, Atlanta, Boston, Buffalo, Chicago, Dallas, Detroit, Denver, El Paso, Fort Lauderdale, Houston, Jacksonville, Jersey City, Kansas City, Lansing, Lincoln, Los Angeles, Miami, Minneapolis, Niagara Falls, New York City, Oakland, Philadelphia, Phoenix, Portland, OR, and Salt Lake City, San Diego, Seattle, Tampa, Washington, D.C.

The intent of Congress with the DHS appropriations bill is to prohibit the Department of Homeland Security from using the designation of an event as one of ``national significance'' or as a ``National Special Security Event'' (NSSE) to infringe on the constitutional right to protest peacefully and engage in nonviolent civil disobedience on the nearest publicly-owned, publicly-accessible, or private land (where the owner has not formally requested that protesters be removed) surrounding such an event.

The intent of Congress with this legislation is strictly to prohibit the Department of Homeland Security, or any other agency or entity with which the DHS is directly or indirectly cooperating, including the Secret Service, or that DHS is directly or indirectly funding, from using an NSSE designation as a basis to require protesters to be in a location that is not within view of those individuals or entities that are the target of the public expression and efforts at redress, or to place persons inside a penned-in area or ``protest pit,'' as such a location deprives the people of the United States of their ability and right to communicate a message to their intended audience, and also deprives persons of their associational rights to interact with demonstrations and join them without obstruction. Further, it could contribute to a larger divide between the political and economic establishment and the general public that is antithetical to the proper functioning of a democratic system. Even if an event is not designated as an NSSE, the intent of Congress is for the principles expressed above to be applicable to any constitutionally-protected protest or other expressive activity.

In the past, these events have included not only presidential inaugurations and meetings of foreign dignitaries, but also the Super Bowl, the funerals of Ronald Reagan and Gerald Ford, most State of the Union addresses and the 2008 Democratic and Republican National Conventions, among many other events not traditionally deemed to be requiring such a major precautionary designation.

The intent of Congress is to mandate that the DHS be authorized only to conduct searches, including searches of electronics on citizen or non-citizen travelers entering or exiting the United States, under a reasonable suspicion standard articulated by courts under the Fourth Amendment.

Congress also strongly intends to reject and condemn DHS assertions that ``intuition and hunch'' are a sufficient basis for its agents to conduct searches of electronics at U.S. borders or ports of entry. Congress specifically intends to reject a February 2013 DHS report concluding that ``imposing a requirement that officers have reasonable suspicion in order to conduct a border search of an electronic device would be operationally harmful without concomitant civil rights/civil liberties benefits.'' Congress intends to express its condemnation of any search that is the result of a mere ``intuition'' or ``hunch,'' of the 6,500 persons that DHS data indicate had their electronic devices searched along the U.S. border between 2008 and 2010. Furthermore, Congress finds that the use of ``intuition and hunch'' as a basis for searches is a violation of the Fourth Amendment, and therefore that appropriated funds under this bill are prohibited from being used in this manner.

With this bill, the intent of Congress is to demand the modernization of standards relating to Americans entering the U.S. with computers, thumb drives, smartphones, cameras and other electronic devices, as these devices hold vast amounts of information regarding owners about who they are and how they conduct business. Much of the law on searches along the border was established before these technological advances dramatically altered

the amount of personal information one could be carrying on himself or herself as he or she enters the U.S., and Congress intends for this amendment to modernize these standards to reflect current realities and expectations of privacy. Until these standards are modernized, Congress intends for border enforcement to search these devices only upon a reasonable suspicion that the holder of such a device is directly and personally bearing evidence of terrorism or other criminal activity.

Organized Labor

The intent of Congress with this bill is to place an absolute prohibition on any DHS involvement related to all legally-protected activities of organized labor. This includes any communication, cooperation, funding, assistance, or other association with another organization for the purpose of targeting legally-protected union activity, or acting as a provider of surveillance and intelligence information to corporate entities that may be the target of lawful labor grievance and labor protest activity.

Examples of what Congress has hereby prohibited can be seen in documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, which show that the DHS communicated with the Pentagon's Northern Command regarding November 2, 2011 port protests involving ILWU workers. Another document obtained from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) by the PCJF shows that the Domestic Security Alliance Council (DSAC), described by the federal government as ``a strategic partnership between the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security and the private sector,'' discussed the protests at the West Coast ports to ``raise awareness concerning this type of criminal [sic] activity.'' The document contains a ``handling notice'' that the information is ``meant for use primarily within the corporate security community. Such messages shall not be released in either written or oral form to the media, the general public or other personnel . . .''

Mr. Chairman, I rise today to discuss shocking revelations reported in the media starting last Wednesday, that is 9 days ago, and continuing for several days afterward, regarding the scope of the NSA's spying program, including both foreigners and Americans.

The NSA is the National Security Agency. Its duty is, as part of DOD, to protect us against foreign attacks, just as DOD itself is supposed to protect us against foreign attacks. And DOD, like the CIA, is on the side of the firewall dealing with foreign threats as opposed to the FBI and the Justice Department who deal with domestic threats.

As of a week ago last Wednesday, the Guardian reported that a particular court order had ordered Verizon, the largest cellular telephone company in America, to turn over its call records for all of its calls--all of its calls.

I have the document from the Guardian's Web site here in front of me. It is a document that is issued as a secondary order by what's known as the FISA Court. That court is the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court established under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.

Let's start with the name of the court, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. As the name of the act implies, the jurisdiction of the court is limited to foreign surveillance and foreign threats. This is by statute.

The order itself was printed and posted at the Web site. Millions of people have seen it since then. What it purports to be--I say purports to be, but, in fact, the agency involved in the NSA has not denied that this is a valid, real document--it says that the court, having found application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an order requiring the production of tangible things from Verizon--specifically Verizon Business Network Services, et cetera, et cetera--orders that the custodian of records produce--not to the FBI--but to the National Security Agency, a component of the Defense Department, upon service of this order, and continued production on an ongoing, daily basis thereafter for the duration of this order, unless otherwise ordered by the court, an electronic copy of the following tangible things:

Right here. Take a look at it.

These tangible things are identified in the order as follows:

All call detail records or telephony metadata created by Verizon for communications 1) between the United States and abroad--it sounds like it might be international--and then 2) wholly within the United States, including local telephone calls.

On its face, this is an order for Verizon--our largest cellular telephone company--to turn over call records for every single call in its possession. Mr. Chairman, that includes calls by you, it also includes calls by me. In fact, it includes calls by me when I call my mother or my wife or my daughter. For those who are listening on C-SPAN or otherwise, it includes every call by you.

Now, the first question that comes to mind is: Is this just for Verizon? Well, we don't know for sure, at this point, but the NSA has not denied that there are orders similar in extent for MCI, for AT&T, for Sprint, for every telephone company that carries any significant amount of data or calls in this country.

Another question is: How far back does this order go? The order itself is dated on its face April 25, 2013. One of the more interesting things about this order, posted on the Guardian's Web site, is that it has no starting date. Under this order--under the plain terms of this order--Verizon has to go and give the Federal Government--specifically the Department of Defense, the NSA--all of its call records of all of its calls going back to the beginning of time. And this obligation continues until July 19, 2013, presumably because the order will be renewed at that point upon request of the NSA and the FBI.

Let's be clear about this. This appears to be an order providing that our telephone companies providing service to us turn over call records for every single telephone call, regardless of whether it's international or not.

Now, if somebody had come to me 9 days ago and said to me, Congressman Grayson, do you think that the Defense Department is taking records of every telephone call that you make or I make or anyone else makes, I would say, no, I have no reason to believe that. It would shock me if it was true.

Well, it is true and it does shock me. Why should we have our personal telephone records, the records of whom we call, when we speak to them, how long we are talking, why should we have that turned over to the Defense Department? What possible rationale could there be for that?

Well, I'll tell you what I think the rationale might be: because somehow that makes us safer. Well, let me say to the NSA and to the Defense Department, you can rest assured there is no threat to America when I talk to my mother.

Now, what exactly is wrong with this? What's wrong with this, first of all, is that there is a firewall between the Defense Department and the CIA on the one hand, and the FBI and the Department of Justice on the other. One protects us from international threats, the other one protects us from domestic threats. That's been the law in America since the 1870s when Congress enacted and the President signed the Posse Comitatus Act. And this order crushes that distinction. It eliminates it, it obliterates it, it kills it now and forever.

Now, the second thing that is offensive about this court order is that it clearly violates the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment reads as follows:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and

seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue

but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, and

particularly describing the place to be searched, and the

persons or things to be seized.

Now, first of all, when the government seizes your phone records, unless you happen to be Osama Bin Laden or someone close to him, there is no reason why the government would believe or have reason to believe probable cause that you've committed a crime or you're going to commit a crime or you have any evidence about someone committing a crime. There's no probable cause here.

Secondly, the Fourth Amendment requires particularity. There's no particularity when the government insists by court order and under threat of further action that Verizon or AT&T or Sprint or anyone else be required to turn over their phone records to the government. There's no particularity.

This really is the essence of the matter. Because if you ask the NSA for justification, they'll say: Well, it's legal. What do you mean it's legal?

Well, according to their published statements, including a statement by their Director last Saturday, they maintain that it's legal because of a single Supreme Court case decided in 1979 that said that the government, specifically local police authorities, could acquire the phone records of one person once. That's the case of Smith v. Maryland in 1979.

Because the Supreme Court says that, at that point, the government could acquire the phone records of one person once, the NSA is maintaining that its entire program is legal and that it can acquire the phone records of

everyone, everywhere, forever. That is a farce.

Now, the other document that came to light last Thursday--in other words, 8 days ago as I speak--was a document, again posted at the Guardian's and then later at the Washington Post's Web site. This is a document that is a PowerPoint presentation, which according to the reports was a PowerPoint presentation to analysts working for the NSA. This PowerPoint presentation is labeled ``PRISM/US-984XN Overview,'' or ``the SIGAD Used Most in NSA Reporting.''

What you see to my right is the reproduction of what was posted at the Web site a week ago. First of all, note that there are certain logos at the top of the page:

Gmail, which for those of you who are not familiar, is the largest provider of email services and hosting. It's run by Google.

Facebook. Many of us are familiar with that. I think my children are all too familiar with it and spend an awful lot of time on it. Facebook allows, among other things, private messaging between friends.

Hotmail, which is Microsoft's email server and service.

Yahoo, which performs a variety of functions, including, among other things, hosting a large number of Web pages. And by the way, when you go to their Web page they can tell who you are from your IP address. And also a very widely used email service.

Google. I think Google needs no introduction, but I've already introduced it. Google allows you to do web searches. It, together with Microsoft, has almost 90 percent of the Web search market in the United States. They keep a record of the searches that you make based upon your IP address.

Skype, which is a telephone company that transmits calls electronically over the Internet.

PalTalk. I'm puzzled. I don't know what that one is.

YouTube, which is the largest host of videos in the world, and again, can tell which videos you're looking at by your IP address.

And AOL Mail, which, as it sounds, is the America Online email service.

This document is dated at the bottom April of 2013, meaning last month--or maybe 2 months ago.

Let's take a look inside. One of the pages that's been produced on the Guardian and Washington Post Web site is this:

By way of background, it's been reported that this is part of a longer document. It's 41-pages long. Only 5 pages have been released to the public through the Guardian and through the Washington Post.

So I'm sharing with you the five pages that were released a week ago and are now public. Let's take a look at this one. This one says that the NSA's PRISM program performs the following functions--and bear in mind, this is purported to be a training document given to NSA analysts to explain what they can do in this program.

Who are the current providers to the program?

Microsoft's Hotmail, et cetera, Google, Yahoo!, Facebook, Paltalk, YouTube, Skype, AOL, and Apple.

What are they providing? Specifically, as the document says, What will you--meaning the analyst--receive in collection, collection from surveillance and stored communications?

The document says it varies by provider. We don't know how it varies, but, in general, what you get is the following: email. The NSA gets email from these providers. It gets Video and Voice Chat, videos, photos, stored data, VoIP, which is an electronic version of your actual words when you are speaking on the phone. VoIP stands for ``Voice over Internet Protocol.'' It's your voice. It gets file transfers, video conferencing, notification of target activity, including log-ons--in other words, are you on your computer or not?--et cetera, online social network details, and what is beliedly referred to as ``special requests,'' as if all of that weren't enough already.

You might wonder: How does the government actually get this information? The five pages that are released give us one answer to that question. Let's take a look at that.

If you look at the bottom, the green rectangle, you'll see that it says that PRISM collection is directly from the servers of these U.S. service providers: Microsoft, Yahoo!, Google, Facebook, Paltalk, AOL, Skype, YouTube, and Apple.

Since it's addressed to the trainees at the NSA, to the people who will actually be doing the analysis of this data--and with the injunction on the left which says you should do both--the plain meaning of this is that the NSA apparently has the capability to collect directly from the servers of these service providers the information on the previous page--in other words, our emails, our chats, our videos, our photos, our stored data, our Voice over Internet Protocol, our file transfers, our video conferencing, our log-ins, et cetera, et cetera.

Now, there is an interesting distinction between these two documents:

In the first case, with regard to the court order, the NSA's position is that it's a valid court order, and we regard it as legal. If you don't like it, that's too bad with you. Go change the law--to which I say, fine, I'm going to try to change that law.

With regard to the second document, the situation is a little more ambiguous. What the NSA has said publicly is that the green rectangle is actually not correct. Now, bear in mind, no one has said that this is not an NSA document. No one has said that it's Photoshopped. No one has said that it is anything other than what it purports to be and what it was reported as.

However, the NSA has taken the position that their own document is wrong for reasons that we don't know and that the NSA, in fact, does not have the capability to directly take-collect from the servers of these companies your emails, your Voice over Internet Protocol, your photos, and everything else. They say that they just don't do that. However, we are still waiting for an explanation of how this green rectangle ended up in this document. If it's not true, they need to explain how and why it's not true.

The NSA also says that, for reasons not evident from this document at all, they don't do this for U.S. citizens. Now, that raises a host of questions. You might think that there might be something else in this document that says that, but the NSA hasn't maintained that. In other words, they haven't said, If you look somewhere else in this document, you'll find that we don't do this for U.S. citizens.

Unless you think that this is somehow selective on my part or on anybody else's part, it has been reported that the whistleblower provided this entire document--all, apparently, 41 pages--to The Guardian and to The Washington Post, and they decided on their own to release only these five.

So if there is something that indicates that the NSA is only doing this for Americans, apparently it's not in this document, and we've reached a strange point where people are being trained in the NSA to have the ability to get the emails and the other information on Americans, but somehow we are told later, separately, that that's not correct. In addition to that, the NSA says that there is some process by which they can distinguish between the emails of Americans and the emails of foreigners.

Frankly, that is a technology so advanced to me that it seems like it might be magic. I used to be the president of a telephone company. I have literally no idea how I could distinguish between the email accounts of an American and a foreigner. I don't know how to do it. Maybe they can tell us how they do it if they're doing it at all. That's the real question: if they're doing it at all. I don't know how they could possibly say this email account is for a foreigner, and this email account is for an American. If they can't, that means they're taking all this stuff--American and foreign--and having it, using it, looking at it, and destroying our privacy rights.

That really is the heart of the matter here.

I don't understand why anyone would think that it's somehow okay for the Department of Defense to get every single one of our call records regardless of who we are, regardless of whether we are innocent or guilty of anything. I venture to say that there are Americans who have never even had a parking ticket; yet the Defense Department is pulling their call records as well. Eventually, we will find out whether

the NSA's own document is misleading and whether the NSA is not pulling email accounts and emails and photos and VoIP calls on people who are Americans, because, if you read this document, it sure looks like they are.

This is not the first time that we have had this problem. This is not the first time that the government has entered into surveillance on people without probable cause. Many of us remember that there was FBI surveillance of Martin Luther King, including the wiretapping and bugging of his personal conversations. I thought, perhaps naively, that we had moved beyond that. In some sense, we have moved beyond that because now they're doing it to everyone. In fact, one could well say that we are reaching the point at which Uncle Sam is Big Brother.

I submit to you that this program, although the proponents picked it as American as ``apple spy,'' is an anti-American program. We are not North Koreans. We don't live in Nazi Germany. We are Americans and we are human beings, and we deserve to have our privacy respected. I have no way to call my mother except to employ the services of Verizon or AT&T or some other telephone company. I'm not going to string two cups between my house and her house 70 miles away. That doesn't mean that it's okay with me for the government--and specifically the Department of Defense--to be getting information about every telephone call I make to her. It's not okay with me.

I submit to you, Mr. Speaker, it's probably not okay with you, and I know that, for most of the people who are listening to me today, it's not okay with you either.

Then Franklin said:

Those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a

little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety.

I agree with that. We do not have to give up our liberty to be safe.

I have already heard from people who tell me that they're afraid that they're going to be blown up by some terrorist somewhere, that they're afraid their personal safety is at risk, and it's okay with them if the government spies on them.

Well, it's not okay with me. And I stand here on behalf of the millions of Americans who are wanting to say, It's not okay with me either. I'm fed up, and I'm not going to take it any more.

When we had the Civil War and there were 1 million armed men in this country who rose up heavily armed to fight against our central government, we did not establish a spy network in every city, every town, every village, every home; but that's what we've done right now.

When I was growing up and we had 10,000 nuclear warheads pointed at us and some people believed there was a Communist under every bed, even then we did not establish a spy network as intrusive as this one.

I submit to you that this has gone way too far and that it's up to us to tell the Defense Department, the NSA, the so-called ``intelligence establishment,'' we've had enough. We are human beings. We are a free people. And based upon this evidence, we're going to have to work to keep it that way. That's what I'll be doing. I hope you'll join me.

With that, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I speak in favor of the amendment. And I yield to my colleague, the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. Richmond).

I reclaim my time, and I yield to the gentlelady from California (Ms. Waters).

I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I have three amendments at the desk. These are Grayson Nos. 1, 3, and 4. In view of the late hour, I ask unanimous consent that they be considered en bloc.

Mr. Chairman, with regard to the first amendment, this amendment is identical to language that was inserted into the Military Construction-VA bill yesterday by a voice vote. It expands the list of parties with whom the Department of Homeland Security and other relevant entities are prohibited from contracting. This includes contractors who have been convicted of fraud, theft, forgery, bribery, et cetera, according to the terms of the amendment and otherwise.

With regard to Grayson No. 3, the next amendment, this amendment is a simple one.

It reads:

None of the funds made available by this Act may be used in

contravention of the First, Second or Fourth Amendments to

the Constitution of the United States.

As you will notice, the same sentiment and relevant language appears in my colleague Mr. Ellison's amendment addressing racial discrimination and other matters. I gladly support his efforts, which passed unanimously by voice vote last Congress, and hope the same will be possible of my amendment in this Congress.

With regard to the last Grayson amendment, I regret that my colleague Representative Holt could not be here to offer this amendment himself. He is in New Jersey today, remembering Senator Lautenberg. The amendment that I call up is actually the Holt-Grayson amendment, the last amendment. It's an amendment that Mr. Holt attached to the bill in the last Congress as an en bloc amendment offered by Representative Aderholt, which passed unanimously. The text of the amendment is the same word for word, and it reads as follows:

None of the funds made available by this Act may be used

for the purchase, operation or maintenance of armed unmanned

aerial vehicles.

This is an important amendment and one that I am proud to offer here today on behalf of Representative Holt. In no instance should DHS have access to or use weaponized drones. The bill before us today is the appropriations bill for the Department of Homeland Security, not the Department of Defense. That appropriations bill will come to the floor later this month, we hope.

As our wars abroad come to a close and as excess militarized drones become available for purchase and use potentially by DHS, I feel that it's important to lay down this marker here today that says, no, DHS may not have access to that military equipment. DHS will continue to have access to surveillance drones, and if the committee report is correct, DHS will increase its supply of drones and possibly even build a new airfield to support them.

In his previous amendment, Congressman Holt shared his thoughts on the ways in which these drones should not be used, so I will close with this: Chairman Carter and Ranking Member Price, let's be clear with DHS--no armed drones in the United States.

I ask for the support of this amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.

Mr. Chairman, this amendment strengthens existing provisions in the bill by preventing the award of contracts of money allocated under this bill to offerers or principals of offerers who, within the 3-year period preceding the offer, have been convicted or had a civil judgment rendered against them for such action as fraud, theft, bribery, making false statements, tax evasion, and so on.

It would be unconscionable, Mr. Chairman, if we allowed taxpayer money to be given to contractors who have been convicted of such things as bribery; and, therefore, I offer this amendment to prevent that.

I yield back the balance of my time.