Floor Statements

Madam Speaker, in accordance with the House Report 111-345, I submit the Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate for H.R. 3963.

December 1, 2009.

Hon. Bennie G. Thompson,

Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security, House of

Representatives, Washington, DC.

Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has

prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 3963, the

Criminal Investigative Training Restoration Act.

If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be

pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Megan

Carroll.

Sincerely,

Douglas W. Elmendorf.

Enclosure.

H.R. 3963--Criminal Investigative Training Restoration Act

H.R. 3963 would direct the Federal Air Marshal Service

(FAMS) to require newly hired marshals to complete a training

program in criminal investigative techniques. The bill would

authorize the appropriation of at least $3 million in each of

fiscal years 2010 and 2011 for that purpose.

Based on information from DHS about the anticipated number

of new employees and costs to train them, CBO estimates that

$6 million would be sufficient to establish and operate the

proposed training program. Assuming appropriation of the

necessary amounts, CBO estimates that fully funding H.R. 3963

would cost $2 million in 2010 and $6 million over the 2010-

2014 period. Enacting the bill would not affect direct

spending or revenues.

H.R. 3963 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector

mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and

would impose no costs on state, local, or tribal governments.

The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Megan Carroll.

This estimate was approved by Theresa Gullo, Deputy Assistant

Director for Budget Analysis.

Mr. Speaker, today I rise with significant concerns about section 159 of the Transportation division of this legislation. It requires Amtrak to allow passengers to check their guns when riding the rails.

It is no secret that rail systems are an attractive target for terrorists. In fact, in last year's attack in Mumbai, two terrorists executed a commando-style raid on a major railway station, gunning down 150 innocent commuters. To date, we have been fortunate that no such attacks have occurred on U.S. soil, but with passage of this legislation, securing the Nation's railway systems becomes far more difficult.

Section 159 requires Amtrak to allow passengers to travel with guns without checking them against a terrorist watch list. We all get checked against a terrorist watch list when we fly, regardless of whether we check firearms or not. How can we justify not using the terrorist watch list on people who travel the rail?

Amtrak policy of prohibiting passengers from traveling with guns was established in response to 9/11. With this bill, Congress, in a heavy- handed way, is interfering with Amtrak's security protocols without a single congressional hearing. This bill would abruptly undermine nearly a decade of conscientious efforts by Amtrak to enhance rail security and protect its passengers and employees. I am also concerned that it does not distinguish between checked baggage transported in a separate car and that which is loaded onto the same car as passengers.

Section 159 also lacks safeguards to ensure that State and local gun laws are respected. Specifically, it is silent on the question of preemption, thereby implying that individuals can carry firearms into jurisdictions where it is unlawful to do so.

I would like to also add that, last year, we spent more than twice as much money per passenger on aviation security as we did on rail security. Section 159 will undermine the security of Amtrak's passengers, employees, and infrastructure. I sincerely hope that we do not soon come to regret this hasty and unexamined passage.

Mr. Speaker, as I mentioned during debate

on the rule, I have strong objections to section 159 of the Transportation division of this bill.

Over the last decade it has become abundantly clear that rail systems are key targets for terrorists.

And the consequences have been devastating for many of our friends around the globe.

In last year's attack in Mumbai, 2 terrorists executed a ``commando- style'' raid on a major railway station, gunning down 150 innocent commuters.

I am grateful that, thus far, Americans have been spared the horror of an attack on our domestic rail system.

But approving section 159 is to act as though the terrible events in Madrid, Mumbai, and Russia could never happen here.

Amtrak's ban on firearms was instituted in response to September 11th, and re-evaluated after each major terrorist attack since.

Section 159 interferes with Amtrak's carefully developed security protocols and exacerbates the vulnerability of railways without hearings or debate.

Still, I would like to recognize Chairman Olver and Chairman Obey for reaching out to discuss my security concerns and potential changes to proposed language.

Unfortunately, none of those concerns are addressed in the provision that is in the conference package.

The bottom line is that it still forces Amtrak to allow passengers to transport guns as checked baggage without even the most basic safeguards.

For example, section 159 does not distinguish between checked baggage transported in a separate car and that which is loaded onto passenger cars.

Moreover, there is not even language that requires checked baggage to be secure.

This means that guns and ammunition could be loaded onto the same cars as the passengers who are transporting them.

As my colleague from Florida, Chairwoman Brown, stated earlier, it is absolutely critical for everyone to understand that checked baggage on a train is not the same as checked baggage on an airplane.

What is even more puzzling is that section 159 requires Amtrak to allow passengers to travel with guns without checking their names against the terrorist watchlist.

We all know that our names are checked against the watchlist when we fly, even if we don't check firearms.

I do not understand how anyone can justify using the watchlist to protect air passengers but refusing to provide the same protection to rail passengers.

This section also lacks safeguards to ensure that State and local gun laws are respected.

Specifically, it fails to address preemption, with the implication that individuals may carry firearms into jurisdictions where it is unlawful to do so.

Last year, we spent more than twice as much money per-passenger on aviation security as we did on passenger rail security.

Still, Congress saw fit to cut Amtrak's security funding by 20 percent for this year.

And since section 159 creates new problems without providing any additional funding, Amtrak will now face more security obstacles with even fewer resources.

Section 159 will reverse nearly a decade of conscientious efforts by Amtrak to protect its passengers, employees, and infrastructure--and I sincerely hope that we do not soon come to regret its hasty and unexamined passage.

Madam Speaker, it gives me immense pleasure to recognize the life and legacy of one of America's most prolific champions of agricultural education and science, Ms. Bertha M. Jones.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 3980, the ``Redundancy Elimination and Enhanced Performance for Preparedness Grants Act.''

This legislation, introduced by Mr. Cuellar, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Emergency Communications, Preparedness and Response, requires FEMA to assess the performance of its homeland security grant program and work towards addressing any identified deficiencies.

The legislation was developed based on finding from an October subcommittee hearing where FEMA testified as to the status of the agency's efforts to establish performance measurements for preparedness grants.

At the hearing, we learned that that FEMA's efforts to implement statutory performance metrics-related requirements are fragmented and poorly integrated. As a result, FEMA is unable to measure how the $29 billion in homeland security grants appropriated since 2002 have improved the nation's overall level of preparedness. Without these much needed performance metrics, FEMA continues to impose redundant grant reporting requirements on State and local governments including those in my home State of Mississippi.

Not only are these redundant reporting requirements costly and time- consuming for State and local officials to prepare, but there is significant evidence that, taken together, they still do not provide FEMA with information necessary to measure the return on investment from federal grants.

Although there have been some improvements in FEMA's administration of homeland security grants, such as the improvements in grant guidance and technical assistance provided to State and local applicants, we still have a ways to go.

H.R. 3980 would complement these efforts by directing FEMA to work with State and local stakeholders to identify and eliminate these redundant grant reporting requirements.

Specifically, H.R. 3980 would eliminate much of the red-tape and improve the performance of FEMA grant programs. The bill requires FEMA to develop a strategy, with timelines, to establish performance metrics for its homeland security grants and provides direction to complete a program assessment of its homeland security grants. These steps are designed to improve the agency's performance, productivity and accountability to the taxpayers. It will also provide Congress with better information on FEMA's performance to allow us to conduct more effective oversight and ensure that taxpayer money is being used efficiently and effectively.

Again, thank you for the consideration of this important legislation.

Mr. Speaker, for a second consecutive year, while Americans gathered with family and friends to celebrate the Thanksgiving holiday, terrorists executed deadly attacks on innocent people that were in transit, on foreign rail systems.

Just last week, two separate bombings in Russia underscored that passenger rail systems remain enticing targets for acts of terrorism.

It has been nearly six months since this body overwhelmingly passed the legislation to authorize TSA's rail and mass transit security activities (H.R. 2200).

Unfortunately, to date, the Senate has failed to move on H.R. 2200.

The Senate also has yet to confirm a new TSA Assistant Secretary to fulfill the rail and mass transit security mandates that Congress overwhelmingly approved in 2007, with the passage of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act.

Plainly, there is still much to be done to secure rail and mass transit systems in the United States from bombings like the ones that occurred in Russia over the weekend, and other acts of terrorism.

In remembrance of those events, as well as the bombings of passenger rail and mass transit systems in Madrid, Spain; London, England; and Mumbai, India that occurred in recent years, H. Res. 28 instructs TSA to strengthen its efforts to secure rail and mass transit systems across the country and to build on existing programs that have shown promise.

This resolution recognizes TSA as being uniquely positioned to lead Federal efforts to secure rail and mass transit systems in the United States, and identifies the National Explosives Detection Canine Team Program as an effective and valuable resource.

House passage of both the 9/11 Act in 2007 and H.R. 2200 earlier this year by overwhelming majorities has emphasized the House of Representatives' commitment to strengthening security of rail and mass transit systems.

I urge my colleagues to join with me in supporting this resolution and reaffirming our strong commitment to strengthening the security of our rail and mass transit systems.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 3963, the ``Criminal Investigative Training Restoration Act,'' which has the potential of bolstering the effectiveness and morale of the Federal Air Marshal Service.

Specifically, this is a bipartisan bill adds the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center's criminal investigative training program to the basic training required for Federal Air Marshals.

H.R. 3963 directs the Federal Air Marshal Service to provide criminal investigative training to all newly hired FAMs within 30 days of enactment.

The bill creates a three-year window for all current FAMs to be provided this additional training.

This training was provide to FAMs prior to 2001 but was halted to allow the Federal Air Marshal Service to swiftly ramp up its workforce in response to the September 11th attacks.

Unfortunately, in the eight years since 9/11, the Transportation Security Administration has not moved forward to restore this training.

I have heard that there were some concerns that there was a risk that FAMs, by virtue of taking this course, would be reclassified as ``criminal investigators.''

The legislation addresses this concern head-on by clearly stating that this such a reclassification will not occur, thereby also ensuring that the pay FAMs receive is not adversely affected.

I thank the gentleman from California, Mr. Lungren, for introducing this legislation and . working of my colleagues to include this Important provision.

I urge passage of this bipartisan bill.

Mr. Chairman, I'd like to thank Chairman Gordon, Chairman Wu and Mr. Mitchell for working to move this important legislation. Every Member of this body represents a community that is secured by a firehouse. But in recent times, too many fire stations have had to short change their own training or community fire awareness programs just to stay operational.

Today, we have the opportunity to reaffirm our support for our hometown first responders by supporting H.R. 3791, the Fire Grants Reauthorization Act of 2009. This legislation seeks to enhance and improve two of FEMA's programs that directly award grants on a competitive basis to local fire stations and departments. This critical reauthorization will help ensure that departments large and small, volunteer and career, can continue to provide lifesaving services, including fire prevention and safety programs.

As a former volunteer firefighter, I'd like to thank Mr. Pascrell, the gentleman from New Jersey, the father of the Assistance to Firefighter Grants program, for working to help pioneer the original program and working diligently to help produce this legislation. The so-called AFG grant and the SAFER grant programs provide funding directly to local fire departments so they can purchase needed equipment, conduct fire awareness and prevention service activities, insure that personnel are well trained for all of the duties, assignments as required for certification. And, in the case of SAFER, recruit and hire and retain firefighters without bureaucratic delays.

This bill also authorizes an additional $9.8 billion in funding for these vital programs. Mr. Chairman, within the AFG program, this bill revises grant allocations so that career volunteer and combination fire departments will have access to equal slices of the available grant dollar pie.

Mr. Chairman, I'd also like to say that during these tough economic times, many communities across America are being forced to cut back on public service. Cutbacks to public services should be avoided at all costs. Again, Mr. Chairman, the International Association of Fire Chiefs, Congressional Fire Service Institute, International Association of Volunteer Fire Fighters, National Volunteer Fire Council, National Fire Protection Association, all these organizations support this legislation.

Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this bill.

Mr. Speaker, I and others have spoken at length on the ways that this bill will improve health care for all of our constituents. Another significant benefit of this legislation which has not received as much attention will be the creation of new high- paying jobs in this country. Let me repeat that for some of my friends on the other side of the aisle, this bill will create high-paying, high-quality jobs in health care delivery, technology, and research in the United States.

First, this bill will create enormous demand for health care workers, especially in the area of primary care. Insuring millions of Americans in this country who currently have no insurance will allow them to see primary care providers and receive the wellness and preventive care they have been denied for too long. This influx of new patients will need doctors, nurses and technicians for their care, while reducing overall health care costs because they will not need much more expensive hospitalizations. I support channeling resources that for too long have been used to treat people once they become sick into jobs and services that will prevent people from getting sick in the first place.

Second, this bill will continue the efforts we began in the stimulus package to deploy new health information technologies that better manage both the quality of care patients receive and the cost at which they receive it. New health care exchanges and new demands on the health system to provide high-quality and cost-effective health care will create new opportunities and markets for our brightest minds in technology. They will be incentivized to create and develop products that will be a win/win for Americans: high-quality health care at an affordable price.

Third, this bill will create high-quality research opportunities in this country. The Energy and Commerce Committee enacted a framework for allowing biosimilar competition in this country. This new class of medicines will help lower costs and bring competition to one area that is key to the future of our health care system. Biotechnology is on the cutting edge of efforts to reduce costly invasive procedures and allow our constituents to live healthier and more productive lives. The creation of this new class of medicines comes with requirements for new clinical research and testing, especially in the area of whether a new biosimilar can be interchangeable with an innovator's product. This research will create high-quality and high-paying jobs and it is imperative that we keep this research and these jobs in this country. We cannot allow these research opportunities to leave the United States and we must ensure that these new medicines are safe. I intend to work with the Secretary of HHS and the Commissioner of the FDA to ensure that the testing and research on these biosimilars occur in this country to make certain that it is done properly and safely and to benefit our economy.

Mr. Speaker, this bill is an investment and an exciting opportunity to create the kind of jobs we so desperately need in this United States while at the same time improving the lives of all Americans. This bill will improve health care, create jobs, and grow our economy.

Mr. Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.

Mr. Chair, before discussing the specifics of my amendment, I would like to address an argument that I expect we will hear throughout the day.

The other side of the aisle seems to be arguing that the economy is so delicate that we simply cannot afford to protect the American people from terrorism. Democrats fundamentally reject that argument. In fact, we have testimony from labor that this bill is no threat to jobs. They have testified ``that the bill will have zero impact on employment.''

We also reject the Republicans' argument because if there is one thing the American people expect us to do, it is to ensure that the country is protected from terrorism. Some facility operators may find it inconvenient to make their facilities more secure, but, frankly, the security of the American people is more important.

My manager's amendment makes a number of technical and clerical corrections to the amendment in the nature of a substitute. My amendment clarifies the types of information we were excluding from the definition of protected information.

Specifically, it clarifies that DHS cannot include in the definition of protected information any information that, number one, is required to be made publicly available under any other law, or information that a chemical facility has lawfully disclosed under another law. DHS can determine by regulation that certain information provided for compliance purposes is not protected. This information may include summary data on the number of facilities that have submitted site security plans or the number of enforcement actions taken, so long as information detrimental to chemical security is not disclosed. This clarification is made in all three titles.

I urge support of this clarifying amendment.

I would also like to address an issue that seems to have come up yesterday. There was a question about the bill's intention regarding DHS' indefinite extension for farmers. Both committee reports filed on this bill speak to this issue.

The Homeland Security report states that the Department has been appropriately sensitive to the concerns of agricultural end users, farms and farmers, regarding chemical security. The Energy and Commerce report states that the committee does not intend for this legislation to require the Department to deviate from its current plan to address the security of agricultural end users on a separate timeline.

Our position is clear. This legislation in no way disturbs the current extension. That said, I am willing to explore how we could make this bill clearer on this point as the legislation moves forward.

Before I reserve the balance of my time, I would like to take a moment to acknowledge the staff that has worked so diligently and collaboratively to get us to this day. On my staff, Chris Beck, Michael Beland, Michael Stroud, Brian Turbyfill, Rosaline Cohen, and Lanier Avant; the Energy and Commerce Committee team, led by Alison Cassidy and Michael Freedhoff; and Ryan Seigert on the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee.

With that, Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chair, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Markey).

To the ranking member, you are exactly wrong on your definition. It does the exact opposite. It protects information, and that's why we put it in there. It was recommended by the Judiciary Committee, and this is a security piece of legislation, not safety. I think if the Chair would recognize that, we would all be better.

Mr. Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the gentlelady's amendment. The size of a facility's workforce or annual operating budget has nothing to do with the facility's security risk.

At our October 1 hearing, we heard testimony from Rand Beers, Undersecretary of the DHS, about this issue. He said, and I quote, this is not an issue of defining whether the risk is less important because the size of a firm is small. The risk doesn't change with respect to the size of a firm.

But what is different about small businesses is that some lack the administrative resources of large multibillion-dollar chemical companies. They might not have an in-house security expert that can direct or prepare their security vulnerability assessment or site security plan. They might not know how to navigate the Washington bureaucracy in order to learn how to best comply with these new regulations.

The underlying legislation does acknowledge that the impact of inherently safer technology provisions on small businesses should be examined by the Department of Homeland Security. DHS has told us that they estimate that 15 to 20 percent of all regulated facilities might be classified as small businesses.

I think the gentlelady's amendment takes the language one useful step further by giving DHS the authority to create tools specifically for small businesses to help them in complying with the inherent safer technology provisions of the bill. This could be guidance and outreach directed to the small business community or it could be software or other methodologies that could make compliance easier.

I urge my colleagues to support the Halvorson amendment.

Mr. Speaker, I rise to claim time in opposition.

In its present form, I am.

Mr. Speaker, I can say to my colleague in this motion to recommit, we will have a jobs bill coming out of this body in the not-too-distant future. I look forward to Republican support of that jobs bill when it comes forth.

But this is a security bill, Mr. Speaker. How in the world can we sacrifice security and tie it to unemployment? Can you believe when the terrorists come they'll say, Is the unemployment rate low enough for us to attack you, or should we wait until it gets to 4 percent? In the last 478 months, we've had 4 percent unemployment 6 of those months. So we're going to have to wait all that time before we invest in security.

This is a security bill; it is not a jobs bill. We will have an opportunity to do a jobs bill later. I look forward to the Republican support for that.

Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Markey).

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that in the engrossment of H.R. 2868, the Clerk be authorized to correct section numbers, punctuation, cross-references, and to make such other technical and conforming changes as may be necessary to accurately reflect the actions of the House.

I appreciate the gentleman's providing the time.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the rule for H.R. 2868. I want to first express my gratitude to Chairwoman Slaughter and the Rules Committee for this rule that allows five Democratic and five Republican amendments.

In the wake of the September 11 attacks, security experts immediately identified the threat of an attack on a chemical facility as one of the greatest security vulnerabilities facing the Nation. In 2006, Congress gave the Department of Homeland Security authority to regulate security within the chemical sector. DHS established the Chemical Facility Anti- Terrorism Standards program in 2007, and since that time, DHS has, by all accounts, worked in a collaborative manner with industry to implement this risk-based, performance-based program.

Earlier this year, I introduced H.R. 2868 to not only reauthorize this important program, which will sunset in October 2010, but to also improve it in a few key areas. At the start of this Congress, Chairman Waxman and I reached an agreement on issues that have dogged this effort. In Chairman Waxman I found a partner who was equally committed to making progress on this important homeland security issue. Starting last fall we began bipartisan discussions in earnest and engaged a wide array of stakeholders including DHS, EPA, chemical sector representatives, water groups, environmental groups, and labor groups. What emerged was the package you see before you today.

Title I is a reauthorization of the DHS program. Titles II and III provide new regulatory authority to the EPA to regulate drinking water and wastewater utilities respectively. This package eliminates the exemptions for the water sector that both the Bush and Obama administrations identified as security gaps and makes a number of improvements to the DHS program.

The underlying legislation, which I introduced in June, built upon two hearings and two markups that were held in the last Congress. H.R. 2868 was marked up by the Homeland Security Committee over the course of 3 days in late June. The Committee on Energy and Commerce held a legislative hearing on H.R. 2868 and drinking water security legislation this October. Both bills were marked up in subcommittee and full committee in October, also.

Whether it was the staff negotiations or during markups, numerous Republican requests and concerns were included in the final product.

Thank you very much.

The detailed collaborative approach used to create the underlying legislation is a process for which we should all be proud.

As a Congressperson who represents one of the more agricultural districts, I also said that this bill does not harm agricultural interests. I have never voted against an agricultural interest. And I look forward to working with that interest on any concerns they might have.

Mr. Speaker, I support the rule for H.R. 2868, and I look forward to today's debate and passage of this important legislation that will help to make America more secure.

Thank you very much. I appreciate the gentleman yielding the time.

Mr. Dent, as you know, is a member of the committee. I thank the Rules Committee for being so generous in allowing Mr. Dent to have two of the amendments that we'll consider later in the debate.

First of all, Mr. Speaker, I want to say that the administration supports this bill. It is absolutely clear that they do. The other issue is the reference to jobs. Well, we've been doing security at chemical plants since 2007. There is no data that says that that security risk has created a loss in jobs.

All we are doing is codifying what the Department is already doing. To say that it's anti-jobs is just totally inaccurate.

The other issue is, my colleague, Mr. Dent, as you know, this is our second time having this bill brought before us. Mr. Dent supported the bill the first time. Now he is against it. I guess you could say he was for it before he was against it. But, clearly, what I am supporting is the fact that the Department looked at several thousand facilities.

I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Since the gentleman raised the question, the civil lawsuit provision has changed in this bill. I would suggest, Mr. Dent, if you look at it, a plant cannot get sued under this particular legislation. A citizen can't bring lawsuit against a plant. We did change it. We heard you. So we have changed it. That's why I think between the rule and the ultimate vote, if you read the bill, we have made the changes.

In addition to that, let me say that hospitals, all those other entities, Mr. Speaker, they have been considered in the DHS review. DHS has determined that there are only 6,000 facilities that require this kind of scrutiny. So it might be hospitals, it might be anything, but they are already doing it. This is nothing new. It's not adding any, and it's not taking any jobs from small business.

Let me say this bill also requires that DHS assess potential impacts on small business. It's not taking jobs. They have to first decide if it's harmful. If it is, then we put in this program monies to help small business improve their security. It's not an undue requirement for them. I want to make very clear; this bill does not hurt small business. It provides monies to support any vulnerability that DHS might find at a small business. It does not require them to fund that improvement on its own.

It's an effort to get risk tied to threat and vulnerability. That's how we do it. The first piece of legislation we carried in the 110th was a bill addressing risk. But that risk has to be decided based on certain metrics. Those metrics are threats and vulnerabilities.

Regardless of what you might hear, this bill does not do away with jobs. It is small business friendly. Because if there is a vulnerability, a vulnerability is a risk, Mr. Speaker, that the Department determines. Nobody would want to work in an environment where a security risk was identified and not corrected. That's why we have the Department. That's why the Department, through the help of Congress, passed this bill in 2006. We are just doing in the CFATS requirement what's already established.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and insert extraneous material on H.R. 2868.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I am pleased to present H.R. 2868, a bill to authorize reasonable, risk-based security standards for chemical facilities.

Faced with the fact that DHS' chemical security program, CFATS, would expire, the President requested and received a 1-year extension to allow this bill to go through the legislative process. Under the CFATS program, DHS placed about 6,000 facilities in four risk tiers. These sites account for just 16 percent of the 36,000 facilities that initially submitted information to DHS.

My committee began working on comprehensive chemical security legislation 4 years ago in response to widespread concern that chemical plants may be ideal terrorist targets. Previous attempts at getting comprehensive chemical security legislation to the floor in the last two Congresses were unsuccessful.

However, this Congress, thanks to the collaborative approach taken by Chairman Waxman, as well as by Chairmen Oberstar and Conyers, the House now has an opportunity to consider this homeland security bill. I am proud of the robust stakeholder engagement that went into this bill, and to the extent with which Department and Republican input was sought and included.

H.R. 2868 closes a major security gap identified by both the Bush and Obama administrations. Specifically, titles II and III authorize EPA to establish a security program for drinking water and wastewater facilities. EPA's new program will complement CFATS.

This approach, which is fully supported by the Obama administration, taps into the existing regulatory relationship between EPA and public water facilities.

Additionally, H.R. 2868 requires all tiered facilities to assess ``methods to reduce the consequences of a terrorist attack.'' Plants that voluntarily perform these assessments, which are sometimes called IST assessments, often find that good security equals good business. In fact, this week, Clorox announced, to strengthen its operation and add another layer of security, it would voluntarily replace chlorine gas with a safer alternative at six of its bleach manufacturing facilities.

H.R. 2868 simply incorporates this best practice into how all tiered facilities integrate security into their operations. Additionally, H.R. 2868 strengthens CFATS by adding enforcement tools, protecting the rights of whistleblowers, and enhancing security training.

Some on the other side are arguing for a 3-year blanket extension of DHS's current authority. Such an approach flies in the face of testimony that we received about gaps in CFATS and would be a rejection of all the carefully tailored security enhancements in the bill.

This legislation demonstrates the progress we can make with a transparent process that is open to diverse viewpoints and addresses the concerns of everyone who wants to be in the process. This is exactly how government should work.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I urge passage of this important legislation and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to enter into the Record testimony from Under Secretary Rand Beers from an October hearing that reflects that this administration supports this bill and desires for action this year.

Statement for the Record by Rand Beers, Under Secretary, National Protection and Programs Directorate, Department of Homeland Security,

October 1, 2009.

Thank you, Chairman Markey, Ranking Member Upton, and

distinguished Members of the Committee. It is a pleasure to

appear before you today as the Committee considers H.R. 3258,

the Drinking Water System Security Act of 2009. This Act is

intended to close the security gap at drinking water

facilities that possess substances of concern.

We have made significant progress since the implementation

of the Chemical Facilities Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS).

We have reviewed over 36,900 facilities' Top-Screen

consequence assessment questionnaires, and in June 2008, we

notified 7,010 preliminarily-tiered facilities of the

Department's initial high-risk determinations and of the

facilities' requirement to submit Security Vulnerability

Assessments (SVAs). We received and are reviewing almost

6,300 SVAs. We have recently begun to notify facilities of

their final high-risk determinations, tiering assignments,

and the requirement to complete and submit Site Security

Plans (SSPs) or Alternative Security Programs (ASPs). CFATS

currently covers approximately 6,200 high-risk facilities

nationwide. The current state of coverage reflects changes

related to chemicals of interest that facilities have made

since receiving preliminary tiering notifications in June

2008, including security measures implemented and the

consolidation or closure of some facilities.

Chemical Security Regulations

Section 550 of the FY 2007 Department of Homeland Security

Appropriations Act directed the Department to develop and

implement a regulatory framework to address the high level of

security risk posed by certain chemical facilities.

Specifically, Section 550(a) of the Act authorized the

Department to adopt rules requiring high-risk chemical

facilities to complete SVAs, develop SSPs, and implement

protective measures necessary to meet risk-based performance

standards established by the Department. Consequently, the

Department published an Interim Final Rule, known as CFATS,

on April 9, 2007. Section 550, however, expressly exempts

from those rules certain facilities that are regulated under

other Federal statutes. For example, Section 550 exempts

facilities regulated by the United States Coast Guard

pursuant to the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA).

Drinking water and wastewater treatment facilities as defined

by Section 1401 of the Safe Water Drinking Act and Section

212 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, respectively,

are similarly exempted. In addition, Section 550 exempts

facilities owned or operated by the Departments of Defense

and Energy, as well as certain facilities subject to

regulation by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).

The following core principles guided the development of the

CFATS regulatory structure:

(1) Securing high-risk chemical facilities is a

comprehensive undertaking that involves a national effort,

including all levels of government and the private sector.

Integrated and effective participation by all stakeholders--

Federal, State, local, and the private sector--is essential

to securing our national critical infrastructure, including

high-risk chemical facilities. Implementing this program

means tackling a sophisticated and complex set of issues

related to identifying and mitigating vulnerabilities and

setting security goals. This requires a broad spectrum of

input, as the regulated facilities bridge multiple industries

and critical infrastructure sectors. By working closely with

experts, members of industry, academia, and Federal

Government partners, we leveraged vital knowledge and insight

to develop the regulation.

(2) Risk-based tiering will ensure that resources are

appropriately deployed. Not all facilities present the same

level of risk. The greatest level of scrutiny should be

focused on those facilities that, if attacked, present the

most risk and could endanger the greatest number of lives.

(3) Reasonable, clear, and equitable performance standards

will lead to enhanced security. The current CFATS rule

includes enforceable risk-based performance standards. High-

risk facilities have the flexibility to select among

appropriate site-specific security measures that will

effectively address risk. The Department will analyze each

tiered facility's SSP to see if it meets CFATS performance

standards. If necessary, DHS will work with the facility to

revise and resubmit an acceptable plan.

(4) Recognition of the progress many companies have already

made in improving facility security leverages those

advancements. Many responsible companies have made

significant capital investments in security since 9/11.

Building on that progress in implementing the CFATS program

will raise the overall security baseline at high-risk

chemical facilities.

Appendix A of CFATS lists 322 chemicals of interest,

including common industrial chemicals such as chlorine,

propane, and anhydrous ammonia, as well as specialty

chemicals, such as arsine and phosphorus trichloride. The

Department included chemicals based on the consequences

associated with one or more of the following three security

issues:

(1) Release--toxic, flammable, or explosive chemicals that

have the potential to create significant adverse consequences

for human life or health if intentionally released or

detonated;

(2) Theft/Diversion--chemicals that have the potential, if

stolen or diverted, to be used or converted into weapons that

could cause significant adverse consequences for human life

or health; and

(3) Sabotage/Contamination--chemicals that, if mixed with

other readily available materials, have the potential to

create significant adverse consequences for human life or

health.

The Department established a Screening Threshold Quantity

for each chemical based on its potential to create

significant adverse consequences for human life or health in

one or more of these ways.

Implementation Status

Implementation and execution of the CFATS regulation

require the Department to identify which facilities it

considers high-risk. The Department developed the Chemical

Security Assessment Tool (CSAT) to identify potentially high-

risk facilities and to provide methodologies that facilities

can use to conduct SVAs and to develop SSPs. CSAT is a suite

of online applications designed to facilitate compliance with

the program; it includes user registration, the initial

consequence-based screening tool (Top-Screen), an SVA tool,

and an SSP template. Through the Top-Screen process, the

Department initially identifies and sorts facilities based on

their associated risks.

If a facility is initially identified during the Top-Screen

process as having a level of risk subject to regulation under

CFATS, the Department assigns the facility to one of four

preliminary risk-based tiers, with Tier 1 indicating the

highest level of risk. Those facilities must then complete

SVAs and submit them to the Department. Results from the SVA

inform the Department's final determinations as to whether a

facility is high-risk and, if so, of the facility's final

tier assignment. To date, the Department has received over

6,300 SVAs. Each one is carefully reviewed for its physical,

cyber, and chemical security content.

Only facilities that receive a final high-risk

determination letter under CFATS will be required to complete

and submit an SSP or an Alternative Security Program (ASP).

DHS's final determinations as to which facilities are high-

risk are based on each facility's individual consequentiality

and vulnerability as determined by its Top-Screen and SVA.

After approval of their SVAs, the final high-risk

facilities are required to develop SSPs or ASPs that address

their identified vulnerabilities and security issues. The

higher the risk-based tier, the more robust the security

measures and the more frequent and rigorous the inspections

will be. The purpose of inspections is to validate the

adequacy of a facility's SSP and to verify that measures

identified in the SSP are being implemented.

In May, the Department issued approximately 140 final

tiering determination letters to the highest risk (Tier 1)

facilities, confirming their high-risk status and initiating

their 120-day timeframe for submitting an SSP. In June and

July, we notified approximately 826 facilities of their

status as final Tier 2 facilities and the associated due

dates for their SSPs. Most recently, on August 31, 2009, we

notified approximately 137 facilities of their status as

either a final Tier 1, 2, or 3 facility and the associated

due dates for their respective SSPs. Following preliminary

authorization of the SSPs, the Department expects to begin

performing inspections in the first quarter of FY 2010,

starting with the Tier 1-designated facilities.

Along with issuing the final tiering determination

notifications for Tier 1 facilities in May, the Department

launched two additional measures to support CFATS. The first

is the SSP tool, which was developed by DHS with input from

an industry working group. A critical element of the

Department's efforts to identify and secure the Nation's

high-risk chemical facilities, the SSP enables final high-

risk facilities to document their individual security

strategies for meeting the Risk-Based Performance Standards

(RBPS) established under CFATS.

Each final high-risk facility's security strategy will be

unique, as it depends on its risk level, security issues,

characteristics, and other factors. Therefore, the SSP tool

collects information on each of the 18 RBPS for each

facility. The RBPS cover the fundamentals of security, such

as restricting the area perimeter, securing site assets,

screening and controlling access, cybersecurity, training,

and response. The SSP tool is designed to take into account

the complicated nature of chemical facility security and

allows facilities to describe both facility-wide and asset-

specific security measures, as the Department understands

that the private sector in general, and CFATS-affected

industries in particular, are dynamic. The SSP tool also

allows facilities to involve their subject-matter experts

from across the facility, company and corporation, as

appropriate, in completing the SSP and submitting a

combination of existing and planned security measures to

satisfy the RBPS. The Department expects that most approved

SSPs will consist of a combination of existing and planned

security measures. Through a review of the SSP, in

conjunction with an on-site inspection, DHS will determine

whether a facility has met the requisite level of performance

given its risk profile and thus whether its SSP should be

approved.

Also issued with the final Tier 1 notifications and the SSP

tool was the Risk-Based Performance Standards Guidance

document. The Department developed this guidance to assist

high-risk chemical facilities subject to CFATS in determining

appropriate protective measures and practices to satisfy the

RBPS. It is designed to help facilities comply with CFATS by

providing detailed descriptions of the 18 RBPS as well as

examples of various security measures and practices that

would enable facilities to achieve the appropriate level of

performance for the RBPS at each tier level. The Guidance

also reflects public and private sector dialogue on the RBPS

and industrial security, including public comments on the

draft guidance document. High-risk facilities are free to

make use of whichever security programs or processes they

choose, provided that they achieve the requisite level of

performance under the CFATS RBPS. The Guidance will help

high-risk facilities gain a sense of what types and

combination of security measures may satisfy the RBPS.

To provide a concrete example: in the case of a Tier 1

facility with a release hazard security issue, the facility

is required to appropriately restrict the area perimeter,

which may include preventing breach by a wheeled vehicle. To

meet this standard, the facility is able to consider numerous

security measures, such as cable anchored in concrete block

along with movable bollards at all active gates or perimeter

landscaping (e.g., large boulders, steep berms, streams, or

other obstacles) that would thwart vehicle entry. As long as

the measures in the SSP are sufficient to address the

performance standards, the Department does not mandate

specific measures to approve the plan.

Outreach Efforts and Program Implementation

Since the release of CFATS in April 2007, the Department

has taken significant steps to publicize the rule and ensure

that our security partners are aware of its requirements. As

part of this dedicated outreach program, the Department has

regularly updated the Sector and Government Coordinating

Councils of industries most impacted by CFATS, including the

Chemical, Oil and Natural Gas and Food and Agriculture

Sectors. We have also made it a point to solicit feedback

from our public and private sector partners and, where

appropriate, to reflect that feedback in our implementation

activities, such as adjustments made to the SSP template.

We have presented at numerous security and chemical

industry conferences; participated in a variety of other

meetings of relevant security partners; established a Help

Desk for CFATS questions; and developed and regularly updated

a highly-regarded Chemical Security Web site. These efforts

are having a positive impact: approximately 36,900 facilities

have submitted Top-Screens to the Department via CSAT.

Additionally, the Department continues to focus on

fostering solid working relationships with State and local

officials as well as first responders in jurisdictions with

high-risk facilities. To meet the risk-based performance

standards under CFATS, facilities need to cultivate and

maintain effective working relationships--including a clear

understanding of roles and responsibilities--with local

officials who would aid in preventing, mitigating and

responding to potential attacks. To facilitate these

relationships, our inspectors have been actively working with

facilities and officials in their areas of operation, and

they have participated in almost 100 Local Emergency Planning

Committee meetings to provide a better understanding of

CFATS' requirements.

We are also working with the private sector as well as all

levels of government in

order to identify facilities that may meet the threshold for

CFATS regulation but that have not yet registered with CSAT

or filed a Top-Screen. We have recently completed pilot

efforts at the State level with New York and New Jersey to

identify such facilities in those jurisdictions. We will use

these pilots to design an approach that all States can use to

identify facilities for our follow up. Further, we are in the

process of commencing targeted outreach efforts to certain

segments of industry where we believe compliance may need

improvement.

Internally, we are continuing to build the Infrastructure

Security Compliance Division that is responsible for

implementing CFATS. We have hired, or are in the process of

on-boarding, over 125 people, and we will continue to hire

throughout this fiscal year to meet our goals. The FY 2010

budget request contains an increase to allow the hiring,

training, equipping, and housing of additional inspectors to

support the CFATS program as well as to continue deployment

and maintenance of compliance tools for covered facilities.

New Legislation

We have enjoyed a constructive dialogue with Congress,

including this Committee, as it works on new authorizing

legislation. The Department recognizes the significant work

that this Committee and others, particularly the House

Committee on Homeland Security, have devoted to drafting

legislation to reauthorize the CFATS program and to address

chemical security at the Nation's water systems. We

appreciate this effort and look forward to continuing the

constructive engagement with Congress on these important

matters. CFATS is enhancing security today by helping to

ensure high-risk chemical facilities throughout the country

have security postures commensurate with their levels of

risk.

The Department supports a permanent authorization of the

program. Given the complexity of chemical facility

regulation, the Department is committed to fully exploring

all issues before the program is made permanent. To that end,

the President's FY 2010 budget includes a request for a one-

year extension of the statutory authority for CFATS, which

will allow the time needed to craft a robust permanent

program while avoiding the sunset of the Department's

regulatory authority on October 4, 2009. Further, as this one

year extension is considered, we urge Congress to provide

adequate time and resources to implement any new requirements

under the prospective legislation and to ensure that new

requirements would not necessitate the Department to

extensively revisit aspects of the program that are either

currently in place or will be implemented in the near future.

Throughout our discussions with congressional committees, the

Department has communicated a series of issues for

consideration as part of any CFATS legislative proposal.

It is important to note that the Administration has

developed a set of guiding principles for the reauthorization

of CFATS and for addressing the security of our Nation's

waste water and drinking water treatment facilities. These

principles are:

(1) The Administration supports permanent chemical facility

security authorities and a detailed and deliberate process in

so doing, hence our preference for that process to be

completed in FY10.

(2) Nonetheless, CFATS single year reauthorization in this

session presents an opportunity to promote the consideration

and adoption of inherently safer technologies (IST) among

high-risk chemical facilities. We look forward to working

with this Committee and others on this important matter.

(3) CFATS reauthorization also presents an opportunity to

close the existing security gap for waste water and drinking

water treatment facilities by addressing the statutory

exemption of these facilities from CFATS. The Administration

supports closing this gap.

As DHS and EPA have stated before, we believe that there is

a critical gap in the U.S. chemical security regulatory

framework--namely, the exemption of drinking water and

wastewater treatment facilities. We need to work with

Congress to close this gap in order to secure substances of

concern at these facilities and to protect the communities

they serve; drinking water and wastewater treatment

facilities that meet CFATS thresholds for chemicals of

interest should be regulated. We do, however, recognize the

unique public health and environmental requirements and

responsibilities of such facilities. For example, we

understand that a ``cease operations'' order that might be

appropriate for another facility under CFATS would have

significant public health and environmental consequences when

applied to a water facility. The Administration has

established the following policy principles in regards to

regulating security at water sector facilities:

The Administration believes that EPA should be the lead

agency for chemical security for both drinking water and

wastewater systems, with DHS supporting EPA's efforts. Many

of these systems are owned or operated by a single entity and

face related issues regarding chemicals of concern.

Establishing a single lead agency for both will promote

consistent and efficient implementation of chemical facility

security requirements across the water sector.

To address chemical security in the water sector, EPA would

utilize, with modifications as necessary to address the

uniqueness of the sector, DHS' existing risk assessment tools

and performance standards for chemical facilities. To ensure

consistency of tiering determinations across high-risk

chemical facilities, EPA would apply DHS' tiering

methodology, with modifications as necessary to reflect

any differences in statutory requirements. DHS would in

turn run its Chemical Security Assessment Tool and provide

both preliminary and proposed final tiering determinations

for water sector facilities to EPA. EPA and DHS would

strive for consensus in this tiering process with EPA in

its final determination, attaching significant weight to

DHS' expertise.

EPA would be responsible for reviewing and approving

vulnerability assessments and site security plans as well as

enforcing high-risk chemical facility security requirements.

Further, EPA would be responsible for inspecting water sector

facilities and would be able to authorize states to conduct

inspections and work with water systems to implement site

security plans. It is important to note that any decisions on

IST methods for the water sector would need to engage the

states given their primary enforcement responsibility for

drinking water and wastewater regulations.

DHS would be responsible for ensuring consistency of high-

risk chemical facility security across all 18 critical

infrastructure sectors.

CFATS currently allows, but does not require, high-risk

facilities to evaluate transferring to safer and more secure

chemicals and processes. Many facilities have already made

voluntary changes to, among other things, their chemical

holdings and distribution practices (for example, completely

eliminating use of certain chemicals of interest). The

Administration supports, where possible, using safer

technology, such as less toxic chemicals, to enhance the

security of the nation's high-risk chemical facilities.

However, we must recognize that risk management requires

balancing threat, vulnerabilities, and consequences with the

cost to mitigate risk. Similarly, the potential public health

and environmental consequences of alternative chemicals must

be considered with respect to the use of safer technology. In

this context, the Administration has established the

following policy principles in regards to IST at high-risk

chemical facilities:

The Administration supports consistency of IST approaches

for facilities regardless of sector.

The Administration believes that all high-risk chemical

facilities, Tiers 1-4, should assess IST methods and report

the assessment in the facilities' site security plans.

Further, the appropriate regulatory entity should have the

authority to require facilities posing the highest degree of

risk (Tiers 1 and 2) to implement IST method(s) if such

methods enhance overall security, are feasible, and, in the

case of water sector facilities, consider public health and

environmental requirements.

For Tier 3 and 4 facilities, the appropriate regulatory

entity should review the IST assessment contained in the site

security plan. The entity should be authorized to provide

recommendations on implementing IST, but it would not require

facilities to implement the IST methods.

The Administration believes that flexibility and staggered

implementation would be required in implementing this new IST

policy. DHS, in coordination with EPA, would develop an IST

implementation plan for timing and phase-in at water

facilities designated as high-risk chemical facilities. DHS

would develop an IST implementation plan for high-risk

chemical facilities in all other applicable sectors.

Because CFATS and MTSA both address chemical facility

security, there certainly should be harmonization, where

applicable, between these programs. We of course continue to

work closely within the Department with the Coast Guard to

review the processes and procedures of both programs. We also

support further clarification in the statute concerning the

type of NRC-regulated facilities exempt from CFATS.

In the area of enforcement, we have expressed in our

testimony on H.R. 2868 the Department's support for

eliminating the requirement that an Order Assessing Civil

Penalty may only be issued following an Administrative Order

for compliance. This change would greatly streamline the

civil enforcement process, enhancing the Department's ability

to promote compliance from facilities. We also support

language that would authorize the Department to enforce

compliance by initiating a civil penalty action in district

court or commencing a civil action to obtain appropriate

relief, including temporary or permanent injunction. We note,

however, that the enforcement provisions this Committee has

proposed in H.R. 3258 would subject drinking water facilities

to a lower maximum penalty as compared to chemical facilities

regulated under H.R. 2868 if enforcement is pursued through a

civil penalty action in district court. This could result

in inconsistent enforcement between facilities.

The Department notes that the Drinking Water System

Security Act of 2009 would give the Administrator discretion

in divulging information about the reasons for placing a

facility in a given tier. This provision is preferable to the

provision in Title I of HR 2868 which mandates that the

Department disclose specific information to tiered facilities

that could include classified information.

The Department also notes that HR 3258 and HR 2868 contain

provisions that require

covered facilities and government agencies to comply with all

applicable state and Federal laws and exclude from protection

``information that is required to be made publicly available

under any law.'' While the Department supports current

requirements for facilities to report certain information to

Federal and state agencies under other statutes, DHS is

concerned that this language as written could increase the

likelihood that sensitive information could be

inappropriately disclosed to the general public. The

Department would like to work with the Committee to explore

what other Federal statutes and information might be affected

by this language in order to ensure that there are no

inconsistencies that could undermine the important goal of

protecting sensitive information from unwarranted disclosure,

while still protecting the public right-to-know about

information that may affect public health and the

environment, as embodied in these other statutes. We will

also consult with our partner agencies that administer the

affected Federal statutes.

Conclusion

The Department is collaborating extensively with the

public, including members of the chemical sector and other

interested groups, to work toward achieving our collective

goals under the CFATS regulatory framework. In many cases,

industry has voluntarily done a tremendous amount to ensure

the security and resiliency of its facilities and systems. As

we implement the chemical facility security regulations, we

will continue to work with industry, our other Federal

partners, States, and localities to get the job done.

The Administration recognizes that further technical work

to clarify policy positions regarding IST and water treatment

facility security is required. The policy positions discussed

above represent starting points in renewed dialogue in these

important areas. DHS and EPA staff are ready to engage in

technical discussions with Committee staff, affected

stakeholders, and others to work out the remaining technical

details. We must focus our efforts on implementing a risk-and

performance-based approach to regulation and, in parallel

fashion, continue to pursue the voluntary programs that have

already resulted in considerable success. We look forward to

collaborating with the Committee to ensure that the chemical

security regulatory effort achieves success in reducing risk

in the chemical sector. In addition to our Federal Government

partners, success is dependent upon continued cooperation

with our industry and State and local government partners as

we move toward a more secure future.

Thank you for holding this important hearing. I would be

happy to respond to any questions you may have.

Mr. Chairman, I now recognize a member of the committee, the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Pascrell), for 2 minutes.

Mr. Chairman, I yield the gentleman 1 additional minute.

Mr. Chairman, before I yield to the gentleman from Texas, I would like to say that this is a security bill. A good security bill makes all of us safe. What we're looking at now is an opportunity to go into facilities that don't, in many instances, have security assessments. If we make security assessments, then we will identify those vulnerabilities those facilities have and help them correct them. Bad people would love to get into facilities with vulnerabilities and do harm. What we're trying to do is help those facilities create the capacity to be secure. That's all we're doing.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Al Green), who is a member of the committee.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 additional minute to the gentleman.

Before I recognize the gentlewoman from California, let me say that nothing in this bill prevents the Secretary from using her discretion in continuing the exemption for farmers. I will put my credentials from agriculture up against anyone's in this body. I represent a rural district. Nothing I would do in this body would harm agriculture, and I think if you check my voting record, you will absolutely see that.

Also for the record, to the gentleman from Oklahoma, let me say that, before any of these things are done, the Department has to see if it's technically feasible; they have to see if it's cost effective, and if it lowers the risk at the facility.

So all of those concerns you raise are justified, but they are addressed in the bill. So I would say that, between the time for general debate and when we start voting, if you would go back and look at that, I think some of your concerns will be resolved.

I yield 2 minutes to a member of the committee, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Richardson).

Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to a member of the committee, the gentlewoman from Houston, Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee).

Mr. Chair, I yield myself the balance of my time.

As you've heard, Mr. Chair, this legislation before us today is critical to the security of our Nation and is deserving of the full support of this House.

With that, Mr. Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Chair, I rise in firm support of H.R. 3854, the Small Business Financing and Investment Act.

As a vital part of our economy, small businesses account for at least 65 percent of American jobs.

The legislation we are considering today provides a much-needed increase in loans for the nation's small businesses.

During a time of economic recession, it is increasingly important that we provide access to start-up capital, long term financing, and other forms of investment capital to small businesses.

Hit particularly hard by these rough economic times, small businesses receive greater access to critical financing through this legislation.

The bill also provides financing opportunities for rural communities through the Rural Lender Outreach Program.

Another critical provision in H.R. 3854 creates a grant program for companies to begin recovery efforts after a natural disaster.

I am confident that the nation's underserved small businesses-- particularly minority owned businesses--will be better served because of this important legislation.

Access to capital is one of the greatest challenges preventing fair competition for small businesses.

H.R. 3854 addresses accessibility to financing and overall investment.

I urge my colleagues to support this important legislation.

Mr. Speaker, today I rise in support of legislation, S. 1694, offered by Ms. Harman. This bipartisan bill is critical to promoting interoperable emergency communications capabilities for the Nation's first responders. This important piece of legislation provides our Nation's first line of defense with the tools and equipment necessary to carry out their life-saving responsibilities.

As Chairman of the Committee on Homeland Security, it remains unsettling that most of the public safety communications failures uncovered during the terrorist attacks on 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina in 2005 still exist today. Those tragic events will forever be engrained in the minds of every American. We learned a shrilling lesson from those major incidents: that when our Nation's first responders cannot communicate during a manmade or natural disaster, lives are lost.

Today, we have the opportunity to act with what Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. coined as, ``the fierce urgency of now.'' Interoperable communications--the ability of emergency responders to communicate in real-time, when needed, and as authorized--remains an unaccomplished goal. Therefore, we must commit to the American people that we will do our due diligence and address the daily challenges-- both human and technological--that first responders face with interoperable emergency communications post-haste.

I would like to applaud Ms. Harman for her leadership in the effort to bring our nation's first responders one step closer to achieving interoperable communications by closing a loophole in the Public Safety Interoperable Communications, PSIC, grant program.

Specifically, S. 1694, which is a companion bill to H.R. 3633, appropriately extends next year's statutory deadline to spend PSIC grant funds to September 30, 2012. The PSIC program is an important grant program for the public safety community and has provided nearly $1 billion of funding to state and local to purchase equipment, deploy new communications systems, and train personnel.

As a condition to receive grants under the PSIC program, states and local governments must develop Statewide Communications Interoperability Plans, SCIPs. The Department of Homeland Security faced delays in approving the SCIPs, creating the challenge for state and local grantees to spend the grant funds by the end of next year.

S. 1694 makes an important change and gives grantees the much needed time and flexibility to do their due diligence and avoid wasteful spending. This bipartisan bill allows for state and local governments to properly invest in public safety communications systems that will achieve the goal of implementing nationwide interoperability.

I support S. 1694 and urge my colleagues to join me in this supporting our Nation's first responders.