Floor Statements

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President, I support GEN George Casey's confirmation to be the next Chief of Staff of the United States Army. His nomination was approved by the Armed Services Committee by a vote of 19 to 6.

Through a long and distinguished career, he has held positions of increasing responsibility, culminating in that of Commanding General of multinational forces in Iraq, in which capacity he served for over 2\1/ 2\ years.

Prior to that command, he was Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, which was preceded by an assignment as Director of the Joint Staff, and before that as Director of Strategy, Plans, and Policy, J-5, on the Joint Staff.

General Casey is an infantryman, having commanded at all levels up to and including division command. As an assistant division commander, he served in Bosnia, and earlier in his career he served in Cairo as a U.N. military observer with the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization. He also served a tour of duty as a congressional liaison officer.

General Casey knows Iraq and the challenges the Army faces there. He also knows the Pentagon and the challenges he will face there. General Casey has the knowledge to perform his primary responsibilities as Chief of Staff, which is the training and equipping of soldiers and caring for them and their families.

There is some opposition to General Casey's nomination because he is identified with the administration's failed Iraq strategy, and I agree that strategy has not been successful. As a matter of fact, I have argued as forcefully as I know how that strategy has not been successful and that we need to change course in Iraq.

It is appropriate to hold military leaders responsible for their own failures, but the principal failures that have led to the chaos in Iraq were decisions of the civilian leaders. General Casey had to deal with the consequences of a myriad of flawed policies, including having insufficient forces at the outset of the operation, failing to properly plan for postwar stability operations, disbanding the Iraqi Army, then trying to build a new army, initially using civilian contractors, and an overly extensive debaathification program, to name but a few.

All of these critical mistakes, which fueled the insurgency and civil disorder, are attributed to the civilian leadership in the White House, in the Department of Defense, and in the Coalition Provisional Authority. Compounding those mistakes was the effect of detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib attributed, in part, to ambiguities in what was considered permissible in the interrogation of prisoners fostered by that very same civilian leadership in the administration, the White House, and the Pentagon, where the advice of uniformed military lawyers was overruled. Those critical mistakes were made in the year before General Casey took command and had severe adverse consequences which he inherited.

General Casey's focus in Iraq was on training and equipping Iraqi security forces to bring them as quickly as possible to a level where they could relieve American forces from the burden of providing the security that Iraqis should be providing for themselves. He was not alone in seeing this was a priority. It was also the focus of his boss, the Central Command commander, General Abizaid, and his subordinates, the Corps commander, Lieutenant General Chiarelli, and the commanders of that training effort, Generals Petraeus and later Dempsey. General Casey put it this way:

The longer we in the United States forces continue to bear

the main burden of Iraq's security, it lengthens the time

that the Government of Iraq has to take the hard decisions

about reconciliation and dealing with the militias. And the

other thing is that they can continue to blame us for all of

Iraq's problems, which are at base their problems.

Those are wise words. General Casey recognized there is no military solution to the situation in Iraq, that only a political solution enabled by Iraqi politicians making the essential political compromises can save the Iraqis from themselves. General Casey is not alone. There actually seems to be an agreement among most observers that an Iraqi political settlement is a key to ending the violence in Iraq. The difference of opinion exists on whether Iraqi politicians need breathing space, as President Bush has said, to reach required political compromises or whether, as many of us believe, Iraqi politicians need to be pressured to make those compromises and that the addition of 21,000 more troops doesn't make a political compromise more likely, it just gets us in deeper into a civil conflict.

It has been said that General Casey was too optimistic about the possibility of troops being reduced, having predicted in the spring and summer of 2006 and then subsequently predicting that reduction toward the end of 2006 and into 2007 was possible. He did make those predictions, and I think he was clearly overly optimistic. He has made a number of mistakes, but the key fundamental flaws were the mistakes

made, the wrong judgments of the civilian leadership of this country, not the uniformed military leaders of this country.

Was he too optimistic? Yes. Is he still too optimistic? I believe he is. When asked about whether he agreed with what the President finally said the other day, that we are on a road to slow failure--the President finally stepping up to acknowledging the reality in Iraq-- General Casey said he believed we are still on a road to slow success. That is how optimistic he is.

I am not going to hold that against him. I think he is wrong in that excessive optimism, but we expect our military leaders to be enthusiastic and positive about the missions they are assigned--the missions that they are assigned--by their civilian leaders. We expect them to be confident and to inspire their soldiers with the importance of those missions, to keep their morale high, and General Casey did that.

He has also increased and decreased troops--both--depending on the missions assigned to him by the civilian leaders.

As he testified, he requested additional troops on six occasions for specific missions, such as to provide security for the elections or otherwise deal with spikes of violence. However, mindful of the stress on soldiers and their families and on the deteriorating readiness of the nondeployed units in the Army and the Marine Corps, he also sought opportunities for reductions--both directions.

One of the real questions I had to face in addressing this nomination was whether General Casey changed his tune when it came to this surge of additional troops that is being requested or being sent by the President. I pressed him on this issue at his nomination hearing before the Armed Services Committee.

I want to read the exchange between General Casey and myself at his hearing within the last week.

I asked General Casey the following:

We asked General Abizaid back in November when he appeared

before this committee whether he needed more troops or

whether he supported more troops going to Iraq. And this is

just last November. And this is what he said. He said that he

met with every divisional commander, General Casey, the Corps

commander, General Dempsey. ``We all talked together. And I

said, in your professional opinion, if you were to bring in

more American troops now, does it add considerably to our

ability to achieve success in Iraq? And they all said no. And

the reason is because we want Iraqis to do more. It's easy

for the Iraqis to rely upon us to do this work. I believe--

This is General Abizaid speaking--

that more American forces prevent the Iraqis from doing more,

from taking more responsibility for their own future.''

I continued in my questioning of General Casey:

Now, General Abizaid said that he spoke to you and that his

opinion reflected your opinion and all the other commanders.

Was that true when he said it?

General Casey:

I'm not exactly sure when in November it was, but it was.

Senator Levin:

So you've changed your view since November?

General Casey:

As I described in my opening testimony, Senator, in mid

November was when the reevaluation of the plan was taking

place. So I suspect John and I talked before that. And that

does reflect my general view on additional U.S. forces in

Iraq.

Senator Levin:

It reflects a general view, but then there was some kind of

a reevaluation which took place in mid November.

General Casey:

That's right, Senator. We're constantly reevaluating how

we're doing and what we need.

Senator Levin:

But that position that General Abizaid stated was your

position when you spoke to him in early November presumably

still remains your general view.

General Casey:

That's correct.

Senator Levin:

Well, if that's your general view, what is the change? Why

are you modifying your general view for this surge?

General Casey:

What has changed, Senator, are several things: One, the

development of a plan, a new plan that was conceived by the

Iraqis and worked in concert with us; so there is a plan that

laid out requirement for those forces. So just to say do you

need more forces is one thing; to say do you need more forces

to execute this plan is quite another. And we do need an

additional two brigades to implement that plan.

I think he is giving us a straightforward answer to that question. His general view is, and was before the new plan was adopted, that we did not need more forces in Iraq; that it took the Iraqis off the hook. There was a new plan which was adopted by the administration, by the Commander in Chief, by the civilian leadership of this country. That plan requires that we not just clear neighborhoods but that we then remain in neighborhoods in Baghdad.

Do I think that is a wise plan? I do not. I am going to vote against the surge. I think it gets us in deeper militarily. This is a military officer who has been given a new plan and has been asked what are the requirements for that new plan which has been adopted by the civilian leaders of this country. And when given a new plan by the Commander in Chief, he very properly said that is going to require some additional troops.

Again, we are going to debate the plan, the wisdom of it, I hope one of these days. We are going to debate the wisdom of whether this surge makes sense. But given a new plan, given that decision, what General Casey is saying is that his general view about the lack of the wisdom of increasing the military presence in Iraq has to be modified when there is a new requirement, a new plan which requires us to be present in the neighborhoods of Baghdad.

Once again, although I disagree with the plan, I view that as a satisfactory explanation for why he now supports the additional troops. Not to the same extent that the President has proposed or decided upon, but to the extent of two brigades. He said the additional brigades will give additional flexibility. He doesn't have any problem with that, but he testified that was not what his recommendation was.

So his emphasis on building up Iraqi security forces to relieve Americans of the tasks that Iraqis should be doing for themselves is a critical part of any strategy in Iraq that has a chance of success, and it is key to the ultimate U.S. military disengagement. The real key to a stable and secure Iraq and a viable Iraq is a political solution that can only be reached by the leaders in Iraq, the politicians. And what American political leaders need to do, in my judgment, is to pressure those politicians to make that happen.

That was never General Casey's responsibility. General Casey never had the responsibility of doing what is critically essential politically, which is to put pressure on the Iraqi politicians to reach a political settlement. He is a military man. He is a military man who, by his own acknowledgment, has made a number of mistakes. Indeed, he listed a number of mistakes for us that he has made and that he takes responsibility for. But the fundamental mistakes which have led to the chaos in Iraq, which did not allow us to help to create in Iraq a stable and viable country, which is the goal of all of us, those fundamental mistakes were the mistakes made by the civilian leaders of this country. To hold him accountable or responsible, and to vote against him because of the major mistakes which led to this chaos through not the uniformed leaders' mistakes but through our civilian leaders' mistakes, it seems to me, is inappropriate and unfair, and I will vote for his confirmation.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. President, a couple of quick comments on my good friend's statement. First, no one suggests that the commanders be absolved from any responsibility. In fact, when we asked General Casey what mistakes had been made, he listed a number of mistakes in his own answers, including:

We underestimated the ability of al-Qaida, the Sunni

insurgents, to provoke sectarian conflict and failed to

preempt the attack against the Golden Mosque in Samarra; we

thought that as more security forces were trained and

equipped we would be able to gradually shift ever increasing

security responsibilities to them and thus reduce our forces

proportionately. This is occurring slower than we originally

projected. We were slow to anticipate the extent of the

radical Shia death squads.

He has acknowledged mistakes have been made. But the fundamental mistakes which have been made which caused us to be in the situation we are in were not George Casey's. Every commander makes mistakes. There is no commander I know of who would say he or she did not make mistakes. No one is absolving General Casey of the mistakes, which he is the first to acknowledge. The question is whether he is going to be held accountable--not for his mistakes but for the fundamental mistakes which were made by the civilian leadership of this Nation. That is the question.

When my friend says General Casey must be the only one in America who doesn't think this policy is a failure, let me give you a couple of other Americans who seem to think the same way. Let's start with the President of the United States, last October, when he said: ``We are absolutely winning in Iraq.''

That is the Commander in Chief. ``We are absolutely winning in Iraq.''

How about another person, the Vice President of the United States, within the last year? ``The insurgency is in its last throes.''

To say that General Casey is the only person in America who has made statements that are overly optimistic, to put it mildly, in terms of what is going on in Iraq, when he is trying to carry out the policies of the administration, keep the morale of his troops, and now, after November the President now says we are on a road to slow failure, after the American public told the President of the United States that we are on a road to slow failure, now what we are saying is: OK, the President acknowledges we are on a road to slow failure unless we adopt his policy of a surge. What General Casey is saying, honestly, when I pressed him--he doesn't frame it that way. He believes we are on a slow progress road. Are we going to say he is not qualified to be Chief of Staff of the United States Army, when he has been Vice Chief, he has been a Commander, he has been a three star general--because he believes it is slow progress instead of slow failure, when we have a Commander in Chief who just a few months ago said we are absolutely winning in Iraq, absolutely winning?

And George Casey, now it is all piled on him. He is the only one in America who seems to think we are winning in Iraq. Well, he doesn't think we are winning in Iraq; he thinks we are slowly making progress in Iraq, to use his words. Do I agree with him? No. I think this policy has been a failure right from the beginning. Going in was a mistake. It was a mistake that was based on arrogance, it was based on a misunderstanding of history, it was based on a misreading of what the threat was, it was based on a lot of mistakes. Disbanding the Iraqi Army? Look what it has led to. Not having a plan for the aftermath? Look what it has led to. These are the fundamentals. These are the transcendent mistakes which have created the chaos in Iraq, and George Casey inherits that.

He makes his own mistakes at a totally different level, degree, than these fundamental mistakes. Suddenly we say he is not qualified to be a chief of staff of the Army because he was a commander who inherited that mess and made his own mistakes of a much lower degree, obviously. Much too optimistic. He is a commander of troops, trying to keep morale up. So he is optimistic, I believe he is overly optimistic, history has proven he is overly optimistic. But to say we are trying to absolve him of mistakes when he acknowledges his own mistakes as any good commander will, learning from mistakes--he listed his mistakes; it is his list-- no one is absolving him. We are simply saying he should not be carrying the load of the mistakes the civilian leadership of this country has made, which has helped to create such chaos in Iraq.

I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I have no objection at all. I am just curious as to about how long. I am not in any way trying to influence the length of time.

I thank my colleague.

Reserving the right to object, of course, I will not--did I understand the Senator to say 10 minutes? We don't have any shortage of time, so I am not trying to restrict the Senator in any way. I just want to plan.

No objection.

Mr. President, for the Committee on Armed Services I report favorably the following nomination lists which were printed in the Records on the dates indicated, and ask unanimous consent, to save the expense of reprinting on the Executive Calendar that these nominations lie at the Secretary's desk for the information of Senators.

Madam President, I yield to the Senator from Virginia 1 minute

to ask a question of the Senator from Connecticut.

Madam President, I hope the Senate will be allowed to debate our policy in Iraq by proceeding to this legislation this afternoon. Iraq is the single most important policy issue facing our country. It was a major issue in the November elections last fall. The American people have strong opinions about what is happening in Iraq. They want their elected officials to debate this issue, and we should do it. The debate should go forward. A filibuster is out of place on war and peace issues, on something of this magnitude. The debate is not about whether we want the United States to act to maximize chances of success in Iraq. We all want to maximize chances of success in Iraq. We all want to see a stable Iraq which enhances our own national security. But the President's course of action, which he has been on for 3\1/2\ years and which he has now proposed to continue on to deepen our involvement in Iraq, does not enhance our security. It does not maximize chances of success in Iraq.

The debate is about the best way to maximize chances of success in Iraq. Is the new strategy of the President, which puts over 21,000 more American troops in the middle of an Iraqi civil war, the best way to bring that about? That is what this debate is about. There actually seems to be an agreement among most observers that an Iraqi political settlement is the key to ending the violence in Iraq. The difference of opinion exists on whether Iraqi politicians need breathing space, as President Bush has said, to reach required political compromises or whether, as many of us believe, Iraqi politicians need to be pressured to make those compromises and that the addition of 21,000 more troops doesn't make a political compromise more likely; it just gets us in deeper in the middle of a civil conflict.

The bill we are hoping to proceed to today incorporates the modified Warner resolution verbatim, except for a minor change in order to make it a bill instead of a resolution. The reason for making it a bill instead of a resolution is simply to make it more amendable. Unlike a resolution, which is clumsy to amend, there is no intent to put this modified Warner language in the form of a bill for any other purpose. As a matter of fact, the majority leader has asked for unanimous consent to treat a resolution with Senator Warner's language as amendable, as though it were a bill, to achieve the goal we are trying to achieve. This unanimous consent was objected to by the Republican leader.

The majority leader, Senator Reid, has also told Senator McConnell that we are more than willing to transform this bill into a resolution prior to final passage, if we can get to final passage, if a filibuster does not thwart our getting to final passage.

What does the modified Warner language do which is incorporated into this bill? It makes it clear the Congress disagrees with the President's plan to increase force levels and urges the President instead to consider all options and alternatives. This bill makes it clear that we will fund troops in the field. There is no difference between these two documents in that regard. Both our bill and the McCain resolution make it clear we want to fund the troops in the field. Our bill makes it clear that the responsibility for Iraq's internal security and for halting sectarian violence must rest primarily with the Government of Iraq and Iraqi security forces. It makes it clear that Iraqis must reach political settlements in order to achieve reconciliation, and the failure of the Iraqis to reach such settlements to create a truly unified government contributes to increasing violence in Iraq.

Our bill makes it clear that the primary objective of the overall United States strategy in Iraq should be to encourage Iraqi leaders to make political compromises that will foster reconciliation and establish a true unity government, ultimately leading to improvements in the security situation.

Adding American troops does not increase the probability of achieving the primary objective. Listen to what GEN John Abizaid said when he testified to Congress in November of last year:

I met with every divisional commander, General Casey, the

Corps Commander, [and] General Dempsey. We all talked

together. And I said to them, in your professional opinion,

if we were to bring in more American troops now, does it add

considerably to our ability to achieve success in Iraq? And

they all said no. And the reason is, because we want the

Iraqis to do more. It's easy for the Iraqis to rely upon us

to do this work.

Finally, General Abizaid said:

I believe that more American forces prevent the Iraqis from

doing more, [prevent the Iraqis] from taking more

responsibility for their own future.

Besides making it less likely that the Iraqis will take more responsibility for their own future, adding more American troops is an attempt to reach a military solution to an inherently political problem.

The Prime Minister of Iraq himself stated last November:

The crisis is political, and the ones who can stop the

cycle of aggravation and bloodletting of innocents are the

[Iraqi] politicians.

Adding more American troops does not pressure Iraqi politicians to be Iraqi leaders and to make the political compromises essential for a political solution; it only allows them to continue what in the words of the National Intelligence Estimate is the ``current winner-take-all attitude and sectarian animosities infecting the political scene.''

The administration says this bill emboldens the enemy. Congressional debate over Iraq policy doesn't embolden the enemy. The enemy is already emboldened.

What emboldens the enemy is the almost 4 years' presence of Western troops in the middle of a Muslim country's capital, which causes over 70 percent of the residents of that country to oppose our presence.

What emboldens the enemy is the open-ended presence of Western troops, which serves as a magnet for extremists and gives a propaganda club to our enemies.

What emboldens the enemy is invading Iraq without the support of the international community.

What emboldens the enemy is lawlessness and looters ransacking public buildings and institutions in Iraq.

What emboldens the enemy is invading Iraq without a plan for the aftermath of the invasion.

What emboldens the enemy is increasing the number of American troops, which results in Iraqis taking less responsibility for providing security for all the citizens of Iraq.

What emboldens the enemy is the creation of Green Zones protecting Iraqi political leaders, in which they pursue a winner-take-all political approach.

Madam President, how much time do I have?

Madam President, we owe our troops everything. We owe them the best equipment we can provide. We owe them the best training. We owe their families the best support we can give them.

We also owe them our best thinking. I think it is an insult to the intelligence of our troops to suggest that debating the wisdom of deepening the military presence in Iraq somehow or other emboldens the enemy. Our troops depend upon us to give them what they deserve: support. And part of that support in a democracy is debating the policy which not only brought them there but which keeps them there and, if many of us are correct, will keep them there longer and with greater casualties. The best way to change course in Iraq is to adopt the modified Warner language.

It has been said that this is not as strong as withholding funds. We don't want to withhold funds from troops in the field. We want to change this policy. If you want to change the policy this administration is following, which relies on a military solution, a deepening military presence in Iraq, we hope you will vote for cloture on this bill.

I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I would like to take this opportunity to honor the life of Mr. Herman Coleman. Herman was an outstanding and dedicated public servant whose influence, knowledge and achievements were widely

known and highly regarded. Over the course of more than 30 years, Herman held several important positions within the State of Michigan, on the national level and in the private sector. His efforts have made a broad impact.

Herman began his career with the Michigan Education Association, where he would ultimately become the Association's first African- American executive director/ chief administrator. Among other achievements, Herman was an integral part of statewide deliberations regarding the desegregation of Michigan's school districts.

His successful tenure with the MEA led to his appointment as Assistant to the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Education. As Assistant Secretary, Herman drafted Executive Order No. 12232, which provided the framework for increased Federal assistance to historically Black colleges and universities. This order remains in effect today. Herman would continue his efforts to improve and reform education policy after leaving the U.S. Department of Education.

In 1985, Herman was appointed by Governor Blanchard as the first African-American chief executive officer of the State of Michigan Insurance Department. After a successful tenure with the department, Herman sought to make his mark in the private sector as vice president of corporate relations for AAA Michigan, where he oversaw AAA's community relations and governmental affairs departments. Herman then moved to the health care arena as a consultant for the Potomac Group Consultants, and, in 1994, began service as both partner/marketing director and managing partner of the Insured Vehicle Identification Network, IVIN.

Herman Coleman's strong leadership and pioneering efforts throughout his lifetime are evidenced by his many achievements and by the many awards and honors bestowed upon him. His legacy will reverberate for many years. I know my colleagues in the Senate join me in honoring the life of Mr. Herman Coleman and in offering the most sincere condolences to his daughters, Hope and Heather, the rest of his family and to his many colleagues and friends. He will truly be missed.

Madam President, I have long supported an increase in the minimum wage. I am pleased that, with the leadership of the new majority in Congress, this minimum wage increase will be passed by a bipartisan majority.

In 1996 Congress raised the minimum wage by 90 cents an hour in two steps to $5.15 an hour. That increase was enacted more than 10 years ago. Since then, the real value of that wage has eroded by 21 percent and the nearly 5.5 million workers earning the minimum wage have already lost all of the gains from the 1996-1997 increase. Since then, Gallup polls have shown that 86 percent of small business owners do not think that the minimum wage affects their business, and nearly half of small business owners think that the minimum wage should be increased. Since then, 29 States, including Michigan, as well as the District of Columbia have recognized the importance of keeping our working families out of poverty by increasing State minimum wages.

Unfortunately, since the 1970s, poverty has increased by 50 percent among full-time, year-round workers. Currently, 37 million Americans, including 13 million children, live in poverty. As the most prosperous nation in the world, our minimum wage should be a living wage, and it is not. When a father or mother works full time, 40 hours a week, year- round, they should be able to lift their family out of poverty. A full- time minimum wage laborer working 40 hours a week for 52 weeks earns $10,700 per year--more than $6,000 below the Federal poverty guidelines for a family of three.

I believe that a full-time minimum wage job should provide a minimum standard of living in addition to giving workers the dignity that comes with a paycheck. These lower paid workers, many of whom have entered the workforce due to the welfare reform, should be rewarded for entering the workforce, not penalized by a poverty wage. A higher minimum wage has the potential to ensure that lower paid workers will be protected from falling into poverty and possibly back on the welfare rolls. The minimum wage increase during the recession in 1991 provided much needed income to poor people and helped to increase spending in the economy. 58 percent of the benefit of the 1996 increase went to families in the bottom 40 percent of income groups. Over one-third of the benefit went to the poorest families--those in the bottom 20 percent of income groups.

Today the real value of the minimum wage is $4.00 below what it was in 1968. To have the purchasing power it had in 1968, the minimum wage would have to be at least $9.37 an hour today, not $5.15. According to the United States Department of Labor, over 60 percent of minimum wage earners are women; almost 40 percent are minorities, and nearly 80 percent are adults. These hardworking Americans deserve a fair deal.

In addition to the long overdue minimum wage provision, this bill contains a package of tax provisions. I am pleased that these include a number of measures to crack down on abusive tax dodges, including an improvement to current law to end the tax benefits received by companies that reincorporate and set up shell headquarters in offshore tax havens.

I am also pleased that the bill extends the work opportunity tax credit, which allows employers credit against wages for hiring workers from targeted groups such as recipients of public assistance, qualified veterans, and ``high risk'' youth. I have heard from a number of Michigan companies that the WOTC program is important to them in their hiring members of these targeted groups, and I am pleased that this provision will be extended through the end of 2012.

I am also pleased that the tax provisions would put in place a limit on the amount that corporate executives and other highly paid employees can place tax-free into deferred compensation plans. Under current law, public companies cannot deduct more than $1 million per year for compensation paid to their top officers. However, compensation that is ``deferred,'' meaning the employee doesn't have immediate access to it, is not subject to this $1 million limit; so deferred compensation packages have become a main way that company executives can get multi- million dollar compensation packages while their companies continue to take a tax write-off.

We have seen these excessive packages time and again in recent stories about runaway executive compensation totaling tens of millions of dollars. Tens and even hundreds of millions of dollars have been salted away in this fashion for corporate executives, and companies have simply found another way to game the system by excluding this ``deferred compensation'' from those individuals' income for the year. It is more than time for Congress to put an end to this game which has fueled excessive executive pay.

This bill would set a limit on the amount of compensation that could receive tax deferral at the lower of $1 million annually or the average of the previous 5 years compensation. The ability of corporate executives to defer tax on up to $1 million in compensation is still a significant benefit that stands in stark contrast to the minimum wage we are attempting to raise for those at the lowest end of the pay scale.

It is only right that those who are at the low end of the pay scale who work hard should receive a fair wage and be able to support their families. These people do not always have the leverage to negotiate a fair salary. This bill to increase the minimum wage will help to move them to a more livable wage.

Madam President, I have long supported an increase in the minimum wage. I am pleased that, with the leadership of the new majority in Congress, this minimum wage increase will be passed by a bipartisan majority.

In 1996 Congress raised the minimum wage by 90 cents an hour in two steps to $5.15 an hour. That increase was enacted more than 10 years ago. Since then, the real value of that wage has eroded by 21 percent and the nearly 5.5 million workers earning the minimum wage have already lost all of the gains from the 1996-1997 increase. Since then, Gallup polls have shown that 86 percent of small business owners do not think that the minimum wage affects their business, and nearly half of small business owners think that the minimum wage should be increased. Since then, 29 States, including Michigan, as well as the District of Columbia have recognized the importance of keeping our working families out of poverty by increasing State minimum wages.

Unfortunately, since the 1970s, poverty has increased by 50 percent among full-time, year-round workers. Currently, 37 million Americans, including 13 million children, live in poverty. As the most prosperous nation in the world, our minimum wage should be a living wage, and it is not. When a father or mother works full time, 40 hours a week, year- round, they should be able to lift their family out of poverty. A full- time minimum wage laborer working 40 hours a week for 52 weeks earns $10,700 per year--more than $6,000 below the Federal poverty guidelines for a family of three.

I believe that a full-time minimum wage job should provide a minimum standard of living in addition to giving workers the dignity that comes with a paycheck. These lower paid workers, many of whom have entered the workforce due to the welfare reform, should be rewarded for entering the workforce, not penalized by a poverty wage. A higher minimum wage has the potential to ensure that lower paid workers will be protected from falling into poverty and possibly back on the welfare rolls. The minimum wage increase during the recession in 1991 provided much needed income to poor people and helped to increase spending in the economy. 58 percent of the benefit of the 1996 increase went to families in the bottom 40 percent of income groups. Over one-third of the benefit went to the poorest families--those in the bottom 20 percent of income groups.

Today the real value of the minimum wage is $4.00 below what it was in 1968. To have the purchasing power it had in 1968, the minimum wage would have to be at least $9.37 an hour today, not $5.15. According to the United States Department of Labor, over 60 percent of minimum wage earners are women; almost 40 percent are minorities, and nearly 80 percent are adults. These hardworking Americans deserve a fair deal.

In addition to the long overdue minimum wage provision, this bill contains a package of tax provisions. I am pleased that these include a number of measures to crack down on abusive tax dodges, including an improvement to current law to end the tax benefits received by companies that reincorporate and set up shell headquarters in offshore tax havens.

I am also pleased that the bill extends the work opportunity tax credit, which allows employers credit against wages for hiring workers from targeted groups such as recipients of public assistance, qualified veterans, and ``high risk'' youth. I have heard from a number of Michigan companies that the WOTC program is important to them in their hiring members of these targeted groups, and I am pleased that this provision will be extended through the end of 2012.

I am also pleased that the tax provisions would put in place a limit on the amount that corporate executives and other highly paid employees can place tax-free into deferred compensation plans. Under current law, public companies cannot deduct more than $1 million per year for compensation paid to their top officers. However, compensation that is ``deferred,'' meaning the employee doesn't have immediate access to it, is not subject to this $1 million limit; so deferred compensation packages have become a main way that company executives can get multi- million dollar compensation packages while their companies continue to take a tax write-off.

We have seen these excessive packages time and again in recent stories about runaway executive compensation totaling tens of millions of dollars. Tens and even hundreds of millions of dollars have been salted away in this fashion for corporate executives, and companies have simply found another way to game the system by excluding this ``deferred compensation'' from those individuals' income for the year. It is more than time for Congress to put an end to this game which has fueled excessive executive pay.

This bill would set a limit on the amount of compensation that could receive tax deferral at the lower of $1 million annually or the average of the previous 5 years compensation. The ability of corporate executives to defer tax on up to $1 million in compensation is still a significant benefit that stands in stark contrast to the minimum wage we are attempting to raise for those at the lowest end of the pay scale.

It is only right that those who are at the low end of the pay scale who work hard should receive a fair wage and be able to support their families. These people do not always have the leverage to negotiate a fair salary. This bill to increase the minimum wage will help to move them to a more livable wage.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. President, there is growing awareness across the country that too little has been done to combat illegal gun trafficking. This awareness was validated by a report released last week by the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence which revealed that some licensed gun dealers are complicit in aiding gun traffickers, yet remain largely untouched by the law.

The report, ``Shady Dealings: Illegal Gun Trafficking from Licensed Gun Dealers,'' was released in Philadelphia, a city that is combating a sharp increase in gun violence. In 2002, the city reached a 17-year low in homicides with 288. However, since then, homicide rates have soared. Last year, the city suffered 406 homicides and is on track to exceed that total in 2007. The report documents over two dozen cases of illegal gun trafficking from dealers across the country. In each case, gunrunners were prosecuted; however, the dealers who supplied them received no legal sanctions.

``Shady Dealings'' documents several scenarios in which dealers turn a blind eye to clear indications of gunrunning. In-store straw purchases are transactions that violate Federal law in which one individual submits to the required Federal background check for a gun that is clearly intended for use by someone else. Multiple purchases of the same model gun by an individual should be an indication that the guns are not for personal use. Large volume sales of handguns should be a red flag to dealers. In one case, a gun dealer sold 87 pistols to a gun trafficker's straw buyer in a single transaction. Another red flag for trafficking should occur when a single buyer makes repeated purchases from a dealer. In one instance, a trafficker from Ohio made at least 19 visits to a particular gun shop, yet was never turned away. Dealer sales to traffickers at gun shows present special opportunities for trafficking. A single gun dealer in Georgia was recorded selling eight guns to one trafficker and 20 additional pistols to two other traffickers. Several of the weapons were recovered by the New York City police, and one of them was used to shoot a New York City police officer.

Unfortunately, making life easier for gun traffickers presents the opportunity for financial reward with little to no consequence for gun dealers. Not one of the dealers profiled in the Brady Center report has been put out of business by the ATF or prosecuted for selling guns to convicted gun traffickers. As a result, the underground market for guns is fueled the diversion of massive numbers of guns from licensed gun dealers into the hands of criminals. Almost 60 percent of the guns traced to crime by the ATF originated from only about 1 percent of the Nation's gun dealers. Additionally, approximately 30 percent of the guns traced to crime were traced within 3 years of their retail sale. I urge my colleagues to take up and pass sensible gun legislation that will help prevent such egregious acts and help protect the welfare of our communities.

Madam President, I wonder if the Senator will yield for a unanimous consent request.

It is just a unanimous consent request.

I was just going to ask unanimous consent that I be added as a cosponsor of the resolution.

As I understand, the resolution has not yet been sent to the desk.

I ask unanimous consent that I be added as a cosponsor to the resolution.

I thank my friend from Nebraska.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent, in accordance with rule XXVI, paragraph 2, of the Standing Rules of the Senate, to have printed in the Record the Rules of the Committee on Armed Services.

Mr. President, I come to the floor this morning to express my support for the nomination of LTG David H. Petraeus, U.S. Army, for appointment to the grade of General and assignment as Commander, Multinational Force--Iraq.

General Petraeus is presently serving as Commanding General, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, the Army's leader development, professional military education, doctrine development, and lessons learned center. This is the place where the Army focuses its attention and its greatest professional capabilities on developing leaders, on military education, on developing doctrine, and on learning the lessons from previous conflicts and challenges. As a matter of fact, the Army and Marine Corps' newly issued counterinsurgency manual was written under the command and guidance of General Petraeus at Leavenworth.

General Petraeus had two previous tours of duty in Iraq. The first was in 2003 when he was Commanding General of the 101st Airborne Division, which was headquartered in Mosul, Iraq. General Petraeus' second tour in Iraq was from May 2004 to September 2005, when he was Commander, Multinational Security Transition Command--Iraq/Commander, NATO Training Mission--Iraq. In that capacity, he was responsible for the organizing, training, and equipping of Iraqi security forces.

General Petraeus' nomination to become the Commander of Multinational Forces--Iraq may be the single most important command in the Nation's defense establishment. The Nation will entrust him with the operational command and the welfare of over 130,000 American service members who are presently in Iraq, and of those who may be deployed to Baghdad as part of the President's planned increase in the middle of a protracted and bloody sectarian battle over the future of Iraq.

General Petraeus is professionally qualified for this command. He is widely recognized for the depth and breadth of his education, training, and operational experience. Noteworthy is his recent leadership of the new Army/Marine Corps manual. He testified that he believes the new military strategy for Iraq will work, and that the U.S. military forces under his command will be able to successfully accomplish their mission. We would not want a commander who did not believe in his mission and in the troops under his command. I pray he is correct.

I am obviously very concerned over a strategy that relies on the Iraqis meeting their commitments when they have repeatedly failed to do so in the past. I am obviously concerned about a strategy which is based on an increased military presence, when expert after expert, including military commander after military commander, has told us there is no military solution in Iraq; that the only way to end the violence in Iraq is for the Iraqis to reach a political settlement.

I am deeply concerned that this new strategy, I believe, is based on the wrong assumption--that there is a military solution to a sectarian war--when in fact the only solution to a sectarian conflict is for those groups to finally share power, share resources, including resolving the differences over autonomy that can end the violence. That is not just me saying that; that is also what the Iraqi President has said repeatedly--that it is the Iraqi political leaders' failure to reach a political settlement that is the cause of the continuing violence.

That being the case, I don't believe--and I don't think a majority of this body believes--that an increase in troops going into the middle of the neighborhoods of Baghdad and staying there--``holding,'' as we say--is going to contribute to a successful conclusion of our presence in Iraq. It is not going to help the Iraqis succeed, to put our troops in their neighborhoods in the middle of the sectarian strife. We are going to add targets without adding to the essential need of the Iraqis to face a reality--to stare at their options, to look into an abyss-- civil war or one nation? That has to be their choice. We cannot make it for them. We can make it easier or harder for them to do it.

The question is whether adding troops into that sectarian cauldron is going to contribute to their reaching a political solution or indeed will delay the day, as some of our commanders have said, when they will reach a political settlement. As a matter of fact, General Casey, the current commander, emphasized this point on January 2:

The longer we in the U.S. continue to bear the main burden of Iraq's security, it lengthens the time that the government of Iraq has to make the hard decisions about reconciliation and dealing with the militias.

General Abizaid said the following:

It's easy for the Iraqis to rely upon us to do the work.

Then he said this:

I believe that more American forces prevents the Iraqis

from doing more, from taking responsibility for their own

future.

That is what General Abizaid said in November.

So those are the expressions of our top military commanders who are there now. I believe they are right. But we need a commander in Iraq. General Casey is retiring. The question is not whether we agree with a particular strategy--and we will have an opportunity, hopefully next week, to vote on whether we agree with the increase of the American military presence as a way of pressuring the Iraqis or taking the heat off of their political leaders to reach a political solution. We will debate that issue.

But we need a commander. We have a qualified commander who has been nominated. There are other issues General Petraeus is going to have to face. General Keane, yesterday, pointed this out. We had a hearing in front of the Armed Services Committee yesterday. General Keane was there, along with former Secretary of Defense Perry and Ambassador Ross. General Keane pointed out yesterday that we have a significant problem which is going to face General Petraeus in Baghdad other than the violence, other than inserting American forces into neighborhoods and trying to hold them with American forces, with an American face, with an American uniform. That is a big enough problem. But the command arrangements are such that U.S. and Iraqi forces are going to be operating side by side in those neighborhoods under two separate chains of

command, violating the unity of command principle that is so ingrained in U.S. military doctrine and, indeed, is one of the key principles in that counterinsurgency manual which General Petraeus helped to create. He must have unity at the command. They must agree down there on those streets: Yes or no, are we going into that house or not?

Now, who goes into that house is a critically important issue. Many of us don't believe it ought to be an American tip of the spear; that the Iraqi forces have been trained, 150,000 or more, to protect their country, and they should be the tip of the spear. That is one issue. There is a great dispute over that issue.

That goes to the heart of the matter as to whether more American troops are going to help solve this problem. But it complicates the problem, it exacerbates the problem when you have two commanders on the ground side by side who have two different chains of command who may have two different opinions as to who ought to go into that house or whether that house ought to be entered. That has not been resolved. That is what General Petraeus is also going to have to face.

General Keane, who is former Vice Chief of Staff for the Army, just yesterday expressed his strong concern about the command arrangements but said he was confident that General Petraeus had the ability to revise the arrangements so that there could be a unity of command. I hope he is right.

It may be a superhuman task. It may be an impossible task. It is not a task which ought to face a commander. These issues ought to be worked out in advance of forces entering into combat situations. But they are not worked out. So General Petraeus has to figure that out as well as the major issues that he is going to face.

Mr. President, did I yield myself a particular amount of time?

I thank the Presiding Officer.

Mr. President, during his testimony at his confirmation hearing, General Petraeus volunteered to provide honest, straightforward reports to the Congress on a regular basis in recognition of Congress's oversight responsibilities. We are counting on him doing so. He may even report to us over a TV network, but he made a commitment. He volunteered a commitment. This was not something we had to press him to do.

He said: I am going to regularly report to Congress on whether this new strategy is working and whether these so-called benchmarks which the Iraqis have allegedly agreed to, representing their commitments-- when will they produce troops; will those troops, in fact, be subject to political pressure; will the Iraqis come through with the commitments relative to the financing of reconstruction? He is going to report to us on all the commitments which the Iraqis have made, all the benchmarks which are supposed to be met. I take him at his word. He is an honorable man, and that is an important representation, again, made at his initiative.

I believe General Petraeus is highly qualified for his promotion to the grade of general and his assignment as our senior officer in Iraq at a very critical and dangerous time. That position needs to be filled. General Casey is retiring. I will vote for his nomination, and I urge our colleagues to do the same.

I yield the floor and reserve the remainder of my time.

Mr. President, I wonder if the Senator from Alabama will yield for one moment.

Mr. President, I want to correct the record when I said General Casey was retiring. General Casey is being transferred to a different position and not retiring. I correct the record on that point. We still need General Petraeus to fill that position because of the shift in and the transfer of General Casey, but it is not a retirement.

I thank my friend from Alabama for yielding so I could correct the record.

Mr. President, unless there is someone else who wants to speak, I have already spoken. I would ask, is the vote scheduled?

I note the absence of a quorum.

Mr. President, I rise today to speak on the lobbying and ethics reform bill that the Senate has passed.

In the early 1990s, I along with several colleagues, including Senator William Cohen, embarked on a journey to enact meaningful lobbying and ethics reform. While we had been assured by colleagues that this was a monumental and perhaps impossible undertaking, we nonetheless forged ahead. Decade after decade, Congress had tried to close loopholes that had existed for almost 50 years, which kept lobbying activities in the dark.

In 1995, we finally succeeded in passing the Lobbying Disclosure Act. Our bill, for the first time, opened up the world of lobbying, and the billions spent in it, to the light of day. That act required paid professional lobbyists to register and disclose whom they represent, how much they are paid, and the issues on which they are lobbying.

As much as we knew that the Lobbying Disclosure Act was a real step forward, we knew that like all procedural reforms, it too would eventually need updating. Inevitably, lawyers and lobbyists would find loopholes and create new methods to dance around the law's intent.

We have seen this dance prominently over the past few years. From super-lobbyist Jack Abramoff's attempts to peddle influence, to Congressman Duke Cunningham's abuse of the appropriations process, it is obvious that the time to close these loopholes has come.

The bill that the Senate just passed brings much needed reforms, many of which I sought in the original Lobbying Disclosure Act over a decade ago. It goes after not only the real problems that have arisen over the past few years, but as the perception of corruption that is sometimes the effect of too little disclosure and rules which are too weak.

One of the most important reforms in S. 1 is a strict curb on gifts by lobbyists to Members of Congress. These are perks that have no place in Government. The new rules in this bill will eliminate these gifts.

I am also pleased at the final outcome of the strong earmark reform provisions in this bill. Too many earmarks are added in the dead of night or buried in conference reports so dense that the average American has no idea where their tax dollars are going. The language can also be ambiguous to the point where we don't even know who is the intended beneficiary. This bill will require full and open disclosure of earmarks, which I hope will help to ensure the quality of the projects which are funded.

Strong travel restrictions are also an essential component of this bill. The new rules will ensure that Members traveling on corporate jets would have to reimburse at the charter rate, not as is now the case merely at the level of a first class commercial ticket.

While I applaud passage of these strong reforms, I believe we needed to go even further. One of the most important provisions in this bill is one that I worked on with Senator Lieberman, which would have finally closed the major loophole that exists under current law that allows lobbyists to conceal millions of dollars worth of expenditures spent in stimulating ``grassroots'' lobbying efforts, or what has been described as ``astroturf'' lobbying.

Ten years ago, when we enacted the Lobbying Disclosure Act, it required paid lobbyists to disclose the amounts that they spend to try to influence Congress and the executive branch. However, under the LDA, lobbyists are not required to disclose how much they spend in efforts to persuade others to help them make their case. In the mid-1990s, the Wall Street Journal estimated that major lobbying firms spent almost half a billion dollars every year for this purpose. The amounts have undoubtedly grown substantially since then. Yet these amounts still go undisclosed on the lobbying disclosure forms filed by those firms. The disclosure provision in S. 1 was intended to close this loophole and require paid lobbyists to disclose all of their expenditures, instead of just some of them.

This provision would have had no impact at all on citizens who contact their Government, regardless whether they decide to make those contacts on their own initiative or at the suggestion of others. It would have had no impact on religious organizations, unions, universities or other employers who suggest that their own members or employees contact the Government. It was aimed at paid lobbyists who spend large sums of money to persuade others to contact the Government in support of a lobbying campaign that they are conducting on behalf of a client. These paid lobbyists would have been required to disclose how much they are

spending on such efforts. This disclosure, like lobbying disclosure in general, would have helped inform the public of pressures being brought to bear on their representatives by paid interests.

Even though identical language was passed by Congress last year when we considered a lobbying reform bill, it was stripped from the final version of this legislation. I nonetheless look forward to examining this issue in the future and hope to work with Chairman Lieberman in the Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee this year to look for solutions to this loophole.

I was pleased, however, that a provision I authored last year to require reporting by foreign lobbyists was included in the final passed bill. Foreign lobbyists file their disclosures under the Foreign Agents Registry Act. The forms are difficult to find and almost as hard to understand. My provision will require a publicly accessible, electronic database containing FARA disclosures in the same format that will be in place for registrants under the Lobbying Disclosure Act.

A number of scandals over the past few years have shown us that ethics and lobbying reform are vital. While this bill was not perfect, I believe it will go a long way to clean up corruption in Washington. This bipartisan effort in the Senate proves that we are up to the task of addressing corruption and perceived corruption in Congress. I am hopeful that the House will soon consider its own lobbying reform legislation and that we will have strong provisions signed into law.

But signing this legislation into law cannot be the end of our efforts. The 12 years since the passage of the Lobbying Disclosure Act have shown the lengths to which some will go to find loopholes in the law to circumvent the reforms and undermine the safeguards that we have enacted. We must remain vigilant to protect the integrity of the legislative process in the coming years and be prepared, if necessary, to revisit the issue with future legislation.

Mr. President, one effort that must not be overlooked in our fight to combat gun violence, is the work of local law enforcement agencies. Detroit's Joshua Project is but one example of the successful work law enforcement agencies are doing all across the country. The Joshua Project began in 2004 as a collaborative effort between multiple law enforcement agencies, to curb gun violence in Detroit's Southwestern 3rd Precinct.

The Joshua Project, modeled after programs in several other cities including Boston, Minneapolis, and Indianapolis, institutes a zero tolerance policy when a gang member commits any type of gun violence. Any gang member's use of a gun results in strict and sustained law enforcement attention for everyone in the gang. The project also seeks to deter gun violence by increased monitoring of probationers and parolees through the use of unscheduled home visits and mandatory call- in meetings. So far over 2,000 former offenders have been called in and nearly 3,000 home checks have been conducted. These measures give law enforcement officials the opportunity to proactively intervene in a high-risk offender's life before another crime is committed.

The implementation of the program relies on an innovative partnership between the Detroit Police Department, the Attorney General's Office and Michigan Department of Corrections, along with the assistance of the State courts. Community involvement also plays a critical role in offering both ideas and solutions within the Joshua Project. Community organizations provide assistance, support and counseling to offenders.

Within the first 17 months after the Joshua Project was implemented, shootings in Detroit's 3rd precinct decreased almost 33 percent and gun related homicides dropped nearly 40 percent. As a result of this success, Detroit Mayor Kwame Kilpatrick, Attorney General Mike Cox, and Governor Jennifer Granholm announced this past summer that the Joshua Project would be expanded to Detroit's 2nd precinct.

Mayor Kilpatrick said of this expansion:

We are most successful in our fight against crime when we

maximize the strengths of our law enforcement partners

throughout the country and state. Our partnership with the

Attorney General has reduced gun violence and has saved lives

in southwest Detroit. By expanding this program, we hope to

build upon our current successes and make the neighborhoods

of the second precinct as safe, if not safer, than we have in

the third precinct.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank all State and local law enforcement officials for their continued service and vital contributions in ensuring the safety of our communities. I am hopeful the 110th Congress will support their efforts by taking up and passing sensible gun safety legislation.

I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.