Protection Of Lawful Commerce In Arms Act
Reserving the right to object, it is my understanding the Senator from Virginia wants to offer an amendment. Madam President, I ask the Senator from Virginia, is it a second-degree amendment? I would agree to that providing-- I want to…
Reserving the right to object, it is my understanding the Senator from Virginia wants to offer an amendment.
Madam President, I ask the Senator from Virginia, is it a second-degree amendment?
I would agree to that providing--
I want to make sure we get a vote on my amendment. This is what this is all about. We might as well get this out in the open as to whether or not there will be votes that will be agreed to on the amendments that are offered. The unanimous consent agreement talked about amendments being offered today and Monday. The Senator from Idaho, I think, as well as I believe the Senator from Nevada, talked about votes on these amendments, but it is not clear in the UC that the amendments offered would be voted upon.
I do not want to lose the regular order that my amendment would be disposed of by agreeing to a unanimous consent agreement that my good friend from Virginia would then come next. That is the issue, I tell my good friend from Idaho.
I will be happy to yield.
Of course.
I would then offer--Madam President, do I have the floor?
I then suggest the amendment in a unanimous consent request, that my amendment again be the regular order first thing on Monday. The reason for this is that it is important to assure that there be votes on these amendments. I do not know what the intention of the Senator from Idaho is relative to----
I have no objection, of course, to that, but my question to the Senator from Idaho is, is it the intention of the Senator from Idaho that there be votes on amendments that are offered on Monday?
Then I would have to object because otherwise I am no longer the regular order.
I am happy to yield for a question without losing my right to the floor.
Not at all. My desire is that I not lose my opportunity to have a vote on my amendment.
I do not want a vote today. Let's be very clear on this. When the operating UC was entered into, it was my understanding that amendments would be allowed to be offered today and Monday. It was also my understanding that there was an intention that that meant those amendments would be voted on at some point--not today but at some point. If there is any doubt that that is the intention of the leadership or of the floor managers, to allow votes on amendments that are offered today, the only way I can come close to having assurance that there will be a vote on my amendment at some point will be to modify any UC to agree to set aside my amendment, which will be fine, but then make it a part of the UC that my amendment then be the amendment that is in order on Monday, because otherwise I am weakening the position I have.
I have no objection to yielding the floor for an answer to that question, without losing my right to the floor.
I thank my good friend from Idaho.
Amendment No. 2631
Madam President, I send my amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.
Do I understand, then, that the Levin amendment would continue to be the regular order under that unanimous consent?
I thank the Senator from Idaho. It is fine with me.
Madam President, what is the pending amendment?
Madam President, in the fall of 2002 the entire country was focused on the Washington, DC, area as an unknown sniper indiscriminately shot 16 innocent people in little more than a month, from September 14 to October 24. Among the sniper victims were Jim Martin, shot and killed on October 2 while walking across a Shoppers Food Warehouse parking lot in Wheaton, MD, after purchasing groceries for his church; Sarah Ramos was shot and killed while sitting on a bench in front of a post office. She was waiting for a ride to take her to a babysitting job; Thirteen-year-old Iran Brown, the youngest of the victims, was shot in the chest and wounded on October 7 after getting out of a car at his middle school; and Conrad Johnson, a 35-year-old busdriver, was shot and killed on October 22 while standing on the top step of his bus at a ride-on bus staging area in Aspen Hill, MD.
On Thursday, October 24, members of the sniper task force arrested John Allen Muhammad and John Lee Boyd Malvo at a rest stop on I-75 in Frederick County. They were charged with shooting the victims with a Bushmaster semiautomatic assault rifle. Both were prohibited under Federal law from possessing a gun. Malvo is a juvenile and Muhammad was the subject of a domestic violence restraining order. Both have been convicted of capital murder in Virginia.
The sniper rifle used by Malvo and Muhammad was later traced to Bull's Eye Shooter Supply in Takoma, WA. Bull's Eye representatives claim not to have any record of sale of the weapon, cannot account for how the snipers obtained the assault rifle. Malvo later admitted he had shoplifted the gun.
The sniper case prompted an ATF investigation of Bull's Eye. The investigation revealed that the gun dealer had no record that the gun used by the snipers was missing from the inventory. The ATF investigation also determined that 77 other guns were missing from the Bull's Eye store. Four prior audits of the dealer found at least 160 additional guns missing from the store. The guns that were missing from Bull's Eye were not all handguns that could walk out the door in somebody's pocket. The gun shoplifted by Malvo was an assault rifle.
The families of the sniper victims filed a lawsuit against Bull's Eye and Bushmaster, the manufacturers that supplied the sniper weapon to the dealer, claiming that Bull's Eye operated its business in such a grossly negligent manner that scores of guns routinely disappeared from its store and that Bushmaster continued to supply that dealer even after years of audits by ATF showing that scores of guns were missing from the dealer's inventory.
Did Bull's Eye or Bushmaster violate any Federal or State statute? That is the issue. That is the heart of the issue we are debating. If you are reckless in your operations, even though you may not have acted illegally, but if you are reckless or if you are grossly negligent in your operations, should you be held accountable for your own actions? That is the question. Should you be held accountable for your own reckless or grossly negligent actions if that gross negligence or recklessness is the proximate cause of somebody else's death or injury?
That is what this amendment is all about. Frankly, that is what the bill is all about, to eliminate the possibility of recovery in cases where somebody can prove recklessness or negligence unless they can also prove illegality. That is the purpose of the bill, to give that immunity unless plaintiffs can prove illegality. The purpose of this amendment is to say that if you can prove gross negligence or recklessness on the part of an individual, and if that recklessness and gross negligence is the proximate cause of injury or death, then you are entitled to bring a lawsuit.
I listened to this debate; I have not been here for much of it, but I read a great deal and tried to follow it. It seems to me that is the heart of the matter and what it comes down to. That is what this amendment is intended to clarify.
The Senator from Virginia is very much on point and is correct. This is a victim's right remedies issue. Do we provide a remedy for a victim of somebody's gross negligence or recklessness that has injured that victim where the proximate cause of the injury--or a proximate cause of the injury, to be technically correct--is the defendant's recklessness or gross negligence or are we going to deny victims that remedy? Are we going to tell a victim: You have to prove that someone violated a law in order to get recovery, even though you can prove gross negligence or recklessness. Even though you can prove that recklessness or gross negligence on the part of someone you sue was a proximate cause of death or injury, you have to prove that there was a violation of law?
Why would we immunize any particular industry from that kind of recovery where it is not somebody else who is being sued for their contribution to somebody's injury but it is the industry itself or a gunstore itself or any store that contributed, through recklessness or gross negligence, to somebody's death or injury?
I have read and heard a lot in this debate about individual responsibility and accountability, that you should not be accountable for somebody else's actions injuring somebody else, and I do not disagree with that. My amendment says where it is your own recklessness or gross negligence which is a proximate cause of an injury or a death, you should not be immunized. That is what my amendment provides, that if your own recklessness or your own gross negligence is a proximate cause of death or injury, you should still be held accountable.
That is what we are going to be voting on. I hope we are going to be voting on it, I should say.
The Senator is correct. In terms of the definition of ``victims,'' we are talking here about families who lose loved ones as well as people who are injured themselves.
I want to emphasize one fact here, which is there was a motion to dismiss this case in the State of Washington brought by victims against Bull's Eye and against Bushmaster. On June 27, 2003, the court denied the motions, and here is what the court said:
[T]he facts in the present case indicate that a high degree
of risk of harm to the plaintiffs was created by Bull's Eye
Shooter Supply's alleged reckless or incompetent conduct in
distributing firearms.
The court said it was the defendant's actions that caused damage to the
plaintiffs. It seems to me for us to say even though Bull's Eye caused damage through recklessness or gross negligence to victims, we are going to deny those victims a remedy unless they can prove there was an illegal action--not just a reckless action, but an illegal action--is to mistreat this particular class of victims.
To single out this class of victims and say, ``You cannot recover unless you can prove illegal action on the part of the defendant''--not just that they were reckless, not just that they were negligent--I think is highly arbitrary and discriminatory treatment of real victims who right now can go to court, and if they can show reckless behavior, negligent behavior on the part of the defendants that was a proximate cause of their injury, then they can recover.
I do not even know that Congress can constitutionally destroy the pending claim. I hope not. I hope we cannot destroy a claim that is pending for an injury that has already been caused, constitutionally, but I do know we should not try. We should not be trying to remove the rights of victims to sue people whose recklessness or gross negligence was a proximate cause of their injury.
That is what this amendment would assure, that that right of action for recklessness or gross negligence which is a proximate cause of the injury can be compensated for.
There are a number of other troubling cases that have been referred to that would be jeopardized. Again, I do not know that we can constitutionally eliminate a claim based on an action which has already taken place. I sure hope not. But I know what the intent of this bill is, which is to immunize the defendants whose reckless or negligent conduct is being sued upon.
The Guzman case, on Christmas Eve 1999--this was a man who was killed by a shot to his heart while standing in front of a Worcester, MA, nightclub. About a week later, the police recovered a handgun in a lot near where this man, Danny Guzman, was killed. The gun was lacking a serial number. It was found by a 4-year-old child. A ballistics test determined the gun was the one that killed Danny Guzman.
The investigation following the shooting revealed the gun was one of several stolen by employees of Kahr Arms. It was discovered that one of the employees in the Kahr manufacturing facility had stolen the gun used to kill Danny Guzman and sold it to buy crack cocaine.
Publicly available records, summarized in a complaint filed by Danny Guzman's family, indicate this employee of the Kahr facility had not only been arrested on various charges over the years but as early as 1995 had been addicted to cocaine and was ``habitually stealing money to support his cocaine habit.''
In March of 2000, the police arrested the Kahr employee who later pled guilty to the gun thefts. The investigation also led to the arrest of a second Kahr employee who also pled guilty to stealing a gun.
According to a complaint that was filed by Danny Guzman's family, Kahr Arms not only apparently hired a drug addict with a record of criminal charges, but the company also chose not to utilize basic security measures that could have prevented the theft, or an inventory tracking system that could have determined that guns were missing. According to the family's complaint, Kahr Arms did not conduct background checks on employees. The company did not install medal detectors, security cameras, x-ray machines, or other devices to ensure that employees did not just walk off with guns.
In fact, an affidavit signed by ATF Special Agent Michael Curran says the person who stole the gun that ended up killing Danny Guzman once said--we all should listen to those words--``he had taken the firearm out of the company, that he does it all the time, and that he can just walk out with them.'' Those are his words. He takes guns out of here ``all the time''--this drug addict. He can just walk out with them.
The company did not track its inventory in any meaningful way. And according to the complaint, from February 1998 to February 1999, approximately 16 shipments of handguns from Kahr Arms failed to arrive at their points of destination.
Did Kahr Arms violate a State or Federal statute? Nobody has claimed they did. And unless they did, under this pending bill, immunity from suit would result. It seems to me this is something all of us ought to be troubled by and focus on because there is a lot of uncertainty and confusion, I believe, as to what this bill would provide.
But at its heart, the issue is this: Should we say unless you can prove an act was illegal on the part of the defendant, you will not be able to recover for damages caused by that defendant's recklessness or gross negligence?
Should that defendant be immune from suit even though his recklessness or gross negligence has caused your injuries, unless you can prove that that conduct was also illegal?
The lawsuit that was filed by Danny Guzman's surviving family members alleges the wrongful death based on Kahr Arms alleged negligence. While the defendants moved to dismiss this case on April 7, 2003, the Massachusetts Superior Court denied the motions. This bill is aimed at nullifying that kind of case. I hope we can't constitutionally do it retroactively. I hope we cannot destroy that cause of action. But we should not try and we surely should not single out one industry to help immunize them against their own acts of recklessness or gross negligence.
In a third case, a team of Orange, NJ, police officers was operating undercover at a gas station that had been robbed repeatedly over the course of several months. Detective Lemongello was among the officers taking part in the undercover surveillance. In the course of a stakeout, Detective Lemongello attempted to question a man who had suspiciously approached the gas station. Lemongello walked up to the man and asked him to remove his hand from his pockets, whereupon the man turned and opened fire, shooting Detective Lemongello three times-- once each in his stomach, chest, and left arm.
Detective Lemongello was able to announce over his police radio that he had been shot and that the suspect had fled the scene. In response to the radio call, Officer Kenneth McGuire set off on foot after the shooter, who had fled into a nearby neighborhood. When Officer McGuire entered a backyard where the suspect was hiding, the suspect emptied his ammunition clip, shooting Officer McGuire in the abdomen and leg. Officer McGuire managed to return fire, killing the suspect. It turned out that the man who shot Officer McGuire and Detective Lemongello was wanted for attempted murder and had at least three felony convictions on his record. This man could not have legally purchased a gun, so the question is, Where did he get it?
Mr. President, I have been asked by my good friend from Vermont to interject a statement on a different subject at this point. To accommodate him, I would be perfectly happy if the Senator from Idaho would be willing to have me yield to him for a statement, without losing my right to the floor.
Yes.
I would be happy to have my amendment set aside, providing
that after the Lautenberg amendment is offered, the floor then be returned to me.
Mr. President, I thank the Chair and thank the Senator from Nevada.
I want to go back to the case of the two police officers who were shot with a gun that was sold under extremely suspicious circumstances by a gun dealer who was then sued by these two police officers.
The lawsuit alleged on the part of the defendants some very serious negligence, gross negligence, recklessness in terms of that sale. The person who purchased the gun bought 11 other guns at the same time, selected by somebody else. The person who filled out the purchase paperwork was not the person who actually bought the guns. They were picked out by a second person.
Like the New Jersey man who shot these two officers, the man who selected the guns was a convicted felon. The guns were paid for entirely in cash, several thousand dollars. The gun purchase was about the second in 3 weeks from the same two buyers from that dealer.
These were significant allegations that were brought by two police officers who were severely injured by that gun, claiming that the action on the part of the gun dealer was negligent and reckless behavior. There is a lot of evidence suggesting that it was.
A West Virginia judge refused to dismiss this case that these two police officers brought saying there was sufficient evidence to go to a jury; that is, evidence of recklessness or negligence on the part of the defendants. It was their recklessness, their negligence which was the proximate cause, allegedly, of the damage.
We have heard a lot about whether people should be held accountable for somebody else's illegal action. That is not what this amendment is about. That is not what this bill is about. What this bill is about is to immunize a certain industry from their own reckless and negligent behavior, not somebody else's, but from their own reckless and negligent behavior, unless the people who are injured can also show that they acted illegally.
This is special treatment for one particular industry.
We owe a great debt to these police officers who put their lives on the line, and it seems to me it is an insult for the response to their bravery to be: You cannot bring an action against a gun dealer who acted negligently or recklessly and whose negligence or recklessness was a proximate cause of your injury. Sorry, you have to prove that gun dealer acted illegally; that he acted reckless is not enough; that you were injured as a proximate result of that recklessness is not enough. We are going to immunize that particular gun dealer and anyone like him from their own reckless, negligent behavior unless you can carry an additional burden that they also acted illegally.
That is the response to officers who are gunned down and where their injuries were a proximate result of the recklessness and negligence of that gunshop.
Those are the allegations. Should they be allowed to prove them? The intention of the legislation in front of us is that they not be allowed to prove them unless they can also allege there was illegal action on the part of that gunshop. I think we can see why so many associations of police officers are very much opposed to this legislation and its purpose.
A number of law enforcement officers wrote Senators a letter opposing what this bill intends. In it they said police officers like Ken McGuire and David Lemongello put their lives on the line every day to protect the public. Instead of honoring them for their service, this bill would deprive them of their basic rights as American citizens to prove their case in a court of law.
Manufacturers and dealers of guns have a right to make and sell guns, but that right also is not unlimited because it comes with some responsibility. Like every other business in this country, people who are in the gun business have a responsibility to conduct that business with reasonable care. If a gun manufacturer or gun dealer fails to do so, and their negligence or recklessness leads to someone being killed or injured, they should not be immune from suit.
According to a recent report, 57 percent of crime guns in the United States could be traced back to 1 percent of the gun dealers in this country. We should not let that 1 percent off the hook. We should not single out one industry for these special protections.
Earlier this Congress, the Senate Judiciary Committee, considered an amendment to exempt class action lawsuits filed against the gun industry from the diversity and removal provisions of the class action bill. The committee rejected that amendment and in its report on the bill the majority put it this way:
Simply put, there should not be one set of rules for one
category of defendants and another for another group of
defendants.
Well, if that holds true in the case of a class action bill, it should be true also relative to this legislation. This bill not only singles out one industry for special favored treatment, but in the process it undermines long-standing principles of tort law.
Traditionally, tort law has been left to the States to define, and if changes have been necessary Congress has usually deferred to State legislatures to make those changes. This bill seeks to impose a Federal tort regime that would virtually eliminate the ability of State courts to hear and decide cases involving even grossly negligent or reckless conduct by gun dealers and manufacturers, even where existing State law would permit such cases.
A Georgetown University Center law professor by the name of Heidi Feldman put it this way about this bill:
. . . one of the most radical statutory revisions of the
common law of torts that any legislature--Federal or State--
has ever considered, let alone passed.
I have looked at a lot of Federal laws that affect the civil liability of various industries, and I, too, have seen nothing that comes close to what this bill would do.
Whatever we are going to do, it seems to me we ought to do it knowingly. We ought to understand what it is that we are being asked to do. What the bill says is, unless someone who is injured by somebody else's reckless or negligent conduct, unless that plaintiff can also show that the conduct was illegal, they will not be able to recover damages for their injuries. That is a radical departure from fairness, not just from the common law. That is a radical departure from protecting victims and trying to preserve their rights.
We should not take that step without at least understanding what we are doing. The purpose of my amendment is to make sure that we at least have an opportunity to vote on a central proposition: Whether or not when somebody is injured as a proximate result of somebody else's gross negligence or recklessness that that person who is injured should have an opportunity to recover damages, even if they are unable to show that the defendant's reckless or negligent conduct was also illegal.
That is the central issue this bill addresses. It is the central issue my amendment addresses. I think it is important that this Senate not only understand what the central issue is but have an opportunity to vote on that specific issue, and that is what my amendment is all about.
My amendment will give us the opportunity to vote on whether we intend to give immunity to persons who cause injuries to others through their own--and I emphasize ``their own''--reckless and grossly negligent behavior, where that behavior is a proximate cause of somebody else's injuries.
I hope the Senate will adopt my amendment. I hope we will modify the bill in front of us so that we can protect victims, and that is really what the amendment and the bill is all about.
I yield the floor.