Floor Statements

Mr. President, today I commemorate the Michigan American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, AFSCME, Council 25, AFL-CIO for 25 years of dedication to State and local government employees. On March 14, 2003, members and supporters of Michigan AFSCME Council 25 will gather to celebrate the commitment this organization has shown and the support it has provided to working families in my home State of Michigan.

For over six decades, AFSCME and its members have worked to combat adversity in the workplace. What began as an effort to save civil service jobs expanded to become an adaptive and dynamic collective bargaining organization. AFSCME has thrived throughout its history by creatively meeting the difficult challenges that it and its members have faced. Today, the organization is a national leader among organized labor movements.

For the past quarter century, Michigan AFSCME Council 25 has represented and advocated for public employees throughout Michigan. The organization's membership includes employees of State, county, and municipal governments, school districts, public hospitals, and nonprofit agencies. Since the formation of Michigan AFSCME Council 25 by special convention in March of 1978, it has been a strong force dedicated to improving working conditions and advocating for its members.

Today, Michigan AFSCME Council 25 represents over 60,000 public employees and is organized into more than 300 local unions. Workers of virtually all public service occupations find a specialized voice within AFSCME. Because of the unwavering dedication that Michigan AFSCME Council 25 has shown to its community, working families and public employees have seen their working conditions improve and their voices heard.

I know that my Senate colleagues will join me in offering our congratulations to Michigan AFSCME Council 25 and its members as they celebrate their 25 years of unwavering support for Michigan's working families.

Mr. President, I raise an issue that has come to my attention regarding the Justice Department's reported attempt to restrict the use of the National Instant Criminal Background Check System by local law enforcement. According to the Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence and the Associated Press, a Department of Justice attorney recently threatened to bring charges against a top firearm official in California. The charges stem from California's practice of conducting National Instant Criminal Background Check System or NICS background checks.

According to reports, the dispute involves the use of the NICS database by law enforcement to determine if guns seized in criminal investigations should be returned to their owners. California officials need access to the NICS database because it includes data from across the country and therefore more accurately determines whether a person is prohibited from possessing a firearm. Local law enforcement in California performs these checks thousands of times per year.

An example from the Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence illustrates the problem. When responding to a domestic violence complaint, law enforcement in California ask if there are any firearms present in the home and take temporary custody of any guns they find. Before returning the guns, law enforcement asks the California Department of Justice to run a NICS background check to determine whether the gun owner is prohibited from purchasing or possessing a firearm. The U.S. Department of Justice is challenging this practice, claiming that it is a misuse of the NICS background check system. The U.S. Justice Department wants law enforcement to stop performing these checks and immediately return guns to their owner.

The Brady Law contains nine categories of individuals prohibited from purchasing and possessing a firearm including felons and illegal immigrants. I believe that law enforcement in all 50 states and the District of Columbia should do everything within the law to insure that these potentially dangerous individuals do not gain access to firearms. The State of California is carrying out a common sense application of the law. As the Los Angeles Times said in a recent editorial, the Justice Department's threatened actions are reckless, and are contrary to both public safety and sensible public policy.

I ask unanimous consent that a copy of the Los Angeles Times editorial be included in the Record.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President, in a few moments, I will send an amendment to the desk. Before I do so, I will make some general comments on the Moscow Treaty which is before the Senate.

I first wish to congratulate and commend our good friends from Indiana and Delaware for their great work on this treaty. As on so many other issues, they have worked together well in the national interest. The document which is before us, as well as the Resolution of Ratification, represents a lot of significant work on their part. I applaud them for it.

The treaty before us is a modest but a positive step in the United States-Russia relationship. It is particularly important we have this treaty. At some point it was suggested the agreement not be in the form of a treaty. As a matter of fact, the administration finally decided--I think wisely so, and I believe with the support of the chairman and ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee--that we have a legally binding treaty rather than relying on unilateral steps that are not binding on future administrations and can be easily changed.

Having a treaty ensures that the Senate is going to be able to fulfill its constitutional role, giving due consideration of any treaty and providing advice and consent before ratification.

I view this treaty as a starting point for further nuclear arms reductions and a useful boost to our new and developing and evolving relationship with Russia. There is much more work to be done to continue to improve our mutual security with Russia, and that work includes further reducing our reliance on nuclear weapons, reducing nuclear proliferation dangers, and improving confidence, transparency, and cooperation with Russia on nuclear weapon matters.

This treaty, while important, is also somewhat unusual. Its central obligation is that both nations will reduce their operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to a level between

1,700 and 2,200 some 10 years from now. There are no gradual steps. It is just at a moment in time, 10 years from now, that level of between 1,700 and 2,200 must be reached. It could be a reduction in the operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads for a very brief period, providing 10 years from the date of ratification that level is reached, and then the treaty expires.

Contrary to numerous media reports, this treaty does not require reductions in nuclear warhead stockpiles or delivery systems. In fact, it does not require the elimination of a single warhead. Under this treaty, both sides can simply remove warheads from land-based or submarine-based missiles and from bombers. Both sides are free to keep every warhead so removed and to store these warheads indefinitely for possible redeployment. The only limitations that will bind the United States and Russia are the limitations on nuclear weapon delivery systems under START I, and that is at least until 2009.

After December 5, 2009, when the START I treaty is scheduled to expire, it is not clear what will happen. At least in the case of START I, the delivery systems must be destroyed.

As the Senate fulfills its constitutionally mandated role in the treaty process and considers whether to provide its advice and consent to the ratification of the Moscow Treaty, there are a number of questions about the proper role of the Senate in the treaty-making process. These are questions to which I know our managers--our chairman and ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee--have given a great deal of time, attention, and thought, and many others in the Senate have as well.

Some of these questions are as follows:

Do we want to agree to ratify a treaty if the executive branch does not clearly commit itself to submitting a substantive change in that treaty as an amendment to the Senate for its advice and consent? And do we want to approve a treaty where there is doubt that the executive branch could extend or withdraw from the treaty without even notifying or consulting with the Senate, without that guarantee, that commitment being written into a Resolution of Ratification?

These are highly significant questions that apply to the treaty- making power and to the advice and consent power of the United States. I want to address those issues in the amendments that I have to offer this afternoon.

The first amendment deals specifically with the question of whether the Resolution of Ratification should provide that the Senate must be notified and consulted prior to the withdrawal from that treaty or the agreement to extend that treaty by the President of the United States.

Article 4, paragraph 2 of the treaty states that this treaty shall remain in force until December 31, 2012, and may be extended by agreement of the parties or superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement.

Paragraph 3 of article 4 states:

Each Party, in exercising its national sovereignty, may

withdraw from this Treaty upon three months written notice to

the other Party.

These are somewhat unusual provisions, as are the administration's statements about them. Previously, extending a treaty was considered something that would require Senate advice and consent.

In the seminal study written in 2001 by the Congressional Research Service for the Foreign Relations Committee called ``Treaties and Other International Agreements: The Role of the United States Senate,'' the issue of extending treaties is clearly presented:

Modifying and extending an international agreement amount

to the making of a new agreement that should be done by the

same method as the original agreement. For treaties, this

means with the advice and the consent of the Senate.

In its article-by-article analysis of the Moscow Treaty, the administration asserts that ``Extension of the Treaty is not automatic and must be done by agreement of the parties.''

The article-by-article analysis continues, with the administration writing:

Since such an extension is authorized by Treaty, it would

constitute an agreement pursuant to the Treaty and would

accordingly not be subject to Senate advice and consent.

That is the extension issue.

On the matter of treaty withdrawal, the administration's article-by- article analysis states:

Unlike some other arms control agreements, this withdrawal

clause is not tied to a party's determination that

extraordinary circumstances jeopardizing its supreme national

interests exist. Rather, the Moscow Treaty includes a more

general formulation that allows greater flexibility for each

party to respond to unforeseen circumstances.

So the withdrawal clause permits either party to withdraw from the treaty for any reason short of a supreme national interest.

The Resolution of Ratification addresses this issue of withdrawal or extension with a declaration numbered 6, which:

Urges the President to consult with the Senate prior to

taking actions relevant to paragraphs 2 or 3 of article IV of

the treaty.

So the resolution before us, and before my amendment is considered, simply urges the President--it is precatory language that says, Mr. President, we urge you, whether it is you or your successor, to consult with the Senate prior to taking the actions relevant to paragraphs 2 or 3, the extension or the withdrawal from a treaty.

The declaration urges the President to consult with the Senate, but it does not protect the interests of the Senate because it is not binding. A President--this President or his successor--could simply decide to extend or withdraw from this treaty without notice or consultation with the Senate.

The U.S. should not either enter into a treaty or withdraw from a treaty lightly and either action--either entering into a treaty, withdrawing from a treaty, or extending a treaty's operations--should be done only with the involvement of the Senate. We have to give our advice and consent to permit ratification in the first place.

We, the Members of this Senate, have the responsibility to assure that involvement. That constitutional responsibility rests in our hands, and we should not leave that constitutional mandate and responsibility up to the discretion of the executive branch. We want the executive branch to consult, and we are going to urge them to consult in a Resolution of Ratification. The question is whether we are going to require that resolution. Barring some circumstances, which I will describe in a minute, we are going to require a chief executive to consult with this body, to give us notice, and to consult, not to seek ratification--that is a second-degree amendment which my friend from Wisconsin will be offering in a moment--but the proposal in my amendment is that we simply require there be notice and consultation of the Senate before there is withdrawal from a treaty which we have ratified, or extension of a treaty which we have ratified. That is the least we can do. That is a middle course, short of saying we have to ratify an extension or withdrawal, which I think is also an appropriate course of action which has been much debated over the years. Short of that, which it seems to me is a matter which is going to be of some debate between the executive and legislative branch, I think a middle course, which we all ought to be able to agree upon, is that a Resolution of Ratification require there be notice to the Senate so we can exercise whatever action we decide to take at that point--no guarantee that we would have to ratify it before it actually occurs but assurance we will be given notice and an opportunity to give our advice, or take whatever action we want, prior to the withdrawal from a treaty or prior to the life of the treaty being extended.

The amendment I am going to be offering is very straightforward. I do not know if this amendment is at the desk. If not, I will send it on behalf of myself, Senator Feingold, and Senator Akaka, and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

I will explain it at this point. This amendment is straightforward. It says that prior to taking any action to extend or withdraw from this treaty, the President shall provide not less than 60 days' notice to the Senate and shall consult with the Senate.

Now, what happens if there is some national security need which prevents the President from providing such notice or consultation? The amendment foresees that possibility and has a waiver provision in case there is some unforeseen national security need that would prevent the President from immediately requiring to notify and consult with the Senate. So there is considerable flexibility given to the President if it is needed for national security reasons.

There has been a lot written about whether or not the Senate must actually ratify a withdrawal from a treaty. There has been much debate on that subject. In a Congressional Research treatise on treaties, written in 1993 and then republished more recently with the same language, this is what the Research Service says about the issue of withdrawal from a treaty and the Senate role in that process, that the U.S. Constitution is silent with respect to the power to terminate treaties. The matter is not discussed in the debates of the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia. Briefly:

While the Constitution tells us who can make treaties, the

President shall have the power, by and with the advice and

consent of the Senate, to make treaties.

It does not say who can unmake them. As a consequence of the Constitution's silence in this regard, there has been some confusion of doctrine upon this point and a variety in practice.

A little later on in this study, the Congressional Research Service says the same: Whether the President alone can terminate a treaty's domestic effect remains an open question. As a practical matter, however, the President may exercise this power since the courts have held that they are conclusively bound by an executive determination with regard to whether a treaty is still in effect. The same result may apply to a congressional termination, particularly if it is regarded as a declaration of war.

So according to the Congressional Research Service, the issue of whether the President alone can terminate a treaty is an open question. This amendment does not intend to resolve that question. A second- degree amendment, however, will be offered which will address that issue. My amendment does not. My amendment simply says--and it seems to me this is a very modest amount of protection for the Senate's constitutional responsibility in the treaty-making process--unless there is some national security reason why you cannot give notice to the Senate that you are intending to withdraw or extend the treaty, give us 60 days' notice so we can take whatever action we deem is appropriate, so we can give consultation and advice on the question of withdrawal or extension. It does not prevent the administration from extending or withdrawing from the treaty. It does not--``it'' being my amendment--require Senate approval of extension, even though that is the policy and practice to date often as elaborated by that study.

It does not require Senate approval of withdrawal from a treaty. It simply says the President shall notify and consult with the Senate before extending or withdrawing from the treaty.

This amendment is consistent with what the Foreign Relations Committee wrote in its report about the treaty relative to the issue of consultation on arms control treaties. It is a very thorough report. The committee that we have before us, on page 22, says the following:

The Senate and this committee have an institutional

interest in the close observation of arms control

negotiations and the successful implementation of resulting

agreements. Past administrations have recognized that

consultations with the Senate prior to taking actions

relating to assigning, amending, or withdrawing from such

agreements may avert serious disagreements.

On the specific question of withdrawal, the committee report says: Should it become necessary for a party to withdraw from the treaty, article 4 provides for 3 months' notice of such a decision. Events can well occur between submissions of the annual report required in condition 2 that would warrant informing and consulting with the Senate. In any circumstance, the Senate would desire notification and consultation.

So the parties, the two countries involved, must give each other 3 months' notice prior to the withdrawal. But relative to the Senate, the report simply says the Senate would desire notification and consultation.

I could not agree more with that statement: ``desire.'' But it is not enough to say we desire a consultation. If we are going to protect the constitutional responsibilities of this body, we must assure our constitutional responsibility and the operation of treaties is going to be protected and our role under the Constitution is, in fact, honored-- not just honored in the breach but in the actual life of the treaty. I believe this is the minimum we should do.

We should write into our Resolution of Ratification a requirement in the absence of some national security reason that the President, whoever the President might be at the time, do give us the notice and give us the opportunity to take whatever action or consult as we deem might be appropriate relative to the issue of withdrawal or extension of this treaty prior to the administration making that decision giving that notice to the other party to this treaty.

The amendment is consistent with what the administration says it is willing to do. Secretary Powell stated: While it is the President who withdraws from treaties, the administration intends to discuss any need to withdraw from the treaty with the Congress, to include the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, prior to announcing any such action.

That is a welcome statement of intent. We should incorporate that assurance. We should enshrine that assurance. We should embody that assurance. Intentions and administrations change. The obligation of this body to the Constitution endures. It is a solemn responsibility. It does not change. The intention of the President or a new President with new intentions changes. Language of the Constitution, relative to what this body's responsibility is relevant to treaties, is unchanging.

This amendment simply requires notification and consultation which Secretary Powell and the committee indicate they want and would expect would happen. It simply assures that, in fact, in the absence of some national security need, which is unexpected, which would permit a waiver of the notice requiring that a President would notify this body before withdrawal or extension of a treaty would occur.

The committee report concludes that: Declaration (6), while not binding on the President, is a formal request that the executive branch maintain the consultation policy enunciated in the Secretary of State's answer to the question--which I gave above that the administration intends to discuss. That is what the committee report says Declaration (6) provides, which is in the Resolution of Ratification. It is a request to the executive branch. That is not strong enough in terms of our obligations to the Constitution and to our responsibility relative to the treaty-making power.

If we want to really assure what we are requesting is, in fact, part of the operation of this treaty, we should include in this Resolution of Ratification a condition which my amendment offers, which is that the President would

do what the committee said it really wants and really desires and really urges, to use the words of the report, and that is to notify, consult with the Senate prior to taking action to withdraw from or extend a treaty.

I yield the floor.

Let me thank my colleagues for their comments. Some of what they say frankly amazes me and startles me.

How the administration could possibly walk away from this treaty because a Resolution of Ratification contains the requirement that they give us 60 days' notice before withdrawing, when in fact they say they are intending to give us that notice, amazes me. The administration has represented to the Senate by Secretary Powell that it is their intention to discuss any need to withdraw from the treaty with the Congress. That is their intention.

How it can be suggested they are going to walk away from a treaty which simply puts into our ratification resolution and embodies what they intend to do, anyway, is a complete mystery to me. It raises the question, are they serious about that intention? Can't we take them seriously? Can't we assure ourselves that maybe the next administration, because it might not have the same intention, should be bound by us? Do we have to leave this requirement to give notice of withdrawal from a treaty up to the absolute discretion of an executive branch? That is not protecting the constitutional role and requirement and obligation and responsibility of the Senate.

The question was raised by my dear friend from Delaware about what the word ``consult'' means in the amendment. It means the same thing as in the language which the Foreign Relations Committee has given us. In declaration 6 of the resolution, it says the Senate urges the President to consult with the Senate. We define ``consult'' in the way the Foreign Relations Committee defines it.

I am happy to.

That is the important difference. But the word is the same word.

The important fact is it is not binding.

That is what it comes down to. This is not an issue as to who has the power to withdraw from a treaty. Both the Senator from Indiana and the Senator from Delaware make arguments about that issue. That is not resolved in this amendment. Both of their remarks address that issue, as did my remarks. I am the first one to acknowledge that as a matter of fact the Constitution is silent with respect to the power to terminate treaties. That is the quote I used before that came from the Congressional Research Service. The Constitution is silent. There has not been a resolution of this issue.

There is the Goldwater case that can be interpreted as the Senator from Delaware did. We do not resolve that issue in this amendment. This amendment does not remove from the President, nor does it purport to remove from the President, the power to terminate or extend a treaty. That issue is a major constitutional issue.

I cannot believe, and I did not hear that either of our colleagues suggested, that there is a constitutional problem with my amendment because my amendment does not require the President to get the advice and consent of the Senate to withdraw from the treaty. My amendment simply says: Before you exercise your right to withdraw, give 60 days' notice to the Senate. I don't think there is the slightest constitutional infirmity in simply providing what the President says he intends to do and what the committee says is desirable be done in the language of the committee ratification resolution, that we urge a formal request that the executive branch consult with the Senate of the United States.

There is no constitutional issue with my amendment. With the Senator from Wisconsin's second-degree amendment, which has been withdrawn, there was a very serious constitutional issue, one which we could spend days on in the Senate, as to whether or not we can require in a ratification resolution that the President obtain our consent to the withdrawal from a treaty. That is a major, massive constitutional issue. That one has resonated around the country for a couple hundred years. That was not going to be resolved in this Resolution of Ratification. I hope some day it is resolved in a lengthy debate.

But what I am proposing is simply the most modest step to give some protection to the obligation and responsibility of this institution relative to treaty-making power, which is that we just be given notice, 60 days' notice, and consultation prior to a decision of

the President to withdraw from a treaty.

I have not heard today, and I don't believe that there is, a serious argument that my amendment raises constitutional issues. As a matter of fact, almost by definition, it cannot, since the President says he is intending to consult with us and since the committee says it is desirable that he do so.

I have not heard that argument. Again, I don't believe it could be a serious argument, that we could simply not do what this amendment does, which is to require that there be 60 days' notice and consultation.

But how the suggestion could be made that the President would walk away from this treaty if the Resolution of Ratification contains language that embodies what the intention of the administration is to do anyway, and what the committee is urging the administration to do anyway, is a complete mystery to me. That one befuddles me--the idea that this administration, which has proposed and signed this treaty, would walk away from the treaty if the Senate says in a ratification resolution that the administration will give us the same notice that the administration says it intends to give us. That one, it seems to me, is not a credible argument.

So there is going to be disagreement as to whether or not the Senate has the power to put in a ratification resolution a provision that the President must, before extension or withdrawal, get the approval of the Senate. If that were part of my amendment, I could understand why there would be a massive debate over that issue--mainly between the White House, which I think would say no way, and many Members of the Senate would say that is the only way we can protect the constitutional obligation of the Senate. But that is not this amendment. That was the Feingold amendment, which was withdrawn.

This amendment walks a middle road and says we want to get a commitment in this resolution that we be given the notice and consultation which the administration says it intends to give us. It cannot bind future administrations. This administration--I don't have any doubt--intends to do what it says it intends to do. Secretary Powell says he intends to give notice. I take him at his word. He is an honorable man. But administrations come and go and intentions change with future administrations. That is the relevance of this amendment-- to put in our ratification resolution what the committee says is desirable, and what the committee says it urges the administration to do, and what the administration says it intends to do, and about which I have not heard a constitutional argument, for good reason, because here we are not limiting the power of the President to withdraw from a treaty.

The President has the same power to withdraw from a treaty before or after my amendment is defeated or accepted. That power doesn't change. What changes, however, with this amendment, would be to say that the Senate, as part of its treaty obligation and responsibility, wants to be informed prior to the withdrawal from or extension of a treaty that the executive branch enters into.

That is, again, a summary of the amendment. I hope, even though obviously the leaders of the Foreign Relations Committee oppose this for the reasons they give--and I don't think there are two Members of the Senate for whom I have greater respect than these two Members. We have worked together on these issues. Senator Lugar, Senator Biden, and I have worked together on so many issues over the years that I have lost count. My respect and regard for them is boundless. But I think this is an issue of important principle that the Senate should address--whether or not we want to be given notice before a President withdraws from this treaty that we are about to ratify, hopefully.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Will the Senator yield for a question?

This is a procedural inquiry. We are trying to determine-- to assist a colleague who has an urgent, unusual need--if we can set a time on this amendment at 4:05; would that be amenable? I hate to interrupt my friend.

That is what is difficult. The earlier we are able to set a time, the earlier we will be able to vote. If we set it 10 minutes from now, it would have to be 4:15 instead of 4:05.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President, I believe the yeas and nays have not been ordered. I modify my amendment by striking the word ``any'' on line 5 and striking the word ``relevant'' on line 5 and substituting the word ``pursuant'' for the word ``relevant'' on line 5. The modification is at the desk.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Madam President, I ask unanimous consent Senator Kennedy be added as a cosponsor to the amendment, and I ask for the yeas and nays.

Mr. President, I expect to take just a few minutes. I will be offering an amendment and then having a colloquy. I send an amendment to the desk on behalf of myself, Senator Daschle, Senator Akaka, and Senator Nelson of Florida.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. President, condition 2 of the Resolution of Ratification requires the President to submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Armed Services Committee an annual report that would include, among other things, the following: A, a listing of the strategic nuclear weapons force levels of the United States and a best estimate of the strategic nuclear weapons force levels of the Russian Federation as of December 31 of the preceding calendar year; B, a detailed description, to the extent possible, of strategic offensive reductions planned by each party for the current calendar year.

The purpose of this amendment is to clarify that those elements of the report should include certain important information on operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads.

I have discussed this matter with Senators Lugar and Biden, and I think we can address the issue satisfactorily with a colloquy between myself and Senators Lugar and Biden.

My question of Senator Lugar is the following: Will the committee urge the administration to include under the annual reporting requirements required by conditions 2(a) and 2(b), that the Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services would receive information on the following: During the calendar year of the report, the specific number and type of warheads that are planned to be no longer operationally deployed; secondly, during that current calendar year, the planned total size and makeup of the stockpile of strategic nuclear warheads by number and by type; and as to the past year, the report would then, hopefully, include and be urged to include by Senators Lugar and Biden the total number and type of any warheads that were dismantled during the preceding calendar year?

I thank both Senators for the assurance that they will urge the administration that the reporting provided for under the Resolution of Ratification would hopefully include the information I have just outlined.

Amendment No. 256, Withdrawn

Mr. President, I now withdraw the amendment.

Mr. President, I would like to pay tribute to the Greater Mt. Carmel Missionary Baptist Church for a half-century of dedication and leadership within the Detroit community. On March 15, 2003, people will be gathering in my hometown of Detroit, MI to celebrate the 50th anniversary of Greater Mt. Carmel Missionary Baptist Church. I am pleased to recognize the members of the Church for their many years of dedication and service to the community.

The Greater Mt. Carmel Missionary Baptist Church first opened its doors on March 1, 1953. At the time, it was only a small congregation that met at a storefront every Sunday. In March of 1965, Greater Mt. Carmel relocated to its current location on Helen Street in Detroit. Later that year, the congregation's Radio Ministry was established and, 38 years later, can still be heard every Sunday afternoon.

Over the last 50 years, Greater Mt. Carmel has become a valuable and well-respected spiritual and educational resource for its growing congregation. Under the guidance of Pastors Montgomery and Pierce, the congregation has expanded upon many fronts and continues to enrich the lives of many people. Greater Mt. Carmel Missionary Baptist Church has partnered with Focus: HOPE to assist with food delivery programs to the elderly and underprivileged. In addition, congregants prepare baskets and meals for homeless Detroit residents during Thanksgiving and Christmas to ensure that no one misses the joy of the holiday season. Greater Mr. Carmel is widely recognized for the multitude of essential services it has provided in our community.

I take great pride in recognizing the efforts of the Greater Mt. Carmel Missionary Baptist Church throughout its 50 year history in Detroit. Their ministry attends to the entire person: mind, body, and soul. I know my Senate colleagues will join me in saluting the accomplishments of the Greater Mt. Carmel Missionary Baptist Church and in wishing them continued success in the future.

SA 251. Mrs. FEINSTEIN (for herself, Mr. Leahy, Mr. Wyden, and Mr. Harkin) proposed an amendment to the resolution of ratification for Treaty Doc. 107-8, The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions, Signed at Moscow on May 24, 2002; as follows:

At the end of section 3, add the following new declaration:

(7) Stand-down from alert status of forces covered by

treaty.--Noting that the Administration has stated that

``[t]he first planned step in reducing U.S. operationally

deployed strategic nuclear warheads will be to retire 50

Peacekeeper ICBMs, remove four Trident Submarines from

strategic service, and no longer maintain the ability to

return the B-1 to nuclear service,'' the Senate--

(A) encourages the President, within 180 days after the

exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty, to

initiate in a safe and verifiable manner a bilateral stand-

down from alert status of all United States and Russian

Federation nuclear weapons systems that will no longer be

operationally deployed under the Treaty, but which the United

States and the Russian Federation may keep operationally

deployed under the Treaty until December 31, 2012; and

(B) expects a representative of the executive branch of the

Government to offer regular briefings to the Committee on

Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the

Senate regarding--

(i) the alert status of the nuclear forces of the United

States and the Russian Federation;

(ii) any determination of the President to order a stand-

down of the alert status of United States nuclear forces; and

(iii) any progress in establishing cooperative measures

with the Russian Federation to effect a stand-down of the

alert status of Russian Federation nuclear forces.

Mr. President, today, my colleague from Maine, Senator Collins and I are very pleased to introduce the National Aquatic Invasive Species Act of 2003. This bill, which reauthorizes the Nonindigenous Aquatic Nuisance Prevention and Control Act, takes a comprehensive approach towards addressing aquatic nuisance species to protect the Nation's waters. This bill deals with the prevention of new introductions, the screening of new aquatic organisms coming into the country, the rapid response to new invasions, and the research to implement the provisions of this bill.

The problem of invasive species is a very real one. Over the past 450 years, during colonization and development of this country, more than 6,500 nonindigenous invasive species have been introduced into the United States and have become established, self-sustaining populations. These species--from microorganisms to mollusks, from pathogens to plants, from insects to fish to animals--typically encounter few, if any, natural enemies in their new environments and wreak havoc on native species. Aquatic nuisance species threaten biodiversity nationwide, especially in the Great Lakes.

Some of my colleagues may remember that back in the late eighties, the problem of aquatic nuisance species was first raised after the zebra mussel was released into the Great Lakes. The Great Lakes still have zebra mussels, and now, 20 States are fighting to control them. Zebra mussels were carried over from the Mediterranean to the Great Lakes in the ballast tanks of ships. The leading pathway for aquatic invasive species is maritime commerce. Most invasive species are contained in the water that ships use for ballast. Aquatic invaders such as the zebra mussel and round goby were introduced into the Great Lakes when ships, often from halfway around the world, pulled into port and discharged their ballast water. Aquatic invaders can also attach themselves to ships' hulls and anchor chains.

Because of the impact that the zebra mussel had in the Great Lakes, Congress passed legislation in 1990 and 1996 that have reduced, but not eliminated, the threat of new invasions by requiring ballast water management for ships entering the Great Lakes. Today, there is a mandatory ballast water management program in the Great Lakes. The current law requires that ships entering the Great Lakes must exchange their ballast water, seal their ballast tanks or use alternative treatment that is ``as effective as ballast water exchange.'' Unfortunately, the effectiveness of ballast water exchange has been left undefined. Consequently, alternative treatments have not been fully developed and widely tested on ships because the developers of ballast technology do not know what standard

they are trying to achieve. This obstacle is serious because ultimately, only onboard ballast water treatment will adequately reduce the threat of new aquatic nuisance species being introduced through ballast water.

Our bill rectifies this problem. First, this bill establishes deadlines for national interim and final standards for ballast water management. This way, technology vendors and the maritime industry know when to expect clear requirements. Second, our bill establishes what the phrase ``as effective as ballast water exchange'' means for the purposes of the interim period. Research has shown that ballast water exchange has highly variable effectiveness rates. This bill takes the maximum effectiveness that ballast water exchange could have using the safest approach--a 95-percent reduction of near coastal plankton and establishes it as the floor for treatment effectiveness which is a 95 percent kill or removal of live organisms. Within 18 months of the bill's passage, the Coast Guard is required to issue regulations implementing an interim ballast water standard that would require ships that enter any U.S. port after operating outside the Exclusive Economic Zone of 200 miles to either use ballast water treatment technology that meets the standard, retain the ship's ballast water, or exchange the ship's ballast water in the high seas. Ships operating in coastal waters would not be required to manage ballast water during the interim standard.

A 95-percent reduction of organisms will be the interim standard used for treatment technology until the EPA, with the concurrence of the Coast Guard, promulgates the final standard. This interim standard is not intended to be implemented for the long run, and it is not perfect. However, a final standard is difficult to set today or in the near future because of the limited research that has been conducted on how clean or sterile ballast water discharge should be, what is the best expression of a standard, and what is technologically achievable. Rather than wait many more years before taking action to stop new introductions, I believe that an imperfect but clear and achievable interim standard for treatment technology is the right approach. This interim standard will lead to the use of ballast treatments that are more protective of our waters than the default method of ballast water exchange provides, and it can be implemented in the very near future. Further, the bill provides the Coast Guard with the flexibility to promulgate the interim standard using a size-based standard or by whatever parameters the Coast Guard determines appropriate.

I understand that ballast water technologies are being researched and are ready to be tested onboard ships. These technologies include ultraviolet lights, filters, chemicals, deoxygenation, and several others. Each of these technologies has a different pricetag attached to it. It is not my intention to overburden the maritime industry with an expensive requirement to install technology. In fact, the legislation states that the final ballast water technology standard must be based on ``best available technology economically achievable.'' That means that the EPA must consider what technology is available, and if there is not economically achievable technology available to a class of vessels, then the standard will not require ballast technology for that class of vessels, subject to review every 3 years. I do not believe this will be the case, however, because the approach creates a clear incentive for treatment vendors to develop affordable equipment for the market. Since ballast technology will be always evolving, it is important that the EPA review and revise the standard so that it reflects what is the best technology currently available and whether it is economically achievable. Shipowners cannot be expected to upgrade their equipment upon every few years as technology develops, however, so the law provides an approval period of at least 10 years.

There are other important provisions of the bill as well. The bill requires the Army Corps of Engineers to construct and operate the Chicago Ship and Sanitary Canal project which includes the construction of a second dispersal barrier to keep species like the Asian carp from migrating up the Mississippi through the canal into the Great Lakes. Equally important, this barrier will prevent the migration of invasive species in the Great Lakes from proceeding into the Mississippi system. The bill establishes an experimental ballast treatment approval process to take effect immediately so that the treatment technology industry can begin full-scale experimental installations of treatments on ships. The bill authorizes additional funding for better coordinated research to find effective means of combating invasive species. It would help Federal, State, and regional authorities guard against future invasions by developing early detection monitoring and rapid response plans. And it provides funding for outreach and education programs to inform the public and marina owners about the dangers of inadvertently carrying aquatic invaders on the hulls of recreational boats or dumping bait buckets into the Lakes.

Invasive species threaten the region's biological diversity and are an economic drain. Estimates of the annual economic damage caused nationwide by invasive species go as high as $137 billion. Because of the system of canals connecting the Great Lakes to the Mississippi River and the Atlantic Ocean, there are no physical barriers to block the spread of invasive species, making the Great Lakes highly vulnerable. Because of the frequency of ships entering into the Great Lakes, though, our region is often ``ground zero,'' and once an exotic species establishes itself, it is almost impossible to eradicate and sometimes difficult to prevent from moving throughout the nation. Therefore, prevention is the key to controlling new introductions.

All in all, the bill would cost between $160 million and $170 million each year. This is a lot of money, but it is a critical investment. As those of us from the Great Lakes know, the economic damage that invasive species can cause is much greater. However, compared to the $137 billion annual cost of invasive species, the cost of this bill is minimal. Therefore, I urge my colleagues to cosponsor this legislation and work to move the bill swiftly through the Senate.

Mr. President, today, my colleague from Maine, Senator Collins and I are very pleased to introduce the National Aquatic Invasive Species Act of 2003. This bill, which reauthorizes the Nonindigenous Aquatic Nuisance Prevention and Control Act, takes a comprehensive approach towards addressing aquatic nuisance species to protect the Nation's waters. This bill deals with the prevention of new introductions, the screening of new aquatic organisms coming into the country, the rapid response to new invasions, and the research to implement the provisions of this bill.

The problem of invasive species is a very real one. Over the past 450 years, during colonization and development of this country, more than 6,500 nonindigenous invasive species have been introduced into the United States and have become established, self-sustaining populations. These species--from microorganisms to mollusks, from pathogens to plants, from insects to fish to animals--typically encounter few, if any, natural enemies in their new environments and wreak havoc on native species. Aquatic nuisance species threaten biodiversity nationwide, especially in the Great Lakes.

Some of my colleagues may remember that back in the late eighties, the problem of aquatic nuisance species was first raised after the zebra mussel was released into the Great Lakes. The Great Lakes still have zebra mussels, and now, 20 States are fighting to control them. Zebra mussels were carried over from the Mediterranean to the Great Lakes in the ballast tanks of ships. The leading pathway for aquatic invasive species is maritime commerce. Most invasive species are contained in the water that ships use for ballast. Aquatic invaders such as the zebra mussel and round goby were introduced into the Great Lakes when ships, often from halfway around the world, pulled into port and discharged their ballast water. Aquatic invaders can also attach themselves to ships' hulls and anchor chains.

Because of the impact that the zebra mussel had in the Great Lakes, Congress passed legislation in 1990 and 1996 that have reduced, but not eliminated, the threat of new invasions by requiring ballast water management for ships entering the Great Lakes. Today, there is a mandatory ballast water management program in the Great Lakes. The current law requires that ships entering the Great Lakes must exchange their ballast water, seal their ballast tanks or use alternative treatment that is ``as effective as ballast water exchange.'' Unfortunately, the effectiveness of ballast water exchange has been left undefined. Consequently, alternative treatments have not been fully developed and widely tested on ships because the developers of ballast technology do not know what standard

they are trying to achieve. This obstacle is serious because ultimately, only onboard ballast water treatment will adequately reduce the threat of new aquatic nuisance species being introduced through ballast water.

Our bill rectifies this problem. First, this bill establishes deadlines for national interim and final standards for ballast water management. This way, technology vendors and the maritime industry know when to expect clear requirements. Second, our bill establishes what the phrase ``as effective as ballast water exchange'' means for the purposes of the interim period. Research has shown that ballast water exchange has highly variable effectiveness rates. This bill takes the maximum effectiveness that ballast water exchange could have using the safest approach--a 95-percent reduction of near coastal plankton and establishes it as the floor for treatment effectiveness which is a 95 percent kill or removal of live organisms. Within 18 months of the bill's passage, the Coast Guard is required to issue regulations implementing an interim ballast water standard that would require ships that enter any U.S. port after operating outside the Exclusive Economic Zone of 200 miles to either use ballast water treatment technology that meets the standard, retain the ship's ballast water, or exchange the ship's ballast water in the high seas. Ships operating in coastal waters would not be required to manage ballast water during the interim standard.

A 95-percent reduction of organisms will be the interim standard used for treatment technology until the EPA, with the concurrence of the Coast Guard, promulgates the final standard. This interim standard is not intended to be implemented for the long run, and it is not perfect. However, a final standard is difficult to set today or in the near future because of the limited research that has been conducted on how clean or sterile ballast water discharge should be, what is the best expression of a standard, and what is technologically achievable. Rather than wait many more years before taking action to stop new introductions, I believe that an imperfect but clear and achievable interim standard for treatment technology is the right approach. This interim standard will lead to the use of ballast treatments that are more protective of our waters than the default method of ballast water exchange provides, and it can be implemented in the very near future. Further, the bill provides the Coast Guard with the flexibility to promulgate the interim standard using a size-based standard or by whatever parameters the Coast Guard determines appropriate.

I understand that ballast water technologies are being researched and are ready to be tested onboard ships. These technologies include ultraviolet lights, filters, chemicals, deoxygenation, and several others. Each of these technologies has a different pricetag attached to it. It is not my intention to overburden the maritime industry with an expensive requirement to install technology. In fact, the legislation states that the final ballast water technology standard must be based on ``best available technology economically achievable.'' That means that the EPA must consider what technology is available, and if there is not economically achievable technology available to a class of vessels, then the standard will not require ballast technology for that class of vessels, subject to review every 3 years. I do not believe this will be the case, however, because the approach creates a clear incentive for treatment vendors to develop affordable equipment for the market. Since ballast technology will be always evolving, it is important that the EPA review and revise the standard so that it reflects what is the best technology currently available and whether it is economically achievable. Shipowners cannot be expected to upgrade their equipment upon every few years as technology develops, however, so the law provides an approval period of at least 10 years.

There are other important provisions of the bill as well. The bill requires the Army Corps of Engineers to construct and operate the Chicago Ship and Sanitary Canal project which includes the construction of a second dispersal barrier to keep species like the Asian carp from migrating up the Mississippi through the canal into the Great Lakes. Equally important, this barrier will prevent the migration of invasive species in the Great Lakes from proceeding into the Mississippi system. The bill establishes an experimental ballast treatment approval process to take effect immediately so that the treatment technology industry can begin full-scale experimental installations of treatments on ships. The bill authorizes additional funding for better coordinated research to find effective means of combating invasive species. It would help Federal, State, and regional authorities guard against future invasions by developing early detection monitoring and rapid response plans. And it provides funding for outreach and education programs to inform the public and marina owners about the dangers of inadvertently carrying aquatic invaders on the hulls of recreational boats or dumping bait buckets into the Lakes.

Invasive species threaten the region's biological diversity and are an economic drain. Estimates of the annual economic damage caused nationwide by invasive species go as high as $137 billion. Because of the system of canals connecting the Great Lakes to the Mississippi River and the Atlantic Ocean, there are no physical barriers to block the spread of invasive species, making the Great Lakes highly vulnerable. Because of the frequency of ships entering into the Great Lakes, though, our region is often ``ground zero,'' and once an exotic species establishes itself, it is almost impossible to eradicate and sometimes difficult to prevent from moving throughout the nation. Therefore, prevention is the key to controlling new introductions.

All in all, the bill would cost between $160 million and $170 million each year. This is a lot of money, but it is a critical investment. As those of us from the Great Lakes know, the economic damage that invasive species can cause is much greater. However, compared to the $137 billion annual cost of invasive species, the cost of this bill is minimal. Therefore, I urge my colleagues to cosponsor this legislation and work to move the bill swiftly through the Senate.

I wonder if the Senator will yield for one question?

We have heard now with some regularity from the administration that they have no idea, no estimate as to what the cost of the war with Iraq will be, nor what the aftermath would cost; in other words, assuming there is a war, assuming that we occupy Iraq with or without others. According to General Shinseki, that could actually involve up to 100,000 troops there for some unlimited period of time. But even if they disagree with that, which apparently some members of the Pentagon do, we have not been able to obtain--and they claim there is none--an estimate of the cost of the aftermath of a war with Iraq at the same time that they are asking us to put in place an additional tax cut.

Does it not strike my good friend from Nevada as being irresponsible to put into place tax cuts with huge costs to the Treasury when we are likely on the verge of a war which has no particular estimated cost, and then the aftermath of that war, which could last years, in turn also has no estimated cost? Does it not strike the Senator from Nevada as simply not being the responsible thing to do to be imposing or putting into place tax reductions which means losses to the Treasury, when we are right on the verge of potential expenditures which could be literally hundreds of billions of dollars over a reasonably short period of time?

And the answer we get is there is no way to know with certainty. These specifics are simply not available. There are too many imponderables. That is true, there are clearly some uncertainties. But it seems obvious to me the planners at the Pentagon must have some range of time or else there is no exit strategy, or else it is forever.

Previous administrations have been criticized for not having exit strategies, not having estimates in time, for making their estimate too short: They will be home by Christmas. But that is no excuse for not having some range--that we will be there from 1 to 3 years according to the best estimate. The worst case scenario is X number of years, best case scenario is such and such. The best case scenario is we won't have problems with the Kurds or the Shia will not be attacking the Sunni. The worst case scenario is we will have those kinds of civil wars. There are best case and worst case scenarios which allow planners who are working actually on estimated costs and exit strategies to come up with some kind of an estimate upon which we can base future resources and expenditures of this Nation.

He did.

Just to add one further thought, it seems to me it would be absolutely irresponsible not to have a range or an estimate of what the cost of a war would be in the best and worst case scenarios.

Yes, or at least a range on what is the worst case scenario and what is the best case scenario. I cannot believe the planners at the Pentagon and the OMB do not have a range. If they don't have a range, it would be irresponsible because how in heaven's name can the administration then say that we can afford a tax cut of the size they are proposing, when we have an impending demand for resources in a war that could be lengthy, costly, and then the aftermath could be lengthy and costly? It borders on the reckless, in terms of an economy, to say we don't have an estimate, we don't know whether or not it is going to be $20 billion, $40 billion, $100 billion--we don't have a range; yet they are trying to persuade a majority of the Congress that we ought to shrink the resources coming into the Government at the same time we are on the verge of war and the aftermath of a war, which doesn't have any estimated length, any estimated cost, and no troop estimate. We were given about a 200,000 estimate. Well, that is too high. OK, what is the ceiling that is more realistic to the people who say 200,000 is too high? We are completely devoid of that.

What we are not devoid of, though, is the effort to shrink resources to this Government through a tax cut, which has a number of problems to it. One of them is that when we are facing what we are in terms of expenditures, it is not the responsible thing to do.

I wasn't aware of the Senator's remarks, but I was aware of the poll.

Mr. President, I am going to speak about the very budget document that the Senator from Nevada and I have been discussing, perhaps in an indirect way. I wish to share some thoughts with the Senate about the proposed budget for 2004, which the President has now sent to Congress.

As always, I wanted to see where the President's priorities were--not in sound bites, but the actual nitty-gritty numbers in the budget document. While every budget request is important, with the economy sputtering the way it is and with huge Federal deficits looming and critical domestic and international issues unresolved, particularly when we are facing the potential of a war and a very lengthy and complicated, expensive aftermath to that war, this budget requires special attention.

I have been keenly disappointed by what this attention revealed. The President's budget would do exactly what he recently said he did not want to do, which was to pass our problems along to the next generation. The President made a very eloquent statement in the State of the Union Address, saying that we are not going to pass our problems along to the next generation. But when you look at the details of the budget, that is precisely what this budget request does.

By the administration's own calculations, this budget would have us run a deficit of over a trillion dollars for the next 5 years, including record-setting deficits of over $300 billion for this year and next.

Now, the contrast here between this projection of deficit and the $5.5 trillion 10-year surplus that was projected in January of 2001 is simply stunning. That contrast between just what 2 years ago was projected for our economy--a $5.5 trillion surplus--now there are projections of deficits upon deficits upon deficits--a projected deficit of over a trillion dollars over the next 5 years.

The administration's plan estimates a non-Social Security deficit totaling over $2.5 trillion to the year 2008, which would leave us with an additional debt of $5 trillion in 2008, which is 150 times greater than what was projected just in the year 2001.

Why such dire fiscal predictions? First, while the tax cut in the year 2001 played a huge part in putting us into the current deficit ditch, the President's call for an additional $1.5 trillion in new tax cuts--most of which disproportionately benefits upper income folks-- will help ensure that we not only stay in the deficit ditch, which we are back into, but that it will be a deep deficit ditch.

Even Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan recognized the danger of such cuts when he spoke of the importance of curbing the deficit, not increasing it.

That perhaps came as a surprise to some people in the administration who were looking to Alan Greenspan to give support to the tax cut proposal and minimize, they hoped, the impact of deficits on future economies. That is not what Chairman Greenspan did. He straightforwardly recognized the danger of the tax cuts when he spoke of the importance of reducing deficits and not increasing deficits.

Mr. President, I see the Democratic leader is in the Chamber. I withhold the remainder of my comments at this time because he has a very important message relative to North Korea, and I wish to participate with him in a colloquy and presentation. So I withhold the remainder of my comments relative to the President's budget at this time.

I yield the floor.

Mr. President, will the Democratic leader yield just for some questions?

Is the Senator aware of a statement which was made before us--I do not know how he would be, but let me brief him on it. We had the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency in front of the Armed Services Committee a couple of days ago, and we asked him whether or not in his judgment there was a crisis on the Korean peninsula because of the actions of North Korea in removing these seals from the spent fuel, eliminating the cameras and kicking out the inspectors. Even though the administration is unwilling to put the label ``crisis'' on what is going on on the Korean peninsula, Admiral Jacoby was more than willing to say, yes, this is a crisis.

I am wondering if the Democratic leader would agree that part of the problem that we have in dealing with the North Korean situation is the unwillingness to see it for what it is, which is a major proliferation threat when there is a country that has been the world's greatest proliferator, including Libya and Iran, missiles and missile technology, when there is a country with a nuclear program that they acknowledge removes the inspectors from its country, whether or not that would represent progress if we could just at least get the administration to acknowledge what the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency says, which is that we have a crisis on the Korean peninsula?

In addition to looking a problem square in the eye and not sugarcoating it, if we are going to solve it, another part of the administration's platform relative to Korea, or approach to the Korean problem, is to say that the multilateral approach is the right approach. I am always glad to hear when the administration is willing to work multilaterally. I have been a critic of the administration because their unilateral rhetoric activities, it seems to me, have been counterproductive in many parts of the world. So whenever the administration talks about a multilateral approach or consulting with allies and friends, that is good news. But when they do the consultation, when they talk to South Korea, both its former President and its new President, as well as when they talk to China, as well as when they talk to Japan, as well as when they talk to other allies in the area, they are told the same thing. When they do use the multilateral approach, they are told: Engage in direct discussions with North Korea. As a matter of fact, the representative of the new President of South Korea, the special envoy of new President Roh, visited us. His name is Dr. Chyung, and he visited with us on February 3.

That was, again, the open advice, he said, of the South Korean Government, is to have the United States talk directly with North Korea so that they can hear from us what our concerns are; so that both sides can avoid any kind of miscalculations; so that we do not fuel the paranoia this isolated regime has. They are paranoid. They are isolated. They actually believe we might strike them with one of our preemptive strikes. They actually believe it.

So the advice we are getting when we talk to our allies and follow this multilateral approach is engage with North Korea, and yet we refuse to do so.

I am wondering whether the Senator would agree that it is not only important that we consult with allies, not necessarily follow the advice but at least give serious consideration to the advice they give us when they talk to us about a direct engagement with North Korea to avoid miscalculation, so that the North can hear directly from us what our major concerns are?

This administration has blown hot and cold when it comes to policy relative to North Korea.

I just have one final question.

The Democratic leader points out just how confusing a policy it is, not just for North Korea but for our own allies. Our ally with the most at stake on the Korean peninsula is South Korea. They could be destroyed if there is a miscalculation. Their capital is within range of tens of thousands of artillery of North Korea.

On March 6, 2001, on the eve of a summit between then South Korean President Kim Jong-Il and President Bush, Secretary of State Powell said we plan to engage with North Korea and to pick up where President Clinton and his administration left off.

Within 24 hours was the Secretary of State's statement that we were going to engage with North Korea and pick

up where the Clinton administration left off because the Clinton administration obtained the framework agreement that resulted in the canning of that very material which is so dangerous which contains plutonium. Within 24 hours, at the summit the next day, President Bush basically said: We are not going to have any discussions with North Korea. We are not picking up where the Clinton administration left off. We do not trust North Korea.

No kidding. That is a mild statement, that we do not trust North Korea. If we did not talk to people we did not trust, we would not be talking to half of the world, including some of the most dangerous people in the world.

Talking to people does not mean we are going to reward anything. It simply means they will hear directly, eyeball to eyeball, from us as to what our concerns are, and also why we do not threaten them, and why, if they will terminate their nuclear program, they can rest assured they will get an agreement from us that there is not going to be any active aggression against them.

The blowing hot and cold, the erratic policy, the undermining not just of our own Secretary of State 24 hours after he said we would continue a policy, but undermining our South Korean allies with so much at stake, it seems to me has contributed to a very uncertain policy on the Korean peninsula, has sowed the seeds of confusion, and fueled and contributed to the paranoia that already existed in spades in North Korea.

I have been to Yongbyon, the place in North Korea where they were canning those fuel rods, where they had sealed them. I don't know that any other Member of the Congress got there, but I got there a couple years ago. I watched the International Atomic Energy Agency as they were sealing those fuel rods. That was a very positive thing to watch, to actually see, under IAEA inspection and supervision, those incredibly dangerous nuclear materials being canned instead of threatening to the rest of the world as potential proliferated material, to actually see it put under the supervision of the IAEA.

That is now out the window. We are starting from scratch. I understate my feelings on the matter when I say the Senator, the Democratic leader here, has so accurately stated the fact that we have a problem. Step 1 is to recognize we indeed have a crisis. Step 2 is not just to consult with allies but to seriously consider what they recommend when they talk about having direct engagement with the North Koreans.

I thank the Democratic leader for his constant determination to keep this Korean peninsula crisis in front of us. We cannot lose sight of it. It is a greater threat than Iraq because in North Korea you have a known proliferator who has removed the inspectors and who has nuclear material which could be so easily distributed, shipped, or sold to people who could do great harm with it.

I thank my friend from South Dakota.

Mr. President, I would like to congratulate World Medical Relief, Inc. for 50 years of distinguished service to needy individuals in the United States and around the world. On March 8, 2003, staff members, supporters, and beneficiaries of World Medical Relief, Inc. services will gather in my home state of Michigan for the ``Miracles of Mercy Gala 2003.'' This event will commemorate the commitment and dedication that World Medical Relief, Inc. has provided to the sick and needy.

For 50 years, World Medical Relief, Inc. has been a driving force for medical support both in my home state of Michigan and internationally. It is noteworthy that the success and accomplishments of this program today are in part the direct result of the unwavering devotion of founder Irene M. Auberlin. The hard work and perseverance of Mrs. Auberlin is now reflected by the many individuals and groups that continue to provide assistance to those most in need.

Today, the program serves over 1,500 people in the metropolitan Detroit area and 125 nations worldwide. I would like to congratulate William N. Genematas for receiving this year's Irene M. Auberlin Service Above Self Award for his long-time dedication to World Medical Relief, Inc. I also would like to commend both the Ford Motor Company Fund for its continued support of the Senior Prescription Program and the Christian Association of Medical Mission for their international aid efforts in developing nations. World Medical Relief, Inc. and its members deserve both our respect and gratitude.

I am sure that my colleagues in the Senate will join me in offering our congratulations to World Medical Relief, Inc. and its members as they celebrate 50 years of distinguished service.

Mr. President, I want to bring to the attention of my colleagues an article from the February 14, 2003, Los Angeles Times entitled ``New Revolver Too Big For 'Dirty' Harry.'' The article discusses a new .50 caliber handgun manufactured by the Smith and Wesson Corporation. The 500 model, the biggest handgun currently in production, is 15 inches long, weighs 4.5 pounds, and uses a .50 caliber Magnum Smith and Wesson bullet that packs a muzzle force of 2,600 foot-pounds. The bullet is half an inch wide and is more powerful than comparable ammunition because it is much longer and contains more gun powder.

According to a Violence Policy Center expert cited in the article, the gun's cartridge has about twice the muzzle energy of most rounds for common semiautomatic assault weapons, such as the AR-15, a civilian version of the military's M-16. In fact, the new gun packs a punch powerful enough to stop a charging bear in its tracks.

A Smith and Wesson representative acknowledges that the company hopes the gun will help Smith and Wesson win back market share lost when the company agreed to a number of steps to improve gun safety and keep guns out of the hands of criminals. Smith and Wesson's decision to produce the .50 caliber handgun represents a step backward in the effort to improve gun safety. Not only has the company apparently scrapped its plan to work with the federal government to take sensible steps to make guns safer and keep guns from getting into the wrong hands, but the company seems to be headed in the opposite direction by creating a handgun that is reported to have double the power of most assault rifles.

Last year, I cosponsored the Military Sniper Weapon Regulation Act, a bill which would change the way .50 caliber sniper rifles are regulated by placing them under the requirements of the National Firearms Act. This bill would subject the sniper rifles to the same regimen of registration and background checks as other weapons of war, such as machine guns.

Unfortunately, the new Smith and Wesson .50 caliber handgun would not be affected by this legislation. However, both the .50 caliber handgun and sniper rifle are simply too powerful to be on the streets. Congress must take a long, hard look at these potentially lethal weapons.

[From the L.A. Times, Feb. 14, 2003]

A Powerful New Revolver Is Drawing Fire Already

(By Ralph Frammolino and Steve Berry)

Even the most ardent firearm lovers acknowledge that Smith

& Wesson's new .50-caliber Magnum revolver is more gun than

anyone needs.

It has double the power of most assault rifles in America.

Its kick can send a grown man reeling; a single bullet can

drop a grizzly.; It is so heavy and long that police say no-

criminal would dare try to hide it in his waistband. It will

cost as much $989.

And gun buyers across the country can't wait to get their

hands on it.

``The initial reaction has been even stronger than we had

anticipated, so we're ramping

up production to meet the demand,'' Bob Scott, Smith & Wesson

Corp.'s chairman, said from the 2003 Shooting, Hunting,

Outdoor Trade Show in Orlando, Fla.

``Certainly, in our booth it's the product that has created

the most buzz.''

The Springfield, Mass-based company, creator of the .44

Magnum of ``Dirty Harry'' fame, unveiled its new offering

Thursday as the world most powerful commercially produced

revolver. Executives for the country's second-largest

firearms manufacturer said they hoped the gun would help

regain lost market share by generating excitement among an

important, albeit niche, market of big-game hunters,

collectors and recreational target shooters.

But even before the weapon's wide distribution, scheduled

for next month, forces on both sides of the firearms debate

are taking aim at its social effects.

Gun control groups condemned the Model 500 as an example of

the industry's ``deadlier-is-better'' mentality, predicting

that the new model would soon find its way to the streets.

``A hunting weapon? that's a joke,'' said Luis Tolley,

director of state legislation for the Brady Campaign to

Prevent Gun Violence. ``What we have here is a weapon that's

designed to appeal to people who just want to make a bigger

hole in whatever they're shooting at. And, hopefully, they're

not living next door to me.''

Said Josh Sugarmann, executive director of the Violence

Policy Center: ``This gun is not being made for hunters in

Africa. It's being made for bored white gun owners in

America. Why are they putting so much firepower into people's

hands?''

The real question, say some gun experts, is: Why are people

demanding it?

Adam Firestone, editor of Cruffler.com, a Web site for gun

collectors, said he viewed demand for Smith & Wesson's new

product as more of an outgrowth of America's obsession with

size and status, rather than an indicator of growing paranoia

over crime or homeland security.

``How many people do you know have Lincoln Navigators or

Hummer H2s?'' he said. ``We are phenomenal at buying beyond

our needs. And with regard to the firearm industry, if it is

bigger, if it is more expensive . . . we will line up around

the corner to buy the darned thing, regardless of the fact

that there may be six other guns that cost half as much and

do the job just as well.''

Smith & Wesson executives hope that the new offering, one

of nine new models introduced at the Florida gun show

Thursday, will put it back in the good graces of a gun-buying

constituency that remains sore over the company's decision in

2000 to sign agreements with the federal government that

promised to put locks on all firearms it sold.

That backlash served as a double whammy, taking away sales

from Smith & Wesson even as the entire industry was in

decline.

``We're in the process of winning back market share or

business that was lost as a result of negative reaction by

consumers to the decisions by the previous ownership,'' said

Scott, the company chairman.

Smith & Wesson has built its reputation by building

bigger guns. The .357 Magnum, introduced in 1935, was

considered a breakthrough because of its muzzle energy

that delivered impact at 535 foot-pounds, said Roy G.

Jinks, the company's historian.

The weapon, developed at the behest of hunters, gained

favor with police during the mobster era because it could

shoot through a car's engine block, he said.

In 1956, Smith & Wesson introduced the even more powerful

.44 Magnum, the gun made famous years later by Clint Eastwood

in his crime-fighting movies as ``Dirty'' Harry Callahan, a

San Francisco cop.

With Thursday's unveiling the company now leapfrogs ahead

of its competitors, which had surpassed the .44 Magnum with

more potent weapons.

The Model 500 uses a bigger frame, takes a new .50 caliber

Magnum Smith & Wesson bullet and packs a muzzle force of

2,600 foot-pounds.

Though there are single-shot, custom pistols that use

larger ammunition, the new gun is the largest production

revolver or semiautomatic pistol.

At .50-caliber, the bullet is about half an inch wide but

is more powerful than other such ammunition because it is

longer and can pack more powder, said Garen Wintemute, a gun

expert and director of the Violence Prevention Research

Program at UC Davis.

He said the gun's cartridge has about twice the muzzle

energy of most rounds for common semiautomatic assault

weapons used in America, such as the AR-15, a civilian

version of the military's M-16.

Wintemute predicted that it would be a smash with gun

enthusiasts who can order one with a barrel as long as 10

inches.

One such enthusiast is Marc Halcon, owner of American

Shooting Center in San Diego.

He said the allure of the weapon ``has something to do with

the artistry of creating a mechanism that will do something

that no other will do. It's another step in science and

engineering.''

On a personal level, Halcon said. ``I already own the most

powerful handgun on the market, and if they build a more

powerful one, then I want to buy it.''

Sam Paredes, executive director of the Gun Owners of

California feels much the same.

``I can't wait to shoot one of these things,'' he said.

Paredes acknowledged that the Model 500 could be portrayed

as the ``boogeyman of all guns.''

He said its recoil would pack such a wallop that it would

be virtually impossible for criminals to rely on it--a

sentiment shared by Lt. Bruce Harris, the firing range master

for the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department.

``It's a little tough to have one of those under your

shirt,'' Harris said, adding that he didn't believe it would

become the weapon of the street because ``gangbangers don't

have $900 to spend on a Smith & Wesson revolver.''

Proposed legislation regulating the sale of .50 caliber

rifles is scheduled for consideration in the state Assembly

and the Los Angeles City Council, said Tolley of the Brady

Campaign. But government officials said Thursday that they

had no plans to include the new revolver in the restrictions.

Still, Tolley said, his group will work to bring the Model

500 under some kind of control because, despite Smith &

Wesson's intentions, the weapon is bound to end up in the

wrong hands.

``They're marketing this weapon to people who get off on

the idea that they have the biggest, baddest gun on the

block,'' Tolley said.

``Unfortunately a number of them are going to juvenile gang

members and people who have an unhealthy fascination with

fire arms.''

Mr. President, I have joined with Senators Reid, Durbin, and Kennedy in introducing the Corporate Patriot Enforcement Act of 2003.

Over the past several years we have been hearing more and more about U.S. corporations using offshore tax havens to avoid paying their fair share of U.S. taxes. One of the most egregious abuses is when a U.S. corporation reincorporates on paper in a tax haven and establishes a headquarters there when, in reality, its primary offices and production or service facilities remain right here in the United States. By opening shell headquarters in a tax haven like Bermuda, companies that got their start in this country, do most of their work here, and benefit from U.S. roads, banks, patents, computers, law enforcement, fair trade laws, its educated workforce, and much more, avoid contributing their fair share to pay for those benefits. Instead, these companies force the rest of America's taxpayers to shoulder the tax burden they have shed.

This corporate conduct mistreats the average American. It undercuts the U.S. corporations that do pay their taxes. It is unfair, it is founded on a deception, and it is time for Congress to put an end to it. It is time for Congress to say to these companies, if you want benefits, you need to stop avoiding your fiscal responsibility with the sham of appearing to move.

The list of companies that have undertaken the tax haven headquarters pretense now called ``corporate inversions'' is growing. The list currently includes such U.S. born companies as Fruit of the Loom, Ingersoll-Rand, and Tyco, although Tyco shareholders are trying to shame that company's management into giving up its Bermuda shenanigans.

It is likely that this list of corporate inversions will continue to grow unless Congress acts to close the tax loopholes that currently permit U.S. companies to benefit from their gamesmanship and avoid federal taxes at the expense of average taxpayers and good corporate citizens. That is why we are introducing the Corporate Patriot Enforcement Act of 2003, the same bill Representative Neal introduced in the House last Congress which garnered over 150 co-sponsors.

This bill would deny tax benefits to U.S. companies that invert by continuing to treat them as U.S. companies for tax purposes. This bill would not only level the playing field between these companies and their U.S. competitors, it would also save other U.S. taxpayers from having to pick up an estimated $4 billion in tax revenues over the next 10 years.

U.S. corporations that reincorporate in tax havens typically reduce their U.S. tax liability in at least two ways. First, by setting up headquarters in a tax haven, the company can eliminate its liability for U.S. taxes on passive and other forms of income earned in foreign jurisdictions. For instance, the company no longer would have to pay U.S. tax on the interest, dividends and royalty payments received by its foreign affiliates which would otherwise have been taxed under Subpart F of the U.S. tax code. By creating a new, so-

called ``parent'' company in a tax haven jurisdiction, the company's obligations under Subpart F disappear, and the passive and other forms of income that would otherwise be treated as Subpart F income subject to U.S. taxation is no longer taxed by the United States. Second, companies that pretend to move their headquarters to a tax haven typically also use tax strategies to shelter income actually earned in the United States. By deflecting this income to the shell parent located in a low or no tax jurisdiction, these companies avoid paying U.S. taxes on income earned right here in the U.S.

Unlike other corporate inversion proposals under consideration, our bill would deny all corporate inverters both of these sought-after U.S. tax benefits in their entirety. Corporate inverters would be treated as U.S. companies for U.S. tax purposes, thereby denying them all of the tax benefits sought by their inversion transactions. This approach hopefully will put an end to companies pretending to move to Bermuda or any other tax haven in order to duck corporate taxes at the expense of honest taxpayers left holding the bag.

Under this bill, a company would be deemed to be inverted, and therefore be treated as a U.S. company, if: 80 percent of the shareholders in the previous U.S. company are shareholders of the new company; and the new company acquires substantially all of the property of the old company; or between 50 and 80 percent of the shareholders in the previous U.S. company are shareholders of the new company; the new company acquires substantially all of the property of the old company; the new company conducts no substantial business activity in the new jurisdiction; and the stock is principally traded in the U.S. These rules would apply to inversions that occurred after September 11, 2001.

Rather than let companies that inverted previously enjoy future tax benefits they do not deserve, the amendment would give companies that inverted prior to September 11, 2001 an opportunity to incorporate back in the United States. If a company failed to do so, the U.S. would begin treating it as an inverted company beginning in 2004 and deny it the future tax breaks sought from its inversion.

We should not let companies off the hook that try to avoid paying U.S. taxes by setting up a computer in a tax haven jurisdiction. Now is the time to close this corporate expatriation loophole. I hope my colleagues will join with us in enacting this legislation into law this year.

Madam President, last Sunday the news program ``60 Minutes'' reported on an exciting new technology called ballistic fingerprinting, which is currently underutilized by our Nation's law enforcement organizations. Each time a gun is fired, it inscribes a unique pattern on each bullet. This marking is referred to as a ballistic fingerprint. The ``60 Minutes'' report presented the case of a New York City double homicide in which the New York Police Department developed little evidence to work with besides the bullet shells and casings from the crime scene. After exhausting all other efforts to solve the case, detectives took those shells and casings to the NYPD ballistics lab to be scanned into the Integrated Ballistic Identification System, a database of ballistic fingerprints maintained by the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives. The ballistics lab was able to connect the gun used in the double homicide to the one used three months later in an armed robbery. An arrest was made and the man was convicted of both crimes. Without ballistics fingerprinting this case might have never been solved.

Through its National Integrated Ballistic Information Network or NIBIN Program, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives deploys Integrated Ballistic Identification System equipment to State and local law enforcement agencies, such as the one in New York City, for their use in imaging and comparing crime gun evidence. This state- of-the-art equipment allows firearms technicians to acquire digital images of the markings made by a firearm on bullets and shells, like was done in the New York case. Unfortunately, at this point, only weapons that are confiscated in crimes are included in this database. Expanding this database to include newly manufactured and imported guns would enhance law enforcement's ability to investigate and reduce gun- related crime.

I believe that the ATF's ballistic fingerprinting network should be expanded, and that is why I have cosponsored the Technological Resource for Assisting Criminal Enforcement Act or TRACE Act. Under this bill, manufacturers and importers would be required to test fire firearms and capture ballistics images of the fired bullets and casings of new firearms. Expanding NIBIN to include these ballistics images would increase the crime gun tracing capabilities of the ATF and local law enforcement. Law enforcement could identify firearms by using the ballistics images of cartridge cases and bullets recovered at crime scenes even when criminals had removed the serial number. In fact, this technology would allow investigators to identify the firearm used in the crime without actually recovering that firearm. The legislation also contains strict provisions stating that the ballistics information regarding individual guns may not be used for prosecutorial purposes unless law enforcement officials have a reasonable belief that a crime has been committed and that ballistics information would assist in the investigation of that crime.

I believe this is sensible legislation that will strengthen law enforcement's ability to effectively track down criminals. This technology has worked for both the NYPD and in the investigation of the Washington area sniper attacks. I urge my colleagues to support it.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of this bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of this bill be printed in the Record.