Mr. President, as we discuss the need to bring down the deficit, we should acknowledge a few basics. First is cannot achieve the deficit reduction we need with spending cuts to nondefense discretionary programs alone. They simply aren't…
Mr. President, as we discuss the need to bring down the deficit, we should acknowledge a few basics. First is cannot achieve the deficit reduction we need with spending cuts to nondefense discretionary programs alone. They simply aren't large enough to make the difference we need, and the damage we would do to American families from drastic cuts in those programs is simply too great.
Second is that in light of those facts and in the interest of basic fairness, a balanced solution to deficit spending must include revenues as well as spending cuts. If we ask college students relying on Federal aid, workers in need of Federal job training, seniors in need of health care to sacrifice in the name of deficit reduction, so, too, should those who benefit from loopholes and handouts in the Tax Code, including loopholes that often benefit only highly profitable corporations, one of those huge loopholes that benefits corporations that dole out large stock option pay to their executives.
Current law provides an unwarranted tax subsidy to executive stock option compensation thereby increasing the tax burden on working families and increasing our deficit. According to the Joint Committee on Taxation, closing this loophole would reduce the deficit by about $25 billion.
Today, under tax rules for reporting stock options, corporations report stock option expenses on their books when those stock options are granted but use another method to claim a different and a typically much higher expense on their tax returns when the stock options are exercised. The result is, corporations can claim larger tax deductions for options on their tax returns than the actual expense they show on their books for those same options.
Stock options are the only type of compensation where the Tax Code allows a corporation to deduct more than the expense shown on their books. For all other types of compensation--cash, stock, bonuses, and others--the tax return deduction equals the book expense. In fact, if corporations deducted on their tax returns more than their books showed as compensation, it could constitute tax fraud. The sole exception to that rule is stock options. It is an exception we can no longer afford.
The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, which I chair, held a hearing in June of 2007, when we examined the stock option tax gap in detail at nine companies. We found that those nine companies claimed tax deductions that were a combined $1 billion greater than the expenses shown on their books. Let me repeat, just nine companies, $1 billion in excess tax deductions.
We were shocked by that finding, and we asked the IRS to calculate the stock option tax gap for the country as a whole. Using actual data from tax returns, the IRS found that for the first full year in which data was available, U.S. companies claimed an excess of $61 billion in stock option tax deductions compared to their book expenses. Since then, IRS data shows that the stock option tax gap has persisted for 5 years. They looked at 2005 to 2009, which was the latest year for which data was available, with the size of the excess tax deductions varying from $11 billion to $52 billion per year. These excessive deductions mean billions of dollars in reduced taxes for corporations wealthy enough to provide substantial stock option compensation to their already well-paid executives and all at the expense of ordinary taxpayers and an increase in the deficit.
It is a tax loophole that is fueling excessive executive pay, increasing the pay gap between millionaires and the middle class, and enabling profitable corporations to avoid paying their fair share to reduce the deficit.
I will soon be reintroducing the same legislation I have introduced in past years to end this misalignment of the Tax Code.
The bill would cure the problem simply by requiring the corporate stock option tax deduction to equal the stock option expense shown on the corporate books. It would not affect the taxes paid by individuals who receive the stock options. It would not affect so-called incentive stock options which receive favored tax treatment under section 422 of the Tax Code and are often used by startup companies.
In addition, the bill would make stock options pay subject to the same $1 million cap on corporate tax deductions that applies to other forms of executive pay. Congress established that $1 million cap so that taxpayers would not have to subsidize enormous paychecks for executives. But the cap can't end that tax subsidy without including stock options. Even if included under the cap, stock options could still be awarded in excess of $1 million, but not at the expense of ordinary taxpayers.
I do not know of any Senator who does not want to reduce the budget deficit. I do not know of any Senator who believes it is wise to subsidize executive paychecks at the expense of working families. But as it now stands, the excessive corporate tax deduction for stock option pay widens the deficit while increasing the tax burden on ordinary taxpayers. By closing this tax gap, by ending the illogical treatment of corporate stock options in current law, we can reduce the budget deficit and bring much-needed fairness to the Tax Code.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be allowed to proceed as in morning business for 8 minutes.
Mr. President, the Department of Justice announced earlier this week that Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame, an accused member of the terrorist group Al-Shabaab, has been indicted on charges of providing material support to Al-Shabaab and al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, conspiring to teach and demonstrate the making of explosives, possessing firearms and explosives in furtherance of crimes of violence, and other violations of Federal law. He will be tried for these offenses in Federal court in New York.
Warsame is a Somali national who was captured in the gulf region in late April and taken to a U.S. Navy vessel for detention and interrogation. The Department of Defense has stated that the interrogation was conducted by an interagency team comprised of U.S. military personnel, with assistance from the High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group. After the completion of this interrogation and a hiatus of several days, Warsame was turned over to a team of FBI officials for law enforcement questioning, and in that he waived his Miranda rights and continued to talk.
This case appears to be an example of our national security and law enforcement teams working together in the manner we would hope they would toward the twin objectives of collecting critical intelligence information and ensuring a successful criminal prosecution of the detainee.
Published reports indicate that Warsame was captured by American military forces on a boat in international waters between Yemen and Somalia after the United States acquired intelligence indicating that a significant terrorist figure was on board the vessel. Under these circumstances, it was appropriate for the military to detain and interrogate Warsame to obtain actionable intelligence. The United States is currently engaged in military operations pursuant to the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force. As the Supreme Court held 7 years ago in the case of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the capture and detention of both lawful and unlawful combatants is a ``fundamental and accepted . . . incident to war.'' I understand these interrogations were conducted in a manner fully consistent with the interrogation techniques authorized under the Army Field Manual on interrogations.
Once our national security team determined that the collection of actionable intelligence had been completed, a separate decision was made, on the basis of the specific facts of this case, as to the best forum in which to prosecute Warsame for his alleged crimes.
The indictment sets forth evidence that Warsame violated a number of Federal statutes, including sections of the Criminal Code prohibiting trafficking in explosives, use of dangerous weapons, acts of international terrorism, providing material support to foreign terrorist organizations, and receiving military-type training from foreign terrorist organizations--making him a candidate for prosecution in a Federal court with jurisdiction over such violations.
Warsame also appears to have engaged in acts of terrorism and material support to terrorism, both of which are crimes under the Military Commissions Act, if they are committed ``in the context of and associated with hostilities'' against the United States. What has not been resolved is whether Warsame meets the jurisdictional threshold in the Military Commissions Act of having acted in the context of hostilities against the United States and having engaged in or materially supported such hostilities.
The administration's national security team unanimously agreed that prosecution in Federal court was the better option and the one most likely to lead to a conviction under the facts of this case. Our Federal prosecutors and Federal courts have a proven track record in prosecuting terrorists. Two years ago, the Justice Department informed us that there were 208 inmates in Federal prisons who had been sentenced for crimes related to international terrorism and an additional 139 inmates who had been sentenced for crimes related to domestic terrorism. By contrast, prosecution of the Warsame case before a military commission would have raised a difficult jurisdictional issue that could have resulted in dismissal or even acquittal.
Critics of the decision to try Warsame in Federal court apparently would prefer that he be tried before a military commission, even though he might be less likely to be convicted there due to the jurisdictional issue. I disagree with that position. In my view, the most appropriate forum for trial should be determined, as it was here, on the basis of the nature of the offense, the nature of the evidence, and the likelihood of successful prosecution. The executive branch officials who made the determination in this case are in a much better position to weigh those factors and make that judgment than is the Congress.
By the way, the approach taken by the administration in this case is consistent with the bipartisan detainee provisions included in the National Defense Authorization Act, as reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee last month.
Those provisions would authorize military detention for enemy belligerents captured in the course of hostilities authorized by the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force. That authority appropriately encompasses the detention of an individual like Warsame, who is suspected of participation in such hostilities, until such time as the military has been able to interrogate the detainee and make an appropriate status determination. While we may not have enough evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Warsame participated in hostilities against the United States, we undoubtedly had sufficient evidence to hold him for the time required to interrogate him and obtain the intelligence that our military needs.
The provisions in the Senate Armed Services Committee-reported bill would also expressly authorize the transfer of such a detainee ``for trial by an alternative court or competent tribunal having lawful jurisdiction.'' Indeed, an amendment to delete this authority was defeated in committee by a bipartisan vote of 7 to 19. We decided, in other words, to leave it up to executive branch officials to determine on a case-by-case basis, as they did here, the most appropriate forum for prosecution, whether it be a Federal court or a military commission.
By contrast, the House version of the defense authorization bill includes a provision that would expressly prohibit the trial in Federal court of any alleged foreign terrorist who might be subject to trial by a military commission--even if he is arrested inside the United States. This provision may well be unconstitutional, given that article III of the U.S. Constitution expressly states that:
The judicial power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority.
Under the plain language of this provision, Congress would appear to lack the authority to exclude the prosecution of violations of the laws of the United States in the Federal courts.
The effort to direct all terrorist cases to military commissions could also be highly counterproductive, providing jurisdictional arguments that defendants could use to seek the dismissal of charges against them. If the House language were adopted, a case in Federal court on a terrorism charge would be at risk of being dismissed on the grounds that it could only have been brought before a military commission, while at the same time, because of the limited jurisdiction of military commissions, the military commission might not have jurisdiction either. In such a case, it would be impossible to prosecute an alleged terrorist in any
forum. The critics of the Department of Justice decision should end their effort to score political points here. The stakes are too high, and if the critics get their way, we might not be able to try some terrorists at all--anywhere.
Some may contend that holding alleged terrorists in the United States for trial could needlessly subject Americans to retaliatory attacks by terrorist organizations. There is no basis for that argument. We have tried hundreds of alleged terrorists in our Federal courts over the last decade. We are currently holding many more--including the Christmas Day bomber, who is being held in my hometown of Detroit. So far as I know, none of these cases have led to retaliatory attacks by terrorist organizations. In any event, we know that al-Qaida and its allies are already seeking avenues to attack us on American soil and would do so if they could. Moving the location of a trial to Guantanamo or some other foreign location is unlikely to deter such an attack.
Last month, ADM William McRaven--the President's nominee to be commander of U.S. Special Operations Command--testified before our Armed Services Committee that a suspected enemy belligerent detained outside the war zones in Afghanistan and Iraq would likely be put on a naval vessel until ``we can prosecute that individual in a U.S. court or we can return him to a third party country.'' Admiral McRaven made it clear later in his testimony that such an individual could also be transferred for trial by a military commission. In other words, we have a choice. We should preserve that choice.
In summary, the Warsame case demonstrates that we do have the capacity to detain and interrogate suspected terrorists in military custody for the purpose of obtaining actionable intelligence, and then to transfer them to an appropriate forum for trial--whether it be a Federal court or a military commission. This case demonstrates that we do not have to sacrifice actionable intelligence for law enforcement purposes, and that we do not have to sacrifice criminal prosecution in order to collect intelligence information. And it demonstrates that we can pursue both of these objectives without being pushed to what Admiral McRaven described as the ``unenviable option'' of having to release the detainee.
The only ``unenviable'' outcome is the one that the critics of the Department of Justice decision would lead us to--prohibiting the criminal trial of suspected foreign terrorists in Federal court and requiring them to be tried by military commissions, even in cases like the Warsame case, where a jurisdictional problem might lead a military commission to dismiss the case.
The action of the administration in the Warsame case is sound. The prosecutorial discretion they exercised as to the best forum for the trial should be preserved and should not be interfered with by the Congress.
I yield the floor.