Madam President, I believe that the McCain amendment is the pending amendment. We will be offering or suggesting that a unanimous consent agreement be entered into where an amendment of mine could be voted upon side by side with the…
Madam President, I believe that the McCain amendment is the pending amendment. We will be offering or suggesting that a unanimous consent agreement be entered into where an amendment of mine could be voted upon side by side with the amendment, with the vote on mine occurring first, under the traditions of the Senate. We are trying to see if we can enter into a time agreement.
I believe our staff is working on a unanimous consent agreement that would allow for that to happen pending the offering and acceptance of that, hopefully.
I yield the floor.
Madam President, I don't know if the unanimous consent agreement has been cleared yet, so I will proceed to debate both the McCain amendment but also the amendment I will be offering as though it is currently pending, because I do expect both amendments will be voted on at the same time.
First, to comment on the two statements that were just made by Senator McCain, one has to do with when did General Petraeus testify relative to the Iraq surge. This is a very critical point because indeed General Petreaus did testify relative to the Iraq surge, but he only testified after the decision was made relative to that surge by the President of the United States. The person who was the commander in Iraq at that time, while the deliberative process was underway in the White House as to whether a surge should take place, did not testify and was not asked to testify. There was no pressure placed on the President of the United States during those 3 months when he was deliberating on whether to surge troops into Iraq, to have his Iraq commander come up here and testify right in the middle of that deliberative process. There was no resolution, there was no request, there was no pressure being placed on the Bush White House to have his commander, who was then General Casey in Iraq, to come up and testify about whether additional troops should be sent to Iraq.
I have no doubt as to what the response would have been by President Bush and his folks: We are in the middle of a deliberative process-- which took about 3 months. Secretary Gates has testified to this. He has spoken about this 3-month deliberative process and we have gone back and checked. It was about a 3-month deliberative process that the President then was engaged in.
The first thing that happened was that President Bush announced this surge on January 10, 2007. Then and only then did Secretary Gates and General Pace, who was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, testify before the Armed Services Committee. And then and only then did General Petreaus testify before the committee on January 23. The commander in Iraq during those critical months--September, October, November, December of 2006--was General Casey.
I think history records that he, as a matter of fact, opposed additional troops to go in to Iraq. But there was no effort made here to get General Casey to come before us and to testify as to why he was opposed to putting troops into Iraq at the same time that President Bush was considering whether to adopt a policy which would send additional troops into Iraq. We did not do that and we didn't do it for a good reason. We didn't think it was appropriate.
So my first comment has to do with whether the kind of policy that we adopted relative to the President of the United States when President Bush was President, and undergoing the same kind of deliberative process as to whether additional troops should be sent into a country-- very similar to what President Obama is undergoing right now--whether the commander there now should be put in a position which we did not put General Casey in? We know what the response of the Bush White House would have been. There was no doubt as to what the response would be. While the President of the United States is thinking through whether to surge troops into Iraq, his commanding general, General Casey, was not called before us. We did not have resolutions here saying call General Casey in. Those of us who opposed additional troops going into Iraq probably had an ally in General Casey, as history has written; in opposition to sending in additional troops.
But there was no effort to put pressure on President Bush by having his commander in the field come before us at a public hearing and say he was opposed to the very thing the President of the United States was considering.
The commander, General Casey, was not put in that position. No commander should be put in that position while the President is hearing from the commander as part of a deliberative process on the very critical issue of whether to send troops in.
So a request was made of me by a number of my colleagues to have a hearing at which General McChrystal would be called. My answer was: We should not do that at this time. There will be an appropriate time. There will be an appropriate time.
The appropriate time is the same time General Petraeus was called in and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs was called in, which was after the decision and not in the middle of that deliberative process.
So the White House is now undertaking a rigorous review of General McChrystal's assessment of the situation and approach in Afghanistan. By the way, before I go any further on this, I read the transcript of General McChrystal on ``60 Minutes.'' I have not seen the speech in London that my good friend, Senator McCain, made reference to, but I have read the ``60 Minutes'' transcript. There was no effort to obtain from General McChrystal what his advice was relative to the resource question, the troops question, which lies before the President.
I know what his response would have been had he been asked, which is, that is between him and the President. But the very purpose of the hearing which is the subject of the McCain amendment, the very purpose, is a hearing on the resources needed or recommended for Afghanistan. That is the very subject which is now under consideration by the President of the United States.
So we have now a President, with his security team, including General McChrystal, who I understand was on a TV monitor yesterday with his responses--we have a President of the United States undertaking a rigorous
review of General McChrystal's assessment. We have the assessment relative to the situation in Afghanistan that has already been provided and has now been made public.
What is now under consideration is whether there ought to be a change in strategy from the March strategy, given the problems that have occurred in Afghanistan since the election, and given the other changes that have taken place, including in neighboring Pakistan, which has an effect on Afghanistan.
According to General McChrystal himself, a policy debate is warranted. What he has said over and over again in his assessment is: Debate strategy before you debate resources. He said: Resources are going to be needed whatever the strategy is. That is General McChrystal's statement: There will be needed resources.
General McChrystal: ``Additional resources are required.'' This is his assessment. But it is the second half of his sentence which is ignored too often, particularly in the media. After he said additional resources are required, without specifying what they are, that is left to this document which is now in the hands of the President, he said:
Additional resources are required. But focusing on force or
resource requirements misses the point entirely. The key
takeaway--
He said from his assessment, these are his words--
is the urgent need for a significant change to our strategy
and the way that we think and operate.
Yet it is a hearing on resources that could come in the middle of a deliberative process. We are not sure whether by November 15 that deliberative process will be completed. I have every reason to believe it will be by November 15, but we do not know. So the McCain amendment has an arbitrary date, whether this deliberative process is completed by November 15 or not under this resolution--and I will be offering an alternative to this. Under this McCain resolution, he must come before appropriate committees before November 15.
That is an arbitrary date, whether the deliberative process of the President of the United States is completed or not. But it is on the very subject, on the very subject that is now under consideration by the President. That subject is resources, troops. But listen to what General McChrystal says. He said: Yes, there are going to be resources needed--without specifying what they are.
As far as we know, he has not, at least in the assessment that is unclassified. But then he says:
New resources are not the crux. To succeed, ISAF requires a
new approach with a significant magnitude of change, in
addition to a proper level of resource.
So it is not the crux. He says strategy is the crux. But the McCain amendment says: We want to hear from McChrystal by a specific date, whether there has been a decision on the crux of the matter or not, which is the strategy. That is not me talking, that is General McChrystal who is saying: The crux of the matter is the strategy.
So now we have the White House--by the way, I am happy to interrupt my comments at any time if there is a unanimous consent agreement that has been reached. So if either the ranking member or Senator McCain knows whether we are in a situation--I would tell you so everybody can know what the proceedings are here, that at any time there is a unanimous consent agreement that can be offered, I would be happy to interrupt.
I thank my friend.
So now General McChrystal himself talks about the value of a policy debate. Here is what he said in the article in the New York Times: He welcomes alternative proposals for how to stabilize Afghanistan and Pakistan. Then he says: ``This is the right kind of process.'' He says: ``I have been given the opportunity to provide my input to the decision.''
So we have this internal deliberation going on in the White House, which I think we would all agree is a matter of supreme importance; that is, whether we put troops in harm's way, and how many, what is the strategy they are following, what is their mission. That is the most important decision I believe a President of the United States can make. It should be a deliberative decision. It is going to be a deliberative decision. This President has made it clear.
There was a March strategy, but there are a number of things that have changed since March, including an election where there are significant allegations of fraud. When such an election takes place, that lowers the support of the people of Afghanistan for a strategy which involves them. They must succeed. It is the people of Afghanistan who have to succeed. It is the Army of Afghanistan that has to succeed. It is the police in Afghanistan. It is the civil administration which must succeed in Afghanistan.
If there is this question about an election which then might impact the support of the people for the very policies in Afghanistan, the institutions that need to be fought for, that could change things. There are events in Pakistan. The Pakistani Government is doing a lot better relative to some of the threats they face. That can make a change. But the President of the United States is committed to reviewing what has happened since March, to see whether that strategy still applies or whether he wishes to change that strategy. It is a debate General McChrystal himself has said is warranted. There are a number of differences between the amendment which I am going to be offering and the pending amendment of Senator McCain.
Madam President, I think we now have a unanimous consent agreement which has been cleared. I ask unanimous consent that amendment numbers 2593, which is the Levin amendment, and 2575, which is the McCain amendment, be debated concurrently for a period of 30 minutes, with the time equally divided and controlled between Senators Levin and McCain or their designees; that no amendments be in order to either amendment prior to a vote in relation thereto; that the vote sequence be as the amendments are listed above; further, that once this agreement is entered, Senator Levin be recognized to call up amendment 2593; and that prior to the second vote in the sequence, there be 2 minutes, equally divided and controlled, prior to each vote, with the second vote 10 minutes in duration; and that the votes in relation to the amendments be at 2 p.m. today; provided further that following this debate, the amendments be set aside until 2 p.m.
I understand it means from now.
I thank my friend from Arizona. I now call up amendment No. 2593.
I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
Madam President, I believe that the Congressional hearings, which are appropriate, should now be handled in the same way as was done when President Bush was deliberating on a surge strategy for Iraq. That is when the President has received his recommendations and has made a decision.
We will, at that point, properly have administration officials come up to Congress, explain the President's decision. We will hear from our military chain of command at that time, including General McChrystal but not limited to General McChrystal. We have a Secretary of Defense whom we need to hear from. We have a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff whom we need to hear from, as well as our CENTCOM commander and our Afghanistan commander.
First, we need to be clear on our strategy. I yield myself 5 minutes.
We need to be clear on our strategy first, then address the question of the resources that are needed to be committed to that strategy.
Under the amendment which I am offering, which will be voted on concurrently, or at the same time as the McCain amendment, we are going to have, if this amendment is adopted, a hearing not just on resources but on strategy and resources.
We are going to have that hearing, if this amendment is adopted, at the appropriate time, not with an arbitrary deadline, which sets a very bad premise. I believe in this circumstance, similar to the Bush Iraq surge circumstance, where the President of the United States, be it President Bush or President Obama, has before him and is considering, in a very deliberative way, this kind of a life-and-death decision.
Under the Levin amendment, there will be a hearing without an arbitrary deadline, but the hearing will take place and could take place long before November 15. The hearing under my amendment will take place promptly after the decision is made by the President.
There is another difference between the two amendments. In addition to the Levin amendment including a hearing on strategy as well as resources, again, General McChrystal says the strategy is the crux of the matter, not just resources. So under the Levin amendment, the hearing will look at both the decision on strategy as well as on resources.
Secondly, under the Levin amendment, the testimony will come after the decision of President Obama, just the way we had hearings after the decision by President Bush.
Third, the hearings will include testimony not only from the Central Command commander and from General McChrystal, our Afghanistan commander, and the Ambassador to Afghanistan, under the Levin amendment the hearing will also take testimony from senior civilian officials and military officials not included in the McCain amendment, including the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Ambassador to Pakistan. That is the third difference between the two amendments which we will be voting on at 2 o'clock.
Finally, in addition to outlining those three critical differences between the two amendments, I want to read from a letter received yesterday--or this morning from Secretary Gates by the majority leader.
I am writing in response to your request for an update on
the . . . strategy and resource assessments prepared by
General Stanley McChrystal.
He goes through a number of paragraphs describing pretty much what we all know, including that General McChrystal's initial assessment, which has been available to us, ``will serve as the prime focus'' of the review the President has undertaken, ``although other options and perspectives will also be included.'' So in addition to General McChrystal's initial assessment, he will also be looking at other options and considering other perspectives.
Then Secretary Gates says the following in this letter to the majority leader:
The decisions that the President faces may be some of the
most important on Afghanistan in his presidency, so it
behooves us to take the necessary time to make sure we get
this right. That said, there are a number of internal
meetings scheduled over the next few weeks on this topic. I
do not expect decisions on the overall strategy--or the
resources necessary to carry it out--to take an extended
period of time.
He concludes as follows:
Until the President makes his decision on the way forward
in Afghanistan, it would be inappropriate for me--or our
military commanders--to openly discuss the advice being
provided or the nature of the discussions being carried out
with the President. However, once the President acts, I will
be happy to testify before the appropriate committees of the
Congress and to facilitate similar testimony by commanders
and other senior Department leaders.
I believe that is the right approach. It is the approach we took when President Bush was considering for 3 months whether to surge troops in Iraq. We did not try to bring his Iraq commander before the Congress for public hearings, a commander who history has indicated--at least it was fairly clear at the time--had a very different perspective than his Commander in Chief. We did not put him in that position. We didn't do that to the President of the United States, to have his commander in the field come before us and say what his opinions were that he was giving to the President at that time. We should not do that now.
I yield the floor.
Mr. President, how much time remains?
I yield myself 2 minutes.
It is clear that a number of things are happening. One is, there is a deliberative process going on. There is not much doubt that the clock is ticking. That is clear. The question is--and this is what General McChrystal says--get your strategy straight. Take the time to get your strategy straight. He also recommends that there will be new resources, whatever the strategy. But he says the key here--these are his words-- take the time to get your strategy right. We can either spend the time that the President deserves and President Bush took to get the strategy right or we will be jeopardizing the lives of the men and women who put on the uniform of the United States, if there is a wrong strategy in place.
The clock was ticking in Iraq. Back in September 2006, there was a recommendation that there be a change in strategy in Iraq, that there be a surge of troops. The recommendation was made by General Keane in September 2006, start a surge. For over 3 months, while the clock was ticking, President Bush considered whether to change the strategy in Iraq. He finally changed it in January of 2007, taking 3 or 4 months to make that decision.
Do you know what. He got the strategy right, finally, in January of 2007, because the surge had a positive effect. But he took the time to make a decision. We did not put pressure on him by calling a commander from the field, who apparently had a very different perspective, for hearings during that process. We respected that process. We did not try to put pressure on a President of the United States by calling the commander, General Casey, in to tell us: No, we do not need more troops, which is apparently what he would have told us, while the President of the United States was considering whether to send additional troops.
The analogy is incredibly close to what is going on now. We should be treating the President of the United States, President Obama, with the same respect for the deliberative process that we provided to President Bush.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a letter which was sent by Secretary Gates to the majority leader, Senator Reid, be printed in the Record.
I yield the floor.
Mr. President, how much time is remaining?
Mr. President, the stakes here are truly huge. We obviously share one goal; that is, to succeed in Afghanistan. What General McChrystal has pointed out repeatedly in his assessment is that the way to succeed is not just with resources. He says the crux of the matter is to get a new strategy. His words: get a new strategy.
The question is, are we going to allow this President the same opportunity to put a strategy in place or to change it, as President Bush did in Iraq, as we have afforded to other Presidents, including President Bush?
The right strategy here is key, as well as the resources. And to set an artificial date is a terrible precedent. To put a commander in the field at a public hearing to try to pressure a Commander in Chief to reach a certain result is unacceptable, inappropriate. The Secretary of Defense is not going to allow it, nor should he, and we are not going to ask it, as chairman of the Armed Services Committee. I hope the Senate does not ask for that to happen either. We did not do that to President Bush. We should not do that to President Obama.
I reserve the remainder of my time.
Mr. President, I yield my remaining 2 minutes to Senator Kaufman.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be allowed to speak for 10 additional seconds.
Mr. President, I want to thank Senator McCain for his warm comments. I feel very strongly about our relationship. It is a great relationship. It could not be possibly affected by differences over policies. I have great respect for the Senator and the huge contributions he makes to this body and to the Nation.
Mr. President, while the majority leader is on the Senate floor and talking so eloquently about the inadequacy of health insurance and specific examples, one of the statistics--and I know it is just a statistic, not a specific example--which has moved me so dramatically in the direction the majority leader described is, if I understand this correctly, the majority of people in this country go into personal bankruptcy because they cannot pay their health care costs. That is bad enough; nobody should go bankrupt because they cannot pay for health care. That is unacceptable in this country.
But what compounds that is that a majority of them do have health insurance. The American people focus on that statistic, and I know statistics are difficult to put our arms around. But the majority of people who go bankrupt because of not being able to pay health care bills have health insurance. This isn't just a matter of trying to get people covered who are not covered; it is a matter of also trying to fill in for the inadequacy of the uncertainty that exists, the instability that exists for people to have health insurance.
I thank the leader. We are not going to be able to get to the needed health care reform without his leadership. He also pointed out a particular circumstance that a number of our States are in. I am grateful for this situation.
In Michigan, we are losing 27,000 jobs a month. I believe we have the highest unemployment rate in the country, which is 15.2 percent. It is growing, and it will continue to grow, apparently. People are losing their health care. The number of people eligible for Medicaid is increasing.
The bill before the Finance Committee has a provision in it that we will have more people eligible for Medicaid. That is critically important. That is one way to get more people eligible for health care. But what the Finance Committee does in its current mark is also say that certain States--including Nevada, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Michigan--are suffering particularly, and in particular ways, and we are a long way from economic recovery. So the additional Medicaid support for those States is highly appropriate. There are reasons for that.
The majority leader talks about the flooding in Georgia or the disaster we had in Louisiana a few years ago or the fires in California. We have an economic fire taking place in my home State of Michigan. I thank the majority leader for his willingness not just to grapple with the entire issue of health care reform but to also recognize not just the situation in his own State, with all the foreclosures they have been facing, but the situation we face in a number of other States economically. We are very grateful.
Mr. President, there are two amendments that we will be voting on next to each other, side by side, relating to the appearance of not only General McChrystal but, if my amendment is passed, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Commander in CENTCOM and General McChrystal, both. That was the approach we used when President Bush, for 3 months, had under consideration an Iraqi surge. Nobody tried to have a hearing at that time to bring in his commander while the President was deliberating to give us the commander's views that he was sharing with his Commander in Chief. As a matter of fact, that commander, General Casey, had views which ran very contrary to his Commander in Chief. But we should follow that same pattern here. We should allow this deliberative process to take place. We should not try to intrude upon it or to put the commander in the field in a position where he is testifying in public relative to what he is advising his Commander in Chief.
I ask for the yeas and nays.
Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. President, I very much oppose the amendment. Secretary Gates opposes it. It would be totally inappropriate, in the middle of a deliberative process, to pit a commander of our troops in the field against the Commander in Chief. We did not do this when President Bush was President and General Casey was the commander. Apparently, he had very different views about the surge. Three months went by while President Bush deliberated on whether to surge troops. We never put General Casey at a hearing to tell us what he was advising President Bush, asking why we heard he might be advising a very different course of action. We never did that to President Bush. We should extend the same courtesy to President Obama during this deliberative process.
There are good reasons why Secretary Gates opposes bringing his commander in front of a public hearing at this time. We should show the same respect for the President of the United States now as we did when President Bush was President.