Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of Mr. Mark Malloch Brown, the Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations. In a recent speech on ``Power and Super-Power: Global Leadership in the Twenty- First Century'' at the Century Foundation…
Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of Mr. Mark Malloch Brown, the Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations. In a recent speech on ``Power and Super-Power: Global Leadership in the Twenty- First Century'' at the Century Foundation and Center for American Progress in New York, on the 6th of June, Mr. Brown criticized the U.S. government for its lack of support given to the United Nations. In his speech he claims that the U.S. in the eyes of the rest of the world has ignored our commitment to the U.N., allowing divisive issues such as the Iraq War to break up a partnership which since the founding of the U.N. has mutually benefited the U.S. and the U.N.
Historically, the U.N. was designed through U.S. leadership and other nations who emerged from World War II with the realization that there must be a vehicle to encourage the promotion of peace and provide collective security to all nations with the goal of promoting global values such as human rights and democracy. Today, the U.N. fields 18 peacekeeping operations around the world, from the Congo to Haiti, Sudan to Sierra Leone, Southern Lebanon to Liberia. Unfortunately, the U.N.'s ability to respond to the world's challenges is being weakened without U.S. leadership.
The speech identifies several key issues that have exacerbated the tension between the U.S. and the U.N. First, The U.N. is currently renovating the dilapidated U.N. Headquarters in New York. Ironically, the government not fully supporting this project is the U.S. Also, the U.N. is undergoing specific reform. This reform comes in many forms from the creation of a new Ethics Office and a whistle-blower policy, to the establishment of a new Peacebuilding Commission and Human Rights Council. Although the U.S. championed such reform, our endorsement has provoked more suspicion than support.
The U.N. will play a larger role in maintaining security around the world. No country can afford to neglect the global institutions needed to manage it. As such, the U.S. needs to be more supportive of the U.N. as a vehicle around which an international consensus can be formed to promote peace, social and economic development. America's leaders must again recognize that the U.N. matters. Ultimately, as America continues to address concerns in countries like Sudan, Iraq and Afghanistan, it should recognize that it needs the U.N. to provide an effective multilateral response that will have international legitimacy and support.
Mr. Speaker, I call upon my colleagues in the House to encourage more open collaboration and engagement between the U.S. and the U.N.
Speech by U.N. Deputy Secretary-General Mark Malloch Brown
Thank you for allowing me to speak to you today on Power
and Global Leadership. I often get asked to talk about
leadership, but rarely about power. I wonder why.
With that thought as my starting point, I am going to give
what might be regarded as a rather un-U.N. speech. Some of
the themes--that the United Nations is misunderstood and does
much more than its critics allow--are probably not
surprising. But my underlying message, which is a warning
about the serious consequences of a decades-long tendency by
U.S. Administrations of both parties to engage only fitfully
with the U.N., is not one a sitting United Nations official
would normally make to an audience like this.
But I feel it is a message that urgently needs to be aired.
And as someone who has spent most of his adult life in this
country, only a part of it at the U.N., I hope you will take
it in the spirit in which it is meant: as a sincere and
constructive critique of U.S. policy towards the U.N. by a
friend and admirer. Because the fact is that the prevailing
practice of seeking to use the U.N. almost by stealth as a
diplomatic tool while failing to stand up for it against its
domestic critics is
simply not sustainable. You will lose the U.N. one way or
another.
Founders' Vision
Multilateral compromise has always been difficult to
justify in the American political debate: too many speeches,
too many constraints, too few results. Yet it was not meant
to be so. The all-moral-idealism-no-power institution was the
League of Nations. The U.N. was explicitly designed through
U.S. leadership and the ultimate coalition of the willing,
its World War II allies, as a very different creature, an
antidote to the League's failure. At the U.N.'s core was to
be an enforceable concept of collective security protected by
the victors of that war, combined with much more practical
efforts to promote global values such as human rights and
democracy. Underpinning this new approach was a judgement
that no President since Truman has felt able to repeat: that
for the world's one super-Power--arguably more super in 1946
than 2006--managing global security and development issues
through the network of a United Nations was worth the effort.
Yes it meant the give and take of multilateral bargaining,
but any dilution of American positions was more than made up
for by the added clout of action that enjoyed global support.
Today, we are coming to the end of the 10-year term of
arguably the U.N.'s best-ever Secretary-General, Kofi Annan.
But some of his very successes--promoting human rights and a
responsibility to protect people from abuse by their own
Governments; creating a new status for civil society and
business at the U.N.--are either not recognized or have come
under steady attacks from anti-U.N. groups. To take just one
example, 10 years ago U.N. peacekeeping seemed almost
moribund in the aftermath of tragic mistakes in Rwanda,
Somalia and Yugoslavia. Today, the U.N. fields 18
peacekeeping operations around the world, from the Congo to
Haiti, Sudan to Sierra Leone, Southern Lebanon to Liberia,
with an annual cost that is at a bargain bin price compared
to other U.S.-led operations. And the U.S. pays roughly one
quarter of those U.N. peacekeeping costs--just over $1
billion this year. That figure should be seen in the context
of estimates by both the GAO and RAND Corporation that U.N.
peacekeeping, while lacking heavy armament enforcement
capacity, helps to maintain peace--when there is a peace to
keep--more effectively for a lot less than comparable U.S.
operations. Multilateral peacekeeping is effective cost-
sharing on a much lower cost business model and it works.
That is as it should be and is true for many other areas
the U.N. system works in, too, from humanitarian relief to
health to education. Yet for many policymakers and opinion
leaders in Washington, let alone the general public, the
roles I have described are hardly believed or, where they
are, remain discreetly underplayed. To acknowledge an
America reliant on international institutions is not
perceived to be good politics at home.
However, inevitably a moment of truth is coming. Because
even as the world's challenges are growing, the U.N.'s
ability to respond is being weakened without U.S. leadership.
Take the issue of human rights. When Eleanor Roosevelt took
the podium at the U.N. to argue passionately for the
elaboration of a Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
world responded. Today, when the human rights machinery was
renewed with the formation of a Human Rights Council to
replace the discredited Commission on Human Rights, and the
U.S. chose to stay on the sidelines, the loss was
everybody's. I hope and believe the new Council will prove
itself to be a stronger and more effective body than its
predecessor. But there is no question that the U.S. decision
to call for a vote in order to oppose it in the General
Assembly, and then to not run for a seat after it was
approved by 170 votes to 4, makes the challenge more
difficult.
More broadly, Americans complain about the U.N.'s
bureaucracy, weak decision-making, the lack of accountable
modern management structures and the political divisions of
the General Assembly here in New York. And my response is,
``guilty on all counts''. But why? In significant part
because the U.S. has not stuck with its project--its
professed wish to have a strong, effective United Nations--in
a systematic way. Secretary Albright and others here today
have played extraordinary leadership roles in U.S.-U.N.
relations, for which I salute them. But in the eyes of the
rest of the world, U.S. commitment tends to ebb much more
than it flows. And in recent years, the enormously divisive
issue of Iraq and the big stick of financial withholding have
come to define an unhappy marriage.
As someone who deals with Washington almost daily, I know
this is unfair to the very real effort all three Secretaries
of State I have worked with--Secretary Albright, Secretary
Powell and Secretary Rice--put into U.N. issues. And today,
on a very wide number of areas, from Lebanon and Afghanistan
to Syria, Iran and the Palestinian issue, the U.S. is
constructively engaged with the U.N. But that is not well
known or understood, in part because much of the public
discourse that reaches the U.S. heartland has been largely
abandoned to its loudest detractors such as Rush Limbaugh and
Fox News. That is what I mean by ``stealth'' diplomacy: the
U.N.'s role is in effect a secret in Middle America even as
it is highlighted in the Middle East and other parts of the
world. Exacerbating matters is the widely held perception,
even among many U.S. allies, that the U.S. tends to hold on
to maximalist positions when it could be finding middle
ground.
We can see this even on apparently non-controversial issues
such as renovating the dilapidated U.N. Headquarters in New
York. While an architectural landmark, the building falls
dangerously short of city codes, lacks sprinklers, is filled
with asbestos and is in most respects the most hazardous
workplace in town. But the only Government not fully
supporting the project is the U.S. Too much unchecked U.N.-
bashing and stereotyping over too many years--manifest in a
fear by politicians to be seen to be supporting better
premises for overpaid, corrupt U.N. bureaucrats--makes even
refurbishing a building a political hot potato.
Making Reform Work
One consequence is that, like the building itself, the
vital renewal of the Organization, the updating of its
mission, its governance and its management tools, is
addressed only intermittently. And when the U.S. does
champion the right issues like management reform, as it is
currently doing, it provokes more suspicion than support.
Last December, for example, largely at U.S. insistence,
instead of a normal two-year budget, Member States approved
only six months' worth of expenditure--a period which ends on
June 30. Developing and developed countries, the latter with
the U.S. at the fore, are now at loggerheads over whether
sufficient reform has taken place to lift that cap, or indeed
whether there should be any links between reform and the
budget. Without agreement, we could face a fiscal crisis very
soon.
There has been a significant amount of reform over the last
18 months, from the creation of a new Ethics Office and
whistle-blower policy, to the establishment of a new
Peacebuilding Commission and Human Rights Council. But not
enough. The unfinished management reform agenda, which the
U.S. sensibly supports, is in many ways a statement of the
obvious. It argues that systems and processes designed 60
years ago for an organization largely devoted to running
conferences and writing reports simply don't work for today's
operational U.N., which conducts multibillion-dollar
peacekeeping missions, humanitarian relief operations and
other complex operations all over the world. The report sets
out concrete proposals for how this can be fixed while also
seeking to address the broader management, oversight and
accountability weaknesses highlighted by the ``oil-for-food''
programme.
One day soon we must address the massive gap between the
scale of world issues and the limits of the institutions we
have built to address them. However, today even relatively
modest proposals that in any other organization would be seen
as uncontroversial, such as providing more authority and
flexibility for the Secretary-General to shift posts and
resources to organizational priorities without having to get
direct approval from Member States, have been fiercely
resisted by the G-77, the main group of developing countries,
on the grounds that this weakens accountability. Hence the
current deadlock.
What lies behind this? It is not because most developing
countries don't want reform. To be sure, a few spoilers do
seem to be opposed to reform for its own sake, and there is
no question that some countries are seeking to manipulate the
process for their own ends with very damaging consequences.
But in practice, the vast majority is fully supportive of the
principle of a better run, more effective U.N.; indeed they
know they would be the primary beneficiaries, through more
peace, and more development. So why has it not so far been
possible to isolate the radicals and build a strong alliance
of reform-minded nations to push through this agenda? I would
argue that the answer lies in questions about motives and
power. Motives, in that, very unfortunately, there is
currently a perception among many otherwise quite moderate
countries that anything the U.S. supports must have a secret
agenda aimed at either subordinating multilateral processes
to Washington's ends or weakening the institutions, and
therefore, put crudely, should be opposed without any real
discussion of whether they make sense or not.
And power, that in two different ways revolves around
perceptions of the role and representativeness of the
Security Council. First, in that there has been a real,
understandable hostility by the wider membership to the
perception that the Security Council, in particular the five
permanent members, is seeking a role in areas not formally
within its remit, such as management issues or human rights.
Second, an equally understandable conviction that those five,
veto-wielding permanent members who happen to be the victors
in a war fought 60 years ago, cannot be seen as
representative of today's world--even when looking through
the lens of financial contributions. Indeed, the so-called G-
4 of Security Council aspirants--Japan, India, Brazil and
Germany--contribute twice as much as the P-4, the four
permanent members excluding the U.S.
Prime Minister Tony Blair acknowledged exactly this point
on his trip to Washington last month, and it is something
which does need to be addressed. More broadly, the very
reasonable concerns of the full U.N. membership that the
fundamental multilateral principle that each Member State's
vote counts equally in the wider work of the U.N. needs to be
acknowledged and accommodated within a broader framework of
reform. If the multilateral system is to work effectively,
all States need to feel they have a real stake.
New Global Challenges
But a stake in what system? The U.S.--like every nation,
strong and weak alike--is today beset by problems that defy
national, inside-the-border solutions: climate change,
terrorism, nuclear proliferation, migration, the management
of the global economy, the internationalization of drugs and
crime, the spread of diseases such as HIV and avian flu.
Today's new national security challenges basically thumb
their noses at old notions of national sovereignty. Security
has gone global, and no country can afford to neglect the
global institutions needed to manage it. Kofi Annan has
proposed a restructuring of the U.N. to respond to these new
challenges with three legs: development, security and human
rights supported, like any good chair, by a fourth leg,
reformed management. That is the U.N. we want to place our
bet on. But for it to work, we need the U.S. to support this
agenda--and support it not just in a whisper but in a coast
to coast shout that pushes back the critics domestically and
wins over the sceptics internationally. America's leaders
must again say the U.N. matters.
When you talk better national education scores, you don't
start with ``I support the Department of Education''.
Similarly for the U.N. it starts with politicians who will
assert the U.S. is going to engage with the world to tackle
climate change, poverty, immigration and terrorism. Stand up
for that agenda consistently and allow the U.N. to ride on
its coat-tails as a vital means of getting it done. It also
means a sustained inside-the-tent diplomacy at the U.N. No
more ``take it or leave it'', red-line demands thrown in
without debate and engagement.
Let me close with a few words on Darfur to make my point. A
few weeks ago, my kids were on the Mall in Washington,
demanding President Bush do more to end the genocide in
Darfur and President Bush wants to do more. I'd bet some of
your kids were there as well. Perhaps you were, too. And yet
what can the U.S. do alone in the heart of Africa, in a
region the size of France? A place where the Government in
Khartoum is convinced the U.S. wants to extend the hegemony
it is thought to have asserted in Iraq and Afghanistan. In
essence, the U.S. is stymied before it even passes ``Go''. It
needs the U.N. as a multilateral means to address Sudan's
concerns. It needs the U.N. to secure a wide multicultural
array of troop and humanitarian partners. It needs the U.N.
to provide the international legitimacy that Iraq has again
proved is an indispensable component to success on the
ground. Yet, the U.N. needs its first parent, the U.S., every
bit as much if it is to deploy credibly in one of the world's
nastiest neighbourhoods.
Back in Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt's day, building a
strong, effective U.N. that could play this kind of role was
a bipartisan enterprise, with the likes of Arthur Vandenberg
and John Foster Dulles joining Democrats to support the new
body. Who are their successors in American politics? Who will
campaign in 2008 for a new multilateral national security?