I thank the gentleman for yielding. Mr. Speaker, everyone in Congress and most people in this country understand that our immigration system is broken and needs to be fixed. Our colleagues on the other side of the aisle have blocked a…
I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Speaker, everyone in Congress and most people in this country understand that our immigration system is broken and needs to be fixed. Our colleagues on the other side of the aisle have blocked a bipartisan Senate bill from coming to the floor, and President Obama has taken action that he is legally permitted and morally obligated to take.
Executive orders are not unusual. Every President since President Eisenhower has used this authority to take action on immigration issues, including six Republican Presidents.
So, Mr. Speaker, when the gentleman from Florida said voting against his bill is like voting against the Constitution, I suggest it is just the opposite. The contours for the executive authority of the President are defined in the Constitution and by precedent of the courts. There is no question that the President has the authority to exercise prosecutorial discretion in this regard. So, in fact, voting for this bill undermines the Constitution because the executive authority of the President is set forth in the Constitution of the United States.
We all recognize there are 11 million undocumented residents of this country. We don't allocate resources to deport all 11 million. We allocate resources to deport about 400,000, which means, by definition, we are asking the department to set priorities in deciding whom to deport. Setting those priorities ensures that they deport the most serious offenders, people who pose threats to our communities.
That act of prosecutorial discretion is what is reflected in the President's executive order.
It is very important to understand that there is practically very little question from legal scholars.
I insert in the Record a letter which has the signature of 136 law professors who support the constitutionality of this provision, as well as a separate letter from additional titans in the legal community, beginning with President Lee Bollinger from Columbia University, Adam Cox from New York University, Walter Dellinger, and several other legal scholars.
25 November 2014.
We write as scholars and teachers of immigration law who
have reviewed the executive actions announced by the
President on November 20, 2014. It is our considered view
that the expansion of the Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals (DACA) and establishment of the Deferred Action for
Parental Accountability (DAPA) programs are within the legal
authority of the executive branch of the government of the
United States. To explain, we cite federal statutes,
regulations, and historical precedents. We do not express any
views on the policy aspects of these two executive actions.
This letter updates a letter transmitted by 136 law
professors to the White House on
September 3, 2014, on the role of executive action in
immigration law. We focus on the legal basis for granting
certain noncitizens in the United States ``deferred action''
status as a temporary reprieve from deportation. One of these
programs, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), was
established by executive action in June 2012. On November 20,
the President announced the expansion of eligibility criteria
for DACA and the creation of a new program, Deferred Action
for Parental Accountability (DAPA).
Prosecutorial discretion in immigration law enforcement
Both November 20 executive actions relating to deferred
action are exercises of prosecutorial discretion.
Prosecutorial discretion refers to the authority of the
Department of Homeland Security to decide how the immigration
laws should be applied. Prosecutorial discretion is a long-
accepted legal practice in practically every law enforcement
context, unavoidable whenever the appropriated resources do
not permit 100 percent enforcement. In immigration
enforcement, prosecutorial discretion covers both agency
decisions to refrain from acting on enforcement like
cancelling or not serving or filing a charging document to
Notice to Appear with the immigration court, as well as
decisions to provide a discretionary remedy like granting a
stay of removal, parole, or deferred action.
Prosecutorial discretion provides a temporary reprieve from
deportation. Some forms of prosecutorial discretion, like
deferred action, confer ``lawful presence'' and the ability
to apply for work authorization. However, the benefits of the
deferred action programs announced on November 20 are not
unlimited. The DACA and DAPA programs, like any other
exercise of prosecutorial discretion do not provide an
independent means to obtain permanent residence in the United
States, nor do they allow a noncitizen to acquire eligibility
to apply for naturalization as a U.S. citizen. As the
President has emphasized, only Congress can prescribe the
qualifications for permanent resident status or citizenship.
Statutory authority and long-standing agency practice
Focusing first on statutes enacted by Congress, Sec. 103(a)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (``INA'' or the
``Act''), clearly empowers the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) to make choices about immigration enforcement.
That section provides: ``The Secretary of Homeland Security
shall be charged with the administration and enforcement of
this Act and all other laws relating to the immigration and
naturalization of aliens . . . .'' INA Sec. 242(g) recognizes
the executive branch's legal authority to exercise
prosecutorial discretion, specifically by barring judicial
review of three particular types of prosecutorial discretion
decisions: to commence removal proceedings, to adjudicate
cases, and to execute removal orders. In other sections of
the Act, Congress has explicitly recognized deferred action
by name, as a tool that the executive branch may use, in the
exercise of its prosecutorial discretion, to protect certain
victims of abuse, crime or trafficking. Another statutory
provision, INA Sec. 274A(h)(3), recognizes executive branch
authority to authorize employment for noncitizens who do not
otherwise receive it automatically by virtue of their
particular immigration status. This provision (and the formal
regulations noted below) confer the work authorization
eligibility that is part of both the DACA and DAPA programs.
Based on this statutory foundation, the application of
prosecutorial discretion to individuals or groups has been
part of the immigration system for many years. Longstanding
provisions of the formal regulations promulgated under the
Act (which have the force of law) reflect the prominence of
prosecutorial discretion in immigration law. Deferred action
is expressly defined in one regulation as ``an act of
administrative convenience to the government which gives some
cases lower priority'' and goes on to authorize work permits
for those who receive deferred action. Agency memoranda
further reaffirm the role of prosecutorial discretion in
immigration law. In 1976, President Ford's Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) General Counsel Sam Bernsen
stated in a legal opinion, ``The reasons for the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion are both practical and humanitarian.
There simply are not enough resources to enforce all of the
rules and regulations presently on the books.' In 2000, a
memorandum on prosecutorial discretion in immigration matters
issued by INS Commissioner Doris Meissner provided that
[s]ervice officers are not only authorized by law but
expected to exercise discretion in a judicious manner at all
stages of the enforcement process,'' and spelled out the
factors that should guide those decisions. In 2011,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement in the Department of
Homeland Security published guidance known as the ``Morton
Memo,'' outlining more than one dozen factors, including
humanitarian factors, for employees to consider in deciding
whether prosecutorial discretion should be exercised. These
factors--now updated by the November 20 executive actions--
include tender or elderly age, long-time lawful permanent
residence, and serious health conditions.
Judicial recognition of executive branch prosecutorial discretion in
immigration cases
Federal courts have also explicitly recognized
prosecutorial discretion in general and deferred action in
particular: Notably, the U.S. Supreme Court noted in its
Arizona v. United States decision in 2012: ``A principal
feature of the removal system is the broad discretion
exercised by immigration officials . . . Federal officials,
as an initial matter, must decide whether it makes sense to
pursue removal at all . . .'' In its 1999 decision in Reno v.
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, the Supreme
Court explicitly recognized deferred action by name. This
affirmation of the role of discretion is consistent with
congressional appropriations for immigration enforcement,
which are at an annual level that would allow for the arrest,
detention, and deportation of fewer than 4 percent of the
noncitizens in the United States who lack lawful immigration
status.
Based on statutory authority, U.S. immigration agencies
have a long history of exercising prosecutorial discretion
for a range of reasons that include economic or humanitarian
considerations, especially--albeit not only--when the
noncitizens involved have strong family ties or long-term
residence in the United States. Prosecutorial discretion,
including deferred action, has been made available on both a
case-by-case basis and a group basis, as are true under DACA
and DAPA. But even when a program like deferred action has
been aimed at a particular group of people, individuals must
apply, and the agency must exercise its discretion based on
the facts of each individual case. Both DACA and DAPA
explicitly incorporate that requirement.
Historical precedents for deferred action and similar programs for
individuals and groups
As examples of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion,
numerous administrations have issued directives providing
deferred action or functionally similar forms of
prosecutorial discretion to groups of noncitizens, often to
large groups. The administrations of Presidents Ronald Reagan
and George H.W. Bush deferred the deportations of a then-
predicted (though ultimately much lower) 1.5 million
noncitizen spouses and children of immigrants who qualified
for legalization under the Immigration Reform and Control Act
(IRCA) of 1986, authorizing work permits for the spouses.
Presidents Reagan and Bush took these actions, even though
Congress had decided to exclude them from IRCA. Among the
many other examples of significant deferred action or similar
programs are two during the George W. Bush administration: a
deferred action program in 2005 for foreign academic students
affected by Hurricane Katrina, and ``Deferred Enforcement
Departure'' for certain Liberians in 2007.'' Several decades
earlier, the Reagan administration issued a form of
prosecutorial discretion called ``Extended Voluntary
Departure'' in 1981 to thousands of Polish nationals. The
legal sources and historical examples of immigration
prosecutorial discretion described above are by no means
exhaustive, but they underscore the legal authority for an
administration to apply prosecutorial discretion to both
individuals and groups.
Some have suggested that the size of the group who may
``benefit'' from an act of prosecutorial discretion is
relevant to its legality. We are unaware of any legal
authority for such an assumption. Notably, the Reagan-Bush
programs of the late 1980s and early 1990s were based on an
initial estimated percentage of the unauthorized population
(about 40 percent) that is comparable to the initial
estimated percentage for the November 20 executive actions.
The President could conceivably decide to cap the number of
people who can receive prosecutorial discretion or make the
conditions restrictive enough to keep the numbers small, but
this would be a policy choice, not a legal issue. For all of
these reasons, the President is not ``re-writing'' the
immigration laws, as some of his critics have suggested. He
is doing precisely the opposite--exercising a discretion
conferred by the immigration laws and settled general
principles of enforcement discretion.
The Constitution and immigration enforcement discretion
Critics have also suggested that the deferred action
programs announced on November 20 violate the President's
constitutional duty to ``take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed.'' A serious legal question would
therefore arise if the executive branch were to halt all
immigration enforcement, or even if the Administration were
to refuse to substantially spend the resources appropriated
by Congress. In either of those scenarios, the justification
based on resource limitations would not apply. But the Obama
administration has fully utilized all the enforcement
resources Congress has appropriated. It has enforced the
immigration law at record levels through apprehensions,
investigations, and detentions that have resulted in over two
million removals. At the same time that the President
announced the November 20 executive actions that we discuss
here, he also announced revised enforcement priorities to
focus on removing the most serious criminal offenders and
further shoring up the southern border. Nothing in the
President's actions will prevent him from continuing to
remove as many violators as the resources Congress has given
him permit.
Moreover, when prosecutorial discretion is exercised,
particularly when the numbers are large, there is no legal
barrier to formalizing that policy decision through sound
procedures that include a formal application and
dissemination of the relevant criteria to the
officers charged with implementing the program and to the
public. As DACA has shown, those kinds of procedures assure
that important policy decisions are made at the leadership
level, help officers to implement policy decisions fairly and
consistently, and offer the public the transparency that
government priority decisions require in a democracy.
Conclusion
Our conclusion is that the expansion of the DACA program
and the establishment of Deferred Action for Parental
Accountability are legal exercises of prosecutorial
discretion. Both executive actions are well within the legal
authority of the executive branch of the government of the
United States.
Hiroshi Motomura & Susan Westerberg Prager, University of
California, Los Angeles, School of Law*; Shoba Sivaprasad
Wadhia, Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of
Law; Stephen H. Legomsky, Washington University School of
Law; David Abraham, University of Miami School of Law; Raquel
Aldana, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law;
Farrin R. Anello, Seton Hall University School of Law;
Deborah Anker, Harvard Law School; Sabrineh Ardalan, Harvard
Law School; David C. Baluarte, Washington and Lee University
School of Law; Melynda Barnhart, New York Law School; Jon
Bauer, University of Connecticut School of Law; Lenni B.
Benson, New York Law School; Jacqueline Bhabha, Harvard Law
School;
Linda Bosniak, Rutgers University School of Law-Camden;
Richard A. Boswell, U.C. Hastings College of the Law; Jason
A. Cade, University of Georgia Law School; Janet Calvo, CUNY
School of Law, New York; Kristina M. Campbell, University of
the District of Columbia David A. Clarke School of Law; Stacy
Caplow, Brooklyn Law School; Benjamin Casper, University of
Minnesota Law School; Linus Chan, University of Minnesota;
Howard F. Chang, University of Pennsylvania Law School;
Michael J. Churgin, University of Texas at Austin; Marisa
Cianciarulo, Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law;
Evelyn Cruz, Arizona State University; Ingrid Eagly, UCLA
School of Law; Philip Eichorn, Cleveland State--Cleveland
Marshall School of Law;
Bram T. Elias, University of Iowa College of Law; Stella
Burch Elias, University of Iowa College of Law; Jill E.
Family, Widener University School of Law; Niels Frenzen,
University of Southern California; Maryellen Fullerton,
Brooklyn Law School; Cesar Cuauhtemoc Garcia Hernandez,
University of Denver Sturm College of Law; Lauren Gilbert,
St. Thomas University School of Law; Denise L. Gilman,
University of Texas School of Law; John F. Gossart, Jr.,
University of Maryland School of Law; P. Gulasekaram, Santa
Clara University; Anju Gupta, Rutgers School of Law--Newark;
Susan R. Gzesh, University of Chicago; Jonathan Hafetz, Seton
Hall University; Dina Francesca Haynes, New England Law,
Boston; Susan Hazeldean, Cornell Law School;
Ernesto Hernandez-Lopez, Chapman University; Laura A.
Hernandez, Baylor Law School; Michael Heyman, John Marshall
Law School; Barbara Hines, University of Texas School of Law;
Laila L. Hlass, Boston University School of Law; Geoffrey
Hoffman, University of Houston Law Center; Mary Holper,
Boston College Law School; Alan Hyde, Rutgers University
School of Law--Newark; Kate Jastram, University of
California, Berkeley, School of Law; Kit Johnson, University
of Oklahoma College of Law; Anil Kalhan, Drexel University
Kline School of Law; Daniel Kanstroom, Boston College Law
School; Elizabeth Keyes, University of Baltimore School of
Law; Kathleen Kim, Loyola Law School Los Angeles; David C.
Koelsch, University of Detroit Mercy School of Law; Jennifer
Lee Koh, Western State College of Law;
Kevin Lapp, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; Christopher
Lasch, University of Denver Sturm College of Law; Jennifer J.
Lee, Temple University Beasley School of Law; Stephen Lee,
University of California, Irvine; Christine Lin, University
of California, Hastings College of the Law; Beth Lyon,
Villanova University School of Law; Stephen Manning, Lewis &
Clark College; Lynn Marcus, University of Arizona James E.
Rogers College of Law; Miriam H. Marton, University of Tulsa
College of Law; Elizabeth McCormick, University of Tulsa
College of Law; M. Isabel Medina, Loyola University New
Orleans College of Law; Stephen Meili, University of
Minnesota Law School; Vanessa Merton, Pace University School
of Law; Andrew Moore, University of Detroit Mercy School of
Law; Jennifer Moore, University of New Mexico School of Law;
Daniel I. Morales, DePaul University College of Law; Nancy
Morawetz, NYU School of Law; Karen Musalo, U.C. Hastings
College of the Law; Alizabeth Newman, CUNY School of Law;
Noah Novogrodsky, University of Wyoming College of Law;
Fernando A. Nunez, Charlotte School of Law; Mariela Olivares,
Howard University School of Law; Michael A. Olivas,
University of Houston Law Center; Patrick D. O'Neill, Esq.,
University of Puerto Rico School of Law; Sarah Paoletti,
University of Pennsylvania Law School; Sunita Patel, American
University, Washington College of Law; Huyen Pham, Texas A&M
University School of Law; Michele R. Pistone, Villanova
University School of Law; Luis F.B. Plascencia, Arizona State
University; Polly J. Price, Emory University School of Law;
Doris Marie Provine, Arizona State University; Nina Rabin,
James E. Rogers College of Law, University of Arizona;
Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Temple University, Beasley School of
Law; Renee C. Redman, University of Connecticut School of
Law; Ediberto Roman, Florida International University; Victor
C. Romero, Penn State Law; Joseph H. Rosen, Atlanta's John
Marshall Law School; Carrie Rosenbaum, Golden Gate University
School of Law; Rachel E. Rosenbloom, Northeastern University
School of Law; Ruben G. Rumbaut, University of California,
Irvine; Ted Ruthizer, Columbia Law School; Leticia M.
Saucedo, UC Davis School of Law; Heather Scavone, Elon
University School of Law; Andrew I. Schoenholtz, Georgetown
Law; Philip Schrag, Georgetown University Law Center; Bijal
Shah, NYU School of Law; Ragini Shah, Suffolk University Law
School; Careen Shannon, Yeshiva University, Benjamin N.
Cardozo School of Law; Anna Williams Shavers, University of
Nebraska College of Law; Bryn Siegel, Pacific Coast
University School of Law;
Anita Sinha, American University, Washington College of
Law; Dan R. Smulian, Brooklyn Law School; Gemma Solimene,
Fordham University School of Law; Jayashri Srikantiah,
Stanford Law School; Juliet Stumpf, Lewis & Clark Law School;
Maureen A. Sweeney, University of Maryland Carey School of
Law; Barbara Szweda, Lincoln Memorial University Duncan
School of Law; Margaret H. Taylor, Wake Forest University
School of Law; David Thronson, Michigan State University
College of Law; Allison Brownell Tirres, DePaul University
College of Law; Scott Titshaw, Mercer University School of
Law; Phil Torrey, Harvard Law School; Enid Trucios-Haynes,
Louis D. Brandeis School of Law, University of Louisville;
Diane Uchimiya, University of La Verne College of Law;
Gloria Valencia-Weber, University of New Mexico School of
Law; Sheila I. Velez Martinez, University of Pittsburgh
School of Law; Alex Vernon, Ave Maria School of Law; Rose
Cuison Villazor, University of California at Davis School of
Law; Leti Volpp, University of California, Berkeley; Jonathan
Weinberg, Wayne State University; Deborah M. Weissman,
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; Lisa Weissman-
Ward, Stanford Law School; Anna R. Welch, University of Maine
School of Law; Virgil O. Wiebe, University of St. Thomas
School of Law, Minneapolis; Michael J. Wishnie, Yale Law
School; Stephen Yale-Loehr, Cornell University Law School;
Elizabeth Lee Young, University of Arkansas School of Law.
Mr. Speaker, the President's executive order will ensure that we have a safer country, that we will grow our economy, and that we will keep families together. I strongly urge my colleagues to reject this Republican proposal and to allow the President's executive order to remain.