Select Intelligence Oversight Panel
I very much thank the gentleman for the time. Madam Speaker, I observed that the minority is complaining about the fact that this approach has not been sufficiently bipartisan. As I recall, during the 10 years that the Democrats were in…
I very much thank the gentleman for the time.
Madam Speaker, I observed that the minority is complaining about the fact that this approach has not been sufficiently bipartisan. As I recall, during the 10 years that the Democrats were in the minority, or more, I asked the Rules Committee almost 100 times to make specific proposals in order. The last time I checked, the record demonstrated that they had made them in order exactly two times.
I didn't hear what you said, but I don't have the time to yield anyway, I am sorry.
The fact is that the 9/11 Commission recognized two problems that in their words rendered congressional oversight of intelligence ``dysfunctional''. The first was that the intelligence authorizing committee was routinely ignored by the administration and the intelligence community because they didn't provide the money. In this town, people follow the money.
Secondly, the Appropriations Committee, frankly, was negligent in its responsibilities for oversight. Example: When Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld established an independent intelligence operation outside of the purview of his own agency's intelligence shop, I tried to find out what was going on. I requested that the Appropriations Committee do a thorough Surveys And Investigations study of what was going on. My efforts were blocked by that same committee.
The third problem we faced is that there was grossly insufficient staff on the part of the Appropriations Committee to have decent congressional oversight. Example: The Democratic minority had exactly one staffer to deal not only with all intelligence issues but also with the entire defense budget. How much do you think you can get done with one person?
The other problem was that there was not sufficient emphasis on intelligence matters by the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee because they had a lot of other things to do dealing with ``little'' problems like the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force.
So the 9/11 Commission suggested one way to correct that problem. They suggested that we merge the authorizers with the appropriators, and that the authorizing committee, in fact, do the appropriating.
We concluded that there was a better way to accomplish the same goal. We felt that the problem with the initial recommendation was that it doesn't make much sense to consider intelligence funding requests standing alone, because in the real world those requests have to compete with other national security imperatives, again, funding the Army, the Air Force, and the other agencies.
Instead, we chose to follow a different model, that of the Joint Committee on Taxation. That committee conducts an annual review of the strategic plans and the budget of the IRS.
This bill follows, with some variation, that pattern. It creates a hybrid committee composed of members from the Intelligence Committee and the Appropriations Committee. They are all appointed by the Speaker because, in technical terms, whenever task forces are created around here, it is the Speaker who does the appointing. Speaker Pelosi has already made crystal clear that she intends to appoint whatever Republicans are suggested by the minority leader.
But there was another reason that the Speaker is listed as appointing all of these people, because we want to make clear to the intelligence community that if they try to ignore what this task force is trying to do, that they are not just messing around with individual Members of Congress; they are messing around with the leader of an independent branch of government who has the authority to inflict consequences if they don't provide information the Congress is entitled to have.
This task force will be given the obligation to prepare an annual assessment of all intelligence activities and to make budget recommendations, which will serve as the basis for the preparation of the intelligence budget, the classified annex to the defense appropriation bill.
The reason the subcommittee needs to have at least the ability in theory to change some of those recommendations is because it has a job which that panel doesn't have. It has the job of measuring the needs of intelligence against other national security needs, and it needs to have that flexibility.
But this bill would also lead to a beefed-up staff for this task force, and that task force will be buttressed by the subpoena power of the Appropriations Committee.
That means that at long last we will have at least one panel which the intelligence community cannot ignore. We will have one panel which even the Republican members of the commission, like John Lehman, have indicated is a great step forward. I would just suggest that if the gentleman had preferred a different approach, it would have been nice if he had produced one in the 2\1/2\ years he had the chance.
I urge support for this proposal.
Madam Speaker, if the gentleman from Illinois, my good friend, wants to hyperventilate over the fact that I simply verbally referred to this as a ``task force'' rather than a ``panel,'' be my guest. I guess his threshold of excitement has been considerably lowered these days.
Let me simply say, the gentleman says this is an insult to Mr. Murtha and to Mr. Young. No, it is not. He asked, does the Defense Appropriations Committee need oversight? It certainly did the last year, and let me tell you why.
When Mr. Rumsfeld set up his separate stovepiping operation for intelligence, I went to Mr. Murtha, asked him to sign a letter instituting a surveys and investigations study because, under our rules, under our practices, we needed the support of the full chairman, the full ranking member and the subcommittee chairman and the subcommittee ranking member. I went to Mr. Murtha. He signed on to the letter calling for the investigation. I went to Mr. Young. He signed on to the letter calling for the investigation. But I was blocked by the full committee chairman.
So if you are asking me, does the Appropriations Committee, based on its record of the last 2 years, need some additional oversight on this issue? You bet it does, because as a result of that refusal to proceed, we never did learn what Rumsfeld was doing until we read it in the press. That is not the way it is supposed to work.
This is the first time that we have created any kind of a panel that will
force the Appropriations Committee and the authorizing committee to work together like adults rather than worrying about dunghill jurisdictional issues. And the security of this country is a whole lot more important than the feelings of any one committee.