Madam Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman's courtesy in permitting me to speak on this resolution. One of the reasons, Madam Speaker, that I argued against our invasion of Iraq long before the war began was because I felt we needed to face…
Madam Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman's courtesy in permitting me to speak on this resolution.
One of the reasons, Madam Speaker, that I argued against our invasion of Iraq long before the war began was because I felt we needed to face far more serious threats like the danger posed by Iran. In the 3 years since that attack, the threat from Iran has grown, and our capacity to meet that threat has diminished. Now Iran has a President who exploits Iranian national grievances to consolidate power and has threatened to wipe Israel off the map. Our troops are bogged down in Iraq, placing them at risk should Iran launch a new wave of terrorism.
We have done nothing to break our dependency on oil, the control of which gives Iran its greatest ability now to blackmail us and other countries.
I appreciate the leadership of my good friend Mr. Lantos and others bringing the resolution forward to spotlight the problems with Iran. I appreciate their working with us to improve the bill.
For instance, now the bill will not allow us to deal with terrorist groups on our own watch list. I think that is very, very important. Unfortunately, this legislation does not provide solutions. Instead it limits the administration's flexibility to pursue diplomacy without providing any new tools not already at their disposal.
We need allies and partners to address the Iranian threat. We need the cooperation of the European Union, of China and, yes, Russia, since we have no more unilateral sanctions to place on Iran.
Our global standing is at a low point. Yet this bill sanctions not Iran, but the very countries we need for a strong diplomatic effort. This bill tragically gives equal weight to overthrowing the Iranian Government as it does to the immediate threat of nuclear proliferation.
Now, I am strongly opposed to this regime, but preventing them from developing nuclear weapons capacity must be our first priority, not prioritizing behavior change over regime change. We pull the rug out from underneath anybody in the current Iranian leadership who values survival over the nuclear program, and it clearly works to eliminate incentives for diplomatic solutions.
I have a sense of deja vu when I think back to the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 which did not explicitly authorize the use of force, but certainly got the ball rolling that led to the tragedy of this Iraq war. Knowing what they know today, how many Members of this House would have voted differently 8 years ago?
I am very worried about where all this ends. We have heard reports from the Pentagon of plans to attack Iran, indeed plans for a nuclear strike on Iran, the repercussions of which should make us all recoil with horror. Now, the administration dismisses these news reports, but the American people
and this Congress got better information about what happened in Iraq from reporters like Seymour Hirsch than it got from, sadly, the President, Secretary Rumsfeld and Secretary Rice.
I do not pretend to imagine the horrific things that Iran would do with nuclear weapons. We are all opposed to that. That is why we need a strong, smart, constructive diplomatic strategy. This bill does not provide it.
For over half a century, Madam Speaker, we have made a series of mistakes regarding Iran, starting in 1953 when the United States led the charge to overthrow the democratically elected Government of Iran and replace them with a dictatorship in the person of the Shah. Our support for that dictatorship and its repressive policies fueled the reaction that led to the Iranian revolution. It was part of what happened with the hostage crisis in Iran.
More recently there are very credible reports that diplomatic feelers extended by the Iranian Government were dismissed by this administration 2 and 3 years ago. I sincerely hope that we do not overwhelmingly and unthinkingly pass a resolution today that makes us feel good because we all hate this regime, but instead sets in motion a process that actually is destabilizing and makes the peaceful future that we all seek harder.
Madam Speaker, I do think this is an important conversation for us to have on this floor. I am pleased that the debate time was extended, and I hope our colleagues will take the time to scroll through the information that is available and think of the consequences.
For instance, I would enter into the record, a letter from Under Secretary of State Nick Burns to Chairman Hyde. I will just quote a little and then insert the rest in the Record.
We have enormous concerns about this proposed legislation,
particularly title II. These provisions would impair our
ability to continue working closely and successfully with our
allies to deal with the threat that Iran poses.
Nobody here, nobody here, apologizes for this regime. And my good friend from Indiana is correct, there is a lot of shared interest and deep concern. The notion that this despotic regime would have control of nuclear weapons is terrifying, absolutely terrifying.
We long for the day that the Iranian people are free, in no small measure because the United States' history with the Iranian people over more than half a century is one where we have not always been on the side of democracy for the Iranian people, overthrowing their democratically elected regime in 1953. That was not a proud moment in our history when we helped install a dictator, but we called him the Shah.
We are united in our commitment to deal meaningfully with this problem. This legislation, as the administration has made clear, falls short of the mark. It is not tightening our sanctions against Iran.
We have done that.
There have been administrations, both Republican and Democrat, who have maybe not been as zealous in implementing those sanctions; but that is on the books. We have done it.
What this talks about doing is extending sanctions against the very people whose cooperation we need to solve this problem. We are confusing our goals. Is it more important to threaten a regime change and thereby consolidate it? This Government of Iran by all indications is not monolithic. There are people who disagree with the sad and repulsive face of the current leader. There are a vast number of young people in Iran who are not at this point violently anti-American. They are pro-Western. There is interest in the United States. If we misplay this, we can end up turning another generation against us in Iran.
We have had empty threats against North Korea that did not stop them from going full speed ahead developing nuclear weapons, in fact, we are probably less safe today because we have not been focused and effective.
I do strongly identify with the words of my friend, the gentleman from Iowa
(Mr. Leach). I have been one who has been somewhat critical of this administration in its actions in the past. I would find it absolutely inappropriate to not reinforce when I think they are trying to reposition themselves vis-a-vis Iran. There are many people on our side of the aisle who were against the rush to war in Iraq and many more who have found that it was a mistake to do so. We have supported more diplomatic initiatives, and this is the opportunity we have now.
This legislation is not each-handed. It is not focused. The administration does not want it. It sanctions our allies. I strongly urge that we do things that are coming down the pike now that we in Congress can do that will make a difference in Iran. Think about how we deal with India and nuclear weapons. This is a decision that is looming ahead of us that will make a difference for China and other countries that have nuclear technology about how we treat them in that situation.
And for heaven's sake, when people have suddenly discovered $3-a- gallon gasoline and that we are addicted to foreign oil, which is part of Iran's strength right now, maybe we in Congress can forget the goofy energy bill we passed and get serious about conservation, alternative energy, increasing fuel standards and giving full value to the American public for our oil and gas resources. These are things that we can do now that will make a difference. Let the administration do its job diplomatically; provide oversight, but do not go over the edge with this legislation.
Department of State,
Washington, DC.
Hon. Henry J. Hyde,
Chairman, Committee on International Relations, House of
Representatives.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing to comment on HR 282, the
``Iran Freedom Support Act of 2005,'' that currently is
pending before your Committee.
We have serious concerns about this proposed legislation,
particularly Title II, which would amend the Iran and Libya
Sanctions Act (ILSA). These provisions would impair our
ability to continue working closely and successfully with our
allies to deal with the threat that Iran poses.
The Iran issue is sensitive and critically important. The
September 24 IAEA resolution, tabled by the EU-3 (Germany,
the UK, and France), was an important step forward. We are
going to have to continue working with our international
partners to isolate Iran and to build and maintain an
international coalition to ensure that Iran does not acquire
a nuclear weapons capability. In doing so, the President
needs the flexibility that HR 282 would impede.
I note that one portion of the bill, Title IV, regarding
support for democracy in Iran, could, with relatively minor
modifications, make a positive contribution to our Iran
objectives, and we would welcome the opportunity to work with
Congress in developing this approach.
Sincerely,
R. Nicholas Burns,
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.
Madam Speaker, I would like to include the following article, which I referenced on the floor, in the Record of the debate on H.R. 282, the ``Iran Freedom Support Act.''
[From the Asia Times, March 30, 2006]
Neo-Con Cabal Blocked 2003 Nuclear Talks
(By Gareth Porter)
Washington.--The George W. Bush administration failed to
enter into negotiations with Iran on its nuclear program in
May 2003 because neo-conservatives who advocated
destabilization and regime change were able to block any
serious diplomatic engagement with Tehran, according to
former administration officials.
The same neo-conservative veto power also prevented the
administration from adopting any official policy statement on
Iran, those same officials said.
Lawrence Wilkerson, then chief of staff to secretary of
state Colin Powell, said the failure to adopt a formal Iran
policy in 2002-03 was the result of obstruction by a ``secret
cabal'' of neo-conservatives in the administration, led by
Vice President Dick Cheney.
``The secret cabal got what it wanted: no negotiations with
Tehran,'' Wilkerson wrote in an e-mail to Inter Press Service
(IPS). The Iranian negotiating offer, transmitted to the
State Department in early May 2003 by the Swiss ambassador in
Tehran, acknowledged that Iran would have to address U.S.
concerns about its nuclear program, although it made no
specific concession in advance of the talks, according to
Flynt Leverett, then the National Security Council's senior
director for Middle East Affairs.
Iran's offer also raised the possibility of cutting off
Iran's support for Hamas and Islamic Jihad and converting
Hezbollah into a purely socio-political organization,
according to Leverett. That was an explicit response to
Powell's demand in late March that Iran ``end its support for
terrorism''.
In return, Leverett recalls, the Iranians wanted the U.S.
to address security questions, the lifting of economic
sanctions and normalization of relations, including support
for Iran's integration into the global economic order.
Leverett also recalls that the Iranian offer was drafted
with the blessing of all the major political players in the
Iranian regime, including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali
Khomeini.
Realists, led by Powell and his deputy, Richard Armitage,
were inclined to respond positively to the Iranian offer.
Nevertheless, within a few days of its receipt, the State
Department had rebuked the Swiss ambassador for having passed
on the offer.
Exactly how the decision was made is not known. ``As with
many of these issues of national security decision-making,
there are no fingerprints,'' Wilkerson told IPS. ``But I
would guess Dick Cheney with the blessing of George W.
Bush.''
As Wilkerson observes, however, the mysterious death of
what became known among Iran specialists as Iran's ``grand
bargain'' initiative was a result of the administration's
inability to agree on a policy toward Tehran.
A draft National Security Policy Directive (NSPD) on Iran
calling for diplomatic engagement had been in the process of
interagency coordination for more than a year, according to a
source who asked to remain unidentified.
But it was impossible to get formal agreement on the NSPD,
the source recalled, because officials in Cheney's office and
in under secretary of defense for policy Douglas Feith's
Office of Special Plans wanted a policy of regime change and
kept trying to amend it.
Opponents of the neo-conservative policy line blame
Condoleezza Rice, then the national security adviser, for the
failure of the administration to override the extremists in
the administration. The statutory policymaker process on
Iran, Wilkerson told IPS in an e-mail, was ``managed by a
national security adviser incapable of standing up to the
cabal . . .''
In the absence of an Iran policy, the two contending camps
struggled in 2003 over a proposal by realists in the
administration to reopen the Geneva channel with Iran that
had been used successfully on Afghanistan in 2001-02. They
believed Iran could be helpful in stabilizing postconflict
Iraq, because the Iraqi Shi'ite militants whom they expected
to return from Iran after Saddam Hussein's overthrow owed
some degree of allegiance to Iran.
The neo-conservatives tried to block those meetings on
tactical policy grounds, according to Leverett. ``They were
saying we didn't want to engage with Iran because we didn't
want to owe them,'' he recalled.
Nevertheless, U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan Zalmay
Khalilzad (now envoy in Iraq) was authorized to begin meeting
secretly in Geneva with Iranian officials to discuss Iraq.
The neo-conservatives then tried to sandbag the talks by
introducing a demand for full information on any high-ranking
al-Oaeda cadres who might be detained by the Iranians.
Iran regarded that information as a bargaining chip to be
given up only for a quid pro quo from Washington. The Bush
administration, however, had adopted a policy in early 2002
of refusing to share any information with Iran on al-Oaeda or
other terrorist organizations.
On May 3,2003, as the Iranian ``grand bargain'' proposal
was on its way to Washington, Tehran's representative in
Geneva, Javad Zarif, offered a compromise on the issue,
according to Leverett: if the U.S. gave Iran the names of the
cadres of the Mujahideen-e Khalq (MEK) who were being held by
U.S. forces in Iraq, Iran would give the U.S. the names of
the al-Oaeda operatives they had detained.
The MEK had carried out armed attacks against Iran from
Iraqi territory during the Hussein regime and had been named
a terrorist organization by the U.S. But it had capitulated
to U.S. forces after the invasion, and the neo-conservatives
now saw the MEK as a potential asset in an effort to
destabilize the Iranian regime.
The MEK had already become a key element in the alternative
draft NSPD drawn up by neo-conservatives in the
administration.
The indictment of Iran analyst Larry Franklin on Feith's
staff last year revealed that, by February 2003, Franklin had
begun sharing a draft NSPD that he knew would be to the
liking of the Israeli Embassy.
(Franklin eventually pleaded guilty to passing classified
information to two employees of an influential pro-Israel
lobbying group and was sentenced to 12 and a half years in
prison.)
Reflecting the substance of that draft policy, ABC News
reported on May 30, 2003, that the Pentagon was calling for
the destabilization of the Iranian government by ``using all
available points of pressure on the Iranian regime, including
backing armed Iranian dissidents and employing the services
of the Mujahideen-e Khalq . . .''
Nevertheless, Bush apparently initially saw nothing wrong
with trading information on MEK, despite arguments that MEK
should not be repatriated to Iran. ``I have it on good
authority,'' Leverett told IPS, ``that Bush's initial
reaction was, `But we say there is no such thing as a good
terrorist.' '' Nevertheless, Bush finally rejected the
Iranian proposal.
By the end of May, the neo-conservatives had succeeded in
closing down the Geneva channel for good. They had hoped to
push through their own NSPD on Iran, but according to the
Franklin indictment, Franklin told an Israeli Embassy officer
in October that work on the NSPD had been stopped.
But the damage had been done. With no direct diplomatic
contact between Iran and the U.S., the neo-conservatives had
a clear path to raising tensions and building political
support for regarding Iran as the primary enemy of the United
States.