Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. Mr. President, I rise to address the critical issue that is before the Senate--reform of our intelligence community and restructuring of the Federal…
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
Mr. President, I rise to address the critical issue that is before the Senate--reform of our intelligence community and restructuring of the Federal Government to enhance our ability to wage the global war on terror and protect our Nation from other threats.
I commend Senators Collins and Lieberman and their staffs for their hard work and leadership on this issue, and I am proud to be a cosponsor of this legislation.
I also thank the Senate leadership for making this a priority. There is no issue more important for us to address. In fact, I believe this legislation is the most important I have worked on since coming to the Senate in 1999.
The war on terror is unlike any conflict we have fought--covert holy warriors seeking to infiltrate our society and those of our allies to do us grievous harm. Against this radical enemy, intelligence is of the greatest importance. We must do everything we can to strengthen our intelligence capabilities. If you think of what we need to do about terrorism, we need to attack, we need to prevent, and we need to prepare. Intelligence is the greatest weapon we have in all three of those categories.
Before I comment on this legislation before us, however, I would like to first offer some principles and thoughts that have guided my deliberations.
First, we must do no harm. Great progress has been made since September 11, 2001, to improve the operations of our intelligence community and make our country more secure. There is no greater evidence of that than when I travel in Ohio to various large urban areas. I am so impressed with the cooperation that now exists as contrasted to what was there before 9/11. Because we are making progress, we must be sure that we do not inadvertently set back our current efforts. We must implement additional improvements.
Second, we must not restructure the intelligence community to deal solely with the threat of terrorism caused by Islamic extremists, as pressing a concern as that is. There are many other threats that require close scrutiny by the intelligence community. Reform must address the threats that will confront America 10 and 20 years in the future in addition to those faced today.
For example, the United States must continue to monitor regional conflicts which have the potential to undermine stability in various parts of the world such as India, Pakistan, China, and Taiwan. Regional conflicts, such as between India and Pakistan, are motivated by political, social, and historical reasons unique to their own countries. In the event that regional conflicts should escalate to such proportions that chemical, biological, or even nuclear weapons would be used, as would be possible in the event of a conflict between India and Pakistan, U.S. interests certainly would be threatened. The intelligence community must remain keenly aware of what is happening in other areas of the world so that the U.S. is not only prepared and able to respond but so that we can do everything in our power to prevent such a crisis from happening.
The United States must also monitor threats presented by rogue nations such as North Korea, rogue states that have the ability to foster regional instability and harm U.S. interests. They, too, must be closely monitored as dictators such as Kim Chong-il look to enhance their power and position. If not, the U.S. risks strategic surprise which would be devastating to our national security interests.
Additionally, the United States must address the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These weapons have the ability to cause grave harm to Americans and life as we know it if found in the wrong hands. They could be used by terrorists against cities in the United States, they could be used in regional conflict, or they could be used by a rogue state to enhance its power.
Third, we should make it clear to the American people that the different perspectives presented on the Senate floor are legitimate. A review of the hearings held by various congressional committees during August and September demonstrated that many former Government officials who have had distinguished careers in senior national security posts hold contradictory opinions on the 9/11 Commission recommendations and related national security issues.
Fourth, reforming the Federal Government to address the challenges of global terrorism is going to take several years to accomplish. It is not going to happen that fast. It is my hope that during the next Congress we will address the critical challenges confronting the Federal law enforcement community, for example. For example, rationalizing responsibility and missions and personnel systems is vital to ensure that Federal law enforcement is best equipped to confront foreign terrorists operating in the United States.
I am pleased that we have addressed some of the needs of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the legislation we are considering today. But much more remains to be done, and it is important for our national security to finish this job.
As my colleagues may know, I sponsored legislation that became law that requires the Office of Personnel Management to study Federal law enforcement personnel systems and recommend improvements. I was concerned that we were going forward with personnel changes and getting some coordination between those law enforcement agencies and the homeland security, but we were failing to do the same thing with law enforcement agencies that were outside of the Department of Homeland Security. The Office of Personnel Management has implemented that legislation. They have made some significant recommendations on how we can improve the relationships, classifications, and so forth, with those outside of Homeland Security. It would be my hope that we implement those recommendations.
Regarding the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, I strongly support creating a robust national intelligence director, but I have been wrestling with exactly how much authority we should give the new national intelligence director. I appreciate the balance that Senators Collins and Lieberman were trying to achieve in their legislation. It is clear to me that these authorities should not be diminished.
In fact, in committee I offered an amendment that would give the national intelligence director reorganization authority over the national intelligence program so that the director could identify efficiencies and eliminate unnecessary duplication of effort. It is unfortunate that my amendment was weakened in committee, and I am still considering amendments to strengthen the management authority of the national intelligence director.
The intelligence community budget process is extremely complex. Indeed, the manner in which these agencies interact with each other is probably the most complicated interagency process in the Federal Government. The budgets of the 15 intelligence community agencies, including all those of the Armed Forces, are intertwined in the National Foreign Intelligence Program, the Joint Military Intelligence Program, the tactical intelligence and related activities.
The Collins-Lieberman legislation seeks to bring clarity to the situation by defining a national intelligence program. However, we may be able to improve this budget definition, and I will weigh all amendments to do so carefully.
At the same time, we must be careful not to erode the budget authority of the national intelligence director. I understand that some of my colleagues may offer amendments to give the national intelligence director a fixed term in an attempt to immunize this individual from political pressure. I would note that a host of other provisions, including a strong inspector general for the intelligence community and an ombudsman to specifically guard against political concerns, have been created to do exactly that.
Quite the contrary, a fixed term is unnecessary and could diminish the effectiveness of the national intelligence director. A close and trusting working relationship with the President is going to be key to the success of the effectiveness of the national intelligence director. We should not weaken this relationship by mandating a fixed-term appointment.
The Governmental Affairs Committee heard testimony from three former Directors of Central Intelligence, and all agreed that the national intelligence director should serve at the pleasure of the President. An incoming President should not be stuck with a national intelligence director from a previous administration.
I know that the Presiding Officer, in his former capacity as Governor of the State of Tennessee and as a member of the Bush Cabinet, understands that if this individual doesn't have the confidence of the President of the United States, his or her effectiveness is going to be diminished a great deal. So much of what this person can accomplish will have a lot to do with that relationship with the President because there are going to be situations where there are going to be differences of opinion. Finally, the boss has to decide them. If you have somebody there that has the job and doesn't have the confidence of the boss, we are in trouble.
Mr. President, although this legislation deals primarily with improving structured roles and missions, the human capital challenges confronting our intelligence community must not be overlooked.
In March of 2001--it seems like a long time ago--my Government Management Subcommittee held a hearing entitled ``The National Security Implications of the Human Capital Crisis.'' The panel of distinguished witnesses that day included former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, a member of the U.S. Commission on National Security in the 21st Century. Secretary Schlesinger concluded his testimony with these remarks:
As it enters the 21st century, the United States finds
itself on the brink of an unprecedented crisis of competence
in Government. The maintenance of American power in the world
depends on the quality of U.S. Government personnel, civil
and military, at all levels. We must take immediate action in
the personnel area to ensure that the United States can meet
future challenges. That fixing of the personnel problem is a
precondition for fixing virtually everything else that needs
repair in the institutional edifice of U.S. national security
policy.
He was so right. Secretary Schlesinger's insightful comments were reinforced by the 9/11 Commission on page 399 of the report. The Commission said ``significant changes in the organization of the Government.'' The Commission went on to say:
We know that the quality of people is more important than
the quality of the wiring diagrams. Some of the saddest
aspects of the 9/11 story are the outstanding efforts of so
many individuals straining, often without success, against
the boundaries of the possible. Good people can overcome bad
structures, but they should not have to.
I will never forget that after 9/11 the first thing that came to my mind was we didn't have the right people with the right knowledge and skills at the right place at the right time. If you go back and look at all of the report, it gets back to that situation and also the fact that they weren't communicating with each other.
I am pleased that the Collins-Lieberman legislation includes some important human capital provisions. I offered an amendment in committee, which was unanimously accepted, that provides enhanced classification and pay flexibilities for intelligence analysts at the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Specifically, my amendment enables the FBI to work with the OPM to develop new classification standards and pay rates for intelligence analysts. The amendment also allows the bureau to improve their performance management system for their intelligence analysts and establishes two congressional reporting requirements. The amendment was completely within the spirit of the 9/11 recommendations, which noted that the FBI should create a specialized and integrated national security workforce consisting of agents, analysts, linguists, and surveillance specialists who are recruited, trained, rewarded, and retained to ensure the development of an institutional culture with strong experience in intelligence and national security throughout the organization.
I thought the other incredible thing after 9/11 was the cry that went out: Can anybody speak Farsi? Can anybody speak Arabic? You would have thought that after the Persian Gulf war there would have been a very aggressive effort, because of the instability of the area, for us to bring in people who could speak Farsi and Arabic. If you looked at the State Department a couple years ago, you would have found we had all kinds of linguists who could speak fluent Russian. But the threat had changed. We didn't have the capacity to change with that threat. Hopefully, with this new national intelligence director, we are going to be able to have that flexibility.
It is my hope that this amendment will provide the Federal Bureau of Investigation with essential human capital flexibilities specifically targeted to building an elite cadre of intelligence analysts. In addition, Senator Lugar and I will offer another amendment to the bill to improve the Presidential appointment process, which has been broken for decades. Over the coming days, I want to work with Senators Collins and Lieberman on this amendment.
This amendment addresses a critical recommendation in the 9/11 Commission Report. It is a problem I have been examining for years. During my time in the Senate, I have found political appointees to be dedicated and diligent professionals who want to make a difference for our country. They often leave high-paying corporate jobs only to find their commitment to our Nation requires an increase in workload and a decrease in salary.
I talked to one individual who filled out the financial disclosure form and all that was required. He said that it cost him $200,000 to pay the professional people to do all the things that were required in this disclosure form that is now currently in effect with the Federal Government. I suspect that the President, when he appointed the Secretary of Education, had to go through all these forms, and so forth, and wondered to himself whether he ought to do it. Before they even begin to work for the Government, however, as I mentioned, they must first navigate the complex, turbulent, and outdated Presidential appointment process--an area where reviews and recommendations for improvement have gone unheeded far too long.
In 1937, a committee issued the first report on improving the Presidential appointment process. During the 67 years since this inaugural report, the appointment process has been formally examined 14 additional times. After such extensive reviews, it is disconcerting for this Senator that we have not been able to enact meaningful reform in this area.
To capture the essence of the problem, understand first that the number of politically appointed positions has grown from 286 to 3,361 over the past 4 decades. This increase is straining an already overburdened system. And the time it takes to complete an appointment has increased through the years from just over 2 months during the Kennedy administration to 8 months in the current administration. I think Secretary Rumsfeld said his team didn't go into place until 6 months after he had been appointed as Secretary of Defense.
Mr. President, 8 months is simply too long to fill an appointed position. I am afraid that if we do not update the current system for processing Presidential appointees, we run the risk of driving good people away from appointed Government service. Progress has been made on this issue during the last several years.
First, on February 15, the Hart-Rudman commission issued their report entitled ``The Roadmap for National Security Imperative for Change,'' which in part examined the Presidential appointment process. The Commission's final report observes: The ordeals to which outside nominees are subjected are so great, above and beyond whatever financial or career sacrifice is involved, so as to make it prohibitive for many individuals of talent and experience to accept public service.
Then on April 4 and 5, the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs held 2 days of hearings on the state of the Presidential appointment process. During those hearings Paul Light from the Brookings Institution said:
Past and potential Presidential appointees alike view the
process of entering office with disdain, describing it as
embarrassing, confusing, and unfair. They see the process as
far more cumbersome and lengthy than it needs to be.
By the way, I held a hearing a couple weeks ago, and Paul Light was there,
and he reiterated that same statement he made in 2001.
On May 16, 2001, the Governmental Affairs Committee passed Senator Fred Thompson's bipartisan bill to streamline the Presidential appointments process that I cosponsored with Senators Akaka, Durbin, Lieberman, and Lugar. Although it passed the Governmental Affairs Committee in the 107th Congress, it did not pass the full Senate. When Senator Fred Thompson left the Senate, I promised him I would continue to push for appointments reform. Therefore, in April of last year, I reintroduced the Presidential Appointments Improvement Act, and today I urge my colleagues to pass this important proposal.
What happens is that after the President comes in and he goes through this line of getting people appointed, they get off on other things, and they forget about the problems they went through to get all their appointees. So it kind of goes to the bottom of the stack in terms of priorities. This 9/11 Commission implementation by the Senate gives us a wonderful opportunity to do something about this problem that has lingered for so many years.
I am certain all my colleagues have read the recommendations in the 9/11 Commission report. As you recall, one of the recommendations underscored the importance of improving the Presidential appointment process. Specifically on page 422, the report states:
Since a catastrophic attack could occur with little or no
notice, we should minimize as much as possible the disruption
of national security policymaking during the change of
administration by accelerating the process for national
security appointments. We think the process could be improved
significantly so transitions can work more effectively and
allow more new officials to assume their responsibilities as
quickly as possible.
The 9/11 Commission report also noted that in 2001, the new administration, like others before it, did not have its team on the job until at least 6 months after it took office. In fact, I commented to people that after the length it took for the President to finally know he was President, we lost that period of time once the President was elected and started building his team; they were just concentrating on who was going to be the President. Once that was done, then they started to concentrate on who the people were going to be in the administration.
They did a great job of taking care of the initial people, but, as you know, it took a long time for them to start filling in that organization.
My amendment offers realistic governmentwide solutions to the problems identified by the 9/11 Commission and the 14 other Commission studies and reports that have detailed the importance of streamlining the Presidential appointment process.
The four main provisions of the amendment include streamlining the financial disclosure forms for executive branch employees. Two, requiring agencies to examine the number of Presidential-appointed positions and recommending to Congress which positions could be eliminated. We are asking them to do it. Three, allowing Presidential candidates to obtain a list of appointee positions 15 days after they receive their party's nomination so they will have an idea of the kind of people they have to look for if they are elected President of the United States. And four, requiring the Office of Government Ethics to review the conflict-of-interest laws.
The principles behind this amendment are simple, and given the bipartisan nature in which the original bill passed the Governmental Affairs Committee last Congress, I ask my colleagues to adopt this amendment. Although it will not solve all the problems with the appointments process outlined in the 9/11 Commission report, the amendment is an important first step for updating an outdated system.
I urge the Senate to support its adoption. Senator Lugar and I will be working with Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman to try to obtain their support for this amendment and to also work out any of the problems they may have with it.