Madam Speaker, on Friday December 4, 2009, I had an opportunity to address the American Security Project Conference regarding the situation in Afghanistan. This speech followed a hearing of the House Armed Services Committee, which I…
Madam Speaker, on Friday December 4, 2009, I had an opportunity to address the American Security Project Conference regarding the situation in Afghanistan. This speech followed a hearing of the House Armed Services Committee, which I chair, the day before. My address is as follows:
[Speech given at the American Security Project Conference, Dec. 4,
2009]
Beyond the Surge: Assessing the President's Afghanistan Strategy
(By Ike Skelton)
First, let me take a moment to thank Admiral Gunn for that
introduction. You're too kind. I'd like to extend that thanks
to Senator Hart and the American Security Project as a whole.
You're doing great work, and I appreciate your efforts. I'd
also like to say happy birthday to Evelyn Farkas, here at
ASP. I would also like to thank our brave men and women in
uniform. We have asked much of them in the past decade, and
they have not failed to deliver.
Two months ago, I wrote a letter to the President saying,
essentially, that he should listen to his commanders in the
field. Being a member of Congress, it took six pages to say
that, but that was the basic message. I made that same point
in private conversations with the President. And so it
pleased me the other night when the President agreed to
provide General McChrystal with additional forces needed to
make this new strategy work.
But before assessing the overall strategy, I think we
should take a moment to remind ourselves why we're in
Afghanistan and the threat we face there.
Al Qa'ida presents a serious threat to our nation. Osama
bin Laden and his minions have attacked us or attempted to
attack us many times over the years. The most remarkable
attack involved the murder of 3000 civilians--men, women, and
children--but it was hardly the only attack. And I do not
believe that anyone has a good reason to believe that they
have given up their attempts to attack us.
Following our invasion of Afghanistan in response to this
attack, al Qa'ida largely fled to the border regions of
Pakistan. Their Taliban allies, meanwhile, continue to
escalate their attacks in an attempt to overthrow the Afghan
government and drive out the international coalition.
Others have differing opinions on this, but I do not
believe that we can ultimately destroy al Qa'ida if we cannot
prevent them from recreating a safe haven in Afghanistan.
I also do not believe that we can be successful in rooting
them out of Pakistan if we fail in Afghanistan.
Afghanistan and Pakistan have some inherent advantages for
al Qa'ida that other places may not. Having been in the
region for over 20 years, they have married into local tribes
and made contacts with other extremist organizations. These
connections have allowed the senior leaders to hide
successfully for many years.
Afghanistan is also of strategic value to al Qa'ida. In
losing Afghanistan, they lost not only the support of a
government and the use of an entire country as a safe haven,
but suffered a tremendous blow to their image. Reestablishing
a safe haven in Afghanistan could rehabilitate this image
among those who resent or oppose the United States, leading
to increases in recruiting and funding.
Nor can we consider Afghanistan and Pakistan in isolation--
the security situation in Afghanistan can have a negative
impact on the stability of Pakistan. It is foolish to think
that if the Taliban and al Qa'ida were able to reestablish
themselves in all or part of Afghanistan, they would not lend
support to those militants seeking to overthrow or
destabilize the Pakistani state. Al Qa'ida has already
assisted the Pakistani Taliban in carrying out attacks on the
Pakistani government, and I would expect this aid to increase
if al Qa'ida regained a base in Afghanistan. There was an
attack at a mosque earlier today that killed dozens. With a
secure base for al Qa'ida, I would expect many more such
attacks. And the only thing worse than al Qa'ida loose in
Afghanistan again is a destabilized, nuclear-armed Pakistan.
On Tuesday night, the President proposed what I think is a
good way ahead as we address this threat. From the extensive
media reporting on the process, we all know how thorough a
review was conducted by the White House, lasting months and
including somewhere around 10 cabinet secretary level
meetings and extensive consultation with every expert they
could find.
President Obama's strategy rightly focuses on seizing the
initiative from the enemy, building Afghan capacity, and
ultimately allowing the Afghan government and security forces
to take the lead in fighting this war.
The President has appropriately called for additional troops from our allies--this is not just America's war, and we must not allow it to become that. Perhaps more importantly, the President has put the burden of reform squarely on the Afghan government, laying out clear expectations of performance and promising support for those ministries and local leaders that perform.
The President has also rightly acknowledged the importance
of Pakistan. Pakistan remains a challenge, playing a key and
often contradictory role in the region. Pakistan, by
assisting in the pursuit of al Qa'ida and Afghan Taliban
leaders, could help bring the war in Afghanistan to an end.
Conversely, if Pakistan were to return to old habits of
supporting the Afghan Taliban, the war may be almost
impossible to win. More concerning, the continued ascendency
of militant movements in the region could destabilize
Pakistan, a country with nuclear weapons. This could be
disastrous for all of us.
I think this is a good strategy. Perhaps most importantly,
it is a strategy that I believe has a good chance of success.
In the past, I have often said that we lacked a strategy for
the first 7 years of the war in Afghanistan. Some of my
colleagues have suggested that this assertion may not be
entirely fair. But, the result of whatever the prior
Administration thought it was doing, ultimately resembled
conducting combat operations without any thought of what we
were trying to accomplish. So having a strategy, much less a
good one, is a great start.
President Obama also, I am pleased to say, took my advice.
He listened to his military leaders, including Generals
McChrystal and Petraeus, Admiral Mullen, and Secretary Gates.
Ultimately, the President endorsed adding 30,000 troops to
carry out his strategy. This is on top of the 21,000 he
dispatched to Afghanistan earlier this year. In January 2009,
there were about 33,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan. In about
7 months, there will be three times that. That is, I believe,
a clear sign of the President's resolve and willingness to do
what it takes to be successful in Afghanistan.
Yesterday, the House Armed Services Committee, which I have
to honor to chair, hosted Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen,
and Deputy Secretary of State Lew. Next Tuesday, we will hear
from General McChrystal and Ambassador Eikenberry. Members,
properly, have a lot of questions about the strategy, and we
want to make sure that the details have been thought through.
I'll list a few of the areas we have explored or will next
week.
Many members are concerned about the July 2011 date to
begin redeployment. So far, most have focused on that date as
being set, rather than completely conditions based, but to me
it looks like this is a case where there isn't much to
complain about. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen were
pretty clear that not only were they comfortable with the
date, but that they thought it served the useful purpose of
motivating the Afghans.
To me, what happens after that date is at least as
important as the date itself. Secretary Gates testified that
the process of transition that begins on that date would
itself be slow and conditions-based, so that while the start
of the process was fixed in time, the end could be adjusted
as required. And I think that flexibility and realistic
approach to a difficult process is exactly right.
One other concern, and one that in my mind might be more
realistic, is the unintended consequences of setting out such
a message. The message of a gradual, conditions-based
transition may not be understood the same way by all
audiences. The Pakistanis may well believe that it signals
that the United States is once again leaving the region, and
that might undermine our hopes of gaining their cooperation.
Various ethnic groups in Afghanistan, fearing a civil war
after we begin to depart, could start stockpiling weaponry or
hedge their bets in other unhelpful ways. I think we have to
keep our eyes open for this possibility and be creative in
reassuring the Afghans and the Pakistanis that we are not
abandoning them.
Corruption in the Afghan government, and the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of that government, is also frequently a subject
of questioning. It's a concern I share, and one that
President Karzai's recent election reinforced. On the
positive side, there are ministers and ministries in
Afghanistan that have functioned well--Minister Wardak at the
Defense Ministry and Minister Atmar at the Interior Ministry
are honest effective ministers. The Health Ministry,
Education Ministry, and the National Solidarity Program, run
by the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, all
seem to be functioning well.
But there are also legitimate concerns. High level
corruption among ministers and governors; shakedowns by
police, judges, and other authorities; and perceptions that
warlords are untouchable by the law feed the belief among the
Afghan people that their government does not serve them. And
President Karzai has not always been helpful--his family is
perceived to be part of the problem, and his unwillingness to
remove the immunity from some ministers so the Afghan
Attorney General can indict them is not helpful.
There are ways we can help push for reform--for example,
not working with those leaders who prove to be corrupt so
that their ability to deliver for their followers or to make
money is hampered--but we have to take this seriously.
President Karzai, in his inauguration speech also promised to
crack down on corruption and to hold a loya jirga of national
reconciliation. I would like to hear from General McChrystal
and Ambassador Eikenberry how we can hold him to these
promises and push to have the jirga also help develop a
compact of what the Afghan people have a right to expect from
their government.
Members will also likely ask about the promised assessment
of efforts in December 2010. I think that is a good time to
begin such an assessment--six months after all the promised
troops arrive in country--but members will likely have many
questions about it. What will we assess? What is an
acceptable level of progress? What are the options if
progress is insufficient? These are all obvious questions.
The one thing I would say is that I think it will behoove all
of us to offer the Administration some breathing space before
we make judgments about the success of the plan. Asking
questions is fair, drawing conclusions about the success or
failure of the strategy before it is really implemented
probably isn't.
So, in the first few days after the announcement of the new
strategy, those are some of my thoughts. I think the
President is to be commended for the strategy and the resolve
he is showing. I believe he is fully aware of the threat
posed by al Qa'ida and the potential posed by a sanctuary for
terror in Afghanistan and a possibly destabilized Pakistan.
These are serious threats we are facing, and the President is
clearly prepared to take realistic, effective and fully
resourced steps to address them.
So I conclude as I started, by thanking all of you for what
you do, and by asking you to think of the brave men and women
in uniform, and the civilians who will assist them, who will
have to do the hard, dangerous work to make this strategy a
success. We owe them a great deal, and we should never forget
it.
Thank you.