Mr. Speaker, we come to the floor this evening to discuss this good news that we read yesterday for our warfighters doing great jobs for the U.S. Air Force and for the taxpayers who are providing the equipment for the Air Force and for a…
Mr. Speaker, we come to the floor this evening to discuss this good news that we read yesterday for our warfighters doing great jobs for the U.S. Air Force and for the taxpayers who are providing the equipment for the Air Force and for a lot of working families in the United States. And that was the decision by the General Accountability Office to essentially allow the protests against the previous proposed decision by the United States Air Force to send a contract for the construction of 80 tankers which refuel our Air Force planes essentially overseas to a combination that is largely European by the Airbus Company.
And we are extremely gratified and vindicated that the General Accountability Office has found that in seven very fundamental ways, the decision by the Air Force to send this American tanker using American taxpayer dollars for American warriors essentially overseas, and they have found that this was a decision that violated some general principles of procurement in issuing contracts using taxpayer dollars. In a very forceful and powerful and unambiguous decision, the General Accountability Office, we call it the GAO up here, concluded that this purported decision to send this contract away was a bad decision, bottom line. And this decision must be reviewed and we hope ultimately reversed.
So we've come to the floor tonight to talk about why that decision was appropriate, why it is welcome, and why we hope the Air Force will move forward working with the bidders on this contract to really reach a decision that's going to be in the best interest of the country as a whole, including our warfighters and our taxpayers and our working families.
And just if I can by way just as a matter of background, this is a contract for eventually 179 what are called KC-X aircraft. The first tranche would be 80 aircraft. These are the tankers that refuel our airplanes, and they are obviously the backbone of our Air Force. Without tankers, we don't have an Air Force. This is perhaps the most critical of the one type of airplane we have because this type of airplane has to be right for the job, competent, survivable, cost- effective, or we don't have an Air Force that requires this refueling capacity.
Now, the contractor that we'll talk about tonight, the Boeing Company, has been essentially the exclusive suppliers of these tankers for the United States Air Force for five decades and with incredible success. The KC-135 has been an enormously successful airplane, and the Boeing family of workers that have provided it have been proud to provide that background. And they were, of course, a bidder to provide the Boeing 767 as the platform, a very well-respected workhorse airplane that is converted for tanker purposes.
And this bid was originally rejected by the Air Force and given to a consortium involving Airbus, and it is that decision that the GAO has found was illegal essentially and violated procurement policies.
Now, the GAO, they're sort of a neutral referee, if you will. They don't have any dog in this fight. They reviewed this decision with intimate care and concluded in seven ways, which we will talk about tonight, this decision was grievously flawed and has to be revisited. So we felt vindicated by that decision because we had been arguing on this floor for a couple months now that that decision was grievously wrong.
I'm joined tonight by at least two Members, Phil Hare of Illinois and Nancy Boyda of Kansas. And I would like to start by yielding to Phil Hare of Illinois about his observations about how we need to restore this American plane to an American manufacturer to take care of American warfighters.
Will the gentleman yield for a moment?
I think you seized on a very important point. This was not a decision by the GAO that they're just going to change this decision because they decided to favor American jobs. Now, we think that's a really important point, but the really fundamental aspects of GAO is they concluded the rules were violated in making the decision of what the best airplane for the money was. They did not take into consideration American jobs. We essentially--the Boeing family sort of won this on the merits of the airplane without any sort of special consideration that we were the hometown team, and I think that's a really important point, and I appreciate you making that.
I appreciate the comments. Again, the GAO decision was not based on job creation or job loss, but we, of course, think that's an important value. And this isn't just those of us who are from the Boeing kind of country who feel this. A study by the Economic Policy Institute studied the proposals of Boeing in the competing European Airbus and concluded that the Boeing project would create twice as many jobs, 14,000 more jobs in this country than the other.
Now, we've seen a lot of these fancy ads by the Airbus contractors suggesting that it's an American airplane. But you can't have an airplane take off to Luce, France, as wonderful as that
country is, land it here and slap an American decal on it and make it an American airplane. And the EPI study, I think, is the most dispositive in showing that 14,000 additional jobs were at stake in this decision.
But again, Boeing wanted to win this on the merits on what's the best airplane. And that's what's so impressive about the GAO study that for seven, not just one sort of technical violation, not two technical violations, they concluded that this decision violated this sort of seven deadly sins of procurement policy. And every single one of them went against Boeing contrary to the law.
So this was a very powerful decision. I was going to use the word ``slam dunk,'' but I'm not sure that's a legal term of art. But that's what it was. This was not some sort of just minor technical decision.
I would like to now yield to Nancy Boyda of Kansas who I appreciate joining us this evening.
You used the word ``strong,'' and I think that's very important here, because the Boeing airplane, the Boeing 767 was found by the Air Force's own evaluation to have five times as many survivability discriminators as the Airbus plane. Now, that's a fancy term to mean it had five times as many characteristics that would allow the plane and its pilots and its crew to survive and complete its mission.
It is a stronger airplane from the sense of survivability. You used that term, and I just want to use a quote by former United States Air Force Chief of Staff and Retired General Ronald Fogelman who stressed survivability as an asset of the Boeing plane. He said, ``When I saw the Air Force's assessment of both candidate aircraft in the survivability area, I was struck by the fact that they clearly saw the KC-767 as a more survivable tanker.'' This was a statement to the ARSAG in his role that he was serving in as a consultant of Boeing. He said, ``To be survivable, tanker aircraft must contain systems to identify and defeat threats, provide improved situational awareness to the aircrew to avoid threat areas, and protect the crew in event of attack. The KC-767 has a superior survivability rating and will have greater operational utility to the joint commander and provide better protection to aircrews that must face real-world threats.''
Now, this just isn't Boeing talk. This is the Air Force's own conclusions that the ``discriminators''--it's a fancy word used in this business--that Boeing included more robust surface-to-air missile defense systems, cockpit displays that improve situational awareness, better electromagnetic pulse hardening, automatic route planning and rerouting, better armor protection features for the flight crew and critical aircraft systems, and better fuel tank explosion protection features.
The Boeing 767, according to the Air Force's own evaluation, concluded that Mrs. Boyda's comment that this is a stronger airplane is correct.
Maybe the question is why not the best, and in this case, the Air Force's own conclusion is the strongest, most survivable airplane essentially is the Boeing 767. So I appreciate this comment about strength from Kansas.
Now, I want to turn to my friend Earl Blumenauer from Oregon who's been a leader on a number of high-tech issues. I don't know if Mr. Blumenauer wants to address the fuel efficiency issues or other matters, but I'd appreciate his comments.
I really appreciate again reiterating that we want this decision to be made on the merits, and one of those merits I want to point out just that I find incredible about this decision--and that's why I'm so happy about the GAO decision--is the recognition that the Air Force totally failed to consider accurately the lifecycle costs of these two proposals.
Now, obviously there's the up-front costs, but to the taxpayer, it's the lifecycle cost or the whole cost of maintaining and operating and parking the airplane that you really have to look at. And according to the GAO and the United States Air Force, they made a mistake in evaluating what the lifecycle costs were.
Just reading from a Reuters article June 12--it was a few days later confirmed by GAO--the U.S. Air Force has conceded that Boeing Company's proposed KC-767 refueling tanker would cost less over time than what was then the winning plane by Airbus.
And this is what the taxpayer has at stake in this thing, and this comes--we need to get down in the weeds a little bit--by the failure to take into consideration several things accurately. Number one, the Boeing airplane uses 24 percent less fuel. It's 24 percent more efficient. So you save, it's about somewhere between--I'm looking for my number here--according to a pretty good study, over the 40-year operational life, the Boeing plane would save $30 billion in projected fuel costs, $30 billion.
I'd like to yield to Mr. Blumenauer for a comment.
And by the way, there seems to be no doubt, these statistics we're giving are essentially inarguable. Airbus is not contesting the fact that the Boeing airplane is 24 percent more fuel. This is just fact. The GAO find that this is, I believe, one of the reasons of life cycle cost.
And by the way, it's just not fuel. Because the Airbus plane is so gargantuan, it's going to cost taxpayers an additional $2 billion in military construction to rebuild the hangers to hang them in and places to park the things. It will also cost $13 billion in additional manpower over the life cycle. So there are numerous reasons why the Boeing plane is a better deal for the taxpayers.
Well, I appreciate that. And just so people know who may be
listening to this--and maybe even a couple of our colleagues, you never know, it's a slow night--I'll just read finding number six by the GAO. And they said, ``The Air Force's evaluation of military construction costs in calculating the offerer's most probable life cycle cost for their proposed aircraft was unreasonable. When the agency, during the protest, conceded that it made a number of errors in evaluation that, when corrected, resulted in Boeing displacing Northrop Grumman as the offerer with the lowest, most probable life cycle cost, the GAO concluded, and ultimately after they fixed their mistakes, concluded that the Boeing airplane is a better deal for the American taxpayer.'' Now, to me, if you've got a stronger airplane and a better deal for the American taxpayer, and peripherally, but not unimportantly, 14,000, at least, more jobs in America, this ought to be a slam-dunk decision. We hope that it will be, ultimately.
I will yield to Mrs. Boyda.
And just to back up what Mrs. Boyda said, she's not just whistling Dixie--or Kansas in this case--she has backed up what the GAO said. They said specifically, in finding number four of seven deadly sins, they said, ``The Air Force conducted misleading and unequal discussions with Boeing by informing Boeing that it had fully satisfied a key performance parameter objective relating to operational utility, but later determined that Boeing had only partially met this objective. And then there's a bunch of other language that's pretty technical.
But what happened here is, for some reason that I don't know for sure--I have some suspicions of what happened here, and that doesn't really matter--but for some reason the Air Force decided bigger was better. And they went and in their original decision opted for a bigger airplane and violated, in several different ways, the procurement rules in order to reach that conclusion.
Now, we've said that the Air Force has already recognized that their life cycle cost decisions were in error. But we really hope in this rebidding that they will not be persuaded that bigger is always better. And what we have found, and some of the things we've talked about tonight, why bigger is not better, it's actually worse in this particular case because when you build a plane that's that much bigger, that exceeds your real requirements, you end up spending a quarter more fuel and you end up spending $2 billion on construction costs.
And here's something that I think is important. The Airbus airplane can only use half as many airfields around the world as the Boeing 767. Now, you think of all the places we can end up in a military conflict around the world and all the relatively little airports that we may want to get involved in, I mean, who knew we were going to be flying from airports in Iraq 20 years ago when we made some procurement decisions? We have to be ready to fly these airplanes anywhere in the world. Yet the Airbus decision, if you buy this larger airplane, it can only use--I think it's either 200 or 400 airports that the Boeing plane can use that the Airbus plane cannot. I think that's really important, and one of the disadvantages of size. Plus, if you look at the requirements, the Boeing airplane fulfills the requirements that they asked for on how much capacity they had to have for refueling, Boeing met it.
So that's one of the things that Mrs. Boyda was alluding to that GAO said, just because you do more than the requirement, it doesn't do you any good. Why give extra bonus points to something that just costs more money and eliminates half the airports in the world where you can land? That doesn't make sense. And I think that was one of the reasons that GAO decided.
And I yield to Mrs. Boyda.
And as a result of this decision that has now been reversed, thankfully--at least by the GAO, they're calling for a reversal--what really happened is that the original decision, the Air Force decided to buy excess capacity that was not needed and gave up a capacity that was needed, which was refueling all our types of aircraft. And the GAO concluded--this isn't just Boeing talking, it's the GAO concluded--that the Airbus cannot refuel some of the airplanes we have in stock right now.
So you sort of paid more money for more life cycle cost for the Airbus airplane, you bought capacity you did not need, and you gave up the one thing you do need, which is to be able to refuel every kind of airplane. What are we supposed to tell the pilots of the Tilt-Rotor aircraft; sorry, you don't get to fuel? We've made a procurement decision that, you know, you'll just have to take the long way around? It was a serious, serious misjudgment because they concluded, for reasons that
escape me, frankly, why bigger is better. And I think that's really the fundamental decision that was made in that regard.
I would like to, if I can, talk about something else that is important that was not in the GAO decision that I do think bears on this, and I think we, as Members of Congress, have a responsibility to look at, and that is this issue of whether or not it should be Federal policy to reward countries and companies that are violating international law on our trade agreements.
Right now, the United States Government has concluded that the Airbus company has been the recipient of billions of dollars of illegal subsidies, illegal subsidies from the governments in Europe, and has concluded with such force that the United States Government, the U.S. Trade Representative, has filed a claim, a lawsuit of sorts, against Airbus because of these illegal subsidies. So the United States Government has determined that this contractor has received illegal subsidies violative of international and consequentially United States law. But then what did the other agency of the U.S. government turn around and do--or tried to do before the GAO blew the whistle? They turned around and tried to give a $40 billion contract to the very company that's violating the trade laws. Now, how does that make us look in international law if we're suing them, saying there's illegal subsidies, and we turn around and give them a $40 billion contract while taking away 14,000 jobs here away from a very well known and successful contractor, the Boeing company? It's ludicrous. Talk about the right hand not knowing what the left hand was doing here.
This is an issue that the GAO did not review and the Air Force did not review because some people in the Senate did not allow them to do that--that's a whole other story how that happened--but it seems to me that we, as Members of Congress, should stand for the enforcement of these trade laws and not reward companies and contractors who we ourselves have concluded violated the law. And I think that's an obligation on us. It's beyond the obligation of the GAO. That wasn't their job, but I think it is our job.
Yes.
Half the airports in the world.
And in making these arguments, I don't think any of us are apologetic for the fact that our constituents and families have been very active in the Boeing Company. My uncles and cousins, I remember my best friend growing up in south Seattle, his dad had the job of breaking Boeing airplanes. And his job was to try to figure out what you had to do to break a Boeing airplane. And when you were a kid growing up, to think that your job was to get to blow up things was pretty fun.
One of his coolest jobs was they would take a Boeing 727 and put a jack underneath it, and jack that wing up and see how far they could jack that wing up before it failed. And when they failed, they would literally explode because of the tension. And those things get up almost 35, 45 degrees. They have incredible flexibility as well as strength. So I grew up with Boeing as part of my blood and family, in the interest of full disclosure. But I think the arguments we're making here tonight go well beyond our sort of familial and constituent interests and duties because I think what we're portraying is a decision that it was so far out of kilter that you had the GAO now blowing the whistle on it, and the GAO is like the referee. They had an instant replay. They had it right on videotape. And they concluded this was a decision that was way, way out of bounds. And we are now hopeful that the Air Force will fully and fairly re-evaluate this. And I think that they will conclude in something that all of us Members conclude, I think tonight.
And I was counting on what Mr. Hare said, five inarguable truths about this contract. I just want to list them, that nobody can argue, everybody would agree, even our Air Force colleagues would have to admit this. Number one, the Air Force's own conclusions showed that there were more survivable discriminators to show the survivability to the Boeing airplane helping the warfighter survive and do their jobs; Number two, the life cycle costs, when you include all the costs for maintenance and reconstruction of the hangars and everything, are less expensive in the Boeing airplane than the Airbus airplane; third, that the fuel life cycle costs are going to be less for the Boeing airplane than the Airbus airplane, in the billions of dollars; and fourth, and this wasn't in the GAO report but we know it to be true, if we go with the Airbus product here, we're going to be spending $40 plus billion of
American taxpayer dollars rewarding a company that our own Federal Government has concluded is guilty of very serious violations of Federal trade rules in the billions of dollars; and fifth, and one that is maybe closest to our hearts at the moment, the Boeing airplane will have at least, and probably more than this, 14,000 families more employed doing high quality work than the competitor.
So the GAO said there were seven major errors, which is extraordinary by the way, not just one, seven major fundamental errors. We will say tonight that there were five strikes and you're out, those are the five strikes that all of us can agree on I think. So we're hopeful that the GAO is heeded, if it is not by the Air Force, we will be doing our job here in Congress, and we will be finding the right avenue in the appropriations process to not allow this decision to stand to make sure that the right decision is made.
I appreciate your contributions on this and so many other things. And I want to say that this, I think, has opened many Members of Congress' eyes to the procurement policy. There are some issues we have to think about in general going forward of our procurement policy. But this is one we have to get fixed to start with before we act holistically. I would like to yield to Mr. Hare for closing comments.
And thank you Mr. Hare. Our thoughts are with your flooded constituents in Illinois. We are thinking about them tonight.
Just a closing comment, where this goes from now, the Air Force is required within 60 days to respond to this protest. They will have 60 days within which to plan their next action in this regard. We know what we would like them to do. Following that, if decisions are not made as they should be, Congress can act in a variety of ways to make sure that this decision is right. And we stand ready, willing and able to do so.
And the longer this goes on, the more our colleagues frankly understand that something was not right in this decision and needs to be reversed. So as time goes on I think we will get closer.
Let me also say in criticizing the decision by the U.S. Air Force, I hope it goes without saying, we have undying respect for the people who serve in the United States Air Force. These are decisions that are hard fought, a lot of technical issues. A decision was not made here according to Hoyle. But do you know what? We have a process of fixing these things. And at the end of the day, the U.S. Air Force is going to be something we always admire. And we are going to get them the right airplane for the job. We know what that is, and we are going to get that job done for them.