Mr. President, I speak as vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, and I oppose the nomination of John Bolton to be U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. I purposely highlight that position on the Intelligence Committee because…
Mr. President, I speak as vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, and I oppose the nomination of John Bolton to be U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. I purposely highlight that position on the Intelligence Committee because it is Mr. Bolton's pattern of attempting to distort and to misuse intelligence that is primary as a reason for my opposing his nomination. I have many reasons to oppose his nomination, but I will restrict myself to my work on the Intelligence Committee.
Senator Biden and other members of the Foreign Relations Committee have walked through some of these facts, although perhaps not all of them yet, related to Mr. Bolton. So I will not go into all of the details. I do intend to provide some background and expand on at least one critical issue. I want to explain why this issue should matter to my colleagues and why Mr. Bolton's actions should disqualify him from this position.
As my colleagues know, beginning in June of 2003, the Senate Intelligence Committee undertook an exhaustive inquiry into the intelligence concerning Iraq prior to the war. After more than a year, the committee unanimously approved a scathing 511 page report describing the intelligence community's systematic failures, particularly on issues related to weapons of mass destruction. One of the central issues to the committee's review was the question of ``whether any influence was brought to bear on anyone to shape their analysis to support policy objectives.''
It was a question so important, in fact, and so fundamental to our committee's oversight role that answering it was one of the four specific tasks laid out by Chairman Roberts and me at the beginning of this inquiry.
The issue of maintaining objectivity goes to the very heart of intelligence and intelligence oversight. Our intelligence agencies are charged with gathering information around the world and then objectively analyzing the information and providing it to the rest of the Government. Intelligence consumers, then, rely on that intelligence for a variety of activities. Often, that information forms the foundation of the very national security policies we depend upon to keep our country safe. It is absolutely essential that our intelligence is objective, independent, and accurate. If it is not, then the system does not work, we waste billions of dollars each year, and we end up making a critical national security decision or a series of them based upon flawed assumptions.
In the extreme, intelligence that is manipulated or shaped to fit preconceived conditions could lead the country into a war that we should not be fighting. This, of course, was the concern that many of us had when we began our investigation of prewar intelligence. It was a central point of the committee's review--a central point. It was something we pursued aggressively. In that case, the committee did not find evidence that the administration officials as a whole attempted to coerce, influence, or pressure analysts to specifically change their judgments--specifically change their judgments--relating to Iraq's WMD. I supported that finding, although in my additional views I described what I thought was a more pervasive environment of pressure, created prior to the war, to reach conclusions that supported the administration's policies.
I describe this effort now, however, not to revisit these issues that we investigated but to impress upon my colleagues and the public how serious it is when policymakers are accused of attempting to manipulate the intelligence process. This is behavior we cannot tolerate, and this is the pattern of behavior Mr. Bolton has exhibited during his tenure as Under Secretary of State. As I said, Senator Biden, Senator Dodd, and others have done a superb job in describing the specific incidents. Let me add a few points to provide context for these episodes.
First, I want everyone to understand that the Intelligence Committee was aware of these allegations long before Mr. Bolton was nominated to this job. These are not incidents dredged up after he had been nominated.
The committee's Iraq report briefly mentions the case of an INR analyst--that is, the State Department intelligence analyst--who had the courage to stand up in a committee hearing and acknowledge what he described as political pressure. When the committee staff interviewed this analyst, they discovered that the instance involved Cuba and not Iraq. That being the case, the committee did not pursue a review because we were doing Iraq, not Cuba.
Unfortunately, the committee's final report described and commented on this incident without conducting a
complete investigation of the facts. It is now clear from the record developed by the Foreign Relations Committee in their excellent work that Under Secretary Bolton attempted to exact retribution against this intelligence analyst because his analysis did not support Mr. Bolton's views.
As with the case of the INR analyst, the State Department analyst, the committee previously was aware of the allegations of politicization related to the former National Intelligence Officer for Latin America. We knew about it. In the course of a briefing to the committee staff in November of 2004, this individual described an effort to have him removed because his analysis was at odds with the views of certain policymakers, including Secretary Bolton. Unfortunately, the committee did not follow up on these allegations until March, when the minority staff on the committee began scheduling interviews. I speak now of the Intelligence Committee, not the Foreign Relations Committee. It is clear from these interviews that the minority staff on the Intelligence Committee did and from the much more extensive work done by the Foreign Relations Committee that Under Secretary Bolton and others, particularly Otto Reich, who was Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America, sought to have the National Intelligence Officer reassigned because his analysis did not support their policies.
These two episodes, in my mind, are enough to disqualify Mr. Bolton from this position. But there is more to this pattern of abusing the intelligence process. During the course of the nomination process, we learned that on at least 10 occasions, Mr. Bolton had sought to learn the identity of 19 U.S. persons--this has been discussed on the Senate floor, but I am going to add something--19 U.S. persons mentioned in intelligence reports. There has been a great deal of speculation as to why he wanted these names, whether it was proper to seek this information.
To answer these questions, Chairman Lugar asked Chairman Roberts and me to solicit information from the appropriate agencies. Eventually-- eventually--eventually, the new Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, GEN Michael Hayden, briefed Senator Roberts and myself. He did not brief Senator Lugar and Senator Biden--Chairman Lugar and Ranking Member Biden. That is a mystery to me. I don't understand that. But he briefed us on the content of the intelligence in question.
Let me be clear. We did not receive the names, the very names provided to Under Secretary Bolton--which is an extraordinary sense of control of one branch of Government over another. We did not receive those names. We read everything associated with those names but not the names themselves. They were not given to us.
Based on my limited review, I noted from the rest of the context nothing improper about the request. That, however, was not the end of the story. As part of our effort to respond to Chairman Lugar's request for information, the committee staff interviewed several individuals with knowledge of Under Secretary Bolton's request for these names. During one of those interviews, a senior member of his staff described actions Under Secretary Bolton took after he received one of those names.
According to this individual, upon receiving the name from the National Security Agency, the NSA, Under Secretary Bolton shared that information with another State Department official. The reasons for this action are not clear, but it seems inconsistent with the stated reasons for obtaining the name.
Let me explain. I must take a moment to describe the information we are talking about and put Mr. Bolton's action in some context. When a U.S. intelligence agency--in this case, the National Security Agency-- receives a report that includes information concerning a U.S. person, that information is, so to speak, minimized--that is the technical term--for privacy reasons, meaning that the U.S. name is replaced with a generic designation such as ``named U.S. Government official,'' or ``named U.S. citizen,'' but that is all. Remember, this is information that is already classified at the highest levels, or it would not receive this treatment--classified at the highest levels and shared with a very limited number of people in order to protect the source of that information. The U.S. name is even more closely guarded and not provided unless an appropriately cleared official reading that intelligence report makes a specific request for it in order to better understand the foreign intelligence, and it is only intelligence that that person can be concerned with.
The rules for dealing with this kind of comprehensive information are very strict. It is only provided on a case-by-case basis at the request of a specific individual. The National Security Agency has a formal and very well established procedure for processing such requests and for providing the names to the requester.
When a decision is made to release the name, it is transmitted with a cover sheet with the following admonition:
Request no further action be taken on this information
without prior approval of the National Security Agency.
Probably that would not have to be there because anybody at that level understands that already, but nevertheless it is there, front and center. This language is clear. This language is unambiguous. But Mr. Bolton apparently disregarded it. Neither the NSA, the National Security Agency, nor the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research has a record of him seeking the necessary approval to further disseminate the name. Now his defenders say he never saw that restriction. I don't know if that is accurate, but I do know that it is entirely irrelevant because he knew about that. Anybody who is experienced to receive intelligence at that level has to know that.
He knew the classification of the intercepts. He knew the sensitivity of information referencing U.S. persons. He knew the special procedures he had to go through to get that name. He knew the requirement to closely guard this information, even if he had not seen the specific language on the transmittal letter. Any attempt to place blame for his action on others is thinly veiled, sad, and wrong.
I still have questions about this episode, but it appears to me on its face that he violated the restrictions placed on this information by the National Security Agency. Even if we discover his actions were technically not a security violation, if by a 1 in 1,000 percent chance it turned out to be true, it emphasizes something even worse, and that is a cavalier attitude to be, therefore, projected into the future in dealing with extremely sensitive intelligence information.
This is part of a pattern which shows a blatant disregard for the importance of the intelligence process which is the spear tip of this Nation's internal security and security around the world and the sensitivity of the information contained in intelligence products.
When viewed collectively, these actions demonstrate Mr. Bolton's unfitness for this position. I thereby urge my colleagues to oppose his confirmation. I thank the Presiding Officer.
I yield to the Senator.
I say to the Senator from Connecticut it is not only appropriate, but it is necessary. The Senator from Connecticut described the very condition of its sensitivity and its importance and therefore the importance of its place in this nomination consideration.
The fact that only Senator Roberts and myself were briefed for a long period of time is part of the way the administration either shares very sensitive information which they do not want other committee members to have--which, of course, makes other committee members furious, as it would me, but they cannot take chances--but what that emphasizes is the importance and the confidentiality and the high degree of sensitivity of the information. When you are putting somebody potentially into the United Nations to effect policy, to reflect the views of the President more directly than the President can do on a daily basis, to reflect the views of the rest of the world toward the United States, this kind of thing must be available to Senator Roberts and myself and, just as importantly, to Senator Lugar as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, for Heavens' sake, and Senator Joe Biden, the ranking member.
That is correct. And that is not available.
No, it was not available and it is part of this pattern.
We have to decide if there are two branches of Government or one.