Mr. President, I join with the chairman of the Intelligence Committee in what he has said. Today the Senate is considering the nomination of Ambassador John Negroponte to become the Nation's first Director of National Intelligence.…
Mr. President, I join with the chairman of the Intelligence Committee in what he has said. Today the Senate is considering the nomination of Ambassador John Negroponte to become the Nation's first Director of National Intelligence. Personally, I strongly support this nomination, and I will discuss the reasons why in a moment.
First, however, as the chairman did, I am going to take a few minutes to describe how critical this new position is to our country and its future, the magnitude of the challenges Ambassador Negroponte will face.
In 1947, Congress created the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of Central Intelligence. The Cold War was upon us and the Nation needed intelligence about our new adversary. The structure we put in place at that time to keep tabs on the Soviet Union grew and took on additional missions over the next 40 years. But the intelligence community stayed primarily focused on that one target of the Soviet Union.
Then in 1990, the Soviet Union dissolved. The world changed dramatically, but our intelligence organizations for the most part did not. As a consequence, we have for the past 15 years made do with an intelligence system designed to penetrate and collect information about a single static adversary. There was no one in charge to force change from within, and before September 11 of 2001, there was little impetus for change from without.
The National Security Act of 1947, the genesis of all of this, designated the DCI to serve as the head of the Central Intelligence Agency, also the principal adviser to the President on intelligence matters, and the head of the U.S. intelligence community--all three of those assignments.
The Director of Central Intelligence ran the CIA, advised the President, but, frankly, never exercised the third responsibility, which is probably the most important other than advising the President, and that is managing the intelligence community itself.
Even after the events, tragic though they might have been, of 9/11, it took 3 years, two major investigations of those events, and the stunning intelligence failures prior to the Iraq war to break through the entrenched interests and to achieve reform that created the position of director of something called national intelligence, all of it.
The difficulty involved in the birth of this new office serves as a warning for the challenges that the Ambassador, if confirmed, as I hope he will be, will face. Bureaucracies are amazingly slow to change. That doesn't say anything bad about the people. That is the way the world works, whether it is corporate, private, or whatever. The bureaucracies are tenacious in defending their turf. Some of the stories are remarkable within the 15 intelligence agencies the Ambassador will have to oversee. Reform of the intelligence community will involve stepping on the turf of some of the most powerful bureaucracies in Washington. And first and foremost among those is the Department of Defense.
Eighty percent of our intelligence spending is in the DOD budget. The incoming Director of National Intelligence will have to quickly establish a close working relationship with the Secretary of Defense, but it must be a
relationship of equals, and Ambassador Negroponte must be willing to exercise the authority given him by the legislation and the President when he and the Secretary differ. In effect, the Director of National Intelligence supersedes the head of the Department of Defense.
Ambassador Negroponte also will encounter and need to manage the CIA, an organization accustomed to operating with tremendous autonomy, a world unto itself. Some of these agencies, such as the National Security Agency--they are called NSA--get acronyms, ``no such agency''--that is part of the way their world operates. That is not to denigrate them, their public service, their public commitment, their willingness to offer up their lives for their country. But bureaucracy of a huge magnitude it surely is.
Then there is the FBI, an agency which is dominated by its law enforcement history and struggling to make itself into a full partner in the intelligence community. Some question whether that can be done; my mind is still open to it. They are trying. Most people say it is working at the top but not in the middle, because if you are a lawyer, you have a yellow pad, you go arrest somebody for breaking the law. If you are an intelligence officer, you find somebody you are suspicious of, and you don't arrest that person. You surveil that person, you trail that person, maybe for weeks, months, to find out where that person takes you and what intelligence we can learn from that.
But these are powerful organizations with very proud histories. They are populated by dedicated and talented public servants who have contributed to our security for decades. But our needs are now different. All of these agencies now must change the way they do business.
Ambassador Negroponte takes charge at a time when the intelligence community is reeling from criticism for the lapses prior to 9/11 and the significant failures related to prewar intelligence on Iraq.
The chairman and I worry about that because it affects morale. One doesn't want to affect morale. But on the other hand, intelligence agencies have to reflect the current needs of this country and act accordingly.
The loose amalgam of 15 intelligence agencies needs a leader who can change not simply the boxes on an organizational chart but the way we do intelligence. The different agencies traditionally have collected intelligence from their sources, analyzed it, put it into their databases, and then shared it as they deemed appropriate. The chairman and I are very fond--both of us--of saying the word ``share'' is now outmoded. There is a need-to-know basis from time to time. But if you share something, that means you own it and that you make the decision you will share it with somebody. We prefer the modern word for intelligence which is going to have to be ``access,'' that anybody in that business has access to that intelligence automatically by definition unless there is a particular need-to-know restriction.
The Director of National Intelligence has to create a new culture where the process of producing intelligence is coordinated across agencies from the beginning. The collection strategies for various targets need to be unified, and the intelligence collected needs to be available to everyone with the proper clearance and the need to know that information.
That is the concept of jointness in operation that the Presiding Officer knows well because he is on the Armed Services Committee, as is my colleague, the chairman of the Intelligence Committee. Jointness is a concept the military has used and made work very effectively. It goes back to the Goldwater-Nichols Act almost 20 years ago, and it is something the Intelligence Committee is going to have to learn how to do. Making fundamental changes is absolutely essential in order to make sure our intelligence is timely, objective, and independent of political consideration.
The credibility of the intelligence community--and, by extension, the credibility of the United States--has suffered when key intelligence reports such as the prewar intelligence report on Iraq failed the test of being timely, objective, and independent as required by law. It is not something they just ought to be doing; it is required by the 1947 National Security Act.
Making major changes in the way the community operates and produces intelligence will be the first step for Ambassador Negroponte. He also must instill a sense of accountability. On this many of us feel strongly. The joint inquiry conducted by the Senate and the House Intelligence Committees into the events of 9/11 called for accountability for the mistakes made prior to the attack where thousands lost their lives. The WMD commission, which finished its work, also highlighted this issue.
But despite these findings and despite what one would think the country would assume and expect, no one has been held accountable for the numerous failures to share critical intelligence and act on intelligence warnings in the year and a half prior to the 9/11 attacks. Likewise there has been a lack of accountability over the failings in the collection, analysis, and use of intelligence prior to the Iraq war itself.
Accountability means people get fired or people get demoted or people get scolded or, concurrently, people are patted on the back, rewarded, encouraged, motivated further, held up before their colleagues as exemplary because they have done something particularly well.
So the Ambassador is not only going to have to deal with problems from the past, but he will have to face immediately the growing scandal surrounding the collection of intelligence through the detention, interrogation, and rendition of suspected terrorists and insurgents. We have been subjected to an almost daily deluge of accusations of abuse stemming from these operations.
The intelligence we gain through these interrogations is, frankly, too important to allow shortcomings in this program to continue, and the Director of National Intelligence will be the official responsible for ensuring we have a comprehensive, consistent, legal, and operational policy on the detention and interrogation of prisoners because there is enormous flux in that whole area right now. The lack of clarity in these areas has led to confusion and likely contributed to the abuse we have witnessed.
Dealing with the many challenges is a tall order. But if anybody can succeed in the position of DNI, Director of National Intelligence, an entirely new position in the U.S. Government, one of the three or four toughest jobs in Washington, that person is Ambassador Negroponte. He has a 40-year career of public service, as has been indicated, in some of most difficult and critical posts in the Foreign Service: Vietnam, the Paris peace talks, South and Central America, the U.N., and most recently in Baghdad.
He has been doing this for 40 years. One of the things I have appreciated particularly about him is that he is not a military person, not a political person, not an intelligence person. He is a diplomat. He is somebody who, through his entire career, has engaged in understanding the nuances of the cultures we have to deal with in the intelligence world and what follows intelligence across the world. But he also knows a great deal about intelligence and the military operations and the political aspects of life simply because you cannot be an ambassador and avoid those things.
He is a diplomat, a manager, a negotiator, which is crucial to bringing these agencies together and to go back and forth with the President and the Congress. He has extensive knowledge of the workings of the Government. That is a very prosaic statement, until one takes it at face value. Most people don't. They have extensive knowledge about certain parts of Government. He covers the ballfield. He has the temperament, standing, and self-confidence, frankly, to deal with the Washington bureaucracy. He has a great deal of confidence in himself, and he ought to--he has the backing of somebody called the President of the United States of America.
The Intelligence Reform Act provides the Director of National Intelligence with considerable authority. But in Washington, DC, the support of the President is invaluable in exercising authority. To put it another way, a person loses their stature pretty quickly if the President is not backing that
person in high-profile decisions, particularly in those instances when decisions meet resistance from the heads of other departments and other agencies which have full call on the President and his attention. The President's support will be absolutely critical to Ambassador Negroponte's success--and succeed he must, Mr. President.
The United States faces a period of enormous uncertainty and threat. The problems of international terrorism will be with us for many decades, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction poses a danger at this minute for the entire world and will for decades to come.
These are difficult targets for the intelligence community, but these are the things that threaten our security every moment. These are the issues the intelligence community must master. They are our front line of defense. The warfighter has not yet engaged properly until the intelligence has been collected and disseminated and policy is made from that. Ambassador Negroponte must lead all of us into a new era on intelligence. I think he is very well suited for the task, and I look forward to his swift confirmation.
In closing, I also hope the Senate moves very quickly to confirm the President's nominee to be Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, and that is LTG Michael Hayden. This is a tandem made in Heaven. General Hayden understands the military, the lifelong service of it. He understands intelligence. He is Director of the National Security Agency. He has a profound, intuitive, knowledge-based understanding of what is under the rocks and what is plainly in sight, what is plainly good or wrong about the intelligence profession. He has led the National Security Agency for the last 6 years. It is an interesting fact that in the National Security Agency, under their roof, is the largest collection of mathematicians in this world. That may be known or not; I suspect it is. But these people do incredibly important things. He has led them now, having been reappointed three times. Together, Ambassador Negroponte and General Hayden make a powerful team. I am very pleased to support them both.
I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
Of course.
If my friend will yield, I further say that the President made an enormous contribution, which was sort of generally overlooked--not by those of us who work in this field of intelligence-- when he made it very clear and made an executive decision that 80 percent of the budget that goes to the military, minus a few very specific tactical areas, and necessarily so, would be under the Director of National Intelligence. That was the President declaring that whoever is in that position will control the funding. Complications can arise, but the President has been clear about who is going to run this operation, and that is very important.
Will the Senator allow me to yield to her such time as she may desire?
Mr. President, how much time remains on this side of the aisle?
Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may consume, which will be less than that.
Mr. President, I am going to use this opportunity to speak on an unrelated issue, not entirely but somewhat, but one that is of critical importance to the intelligence community and the American people.
Last week, I filed an amendment to the emergency supplemental appropriations bill. Unfortunately, I was not able to bring the amendment before the Senate because it was not germane under postcloture rules. This amendment is important enough, however, that I will take just a few minutes to explain it.
My amendment was, and is, simple and straightforward. It expresses the sense of the Senate. It is not directive. It expresses the sense of the Senate that the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence should conduct an investigation into matters related to the collection of intelligence through the detention, interrogation, and rendition of prisoners. That is its purpose.
The amendment, as I indicated, does not direct the committee to undertake this much needed and long overdue congressional review. Rather, it is a statement by the Senate that the committee should carry out its oversight duties and carefully, thoroughly, and constructively evaluate the interrogation practices of the U.S. Intelligence Community.
A year has passed since the appearance of photographs graphically portraying the abuse of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison. Since then, we have
seen a steady stream of accusations relating to the way U.S. military and intelligence agencies treat individuals in their custody. Allegations of mistreatment have surfaced wherever the United States holds prisoners overseas--across Iraq, in Afghanistan, and at Guantanamo Bay.
Troubling new revelations have become almost a daily occurrence-- literally a daily occurrence--with a disturbing number of these incidents resulting in prisoner deaths.
At least 26 prisoners have died in American custody. The disturbing charge has been leveled against the United States that we are exporting torture through rendition practices that lack accountability.
Who can honestly say these events and allegations are not serious enough to warrant an Intelligence Committee investigation?
The collection of intelligence through interrogation and rendition is an extremely important part of our counterterrorism effort and one of our most important intelligence tools.
But this tool, as with all others, must be applied within the bounds of our laws and our own moral framework. It must be subject to the same scrutiny and congressional oversight as every other aspect of intelligence collection. This, unfortunately, has not been the case.
Despite the critical importance of interrogation-derived intelligence and the growing controversy surrounding detention, interrogation, and rendition practices and policies, the Congress has largely ignored the issue, holding few hearings that have provided only limited insight.
More disturbingly, in this Senator's judgment, the Senate Intelligence Committee--the committee charged with overseeing intelligence programs, and the only committee with the jurisdiction to investigate all aspects of this issue--is, in this Senator's judgment, sitting on the sidelines and effectively abdicating its oversight responsibility to media investigative reporters who go at it very aggressively and on a daily basis.
As the Intelligence Committee's vice chairman, I have been pushing, for the past 3 months, for an investigation into the legal and operational questions at the heart of the detention and interrogation controversy.
My requests, and those of other committee members, have been rebuffed, based upon the argument that we have been fully informed on the particulars of our detention and interrogation program, and the Intelligence Committee need only monitor these operations.
The point has also been made that the Intelligence Committee should not undertake an investigation into these issues because the CIA Inspector General is conducting his own investigation. I reject this notion that the Senate should cede to the executive branch its oversight responsibilities. Carrying out oversight is why the Senate Intelligence Committee exists.
Effective congressional oversight is not achieved passively waiting for and accepting the parameters of internal executive branch reviews. We are separate in our responsibilities, executive and legislative. While it is true that the CIA inspector general is investigating specific allegations of abuse involving intelligence personnel, those specific cases represent a small portion of what the Intelligence Committee should be examining. Many fundamental legal and operational issues are outside the inspector general's very limited focus and deserve the Intelligence Committee's immediate attention.
We have a duty to not simply monitor but to actively inquire about the conduct of congressionally funded activities--that is our job-- especially activities such as prisoner interrogation that can have life or death implications. Down the road, if we don't set these rules straight, that can come back to haunt our soldiers and their safety.
Up to this point, the Intelligence Committee oversight that I am speaking of has been, in the judgment of this Senator, abdicated to the press over the past year. Here is a sampling, which I will go through quickly, of headlines from articles that have been published in recent weeks: ``Interrogator Says U.S. Approved Handling of Detainee Who Died''; ``White House Has Tightly Restricted Oversight of CIA Detentions''; ``FBI Report Questions Guantanamo Tactics''; ``Questions Are Left by C.I.A. Chief on the Use of Torture''; ``CIA's Assurances on Transferred Subjects Doubted--Prisoners Say Countries Break No-Torture Pledges''; ``Europeans Investigate CIA Role in Abductions''; ``Army Details Scale of Abuse of Prisoners in an Afghan Jail''; ``Prisoners at Abu Ghraib Said to Include Children''; ``Army, CIA Agreed on `Ghost' Prisoners''; ``Lack of Oversight Led to the Abuse of Detainees, Investigator Says''; ``Ex-CIA Lawyer Calls for Law on Rendition''; ``CIA Avoids Scrutiny of Detainee Treatment''; ``Files Show New Abuse Cases in Afghan and Iraqi Prisons''; ``CIA Is Seeking New Role on Detainees''; ``FBI Agents Allege Abuse of Detainees at Guantanamo Bay''; ``CIA Was Wary of U.S. Interrogation Methods in Iraq.''
I think the Presiding Officer gets the drift.
I ask my colleagues to consider the finding made by General Fay in his recent report on the abuses at Abu Ghraib. General Fay found that CIA practices ``led to a loss of accountability, abuse . . . and the unhealthy mystique that further poisoned the atmosphere at Abu Ghraib.''
General Fay was unable to fully investigate the CIA's role at Abu Ghraib and other prisons. The Senate Intelligence Committee, however, is not unable to do that. That is our job.
These and other reports highlight the need for the sort of strong congressional oversight that in my judgment is now absent. There are many legal and operational questions that we should be investigating to ensure that this vitally important intelligence collection program is not continually hampered by vague and confusing legal and operational directives.
For example, on March 18, 2005, the Central Intelligence Agency issued a statement that:
CIA policies on interrogation have always followed legal
guidance from the Department of Justice.
That may be so, but was that legal guidance supportable? A lengthy legal opinion of the Department of Justice on interrogation practices, which had been issued in secret in August 2002, was quickly repudiated by the White House when it became public in June of 2004 and was superseded by a public Justice Department legal opinion in December of 2004. As that episode indicates, secret law is an invitation to great error.
The Intelligence Committee, which includes members of the Senate Judiciary Committee, must conduct a complete examination of the legal guidance that CIA and Defense Department interrogators have been given. What supporting roles do the CIA and FBI play in the interrogation of suspects at military-run institutions? And how are their activities coordinated, if they are?
It has been publicly reported that the CIA requested that a number of prisoners held in Iraq not be registered and be kept from international inspection--so-called ghost detainees--and that FBI officials lodged strenuous complaints about the mistreatment of prisoners held at Guantanamo Bay. I cannot emphasize how strongly those FBI objections were. These reports and others strongly suggest that different agencies are operating by different sets of interrogation and detention rules, which is a recipe for disaster.
The Congress should evaluate the general policy guidelines for which it is appropriate to render a detainee to another country, and what intelligence is gained from such practice.
More specifically, we must examine the validity of assurances that the United States is given when detainees are rendered to other countries that they will not be tortured. The Congress should undertake, with the intelligence community, case studies of interrogations, including the methods used and, importantly, the reliability of the information obtained. As with other intelligence tools, we should consider on the basis of facts, rather than surmise, what works, what does not work, to obtain reliable information that actually contributes to our national security. The Congress should examine plans for the long-term detention or prosecution of persons detained or rendered for interrogation purposes.
Should the United States, for example, hold detainees without trial for years or decades to come? Is it acceptable to do that for the reason that the
detainees' acknowledgment of their actions came during interrogations that would neither meet the standards of a U.S. court or U.S. military commission?
The reality may be that if Congress continues to default in its oversight and legislative responsibilities, that the courts, in fact, themselves will end up filling that vacuum. The threat of terrorism is going to be with us for many years, if not decades. The intelligence we gain through interrogations will be crucial in protecting Americans themselves against future attacks. If we are to optimize those counterterrorism efforts, we need to have a plan, not an ad hoc policy, for how to deal with people in our custody.
America is not a nation that uses or condones torture. We are party to international agreements that prohibit these acts, and we demand humane treatment for our citizens when they are arrested abroad and for our soldiers when they are captured on the battlefield. We must uphold the same high standards for individuals in our custody or we will rightly be branded as hypocrites, and we will put our soldiers and our citizens in danger. I cannot emphasize that enough.
Next year will mark the 30th anniversary of the Senate Intelligence Committee. The committee was created in the crucible of an extensive bipartisan investigation in 1975, led by Senators Frank Church and John Tower, into allegations of abuse by U.S. intelligence agencies. One conclusion, as described by Howard Baker--somebody I admire enormously--was that the congressional oversight system had provided ``infrequent and ineffectual review'' and that ``many of the abuses revealed might have been prevented had Congress been doing its job.''
Accordingly, the resolution establishing the Intelligence Committee charged it to ``provide vigilant legislative oversight over the intelligence activities of the United States to assure that such activities are in conformity with the Constitution and the laws of the United States.''
It is time for the Senate Intelligence Committee to carry out the vigilant legislative oversight that is our duty and which a number are calling for us to do. We should launch a comprehensive and constructive investigation into the detention, interrogation, and rendition practices of the intelligence community because it is long overdue.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Congressional Record several editorials that have appeared around the country calling for congressional action. They include editorials from many newspapers, including the Washington Times and newspapers from Tennessee, Oregon, Florida, Maryland, New York, and California.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. President, I thank my colleague. Needless to say, all of us on the Intelligence Committee do all of this for the protection of the American people and protection of the American troops. That goes without saying.
I have to say that all of the investigations to which my friend and distinguished chairman of the Intelligence Committee referred in his remarks were all about the military. None of them were authorized to get into or had access to information about the Central Intelligence Agency and its role. We do not investigate the military in particular; the Armed Services Committee does. We investigate the Central Intelligence Agency and any other intelligence efforts with respect to detention, interrogation, and rendition.
So there are lots of studies that have been done, but there are precious few, if any, that have been done with respect to the intelligence community.
I have put forward this amendment because I think it must be done. I do not consider it irrational. I do not consider it against our troops. I think I made the point it is in part to protect our troops because we are going to be facing these kinds of situations for years and years to come.
I look forward to and I have some confidence that the chairman and myself and members of the committee can come to an agreement on how we approach this in a way which works, gives us the information we need, and we can proceed forward to protect our soldiers.
Mr. President, if there is no other Member on our side who wishes to speak, I yield back the remainder of my time.