Floor Statements

Mr. President, I see my colleague from Michigan.

May I make a suggestion to the distinguished leader? Quietly, in the rooms off the Chamber, I think a resolution of this matter is about to be achieved. So, therefore, the purpose of my amendment would be to frame for colleagues the issue as I see it, which I think can be explained very simply and calmly.

Then perhaps a few comments, and this amendment, I understand, will be laid aside, and we can proceed to the Chambliss amendment.

No objection.

I was here early this morning with Senator Bayh, so that is the purpose of my presence, solely for that amendment.

Mr. President, for the Committee on Armed Services I report favorably the following nomination list which was printed in the Record on the date indicated, and ask unanimous consent, to save the expense of reprinting on the Executive Calendar that this nomination lie at the Secretary's desk for the information of Senators.

Mr. President, I am joined by my colleague, the ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, the Senator from Michigan. This is an amendment which we have jointly worked out together.

Amendment No. 3875, As Modified

Mr. President, from a parliamentary standpoint, I now send a modification to amendment No. 3875 to the desk.

I thank the Presiding Officer. I shall be very brief on this matter.

The distinguished manager and comanager have worked with my staff and Senator Levin and myself, and we have come to an agreement on this issue.

Again, it is an amendment by myself, Mr. Levin, Mr. Stevens, Mr. Inouye, Mr. Allard, Mr. Sessions, Mr. Cornyn, and Mr. Chambliss.

I start by referring to the 9/11 report. This is a very important report which has been a roadmap for so many of the provisions and it is a roadmap I have used for this provision.

I read from page 412:

The Defense Department's military intelligence programs--

the joint military intelligence program (JMIP) and the

tactical intelligence and related activities programs

(TIARA)--would remain part of that department's

responsibility.

That is the purpose of this amendment. It is to clarify. I think it was the intent of the managers all along. They made statements comparable to what is in the 9/11 report from which I just quoted and, therefore, this amendment would leave in place those programs being performed by what we call the combat agencies, largely under a contractual relationship, and they would remain in place, but with the understanding that upon completion of a review, to be conducted by the national intelligence director and the Secretary of Defense, if they reach, as is specified under the bill, a joint opinion as to the desirability to move them into the national intelligence program, in all likelihood that can be achieved.

I thank the managers. I yield the floor to my distinguished colleague from Michigan. I thank my distinguished colleague, Senator Levin, for his work on this very important amendment, an aspect of which is tailored to meet a concern that the Senator from Michigan has.

I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I thank my distinguished colleague and ranking member. Given that the two of us are about to start a hearing in 10 minutes, I guess it is best we go to the adoption of the amendment, but I yield for any comments the distinguished chairman may like to make.

Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President, I have worked with the distinguished managers. Like so many things in the course of our legislative process, we have worked out a very large number of items, and they have been accepted. One remains and, in my judgment, the various good-faith proposals simply do not meet the criteria that I feel has to be established. So I have two courses of action. One, which I intend to follow, is to withdraw the amendment. The second, of course, would be to press this on with a vote. Frankly, given the structure of the vote--I don't say this as criticism--it does not allow the time in which to get sufficient information and viewpoints to my colleagues to prevail on such a vote. So I think the better course of action for this Senator is to continue to press my concerns in the course of the conference.

At this time, I call up amendment No. 3876.

Mr. President, I ask that the amendment be withdrawn.

For a little expression of the explanation of the amendment, I go back to two very important documents. The first is a letter dated September 28, 2004, Statement of Administration Policy. I ask unanimous consent that the following paragraph be printed in the Record.

That paragraph states that:

The Administration opposes the Committee's attempt to

define in statute programs that should be included in the

National Intelligence Program.

I believe we have to work this out in a clearer fashion. It is also more clear than what is in the amendment structure today, so I will put that aside and then go to the subject of this amendment.

The last paragraph of the September 28 letter reads:

The Administration notes that the Committee did not include

Section 6, (``Preservation of Authority and Accountability'')

of the Administration's proposal; the Administration supports

the inclusion of this provision in the Senate bill.

That was the basic intent of my amendment; therefore, I will take the opportunity to work on that during the course of conference in the hopes of achieving that goal.

I thank the managers for their effort to work on it, and we will hopefully work on it further to achieve this administration goal.

Mr. President, I rise today to remind my colleagues that this week is Nuclear Medicine Week. Nuclear Medicine Week is the first week in October every year and is an annual celebration initiated by the Society of Nuclear Medicine. Each year, Nuclear Medicine Week is celebrated internationally at hospitals, clinics, imaging centers, educational institutions, corporations, and more.

I am particularly proud to note that the Society of Nuclear Medicine is headquartered in Reston, VA. The Society of Nuclear Medicine is an international scientific and professional organization of more than 15,000 members dedicated to promoting the science, technology and practical applications of nuclear medicine. I commend the society staff and its professional members for their outstanding work in the field of nuclear medicine and for their dedication to caring for people with cancer and other serious and life-threatening illnesses.

Some of the more frequently performed nuclear medicine procedures include: bone scans to examine orthopedic injuries, fractures, tumors or unexplained bone pain; heart scans to identify normal or abnormal blood flow to the heart muscle, measure heart function or determine the existence or extent of damage to the heart muscle after a heart attack; breast scans that are used in conjunction with mammograms to detect and locate cancerous tissue in the breasts; liver and gallbladder scans to evaluate liver and gallbladder function; cancer imaging to detect tumors; treatment of thyroid diseases and certain types of cancer; brain imaging to investigate problems within the brain itself or in blood circulation to the brain; and renal imaging in children to examine kidney function.

I thank all of those who serve in this very important medical field and join them in celebrating Nuclear Medicine Week.

Madam President, seeing the absence of Senator Byrd, I ask the Senator, would you like to proceed to my amendment to take a little time while he comes to the floor?

Madam President, I now observe the presence of the Senator from West Virginia.

Amendment No. 3877, As Further Modified

Madam President, I send to the desk a modification to amendment No. 3877.

This is an amendment which strikes a balance between the respective authorities of the newly to be created NID together with the Secretary of Defense and others as it relates to the recommendations to the President for the appointment of Presidential appointees. It has the support of the distinguished managers on both sides. I worked in cooperation with the White House staff in its preparation, and they have expressed strong concurrence.

Madam President, I note the long hours and hard work of the two managers. We started on this on Thursday, when I first introduced it, and we worked it again on Friday. Those were productive days. Even though we did not have rollcall votes on Friday, much was accomplished, including the resolution of this amendment.

I ask now that the amendment be agreed to.

I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Amendment No. 3845

Mr. President, I would like at this time to address the Senate and the managers with regard to two amendments. I want to be cooperative in the procedures that they may have in mind for further amendments. If it is convenient, I would like to move forward. If not, I would like to know at what time would be more convenient for the managers. I think we are making considerable progress.

Mr. President, I certainly want to be cooperative. I hope the Senator will take into consideration that I now have the floor.

No. I want to be cooperative. I am perfectly willing to yield the floor for the purpose of a quorum. It is my hope that I will be recognized at such time as the quorum call is to be withdrawn at the discretion of the managers.

Reserving the right to object, the Senator was not on the floor. I had the floor and yielded to the managers for the purpose of going into the cloakroom. So I think I have a

right to be recognized when the managers seek recognition, at which time I want to go ahead with my amendments. May I inquire as to the amount of time my distinguished colleagues desire?

I am trying to be accommodating.

If it is agreeable to the distinguished Senator, I will follow him and the Senator from Illinois can follow me.

I will not take an undue period. It is largely in the hands of the managers as to their desire to probe some of the aspects of the amendments. I hope it can be a reasonable period of time, and I hope we will not prolong the Senator's schedule.

I thank my colleague for his usual courtesy.

No, they are not ready to be adopted.

Amendment No. 3807

Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Presiding Officer.

I wish to inquire of the manager, is this an appropriate time to move forward?

I send to the desk two amendments which I will address. They are companion amendments, but I felt it was necessary to do it in two different amendments. One is 3874 and one is 3875. Copies are at the desk, but for the convenience of the clerk I will send up additional copies.

I have heard reference made to the fact that this bill leaves intact the manner in which we deal with the TIARA programs and the JMIP; that is, the Joint Military Intelligence Program. I would like to read from page 412 of the 9/11 Commission. The Commission states as follows:

The Defense Departments's military intelligence programs--

the joint military intelligence program (JMIP) and the

tactical intelligence and related activities program

(TIARA)--would remain part of that department's

responsibility.

My question to the distinguished managers, if they desire to reply, is, Is it their position--and I believe they have so stated, but I wish to give them this opportunity--that the recommendation of the Commission that

they remain at the Department of Defense, is it the understanding of Senators in their bill that is now before the Senate that that comports with that objective?

May I read it again?

Yes, I thank the Senator. Page 412 of the Commission report:

The Defense Department's military intelligence program--the

joint military intelligence program (JMIP) and the tactical

intelligence and related activities program (TIARA)--would

remain part of that department's responsibility.

I thank my distinguished colleague.

I would like to now go to the bill and specifically draw the managers' attention to pages 6 and 7. The bill reads:

The term ``National Intelligence Program''--

And that is what the distinguished manager was addressing--

(A)(i) refers to all national intelligence programs,

projects, and activities of the elements of the intelligence

community; (ii) includes all programs, projects, and

activities (whether or not pertaining to national

intelligence) of the National Intelligence Authority, the

Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency,

the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National

Reconnaissance Office . . .

Now, therein is the problem that the Senator from Virginia has. What is the meaning of ``whether or not pertaining to national intelligence''? Because the title says this is the definition of national intelligence. (A)(i) basically gives that, and then (ii) seems to extend the definition to include programs that are not now part of the national intelligence program; that is, ``whether or not pertaining.'' I find that of considerable concern.

The purpose of the amendment is to clarify that form because having had considerable experience when I worked in the Department and the years that I have been privileged to be on the Armed Services Committee--and I have to be very careful as I speak because these are so highly classified, but I will just give generally a picture of my concern.

Right now, the JMIP literally contracts extensively with the Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the NGA, as it is referred to. For example, the Department of Defense puts in the JMIP budget, through the budgeting process, a block of money. It can then go and contract with these several what we call combat agencies, because they have all the assets--the technical people to do the work. So they sign the contract for a program and that program is absolutely essential to the functioning of, in many instances, the TIARA program, but in many instances the JMIP. And it is essential. The JMIP cannot function unless that particular program for which it has contracted with the NGA is fulfilled.

As I read this amendment--let's call it program X--program X could be transferred under the language ``whether or not pertaining to National intelligence,'' and it goes into the NGA, and then, frankly, the NID might make a decision that, wait a minute, we have to get a very expensive overhead system and we have to go down into the various budgets of the different combat agencies and scrape up some money.

So they come down and they say JMIP says they need the money, but I think we have to prioritize. We are going to take the money and we are going to put it toward the overhead system and it will not be used--for example, this is one of the main functions of the National Geospatial Agency--to make maps. As a matter of fact, when I first came to the Senate it was the old mapping agency. Now it has been combined several times through a number of job descriptions.

But that could be lost. Suddenly we are controverting the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission, that everything in the TIARA and the JMIP is going to be left untouched.

That is the problem I see. I think we have to take a good look at this amendment because my amendment eliminates that language--that is one of the two amendments--it eliminates it in such a way that we redefine that paragraph 1. On page 6, the one I read from, strike so- and-so and put this language in, that is:

The term ``National Intelligence Program''--

(ii) includes all programs, projects, and activities of the

National Foreign Intelligence Program as of the date of

enactment of this Act, including the Central Intelligence

Agency--

And then it goes on to read:

the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial. . . .

All I have done is keep in place the recommendation of the Commission. The very words I have heard the distinguished managers say on the floor a number of times--and I have it back in the previous Records, in which she has represented to this body in the course of the four or five days we have been debating that we are not touching TIARA and we are not touching the JMIP.

There is my problem. I believe this fixes it.

Amendment No. 3874

The next amendment addresses what the distinguished managers said a few minutes ago. There could come a time where it is the judgment of the NID that some of these programs should no longer be under the jurisdiction of the JMIP, and therefore my other amendment kicks in. It reads as follows:

Removal From Current Programs. A program, project, or

activity referred to in subsection (a) may be removed from

the Joint Military Intelligence Program or the Tactical

Intelligence and Related Activities programs only if agreed

to by the National Intelligence Director and the Secretary of

Defense.

So the two of them could make adjustments in the future. But right now, we have a number of programs in JMIP which are being performed by the combat agencies and I think it would not be in our best interests to dislodge those programs now. In the future, if the two heads agree, this is the statutory authority to do it.

I feel very strongly about these amendments. So much so I will ask for votes on them if we are not able to--I don't say that in the way of anything other than expressing my sincerity in these amendments, but I hope you could possibly accept them. If you cannot, I feel obligated to ask for the yeas and nays.

Mr. President, replying to my distinguished colleague, let's use the example of maps. They are absolutely essential to the troops. They can't operate without maps.

The only existing entity of the Federal Government that can make maps is the NGA. Right now, the JMIP, which is the Joint Military Intelligence Program, is acting on behalf of all the services--the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. They all desperately need maps. They have this contract which they pay for out of this budget to have the maps made. But the way your bill is drawn, it seems to me that they could stop making the maps for the military because they think that the dollars are better needed for overhead systems. There sits the Secretary almost powerless unless he runs right up to the President and says: Wait a minute. And you can't have him going to the President on all of the dozens of contracts that the JMIP has with the various contract agencies.

I ask a question. The 9/11 Commission explicitly said don't do this. I thought I understood the manager to say: Well, we are not doing it. I have about four or five references where on the floor the manager said we are not touching TIARA or JMIP; those programs remain under the budget of the Secretary of Defense.

With no intention to do other than what is right, we have a vague situation that we cannot let remain and jeopardize the maps. It is the clearest thing I know that is understandable by everybody in this Chamber--the need for those maps for our soldiers, our naval personnel on the high seas, those flying the aircraft. You cannot limit the ability of the Secretary of Defense to adequately provide those maps.

I say to my distinguished colleague, my colleague has a statute which puts in question the ability to control the very thing my colleague said time and time again she was not going to touch.

Mr. President, in response to my colleague, I am not touching the satellites. I agree. Everything she said is absolutely correct. We are not touching the satellites. But we are concerned about things such as the mundane maps which are about 80 percent used by the tactical forces, maybe 20 percent distributed elsewhere in the Government for other purposes. But that is the heart and soul of tactical intelligence. It is desperately needed. You simply have to let those moneys that the Secretary of Defense allocates by contract to the NGA to do the maps be untouched. They cannot be seized in a sweep-up or a reprioritization.

We just had an amendment which was rejected about the reprogramming authority. You have extensive reprogramming authority. But time and time again, I have heard the Senator from Connecticut say we are not going to touch TIARA, we are not going to touch the JMIP. Yet, if I could draw the attention of my colleague from Connecticut to page 6 of the bill, the language is very clear. It says:

The term ``national intelligence program'' includes all

programs, projects and activities whether or not pertaining

to national intelligence.

So you are going beyond national intelligence. You are grabbing the responsibilities of the TIARA Program and the JMIP. There is the language.

Mr. President, I thank my colleague. He precisely came to my point.

Roughly about 30 percent of the NGA budget is derivative of the JMIP budget. One of the pending amendments of the Senator has this provision in it. He said the programs may be moved. My language does that. It says: A program, project, or activity referred to in subsection (a) may be removed from the JMIP or the tactical intelligence but only if agreed to by the national intelligence director and the Secretary of Defense.

So they have the concurrence of the two principals, and then move it but leave in place now those programs such that the budgets remain until they make a joint decision to move them.

I used the example of maps. You cannot cut off the flow of maps back to the troops, the sailors, and the airmen. Yet those maps are made by the NGA.

I concur.

Mr. President, I thank the Senator for that reassurance. But the language now transfers that program, if we look at the parenthetical on page 6, and includes all programs, projects, and activities, whether pertaining to national intelligence or not, which means you grabbed it all and moved it.

That may be to the advantage of our national intelligence system, our tactical system, some date in the future, but do not do it now until we have had some measure of experience.

The Senator from Virginia has provided for the removal of those programs with the concurrence of the two principals. You cannot take away from the Secretary of Defense. He is, under title 10, required to provide for the men and women of the Armed Forces their basic needs. Nothing is more basic than the simple maps, and 80 percent of that cost of producing those maps comes out of JMIP.

I plead with the Senator, leave it for the moment. As we go through the progression and implementation of this, it seems to me the NID and Department of Defense can work it out if for some reason there is concurrence of viewpoints. This is crippling the Secretary of Defense in fulfilling his missions under title 10 where he is required by law, enacted by this Senate over a period of many years, to keep those troops supplied with what they need.

Mr. President, if I understood my colleague, all the TIARA and JMIP budgets are off the table. Did the Senator just say that?

It is the ``not quite.''

You did not confuse this old fox; he is listening. But the others may not be able to follow these nuances.

Splendid. Leave it there.

Mr. President, would the Senator look at page 412 of the 9/11 Report, please.

Let me read it:

The Defense Department's military intelligence programs--

the joint military intelligence program (JMIP) and the

tactical and related activities program (TIARA)--would remain

part of that department's responsibility.

In testimony before your committee, the 9/11 Commissioners have repeatedly stated that some portions, as the Senator said, of JMIP, might ultimately need to be moved to the national intelligence program but only after a thorough review.

The humble Senator from Virginia is just trying to keep the programs in place until as that wise old Commission said, ``ultimately'' you may review them and consider moving them.

I bring to the attention of the managers something they are already aware of, but I think it is important it be incorporated in the debate. I draw the Senators' attention to the September 28, 2004, Statement of Administration Policy, which is in the Record in many places, the guidance that was sent to you and your distinguished colleague, the chairman, Senator Collins. It says in the fourth paragraph:

The administration opposes the Committee's attempt to

define in statute the programs that should be included in the

National Intelligence Program; the Administration believes

that further review is required. The Administration also

believes that the Committee's bill provisions relating to the

NID's role in the acquisition in major systems needs further

study.

There is a clear statement of policy by the White House on the precise point that is in these two amendments.

I say to my colleague, if the Senator has a reply to this, I am happy to hear it; otherwise, I ask for the yeas and nays and then I will fight on.

Mr. President, if I might reply, I was privileged to know General Clapper very well. I think you will find he was not with the NGA, but he was Director of the DIA, when he used to come before the Armed Services Committee. He is with the NGA now.

I just point out to you, I will have to go back and look at his testimony, but I know he fully understands the need to keep intact the Secretary of Defense's absolute authority to control those matters which are essential to the fulfillment of his title 10 responsibilities.

I say to you most respectfully, this, in my judgment, is sufficiently vague as to put that in jeopardy. But I have taken generously of the time of the managers, so at this time I ask for the yeas and nays on both amendments that are pending.

Mr. President, I will do it singularly if there is a technical problem. Why don't I do it singularly. First I ask for the yeas and nays on amendment No. 3875.

I thank the Presiding Officer. I ask for the yeas and nays on amendment No. 3874.

Fine. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be laid aside.

Mr. President, I call up amendment No. 3875 and ask for the yeas and nays on the amendment.

I thank the Presiding Officer and thank the managers of the bill.

Madam President, I thank the managers of the bill. Before I commence, I wonder if I might comment on the presentation of the distinguished Senator from West Virginia, which I was privileged, as many others were, to listen to very carefully. It was prepared in his usual very thorough style, magnificently delivered. I am going to take a close look at it. I thank the Senator for his contribution to this effort.

Yes.

Madam President, not until I make the following observation: First, I thank the Senator for his comments. They are undeserved but I appreciate them. I remember how many times on this floor the Senator has recounted the importance of his wife's role in his career, but the one I always remember--I have only been here a mere 26 years as compared to my senior colleague--was during my first couple of years, and we were going well into the night. The Senator paused to say how he used to go to night law school, and although he was a Member of Congress and burdened with the duties, she would come with a little lunch bag with a carton of milk and a sandwich to tide him over until he left the Chamber, whether it was the House or the Senate, and go to night law school to get his degree. I always remembered that.

Give her my warmest regards.

Madam President, I thank the distinguished managers of this bill. I rise now for the purpose of sending an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration. I note that Senator Stevens and Senator Inouye are cosponsors of the amendment.

Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Madam President, this amendment is for the purpose of bringing into realignment what I believe is the proper balance of the authorities of the new NID together with the respective Cabinet officers, each of whom has some portion of intelligence responsibilities remaining, as well as the Director of the FBI.

I will read the amendment briefly so that colleagues can follow exactly what I am trying to do. The amendment says:

Concurrence of NID in certain appointments recommended by

Secretary of Defense. (1) In the event of a vacancy and a

position referred to in paragraph (2), the Secretary of

Defense shall obtain the concurrence of the National

Intelligence Director before recommending to the President an

individual for nomination to fill such vacancy. If the

Director does not concur in the recommendation, the Secretary

may make the recommendation to the President without the

concurrence of the Director, but shall include in the

recommendation a statement that the Director does not concur

in the recommendation.

It is just to bring into balance the fact that according to my research, each of the other departments and agencies that have an intelligence role get to recommend, with the concurrence of the Cabinet officer or the head of the FBI. This is the one instance with regard to these combat agencies where it should be brought in alignment with the other methodology and procedures adopted for these important personnel selections.

I draw the attention of the managers to section 117(b) of the bill before us. It gives the national intelligence director responsibility and authority to recommend appointments for several agencies that hopefully will continue to be retained within the Department of Defense: The National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

I say hopefully because we have thus far withstood the very significant amendment by the distinguished colleague from Pennsylvania, coauthored by the distinguished colleague from Kansas, Mr. Roberts, and others. The Senate addressed that and by an overwhelming majority literally rejected the taking of these three combat agencies and putting them under the direct jurisdiction of the NID.

Now, that is a concept that was hard fought, decided, and as a consequence, hopefully it will remain as it is in the managers' bill.

The purpose of the amendment was to dislodge the managers' section with regard to that. That was rejected by the Senate very resoundingly. I believe, therefore, it is appropriate at this time to bring into alignment with the other departments and agencies the authority for the Secretary of Defense over these three entities which remain in his department to make the recommendation to the President with the concurrence of the NID, and in those instances where there is nonconcurrence the President then would have the benefit of that diversity of viewpoints. That is the purpose of this amendment.

We must remind ourselves that these are combat support agencies in the Department of Defense. Under the bill, as of this moment, the agencies remain under the authority of the Secretary of Defense.

Then the interesting aspect of this, which is important to my amendment is that in the case of the NSA, this is normally a military promotion from two stars to three stars to take on this important position of the Director of NSA, and that Director of NSA also serves in the position of Deputy Commander U.S. Strategic Command for Information, Operations, Planning and Integration, a very critical warfighting post. Consequently, these are matters that the Secretary of Defense, who is accountable to the President and who has direct line authority from the President to the SECDEF to the combat commanders, that are important to maintain.

In the case of the NRO, this is a civilian appointment, to direct the activities of the National Reconnaissance Office but is an appointment as the Under Secretary of the Air Force. He is dual hatted, again, an individual who serves not only in the important post of the intelligence NRO but as an Under Secretary of the Air Force in the Department of Defense. It is imperative that the Secretary of Defense have the authority to make the recommendation together with the concurrence of the NID.

In the case of the NGA, this can be a military appointment similar to the NSA. One primary function of the NGA is to meet the mapping needs of our military forces. I repeat, the military forces are highly dependent upon this agency for the tactical maps that are needed wherever they are in the world today facing the challenges and the threats to our country.

These three appointments, I say most respectfully to the managers, I feel ever so strongly should be initiated by the Secretary of Defense with a recommendation, and then the statute, if my amendment is adopted, will give the concurrence of the NID as an essential part of the process.

Current law provides for the Secretary of Defense to recommend appointment of these individuals with the concurrence of the DCI. We have clear evidence for many years this system has worked and worked well. There are examples where the DCI nonconcurred and the Secretary revised the nomination in a manner consistent with gaining the concurrence of the Director of the CIA.

The President has said he does not want anything we do in the area of intelligence reform to blur the lines of authority, responsibility, and accountability between him and the heads of the departments. I feel my amendment will meet that criterion as set forth by the President. I strongly urge my colleagues to examine the current provision, examine the practice with respect to other departments and agencies in the Government, and hopefully I will gain the support of the managers as well as of my colleagues and that this amendment will be adopted.

I yield the floor.

Madam President, will the Senator yield?

I want to pick up on the last point. I find there is no effort to change the authority of the Secretary of State in the selection of his people to do the work. But I feel strongly that the work done by the Department of State serves the whole community. It isn't exclusive to the Secretary of State.

I bring to the Senator's attention the fact that the Department of State had some thoughts at variance with the Central Intelligence Agency as related to the aspect of the critical issues relating to the weapons of mass destruction. Does the Senator recall that?

Therefore, they serve the whole community. And perhaps if a caveat on some of that had been brought to the forefront in a more strengthened fashion, who knows what the outcome might have been.

I do not believe the Senator can tell me that the person in the FBI who has responsibility isn't serving the entire community. I think the Senator ought to go back and reexamine that representation. I do not find it strengthened by making an exception for the Secretary of Defense as relates to these three individuals.

For example, I draw on my experience as Secretary of the Navy. There was quite a competition when vacancies of the NRO and NSA came up. The service Secretaries were invited to make nominations to the Secretary of Defense for the offices. In the capacity of a service Secretary, you get to know these individuals as they work their way up through the ranks and are promoted. You have a special knowledge of their capabilities and their strengths. You can advocate that to the Secretary of Defense, who then in turn makes the decision with regard to who should be selected to head the NRO based on the cumulative advice of the several service Secretaries. Those positions are often rotated between the Air Force, the Army, and the Navy, and they are extremely important assignments.

With all due respect to the NID, he has so much to be done that he cannot possibly have the knowledge about the achievements of all of the various individuals to make a recommendation. He can, of course, come in after study and concur or not. But you are holding the Secretary of Defense saying you have all the responsibility with regard to this agency. In many respects personnelwise, you are reducing the Secretary of Defense to a payroll clerk when you do not allow him to make the selections of the people he thinks are best qualified. In the case of the NRO, he serves as an under secretary of the Air Force with duties related to the NRO and duties related to the entire space program in the Department of the Air Force. The Secretary of Defense should make the appointment of the people who serve his Department.

I cannot accept the Senator's distinction about how you leave the State of Department alone, the FBI alone, the Energy Department alone, let those Secretaries make their recommendation and decisions with regard to personnel, and then in almost a demeaning way say to the Secretary of Defense, Oh, no, when it comes to your people, you have the right to concur or not.

Mr. President, it is obvious the managers at the moment are somewhat entrenched in their views. I hope we will have an opportunity to appeal to the broader and hopefully more open minds of the collective Senate as a whole.

Could the managers advise those Members who have deferred other plans, with the importance of being here today to advocate amendments, what will be the procedure when this will be laid aside? There will be a record when we return Monday. I presume it would be scheduled in some order, at the discretion of the managers, together with the leaders of the Senate, as to the vote.

Do I get 2 minutes, 3 minutes, 4 minutes at the time the amendment is brought up? I would like to weigh in a little bit now given that I have not thus far persuaded my two distinguished colleagues, both members of

the Armed Services Committee, who are interfering, in my judgment, with the direct chain of command between the President and his combatant commanders and principal civilian appointees.

I thank my distinguished colleague. I shall certainly be here. As a matter of fact, I will preside for a period of time. Maybe when I get in the chair and have the gavel, I can do something about this amendment.

In any event, I am appreciative of the courtesies that have been extended to Members of the Senate deliberating on this bill. This is an important matter.

Hopefully, in the interim, I can persuade not only the Senate but the White House to indicate its position on this amendment.

I thank the Chair. I thank my distinguished colleagues. I will be available for further amendments as the managers decide to have them scheduled during the course of the day.

This amendment will now be laid aside?

Mr. President, will the Senator yield for 1 minute? I associate myself with his remarks about how we are going about this. We have made enormous progress since the 1991 operation in Iraq, as the Senator well knows, particularly in the tactical level and in military intelligence. I am hopeful that in this haste, we do not unintentionally go back from the progress we have made so far.

Mr. President, I wish to compliment our distinguished colleague. He has spent a lot of time on the Senate Armed Services Committee. He is very familiar with these processes and the people.

We can write the laws as best we can, but it comes down very often to those human relationships to which he referred and this particular framework in the NID. Because the NID cannot, as the distinguished chairman has said, create a whole new department, he has to rely on subordinates who have direct line of authority over a lot of troops, but he is not going to have troops in the sense the Senator from Alabama and I have used them for the departments and agencies of the Government as they function today. He is a step removed.

Those personal relationships with his immediate subordinates and advisers are going to be very important. I thank the Senator.

Mr. President, at this time, if it is convenient to the managers, I will proceed on an amendment.

Amendment No. 3876

Mr. President, I send to the desk an amendment and ask for its consideration.

Mr. President, I refer to the September 28, 2004 Statement of Administration Policy in which the administration expresses their support for the very able work of the distinguished chairman and ranking member on S. 2845.

However, equally important are a number of items that were referred to in this document called the SAP. I draw the attention of my colleagues to the last paragraph. I shall read the first sentence:

The Administration notes that the Committee bill did not

include Section 6 (``Preservation of Authority and

Accountability'') of the Administration's proposal.

I ask unanimous consent that the entire paragraph from the SAP be printed in its entirety in the Record.

Immediately following it, I ask unanimous consent that section 6 to which it refers, drawn from the policy statement forwarded by the administration in its efforts to give the very helpful advice and counsel to the Senate--and I presume the House, as we are working on this matter--be printed in the Record.

The amendment which the Senator has drawn here, myself,

Senator Stevens, and Senator Inouye as cosponsors, we have lifted essentially the language of that into the amendment such that the administration's request in that SAP document is met.

In support for the action I am taking, I refer as follows: The President made two basic decisions with respect to intelligence reform designed to implement the 9/11 Commission recommendations. First, he decided that the national intelligence director should have ``full budget authority'' with respect to the national foreign intelligence program. The bill before us contains a number of provisions intended to carry out that decision.

Second, the President made an equally important decision that the heads of the departments should continue to be in charge of and therefore continue to be accountable for the performance of their respective departments.

This amendment I have submitted would carry out the second Presidential goal.

The language of the amendment, as I said, is virtually identical to the language of the administration's proposal which I have now placed into the Record.

The amendment makes clear that the principal officers of the executive departments will remain as the organic statutes, for their departments currently provide the heads of their departments with authority over and responsibility for those departments.

The amendment also preserves the existing authority of the Director of Office of Management and Budget with respect to the budget administrative and legislative proposals.

With this amendment, the bill would provide for a strong national intelligence director and would also ensure that the heads of executive departments remain accountable for the performance of their departments, including the intelligence elements of those departments.

It seems to me that is essential. Again, we come back to the basic concept, we are not creating a new department of government. Consequently, the NID has to rely on the department agency heads to perform their services, and to do that they have to be put into a position of accountability. That accountability is essential to the smooth operation of the goals of this particular legislation.

A strong national intelligence director and accountable heads of departments are compatible concepts. As part of their responsibility, heads of the departments will be accountable for ensuring faithful implementation by their departments' intelligence elements of the guidance and tasking issued by the national intelligence director under such authority as may be granted by the final draft of this legislation.

The President gave a very clear example that illustrates the need for this amendment when he discussed the intelligence reform on August 2, 2004. He said: The national intelligence director will work with the respective agencies to set priorities, but let me make it also very clear that when it comes to operations, the chain of command will be intact. When the Defense Department is conducting operations to secure the homeland, there will be nothing between the Secretary of Defense and me.

Consequently, I would add one other thought. The chief of staff thereafter echoed on the quote: We do not want to do anything that would undermine the chain of command and the responsibilities that go with the Department of Defense, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Secretary of the Homeland Security Department, and other intelligence agencies, the Attorney General, for example.

I am certain they meant to include the Department of State.

This amendment carries out that objective.

I would be interested in the comments of the chairman and the ranking member, and I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I would have to reflect on that because it seems to me the Senator is trying to have it both ways, and I am sure my distinguished colleague would not be seeking that goal.

Let me repeat that. I did not have the microphone on.

I say that the distinguished Senator is trying to have it both ways.

Fine.

So what is the proposal of the Senator?

That is not my intention.

Yes, but let's work around it and be very mindful of the President's language. He said: Equally important that the heads of the departments should continue to be in charge of and therefore continue to be accountable for the performance of their respective departments.

Then I read his direct quotation, which seems to me we have translated into this amendment in good faith.

Obviously you tried to express the good intentions of trying to work this out. Certainly I desire to do so. But we must be very careful, under the extraordinary circumstances under which this very important piece of legislation is being put together. I am sure lots of work will take place over the weekend, but Monday and Tuesday are days in which certainly this bill, in its construction, is likely to be completed. We have to be careful that we do not create gaps in it, where a department head now can say: Look, the

bill took that authority away. If a problem occurred, that is the NID's problem. And then the NID says: Oh, no, that is your problem on your account. We just cannot have finger-pointing when it comes to issues as important as our Nation's intelligence.

I think that consultation would be helpful. I have undertaken it in connection with this amendment. I believe my views are consistent with theirs. But an awful lot of work has gone on now. It may be that there is some refinement that would further strengthen this.

For the moment, if the distinguished chairman wishes to speak, I will be happy to hear it and we will just put the amendment to one side.

I would like to come back this afternoon to modify an amendment that is at the desk, again, to clarify that in hopes that it comes near to what your goals are.

I will be back. If the chairman could advise me, is there going to be further time?

That should be adequate time.

Mr. President, I fully understand the import of the language you are quoting. But that is almost putting a blessing on everything that is written into the bill. I am not sure I am prepared as yet to say that. That is going to require a little study on the part of both of us because I think the effect of your language is, don't touch the bill, but what the bill leaves they are accountable for. That has to be thought through.

I understand that.

We are trying to make certain just that undefined but all important concept of accountability remains. As you possibly take portions of the responsibility of department heads away and give it to the NID, I want to make sure, if something goes wrong, who is accountable.

We will work. I understand your perspective, but I am not prepared, as yet, to accept that amendment. So we will lay this aside. I thank you.

Mr. President, I am prepared to go ahead with the other matter, if I might.

Amendment No. 3877, As Modified

Mr. President, I would like at this time to send to the desk a modification to amendment No. 3877 by the Senator from Virginia.

Mr. President, earlier today I engaged in a colloquy and submitted the original form of this amendment. Subsequent thereto, I had the opportunity to consult with a number of individuals. It is my desire now, basically, to revise my amendment to comport with section 106 of the President's proposal, which he forwarded to the Senate. That is entitled:

Appointment of officials responsible for intelligence-

related activities. Requirement for National Intelligence

Director concurrence with respect to certain appointments,

with respect to any positions that heads of agency or

organization within the intelligence community. . . .

My concern, what I am trying to achieve by this succession of amendments, is to provide some uniformity in the process designating and selecting the heads of the various--for example, the combat commands, as I refer to them, that was the subject of my earlier amendment.

I find that the President's approach in the proposal that he forwarded to the Senate is preferable to my earlier attempt at this. It reads:

If the appointment to such position is made by the

President, any recommendation to the President to nominate or

appoint an individual to such position shall be accompanied

by the recommendation of the National Intelligence Director

with respect to the [proposed] nomination or appointment. . .

.

(2) if the appointment to such position is made by the head

of the department containing agency or organization [within

the intelligence community or] the Director of the Central

Intelligence Agency, or a subordinate official of such

department or of the Central Intelligence Agency, no

individual shall be appointed to such position without the

concurrence of the National Intelligence Director.

I believe that, then, confirms there is a certain degree of uniformity and preservation of accountability for the people selected in the various heads of the departments and the agencies.

With that, I will yield the floor for such comment as may be forthcoming from the chairman and ranking member.

I thank my colleague for the question because earlier today I had a number of discussions related to this question. I talked to some of the White House people. I think I have spoken in the Chamber a number of times about my concern as to the future posture, standing, of this Director of Central Intelligence. He has this magnificent organization, albeit there was a problem on the weapons of mass destruction, but in terms of numbers it was a relatively minute number of people, although the problem is very serious. The organization is all over the world and they are taking risks, extraordinary in some instances, comparable to the men and women in uniform of the Armed Forces as they pursue their assignments.

It is my concern in this reorganization where the director of intelligence now becomes a subordinate, and a decision is to be made by the President, in this legislation it appears to be the case he will not be at the moment on the council--are you familiar with the council of the Secretaries of State and Defense, Attorney General, Homeland Security, and others, who will be sort of a close-knit group and NID will be chairman of the council, and from time to time they will be advising the President, presumably, through the NID? I have tried to work it out so if, say, the Secretary of Defense has views at variance with the NID at the time the NID briefs the President on the NID's position, he is obligated by law to brief the President on the divergent position of one or more members of his council. That is a pending amendment. It is a joint intelligence communities council.

Anyway, I felt that perhaps somehow the Director of the CIA should be involved. There is concern about protocol. It is all Cabinet. He, as such, does not have Cabinet rank. I am working on a proposition to see whether we can preserve the integrity that has been accumulated over many years of the Director of the CIA. It is not only in the United States; he is known all over the world as a person who holds that position. I don't want to see any loss in the eyes of the counterparts worldwide as this new structure, presumably, will be enacted into law.

The answer to the question is, of course, the President can have whomever he wishes to brief him, but I presume NID is specifically someone that the President asked the Congress to create by law. He would be the principal briefer. From time to time he would be accompanied perhaps by others and I think more often than not by the Director of the CIA.

Given that it is the President's absolute authority to decide who he wants to brief him, I don't think it should be written into law, but I am seeking some clarification to the very question the Senator has asked because it is of concern to me. As soon as I gain further information, I will be happy to share it with my colleague.

Mr. President, the Senator is quite correct. We do not want to do that.

In good faith, the chairman of the committee has repeatedly said, in this Chamber, we are not creating a whole new department. I heard the ranking member today mention that. Therefore, we would not in any way be trying to create that number of persons.

Nevertheless, who knows them better--that is, the individual members of the CIA--than the Director who has daily hands-on authority, who travels and visits in posts all over the world, who is basically responsible for their promotion, demotion, and accountability.

And that fact is known, if I can say to my colleague, that fact is known the world over, that the man who directs the CIA and who is visiting in Great Britain or Pakistan, that is the man who will go home and look the President of the United States straight in the eye. That carries a lot of weight as it results in the creation of personal relationships between the director of our intelligence and his counterparts worldwide.

I do not think it is a subject that can be legislated in law. It is something of legislative history being created in the Senate now and is a vital part of the future interpretation and implementation of this new law.

I thank the Senator.

Mr. President, for the Committee on Armed Services I report favorably the following nomination lists which were printed in the Records on the dates indicated, and ask unanimous consent, to save the expense of reprinting on the Executive Calendar that these nominations lie at the Secretary's desk for the information of Senators.

Mr. President, I believe I am a cosponsor of the amendment.

This is a debate we had many years on the floor of the Senate. It has been a debate we have talked about so many times, and there has been a consistency in the voting in the Senate to recognize the wisdom not to release the budgets.

As yet, with all due respect to our managers and others, I have not heard an absolutely convincing argument to turn back at least several decades that this has been an issue of debate on this floor. What is it in the public interest or, most importantly, our national security interests that requires us at this time to reverse positions that have been taken by this Chamber, together with the other body, over the period of several decades that I have been privileged to serve here?

My concern is that this world today is so rapidly changing, and with the advancement of electronics and so many devices to determine what we in an open society are doing, why put the roadmap on the table for all to begin to search?

It has been my experience that if you put out half a loaf, it will be followed by a request to get the other half of the loaf. Were this provision to prevail, we would be back here in a very short time, some colleagues with the best of intentions, saying: Why don't you put it all out? Why should we have any of it secret? That, coupled with the fact I have in my lifetime never seen a period where there is greater uncertainty about the security of this country--because of the progression of weapons of mass destruction, because of the progression of terrorism, and the proliferation of individuals who are willing to give up their lives to do harm in this country and other parts of the world--I just do not think at this point in time, without following, I think, the sage advice of our distinguished President pro tempore, we need to reverse what this Chamber has considered and decided upon year after year that I have been here.

So I urge colleagues to support the amendment of the senior Senator from Alaska. I intend to strongly do so.

Mr. President, I ask the Senate to turn to the consideration of amendment No. 3781 which is pending at the desk.

Mr. President, I send to the desk a modification of the amendment.

My understanding is the modification is accepted by the managers.

Let me explain the modification. The original text required that the national intelligence director, in his capacity as chairman of the to-be-created joint intelligence community council that was part of the President's message, originally I had it that he would have monthly meetings of the council or meetings upon the request of the members of the council. But I think it more appropriate that that be modified, which has now been done, such that the amendment will read: Strike that paragraph and in its place put the national intelligence director shall convene regular meetings of the joint intelligence community council. And then I will address the balance of the amendment.

It has been my concern, and I think from a fair reading of the 9/11 Commission report, that we have to keep the views of those individuals primarily responsible for the collection, dissemination, and analysis of intelligence, those individuals who are on, incidentally, the council, who are your principal Cabinet officers--and that is the Secretaries of State, Defense, Homeland Security, Energy, Treasury, and the Attorney General--those individuals from time to time could develop positions regarding an intelligence issue which are at variance with the national intelligence director.

That collection of Cabinet officers is a vast array of individuals who will be working on issues of intelligence, collaborating with other agencies. From time to time, I am of the opinion that one or more of the members of the council might well have opinions that are at variance with the national intelligence director, and that when the national intelligence director goes to brief the President, there should be an obligation in law--I feel that strongly

about it--that those opinions at variance with the national intelligence director must be given to the President and such others who may be in attendance at the time the national intelligence director presents his or, as the case may be, her viewpoint.

The strength of our intelligence system has to be predicated on competition of thinking. I have always liked the word that the 9/11 Commission seized upon, ``imagination.'' It seems to me that type of competition and imagination is likely to develop better if we have the certainty that the viewpoints the President receives from the national intelligence director are not held by one or more of the members of that council, but that the President will receive the benefit of the other viewpoints. I think that system has to be made and put into law. It is so vitally important because, for example, as a member of the Intelligence Committee, when we examined, in extensive hearings conducted by Chairman Roberts and Vice Chairman Rockefeller, the issue of weapons of mass destruction--and the conclusion that is being reached is that there was a substantial variance between the intelligence opinions and what is evolving as the actual, factual situation--it appears that the caveats were not given the proper emphasis by people, from the President on down, as they reviewed the work of the various intelligence-collecting agencies.

For example, the CIA had its position. From time to time, the Department of Energy had opinions at variance with the CIA. At times, there were opinions of the DIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, which were at variance with the opinions of other departments and agencies. I think it is essential. Those caveats, in the case of weapons of mass destruction--I will use the phrase that they were not given the emphasis that was needed. That is a whole chapter. It is all laid out in a very extensive report developed by the Intelligence Committee, which is now public record.

This amendment, hopefully, will go a long way to ensure that diverse opinions will be given to our President. That is the thrust of it. It is patterned after the Goldwater-Nichols Act--a piece of legislation on which I was privileged to have a very active role, enacted by the Congress in the late 1980s--which organized some elements of the Department of Defense and, most specifically, the joint staff.

Mr. President, the act said that when the Chairman of the Joint Staff meets with the President of the United States, if there were members of the Joint Chiefs--i.e., Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of Naval Operations, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Commandant of the Marine Corps--who held opinions at variance with the Chairman, the Chairman was obligated under law to share those opinions with the President and such others as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was addressing. That has been a very effective piece of legislation.

This amendment is patterned almost verbatim after, and consistent with, the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Frequently, the 9/11 Commission, quite properly, paid a great deal of respect to that piece of legislation.

In concluding my remarks--and I have worked on this, but I have not found a solution yet--this Senator is concerned about the future of the Central Intelligence Agency as an organization and the role of the head of that agency--now our former distinguished former colleague, Porter Goss. Therein resides an enormous wealth of professional people in all the nations of the world, in one way or another, who have come up through the ranks, training and taking risks, often commensurate with the risks the men and women of the Armed Forces take, often with long separations from their families in some of the more difficult posts in the world. All of that infrastructure is going to remain under the Director of the CIA, who will now report no longer directly to the President but to the concept of the new national intelligence director. That has been decided.

I may eventually come up with the solution. I am trying to figure out how, if the Director of the CIA has a view that is held strongly, and it is at variance with the viewpoint of the national intelligence director, how that view can be properly emphasized and given to the President and such other persons as the NID will be addressing.

Yes.

Yes. My last section, recommendations to Congress, says:

Any member of the Joint Intelligence Community Council may

make such recommendation to Congress relating to the

intelligence community as such member considers appropriate.

So in this particular law is specific authority for those Cabinet officers and others to come directly to the Congress. I am glad my colleague brought that up.

Yes.

It happened on mine when I was in the Department of Defense.

Mr. President, I think it does, and that is why I have put in this paragraph, which is very explicit. This paragraph relates to the members of the Joint Intelligence Community Council, which I enumerated before as the several Cabinet officers--Secretaries of State, Defense, Homeland Security, Energy, and the Attorney General.

The Senator is correct, Mr. President.

The Senator is correct.

I yield the floor for a moment for the purpose of receiving the distinguished chairman's views on this matter.

Mr. President, I thank my distinguished friend and colleague, the manager. Might I solicit her views on the concern I have--and I have not figured out how to do it. The views of the Secretaries of State and Defense are very important because they have their own internal intelligence functions and they are subjected to this, particularly those two Cabinet officers, on a daily basis.

The Director of the CIA will report to the national intelligence director. The national intelligence director--I do not know quite what the infrastructure will be. It is conceived, as the Senator from Maine said earlier today and several times, that she is not creating a whole new department. But the CIA Director will remain in charge of what I say is the most magnificent reservoir of professionals to be found anywhere in the world. I cannot give, because of classification, the numbers, but it is in the tens of thousands of these individuals all over the world. The CIA Director has instantaneous contact with them and personal association as he travels--or she, as the case may be-- worldwide. It is a network of these intelligence people who have knowledge that comes back up to the Director. He is hands on. The NID will not have that hands-on experience, cannot possibly because he has so much to manage.

One of the reasons for this legislation is to split off the functions of the former head of the CIA, the Director of the whole Central Intelligence, and to give those responsibilities, as it relates to the national collection of the intelligence program, portions of it to the NID to operate now, leaving the Director of the CIA to manage primarily that agency.

Supposing the Director of the CIA has a strongly held opinion and viewpoint which is at variance with the national intelligence director, but when the national intelligence director goes in to brief the President and the Security Council, in all likelihood the Director of the CIA will be at Langley. I am not certain how that varying opinion is given to the President and the other structure at the White House and the other Cabinet officers who may be present--for instance, at the meetings of the council, how that opinion can be expressed. I have not thought of it. Maybe the chairman and I can work on this in the few days remaining on this bill. But I am concerned about it.

Mr. President, all along I have expressed complete concurrence in what the Senator has done in this bill to the extent the Senator and I have looked at various sections. I may have reservations about others and tomorrow I hope to engage with the Senator on a number of amendments.

As to the basic charter that the Senator outlined in her opening remarks, I am not going to at this time in any way indicate an objection. I just wanted to focus on this one individual, the CIA Director, who, as the Senator knows, under previous Presidents, and certainly President Bush, was in his office one way or another almost every day of the week working with him.

The CIA Director had this--I understand all of these responsibilities may be too much for one individual and I am not arguing about shifting that at the moment, but I am talking about this magnificent collection of individuals--and he is the boss--who take all of these risks together, collect and analyze and develop opinions and it comes up to him and he may form a view which is totally opposite to the NID, and the NID goes into the President. I have guaranteed here that the Cabinet officers have the right to have their views presented simultaneously, one view after another, to the President, but I am not satisfied yet that the views of the CIA Director, which could well be different than the analysis and conclusion of the NID, would be given to the President with the weight and sufficiency I think they merit.

I see the Senator's point. The Senator put out a very clear example of the NRO, the NSA, the old mapping agency, they report to the SECDEF--we have just given the SECDEF the right to have his views presented simultaneously if they are at variance with the NID at the time he meets with the President. That is not present in the Central Intelligence Agency. If those views vary, there is no obligation under the law to see that they are presented simultaneously.

The Senator says she cannot envision how they would not be. Well, it depends on the human factor, that these two individuals would get along and have a mutual respect. I can remember in my first term on the Intelligence Committee, there was a very colorful Director of the CIA, Mr. Casey. He was an extraordinary man. I remember he used to come in and testify before the committee. All the members would lean up like this because they could not understand him, to be honest. He spoke in a rather unusual way. I think he did that

to get through his testimony pretty quickly and get out of that hearing room. I am trying to put a note of humor into some serious things, but let us hope the Senator is right that as this law goes forward those individuals entrusted, the NID and CIA Director, can have a mutual respect and a mutual professional bond that will enable the views of the CIA Director to be given to the President if they are at variance with the NID. That is left up to the human quotient. This amendment, if adopted, puts it in law, not for the CIA Director but for the other members.

In no way do I wish to in any way diminish the significance of the NID that is now being created presumably by law in the future. I think we have had a healthy discussion. I appreciate the distinguished manager accepting this amendment, and I will continue to work on the Director of the CIA issue which I continue to be concerned about. Maybe as a consequence of this colloquy, those who might be following it could come up with an idea. I hope they would communicate it to me or to the distinguished chairman.

If there is no further debate, I ask that the amendment be agreed to.

I ask unanimous consent that the following Senators be added as cosponsors to the amendment: Senators Stevens, Inouye, Talent, Allard, Dole, Chambliss, Cornyn, Ensign, and Inhofe.

Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.

I wish to express my appreciation to the distinguished manager. I look forward to rejoining her tomorrow. Let us hope that those amendments that I bring forward largely with my colleague Mr. Stevens will add to the strength of this bill.

Mr. President, in consultation with the managers of the bill, it is the desire of the majority leader and Democratic leader to keep moving tonight. I will send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. President, in the study of the 9/11 report, frequent reference is made to the Goldwater-Nichols Act. It is a piece of legislation in which, as a member of the Armed Services Committee, I had a great deal of participation, working on this particular statute. It was an attempt, and a successful attempt, to rewrite the defense- related laws, and describes certain changes which would make the Department and particularly the Joint Chiefs of Staff a more effective body.

I want to refer to one provision.

I ask unanimous consent that certain portions of the statute be printed in the Record following my remarks.

Mr. President, that provision reads as follows:

Advice and Opinions of Members Other Than Chairman . . . A

member of the Joint Chiefs--

That could be the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, the Commandant of the Marine Corps.

I repeat:

A member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff--other than the

Chairman--may submit to the Chairman advice or an opinion in

disagreement with, or advice or an opinion in addition to,

the advice presented by the Chairman to the President--

That is the President of the United States--

--the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense.

If a member submits such advice or opinion, the Chairman

shall present the advice or opinion of such member at the

same time he presents his own advice to the President, the

National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense, as

the case may be.

We learned that in the course of the past 18 months or maybe longer-- I will not try to define the exact period of time--when our President was making

decisions in connection with certain advice he was receiving from the intelligence community--I will just touch on this lightly, and perhaps others will want to address this with more specificity--certain caveats, being other opinions--the opinions, say, of the Director of Central Intelligence--were not brought with sufficient force and effect to the attention of the policymakers.

The purpose of my amendment is to enable a framework by which, following the precedents of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, certain individuals in the contemplated new legislative framework as described by the distinguished chairman and members of the Governmental Operations Committee, other opinions will be brought to the attention of the President at such time as the NID is briefing the President.

I will refer with specificity to the amendment I have sent to the desk at this time. The first paragraph is technical, so I will omit that. I will go right to the operative paragraph:

Advice and opinions of Members other than Chairman. ``Members'' refers to the Joint Intelligence Community Council which is established, it is my understanding, by the chairman's statute.

A member of the Joint Intelligence Community Council (other

than the Chairman) may submit to the chairman advice or an

opinion in disagreement with, or advice or an opinion in

addition to, the advice presented by the National

Intelligence Director to the President or the National

Security Council, in the role of the Chairman as Chairman of

the Joint Intelligence Community Council. If a member submits

such advice or opinion, the Chairman shall present the advice

or opinion of such member at the same time the Chairman

presents the advice of the Chairman to the President or the

National Security Council, as the case may be.

The Chairman shall establish procedures to ensure that the

presentation of the advice of the Chairman to the President

or the National Security Council [or the Secretary of

Defense] is not unduly delayed by reason of the submission of

the individual advice or opinion of another member of the

council.

Lastly, ``Recommendations to Congress:

Any member of the Joint Intelligence Community Council may

make such recommendations to Congress.

I presume that would be interpreted as the leadership of both Houses and the chairmen and ranking members of the relevant committees.

The reason I have not been more specific here is that we are awaiting the decisions of the group on which I am privileged to serve headed by the distinguished whip, Mr. McConnell, and on other side the distinguished whip, the Senator from Nevada, Mr. Reid.

In other words, as we look at the revisions that will be proposed in connection with the oversight responsibilities of the Congress, that may require some refinement.

I will reread it:

Any member of the Joint Intelligence Community Council may

make such recommendations to Congress relating to the

intelligence committee as such member considers appropriate.

I think that is the insurance that is quite visible to put in place such that other opinions can be considered by the President of the United States.

Throughout, the 9/11 report referred to: We have to have imagination. We often use the phrase ``be competitive'' with opinions within the structure of the intelligence committee. I believe that is all good. I really do. And the purpose of this amendment is to ensure that there is in law a procedure that these important members of this council will have the opportunity to see that their views are presented contemporaneous--at the same time the President receives the views of the NID. That is the purpose of the amendment.

I understand tonight it will be pending, and at such time as the distinguished chairman of the committee wishes to come over and review the subject with others, I would be happy to do so.

Exhibit I

(d) Advice and Opinions of Members Other Than Chairman.--

(1) A member of the Joint Chief of Staff (other than the

Chairman) may submit to the Chairman advice or an opinion in

disagreement with, or advice or an opinion in addition to,

the advice presented by the Chairman to the President, the

National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense. If a

member submits such advice or opinion, the Chairman shall

present the advice or opinion of such member at the same time

he presents his own advice to the President, the National

Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense, as the case

may be.

(2) The Chairman shall establish procedures to ensure that

the presentation of his own advice to the President, the

National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense is not

unduly delayed by reason of the submission of the individual

advice or opinion of another member of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff.

(e) Advice on Request.--The members of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, individually or collectively, in their capacity as

military advisers, shall provide advice to the President, the

National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense on a

particular matter when the President, the National Security

Council, or the Secretary requests such advice.

(f) Recommendations to Congress.--After first informing the

Secretary of Defense, a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

may make such recommendations to Congress relating to the

Department of Defense as he considers appropriate.

Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chairman for her views.

I ask unanimous consent that Senator Stevens be listed as a cosponsor of the amendment. There may be others in due course that would like to do so.

Mr. President, I am privileged to offer one of the first amendments. I have other amendments of which I think the chairman is aware. We are going to comply with her request and the leadership to have the text before them within the amendments that are established. I want to be very constructive as a working partner as we move forward with this important piece of legislation.

Mr. President, on that note, I best yield the floor.

Amendment No. 3781

Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that following the conclusion of the vote I be recognized to speak in opposition to the Specter amendment for 10 minutes.

Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the Specter amendment. I wish to compliment the managers of the bill, Senators Collins and Lieberman. I thought their arguments were overwhelmingly persuasive in support of the President's position and indeed the 9/11 Commission that these agencies--the National Security Agency; the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the former Mapping Agency, as we knew it; and the National Reconnaissance Office--have important intelligence functions. They are collection agencies. They must remain under the managerial supervision of the Secretary of Defense. I feel ever so strongly about that.

These three agencies are designated in law as combat support agencies, servicing our troops, the men and women of the Armed Forces wherever they are in the world facing harm's way, today, tomorrow, and in the future.

The President announced, on September 8, that these three agencies would not--I repeat, would not--be moved from the Department of Defense. This decision was based on two very important principles: One, no reform measures that the President advocates should disrupt ongoing operations in the war on terrorism. I am certain all colleagues fully appreciate the sensitivity of that extremely important decision and principle not to move these three agencies. Secondly, no ambiguity should be introduced in the chain of command, from the President through the Secretary of Defense down to the combatant commanders. That is vital to the war on terrorism and indeed other military operations.

These three agencies are designated combat support agencies providing direct intelligence support to the unified combatant commanders currently fighting in Iraq, Afghanistan, and in other theaters.

The Secretary of Defense is accountable to the President. Under law-- I shall turn to the law momentarily. To ensure that these agencies provide the proper intelligence to our military customers, the Secretary of Defense must be able to direct them in executing their operational missions.

I would like to pause for a minute and draw to my colleagues' attention the law. It reads, for the Secretary of Defense:

The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director

of Central Intelligence, shall--

(1) ensure that the budgets of the elements of the

intelligence community within the Department of Defense are

adequate to satisfy the overall intelligence needs of the

Department of Defense. . . .

Further on down it reads:

(4) ensure that the elements of the intelligence community

within the Department of Defense are responsive and timely

with respect to satisfying the needs of operational military

forces. . . .

I do not see how the amendment of my colleague from Pennsylvania modifies the existing law, and that is imperative if this amendment is to be effective.

I draw my colleagues' attention further to the law, and that is title 10 with respect to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. I read from section 193:

(a) Combat Readiness.--(1) Periodically (and not less often

than every two years), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff shall submit to the Secretary of Defense a report on

the combat support agencies. Each such report shall

include--

(A) a determination with respect to the responsiveness and

readiness of each such agency to support operating forces in

the event of a war or threat to national security; and

(B) any recommendations that the Chairman considers

appropriate.

That law would have to be modified in some way were this amendment to be adopted.

So, in conclusion, Mr. President and colleagues, I foresee a potential disruption to operations were this amendment to become law. Numbers are classified, but approximately one-half of the employees of these agencies are Active-Duty military personnel.

In addition to national requirements, these agencies provide great volumes of tactical-level support to the warfighter.

Also, in existing law, I draw to my colleagues' attention that the Under Secretary of the Air Force is dual-hatted as a Director for the NRO. So that, too, would have to be amended and changed. Furthermore, the Director of the NSA is dual-hatted. He is a Deputy Commander of Strategic Command for Information, warfighting responsibility.

So in conclusion, I strongly support the position of the distinguished chairman and ranking member and urge colleagues to vote against this amendment.

Mr. President, the one thing we want to avoid is patchwork legislation. I have drawn to the attention of my colleague--

I thank my colleague. But, I say to the Senator, I would be happy to enter into a colloquy with you on this point.

I would hope you do so.

I pointed out specific provisions of the law requiring certain accountability of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. We do not want to do patchwork legislation.

My understanding, after reading and studying your amendment, is you take these three entities out of the Department of Defense. I do not read into the amendment where there is a residual authority left in the Secretary to perform the functions as prescribed in title 10 and, to some extent, title 50.

I will wait for the Senator from West Virginia to answer. You directed it to the Senator from West Virginia.

I am trying to inject a little lightheartedness.

I say to my good friend, a little humor now and then is well advised. But I understand precisely the question directed to me. Let us read your amendment. Would you read your amendment and show me where that residual authority under titles 10 and 50 are left in the Secretary of Defense?

I would draw that argument to the attention of the distinguished manager of the bill. My understanding, in reading some of your comments, is that I do not find in this amendment where there is a clear delineation of authority and that managerial responsibility, as required under titles 10 and 50, remains in the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. President, I am reading from section 305, Defense Intelligence Agency. I believe that is clear on the DIA, but I do not see it with reference to the National Reconnaissance Office. ``The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office shall be under the direction, supervision, and control of the NID.'' I just see no residual managerial authority left in the Secretary of Defense to fulfill his statutory requirements under titles 10 and 50.

``Line of authority: The Director of National Reconnaissance shall report directly to the national intelligence director regarding the activities of the National Reconnaissance Office.'' I mean, there is the clear English language.

I say to my good friend, he may be well intentioned, but I am somewhat at a loss to find any reference in this amendment that preserves that residual responsibility which you have represented to the Senate.

Might I just hand you the amendment and ask you to point to the language which you feel leaves the residual authority in the Secretary of Defense?

I have given every opportunity to my colleague. I stand by my representations to my colleagues and I support the managers of the bill in having this amendment defeated.

Mr. President, if the distinguished manager would yield for a question, the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania, in support of his amendment, submitted for the record a letter dated September 20, 2004, signed by a number of colleagues. Here is a statement that I believe confirms the proposition I just enunciated, that the amendment would strip the Secretary of all of his responsibilities as existing in other statutes. I will read it:

We are writing to you, however, to express our serious

concern that current draft of the bill, as described by your

summary and after review--

It is addressed to the chairman.

--by the Governmental Affairs Committee members and staff,

does not give the NID additional authorities that will be

required to provide the unity of leadership and

accountability necessary for real intelligence reform. In

particular--

This is the operative sentence.

--we feel strongly that the NID must have day-to-day

operational control of all elements of the intelligence

community performing national missions.

It goes on. So it is very clear.

I would say that they do single out the term ``national missions,'' but these combat support agencies perform both national missions and tactical combat missions. They are not clearly separable. I mean the soldier, sailor, airman, and marine in the field today relies on satellite intelligence, which is a national mission of, say, the NRO, as well as the tactical support the NRO gives in various ways.

So I feel that as I read the amendment, it is totally contradictory of the desire of the 9/11 Commission, totally contradictory of the advice and counsel that the President has given the Congress, am I not correct?

Mr. President, may I ask my distinguished colleague another question? This is a letter which is now submitted for the Record. It contains the names of about eight or nine other Senators. Have any of those Senators come to clarify this point? I would like to study what they have said.

I hope to be on the Senate floor when they do that. I wonder if the managers of the bill might acquaint them with the title 10 and title 50 provisions and ask where in the amendment those provisions are modified; otherwise, we are going to end up with a patchwork. That is one thing I know this chairman and ranking member do not wish to have.

Mr. President, I will pose a question to both managers, also members of the Armed Services Committee. As we proceed with this legislation, I am sure you are bearing in mind that we recall the aftermath of the 1991 war in which we participated in liberating Kuwait. You will recall as a member of the committee that General Schwarzkopf came before us at that time as sort of an after-action report. He talked in some detail about what he felt were shortcomings, particularly in the tactical intelligence, as to what he needed as a warfighter, as commander of the forces. That sounded alarms throughout the system. It startled many of us that that shortfall existed to that extent. Immediately the then Secretary of Defense and the successive Secretary of Defense--particularly Secretary Rumsfeld--have done everything possible to strengthen and remove the weaknesses that were in the system at that time.

As we proceed on this bill, I hope we have been mindful of particular tactical strengths that have been built into the existing system. It would be my fervent hope that nothing in this bill would roll back that progress. I wonder if the managers might address that, since both are members of the Armed Services Committee and have experience with the gulf war and what has been done in the ensuing years.

Mr. President, that is reassuring. If I might further inquire of my distinguished colleague, I was given today, and I expect the managers maybe earlier received this, in any event, this is the September 28 communication from the Executive Office of the President to the Senate. It is entitled ``Statement of Administration Policy.'' Has that been printed in the Record as yet today?

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent, at this point in the debate or at the conclusion of our colloquy, to print this Statement of Administration Policy in the Record.

Mr. President, I think it is a document that will be of value to all Members of the Senate if they have not received it.

I would like to draw the attention of the two managers to that operative paragraph 2:

The Administration supports, in particular, the

establishment of a NID with full, effective, and meaningful

budget authorities and other authorities to manage the

Intelligence Community including statutory authority for the

newly created National Counterterrorism Center. The

Administration will oppose any amendments that would weaken

the full budget authority or any other authorities that the

President has requested for the NID. The Administration will

work in the legislative process to continue to strengthen and

streamline intelligence reform legislation and to make

adjustments to ensure that the President continues to have

flexibility in combating terrorism and conducting

intelligence activities.

It is the operative phrase that ``the Administration will oppose any amendments that would weaken the full budget authority,'' and the preceding sentence where they said ``a NID with full, effective, and meaningful budget authorities.''

Mr. President, first, I would like to ask the two managers, is the purport of this paragraph consistent with all the several provisions in the bill that refer to budget authority, in their judgment?

Without diminishing in any way that very encouraging sentence, if you go on to read the totality of this communication, there are expressly in here some reservations, but I will not get into that at this point in time.

I want to go back to these words, ``full, effective, and meaningful budget authorities.'' We just had a debate on the Specter amendment, which I believe, with no disrespect to my good friend and colleague, is an extreme viewpoint on this, and I am hopeful the Senate will not adopt it, but we do come back to this pivotal question, and tomorrow I hope to bring forth some amendments. Now that I see the expressed language and the Senator assured me her bill tracks this, I have to have some clarification--at least I shall seek clarification--of what is the remaining role of the Secretary of Defense with regard to those portions; namely, these three combat agencies, together with DIA, what is the residual area of collaboration, jointness, in the preparation of the budget--preparation is part 1--and then the execution of the budget after it goes through the authorization and appropriations process and begins to come back to the several departments and agencies.

So let's talk about what the Senator believes this language--which is consistent, as she says, with the language in the bill--I presume the Senator's language would not be modified or changed by this--what is left to the Secretary of Defense in regard to the budget authority?

Mr. President, I really think that is an important representation the Senator has made, but I do not read in this language of the communication from the White House the distinction that she draws between tactical and national. Can I refer the Senator again to this language?

I draw the attention of the distinguished managers to the words ``the Administration will oppose any amendments that would weaken the full budget authority. . . .'' It is the word ``full.''

To me ``full'' is the whole basket. It could be interpreted that way.

Mr. President, I acknowledge that, the JMIP and the TIARA in the language sent up. But it seems to me the writer of this could have been somewhat more explicit in the communication because this is an important communication to guide Senators desiring to establish their voting pattern in connection with the Senator's bill.

I think I pressed the point far enough and I think the Senator from Maine has been very courteous in her responses. I just want to bring to the attention of colleagues, when this says ``full,'' it is your understanding it did not include the JMIP, the TIARA, and those programs; is that correct?

I am privileged to be in this colloquy with my friends. I would like to have the assurance of the ranking member of the committee that he concurs in the statements just made by our distinguished Chair.

The question is the language sent up by the administration did have a breakout of the budget authority as relates to certain parts of the overall programs performed by these combat agencies.

I ask our distinguished manager of the bill whether this language in the communication today which said the administration opposed any amendments, because I proposed to have an amendment tomorrow--it may be opposed by the administration, but I want to make sure that the phrase ``full budget authorities'' is not amending what they sent up by way of language.

Well, time will tell. I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the Record a copy of the administration--I think the Senator referred to it as a bill although it was never introduced--language they sent up which made a clear reference and distinction to what budget authority was given to the NID and what residual remains in the Secretary of Defense. Am I correct on that?

Yes.

It was a communication from the administration----

I guess to the managers of the bill or the committee. Nevertheless, it is a document expressing the intentions, and the distinguished chairman has clearly indicated that her bill tracks that.

Yes.

I asked that if a construction of this language we received today is full budget authority, it could lead someone to the conclusion that everything was transferred.

Good. And if they had inserted that in there, it would have been clearer, I hasten to add. We are not going to debate this further. In fairness, having raised this question, I think the Senator has brought considerable clarification. It may be the administration may be more forthcoming about what they precisely meant by the use of full budget authority in the use of this communication, but let me proceed in my questioning with regard to the residual authority of the Secretary of Defense over those budgets in the combat agencies, and I would like to add DIA, which is also a combat agency.

As the Senator says in her bill, those sections which are tactical are in the discretion of the Secretary in the preparation of the budget, and he would collaborate with the NID in preparing those sections. Now, on the national intelligence collection, I think the chairman agrees with me that the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines utilize that in carrying out their tactical missions, although it classifies the NRO and the gathering in space as the national program. Am I correct? It does feed into the tactical portion?

So, therefore, should not the Secretary of Defense have a voice--and I would like to see how we can describe that voice--in the compilation of that budget for the national program which in part supports the efforts of the forces in the tactical missions?

Mr. President, that is very helpful. I wonder if the Senator's staff would provide for the Record at this point an insertion of those references in the bill which supports the Senator's very important representation to the Senate just now, that the Senator feels he has the consultation role and such other roles as to assure the Secretary of Defense that he has a voice in the preparation of the budget.

I just wanted to have the pages annotated. I think my colleague witnessed several colleagues today saying it would be helpful if we could get a clearer understanding of some things, and I think the Record today could be of help to those who want to see in the Senator's bill precisely those sections which underpin the Senator's important representation. I ask if the Senator might consider putting that into the Record.

Mr. President, I was not challenging the language. I was simply trying to get a reference. The Senator provided it, and I thank the chairman.

If I could transition to the second part of this, the budget is prepared and approved by the President. It is then acted upon by the Congress by authorization and appropriation and it goes to the NID. Am I correct?

Yes.

Right.

Right.

I thank the chairman. That portion of the budget then goes back to be administered by the Secretary of Defense; is that clear?

That nonnational portion.

It goes back to the Secretary of Defense. I thank the distinguished chairman on that point.

I see on the floor my distinguished colleague, the ranking member of the

Armed Services Committee. I wondered, since he followed this colloquy and I know he has worked very hard in this area with the Senator from Virginia, have some of his concerns which he has expressed to me been touched on in this colloquy?

I think I have the floor.

Mr. President, I think I have the floor. I am quite happy to yield to my colleague to respond to my inquiry.

Yes, if I could make a preliminary statement, and then I will be glad to yield. As a matter of fact, I will yield the floor. If you seek the floor, I am going to yield it momentarily.

Mr. President, first I thank the distinguished manager and ranking member for engaging in I think a very important colloquy. I wanted to make a record for some colleagues who have asked a number of questions, and I think we made an interesting record here that will help in their deliberations and thought processes.

I will have amendments tomorrow, hopefully to clarify some things which I feel should be clarified. They are constructive amendments, I say to the distinguished chair and ranking member, because I want to be cooperative and supportive of the President and your efforts. But I do feel very strongly that there are some amendments.

My colleague, Senator Levin, and I have worked together. It may well be we will jointly put in some amendments tomorrow on this subject. Not in a manner of a turf battle. I am really quite in temper that that word continues to be brought up, because I personally am striving to do what is best for this country and to make our intelligence system stronger as a consequence of this legislative process. I think it can be achievable. But I have to get clarifications. The language in this message that came up today about full budget authority seems to be somewhat contradictory of some other things. But we will work it out.

I thank the distinguished managers and I yield the floor.

Mr. President, today, as part of the Working Families Tax Relief Act, the Senate will pass legislation that I authored to extend for another 2 years an important tax relief provision aimed at America's teachers. The teacher tax relief benefit in this legislation will provide almost a half a billion dollars worth of tax relief targeted directly at our Nation's teachers.

Why do teachers need this kind of specific tax relief? It is estimated that the average teacher, who is already underpaid, is spending $521 out of their own pocket each year on classroom materials--materials such as pens, pencils and books. First-year teachers, who typically earn less than the average teacher, spend even more, averaging $701 a year on classroom expenses.

Why do they do this? Simply because school budgets are not adequate to meet the costs of education. Our teachers are picking up the slack.

The Teacher Tax Relief Act is a small, yet important sign of recognition by the Federal Government of the many sacrifices that our teachers make. Originally signed into law in 2002 by President Bush, this legislation, which was authored by Senator Collins and myself, allowed teachers to take up to a $250 above the line Federal deduction for classroom expenses. The deduction is available when teachers reach into their own pockets and take money out to buy simple things like pencils, erasers and books to help their students succeed in their education.

As passed in 2002, the Teacher Tax Relief Act was a 2-year tax relief provision. Accordingly, without the extension provided in the Working Families Tax Relief Act, teachers would soon have faced a higher tax bill. With passage of today's legislation, teachers are guaranteed that they will be able to utilize this important tax benefit for at least the next 2 years. I remain committed to working to expand the Teacher Tax Relief Act and to make this important legislation a permanent part of our Tax Code.

Yes, thank you.

Mr. President, I thank my good friend and colleague, the chairman of the Intelligence Committee. I hope the Senate appreciates the thoroughness with which Chairman Roberts has gone into this nomination. He has provided the members of the committee and many others with an opportunity to express their views with regard to the nomination. An extensive series of hearings have been held--more than have been held on a nominee in a long time. Maybe only Supreme Court Justices occasionally see the volume and thoroughness with which this nomination has been carefully viewed by the Senate. I compliment the chairman, and indeed the ranking member who participated very actively in this, as well as the members of the committee.

I first came to know the nominee about a decade ago. I remember one of our most revered, distinguished contemporary colleagues, Senator Moynihan, who sat right back there. I was on the floor and he stood and said it was time to abolish the CIA. He had a lot of concerns about the Agency. At that time, I was the vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee. Together, with Porter Goss and some others, we put together a piece of legislation establishing a commission to examine some of the concerns of our distinguished late colleague from New York. Porter Goss and I served on that commission. Les Aspin was the first chairman. He had an untimely early death and he was followed by Harold Brown. That was my initiation to work with this fine, able individual.

I commend the President for selecting him to take on this important assignment. I thank Representative Goss, his wife, and family for undertaking another chapter of public life.

All of his credentials have been carefully reviewed. I would like to talk about somewhat of a different aspect of the challenges that will face Porter Goss. We just concluded a very extensive briefing upstairs with the Secretary of Defense, Ambassador Negroponte, the commander of CENTCOM, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the Deputy Secretary of State, almost three-quarters of the Senate being present. The briefing was about the situations primarily in the Iraq and Afghanistan theater, but it was about terrorism on the whole.

As part of our discussion, we talked about the ongoing work in the Congress of the United States with regard to the 9/11 report, which all of us believe is a very significant contribution by a conscientious group of tried, tested, and able public servants. But we worked through these equations and options. The Governmental Affairs Committee is doing the markup of what will be the primary vehicle. Senator Roberts contributed his views on it.

The Senate Armed Services Committee had a hearing with the Secretary of Defense, as well as the Acting Director of the CIA. So the Senate has done a lot of work in preparation.

How does that relate to Porter Goss? I cannot predict, and I don't think anyone can, at this time what will eventually evolve with regard to the legislative achievements of this body and the House in a conference. Perhaps a lot of people have high expectations that a bill will be before our President shortly.

I intend to work conscientiously, as I have, and will continue to work, forgetting any question of turf, to try to achieve a strong bill that clearly improves and strengthens our intelligence system.

I brought in a reference to the briefing today because in some discussion

with our colleagues--and it was a classified briefing, but I can share this--General Abizaid said he is acting on intelligence daily to conduct his mission. Lives are at risk, and he clearly, drawing on his extensive experience in the Army said: Today the intelligence collection that my soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines need and have and use is vastly improved over what we had in gulf war 1 in 1991.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may speak for another 4 minutes.

Mr. President, there has been steady progress in the improvements in our intelligence system. The Department of Defense is the largest user, and these senior people in the Department of Defense--civilian and military alike--have not tried to tell the Congress what to do but respectfully told us what not to do: Don't do anything to weaken the improvements that we have achieved--I say we, working with the Congress and the President--we have achieved to date since 1991 in the first gulf war and, indeed, since 9/11 with President Bush and Executive orders, a wide range of implementation of important things that have been done to improve our intelligence system, particularly from the standpoint of the tactical use by the U.S. military.

If confirmed and if we pass a new law signed by the President, Porter Goss will be the man entrusted to implement that law. And I say to my colleagues with the deepest respect, that is a daunting task--to do it in a way not to shake the confidence of the tens upon thousands of conscientious employees in the various departments and agencies, the CIA, the Department of Defense who are concerned about their jobs, concerned about their futures. We need to hold the team in place. We need to keep what is working now going as we phase in such new laws and provisions as this body, working with the House and signed by the President, may enact.

I do not know of another individual who has the experience of Porter Goss or is better qualified to take on the task of implementing such new laws as the Congress and the President may enact.

I urge my colleagues to give this very fine, outstanding American who, once again, was thinking about a quieter form of life the opportunity to move into this job.

There was printed in the Record a report that was issued by the CSIS, prepared by a number of former colleagues and others in the intelligence community trying to say to the Congress we best move with considerable caution as we enact this new legislation. I found this very helpful in my work participating in drawing up this bill, and I commend it to my colleagues.

Mr. President, again I thank the distinguished chairman and the distinguished vice chairman of the committee for their work in making it possible for this nomination to have been carefully reviewed by the Senate in terms of a series of hearings and a very active and thorough debate on the Senate floor.

I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I rise to commend and congratulate the American Youth Philharmonic Orchestra of Annandale, VA on its fortieth anniversary.

The cultural and political history of the United States has changed dramatically over the last five decades. During that time, however, the American Youth Philharmonic Orchestras have provided a vital service for young musicians throughout northern Virginia and the District of Columbia. The 2004-05 concert season will commemorate the 40th year in which the American Youth Philharmonic Orchestras have trained new generations of children, teenagers, and young adults to become extraordinary musicians. To give an example of the marvelous impact that this institution has had, over 100 public and private schools from Washington's metropolitan area are represented within the orchestra's current enrollment. The students of the American Youth Philharmonic constantly strive for excellence in their performances; such preparation increases the chance that they will seek to make a positive impact on our society, whether through the arts or other endeavors.

With a group of approximately 400 students, the orchestra has represented Virginia and the District of Columbia with distinction in the performances at the Kennedy Center, the Festival of Youth Orchestras, and the Spoleto Festival in South Carolina. Remembering this Nation's tragic losses on September 11, 2001, the Philharmonic performed a touching concert, entitled ``The Spirit of Freedom,'' at New York's Carnegie Hall in January 2002. In addition to their exceptional performances in the United States, the American Youth Philharmonic was a dignified cultural ambassador for this country at the International Rachmaninoff Festival in Russia, the Aberdeen International Youth Festival in Scotland, and the British Festival of Youth Orchestras. The young men and women of the orchestra have offered the diplomatic language of music to our friends abroad, and they deserve to be recognized for their efforts.

If we were to gauge the success of the American Youth Philharmonic by the rate at which its students are accepted to the best musical and educational schools in the United States, we would see that the American Youth Philharmonic is unrivaled in its training of our Nation's best and brightest. Members of the American Youth Philharmonic have continued their study of music at the Oberlin Conservatory, the Juilliard School, Carnegie Mellon, and the Cleveland Institute of Music, while others proudly accepted offers to Harvard, Princeton, Stanford, and the University of Southern California, to name a few.

Beyond the beauty of the sound generated in their performances, the American Youth Philharmonic Orchestras have given their time and service to the surrounding communities of Northern Virginia and the District of Columbia. The American Youth Philharmonic created a music mentorship program that trains designed high-school members to offer free tutoring to younger musicians in the area. In this way, the students of the orchestra are able to strengthen their own abilities as teachers while providing an enriching experience to those who are limited by financial circumstances or their special needs. Recognizing the value of this community service, the First Place Arts Council of Fairfax County, VA recognized the American Youth Philharmonic with the Arts for Special Audiences Award in 2000.

We must also credit the constant dedication of Maestro Luis Haza for the brilliance of the American Youth Philharmonic. Mr. Haza has given 20 years of service to this ensemble in addition to his 29 years of ongoing performance as a violinist with the esteemed National Symphony Orchestra. Born in Santiago, Cuba, Mr. Haza was honored with a Washington Immigrant Achievement Award in 2004, and he truly demonstrates a commitment to the values of democracy and freedom on which this country was founded. While Mr. Haza has shared his talent for musical direction with the London Symphony Orchestra, our own National Symphony Orchestra, and the national orchestras of Panama, El Salvador, and Guatemala, his passion for music is never more evident than in his direction of the American Youth Philharmonic. Mr. Haza has dedicated a lifetime to sharing the gift of music with young people throughout the Americas, and his legacy to this country will be reflected in the values of his students for many years to come.

Mr. President, I rise to note the April 20th release of the Preliminary Report of the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy. This comprehensive report, the first of its kind in 35 years, lays out an ocean blueprint for the 21st century for implementation by the Congress and the Administration. The Ocean Commission, led by former Chief of Naval Operations and Secretary of Energy, Admiral James D. Watkins, USN (Ret.), is to be congratulated for its diligence and dedication to its mandate to make recommendations for a comprehensive and coordinated national ocean policy for the United States.

The Commonwealth of Virginia has always had a strong connection to the ocean. From the arrival of settlers in Jamestown in the early 1600's, to the current day when the ports of Norfolk, Portsmouth and Newport News play a vital role in our Nation's economy and security, Virginia has always depended on the oceans. While the Commonwealth has long recognized the importance of the oceans, one of the most valuable contributions of the Ocean Commission's report is its finding that oceans and their resources are important to all States, and that we all have a role to play in their protection and management.

The Ocean Commission's preliminary report represents the culmination of 2\1/2\ years of work, including 15 public meetings around the country, 17 site visits to gather more detailed information, and input from 445 witnesses, resulting in nearly 1,900 pages of testimony. The report is over 400 pages long and contains almost 200 recommendations designed to improve the Federal governance structure, enhance and increase ocean science and research, improve coastal water quality, sustain our Nation's fisheries, and improve the stewardship of our oceans through an expanded education and outreach program.

An overarching theme of the report is the need at the Federal, regional and State levels to move toward an ecosystem-based management approach that acknowledges the complexities of both ecosystems and human needs. This approach recognizes the relationships among all ecosystem components and requires fundamental changes in governance and greatly improved science and education. Through its active participation in the Chesapeake Bay Program, Virginia understands the many advantages to be gained by developing regional, ecosystem-based approaches to address the complex inter-relationships of activities in many States that impact the Bay.

As the former Chief of Naval Operations under President Reagan, Admiral Watkins well knows the role oceans have played in protecting United States national security interests. The Ocean Commission's preliminary report, while not focused primarily on national security issues, contains recommendations on ports and marine transportation, vessel operations, increased ocean research and exploration, improved management of our ocean resources, and accession to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea--all of which will contribute to our Nation's security and future well-being.

As the Commission finalizes its report I look forward to working together with the administration and my associates in this body and in the House as we take advantage of the opportunity presented by the work of the Ocean Commission to implement a new vision for the future of our Nation's oceans.

Will the Senator yield?

First and foremost, I can't comment on the Washington Times article. But yesterday, in the course of an Armed Services Committee briefing by General Dayton, who at this point in time is also briefing the Senate Intelligence Committee--and I just left the Intelligence Committee meeting to come to the floor--the matter was discussed. That much I will confirm, as appropriate. As a member of the Committee of the Armed Services, my able friend knows that at every juncture our committee, largely through yourself and Senator Roberts most often, brings up a current report on that.

I will not say, other than it was a matter that was discussed, and General Dayton shared with us his views. But I wish to point out, in discussing it with General Dayton, he finds that whatever was carried today, reflects it as his views, and he simply wants to say the final decision rests with the Secretary of the Navy, not General Dayton, as to the course of this investigation. So that much I will say. Beyond that, I believe, regrettably, it was a top secret briefing, but nevertheless information might well have gotten out. That is regrettable.

I thank the Senator for bringing it up. I, too, join you in fervently wishing and praying for Scott Speicher. The Senator has to be commended for the amount of time he has spent on this situation.

Mr. President, I commend my colleague. He has worked very hard on the Speicher case and undoubtedly his commitment will carry forward. I suggest, based on what was said yesterday, that he will be in consultation with the Secretary of the Navy. He has the authority to make disclosures as he sees fit about this case, but I believe General Dayton, in a very professional and conscientious way, will discharge his duties.

The 9/11 Commission Report

Mr. President, I would like to provide this Senator's observations, very preliminary though they may be, with regard to the report of the 9/11 Commission which was made public today.

Yesterday I joined about a dozen or so Senators, the distinguished majority leader, and others to receive a brief private briefing. That was our first official glimpse of this report. I have not had the opportunity to, of course, go through this rather prodigious volume-- each Member received a copy--but I do intend to do so because I think it is a very important contribution by this Commission. I think many parts of it can provide a roadmap for things that must be done.

It has been my privilege to serve in the Senate--this is my 26th year, and I commit to work with other colleagues, all colleagues, to see what we can do to strengthen our ability, not only in intelligence, but across the board in all areas of national security.

As privileged as I am to be the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I am prepared to listen to how the responsibilities of that committee should be changed for the better. I will not participate in any obstruction simply because of turf. I have been here too long. Also, this changed

world in which we live is so very different than when I came to this institution a quarter of a century ago, and most particularly in the aftermath of the tragedy of 9/11.

So I think it is incumbent upon all of us in the Congress and, indeed, the executive branch to have a strong self-examination of the areas covered by this report; to use this report, along with input from other commissions, groups, and individuals, as a sort of roadmap to guide us into those areas which need to be carefully reviewed.

Out of that process, which I hope is a carefully thought through, not rushed, deliberative process, I hope will evolve such changes as we, Congress, deem necessary to strengthen our capability to deter and, if necessary, engage further in this war against terrorism. So, therefore, I say with respect, I welcome the recommendations of the Commission. I commit to study them and commit to work with my colleagues.

Yesterday a specific question was put to the two cochairmen of the 9/ 11 Commission: Is America safer today? And their unhesitating acknowledgment was it is safer today, and I agree it is. Is it as safe as we need? None of us believe that. But I think conscientious efforts have been made all along the way to make this a safer Nation, and we have, in large measure, succeeded with the goals within the timetable we have had.

I am disappointed, however, that there was not more thorough dialog between the 9/11 Commission and Members of the Congress. I do not take that personally. I did have an opportunity to visit in my office some 2 weeks ago--a very pleasant visit--with one member, at which time we exchanged views. Somehow I do not feel that was the type of consultation that enabled us to get into the report and make constructive contributions. I do not suggest all 535 Members of Congress troop up before the 9/11 Commission. We do not have time to do that. Somehow it seems to me a better balance could have been struck between the knowledge and the ideas we have in the institution of the legislative branch of our Government that could have been shared with this Commission. After all, the Commission was, in many respects, created as a consequence of the actions of Congress.

Having said that, I am going to take some specific issue with this rather sweeping indictment that we have been dysfunctional in our oversight.

All throughout my public service, I have been privileged to have a number of jobs, and I am very humble about it, but I am far from perfect, and I have always welcomed constructive advice and criticism. But this time this dysfunctional brush that was wiped across struck me as not fair to certain things I personally have a knowledge of that were done by this body, the Senate.

I will start back some years ago in 1987 when, as a member of the Armed Services Committee, we structured the Goldwater-Nichols legislation which had sweeping ramifications in our overall defense setup. It has been hailed since that period of time as a landmark achievement by the Congress to begin to transform our military from the cold war era to the era of the threats today which are so diverse and so different as compared to those we confronted during World War II and in the immediate aftermath of the cold war.

That was quite an accomplishment and, in large measure, is owing to Senator Goldwater and Congressman Nichols. Again, I had the privilege to serve with those two men for many years, long before we started the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

As a member of the Armed Services Committee--and I say with humility and personal pride, I was a close personal friend of Senator Goldwater. I admired him so much and looked forward to the times we worked together and traveled together. I remember Congressman Nichols bore the scars of World War II, having been a very courageous serviceperson in that war. He was extremely conscientious about his duties on the House Armed Services Committee. These two giants in the way of thinking got together and relentlessly drove this legislation through both bodies of the Congress, and it has withstood the test of time.

Contemporaneous with this, I remember my dear friend with whom I came to the Senate, Senator Cohen, who later became, after he resigned from the Senate, Secretary of Defense. We worked together as a team with others to carve out of the Department of Defense, taking from the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marines some of the best and the brightest to create the Special Operations Command.

While today most colleagues have seen their magnificent performance worldwide, particularly as a front line against terrorism, I remind them it was a tough and long struggle, vigorously resisted by the Department of Defense, to create this new entity and to give them their dedicated assets of modest naval vessels, modest number of airplanes, and other equipment which was their own. But we succeeded. Today those forces have established themselves in the contemporary military history of this country as an essential part of our military structure, much admired by all, much envied by all, and their performance record is second to none. I do not mean to suggest by that they have outpaced or outperformed the basic elements, particularly combat-committed elements of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines. No, it is that the whole military looks with a sense of pride toward their accomplishments. I am proud to have been a part of establishing this important part of our armed forces.

Then in 1999, when I was privileged for the first time to become chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I went in there and I changed basically a structure that had been in place for decades, the subcommittee structure. Again, I carved out a new subcommittee called Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities. This is 1999. This is not in the aftermath of 9/11. This is 1999.

I must say, I have had the constructive support of the members of the committee, and by pure coincidence--I am speaking of the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities--the first chairman of that subcommittee, the distinguished Senator from Kansas, Mr. Roberts, just walked into the Chamber, and perhaps he will have a word or two about the functions of that subcommittee.

Mr. President, I say to my distinguished colleague, I was saying the 9/11 Commission has brushed the Congress as being sort of dysfunctional, and I was going back in history. The Senator from Kansas was one of my principal supporters on establishing the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities. He has been ranking member or chairman of that subcommittee, and under his leadership and that of the full committee, we have achieved a great deal, and have helped the Department of Defense move forward in the areas of joint experimentation, homeland defense, counterterrorism, and future technologies and concepts that will be needed to confront future threats.

That subcommittee was directed to look forward a decade and determine what are the threats that are going to face the United States of America and how best our Department of Defense needs to transform itself and allocate assets and men and women to take up the positions of responsibility to meet those threats.

That subcommittee has done its work and done it admirably and has measurably enhanced the overall strength of our military today.

My distinguished colleague, Senator Roberts from Kansas, is chairman of the Intelligence Committee. I am privileged to serve on that committee today. In years past, I was privileged to serve 8 years. We have this rotation in the Senate, and this is my second tour on that committee. When I was vice chairman, together with other members of that committee, we fought hard against the cuts in intelligence.

I ask unanimous consent that portions of the minority view report be printed into the Record.

I have the report that accompanied the 1994 bill. This was written in July of 1993. This report covered the ensuing fiscal year. I wrote the minority views, which were joined in by other colleagues on the committee at that time: Senator Danforth, who is now our Ambassador to the United Nations; Senator Stevens, who is currently chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee; Senator Lugar, who is currently chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee; and our former colleague, Senator Wallop.

Here is what we had to say, and I do not think this is dysfunctional participation, but I will let my colleagues judge for themselves after I have read portions of this report.

The minority views of the following Senators:

The United States must maintain and strengthen U.S.

intelligence capabilities to provide for the future security

of the Nation and for the protection of its interests around

the globe. The U.S. should commit more resources to

achievement of that objective than the fiscal year 1994

intelligence authorization bill reported by the Select

Committee on Intelligence would provide.

We were, of course, members of that select committee.

The U.S. faced grave security risks during the Cold War,

but it faced them in an international environment that was

comparatively stable and predictable. With the end of the

Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union and its

Warsaw Pact military alliance, the U.S. had hoped for a ``New

World Order'' with stable and steady progress toward greater

democracy, freedom and free enterprise. What the U.S. faces

in the post-Cold War era, however, is a more chaotic

environment with multitude challenges to U.S. interests that

complicate the efforts of the U.S. and cooperating nations to

achieve the desired progress. In an unstable world of diverse

and increasing challenges, the need for robust and reliable

U.S. intelligence capabilities has grown rather than

diminished. America faces a world in which: Ethnic, religious

and social tensions spawn regional conflicts; a number of

nations possess nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them

on a target; other nations seek nuclear, chemical or

biological weapons of mass destruction and the means to

deliver them; terrorist organizations continue to operate and

attack U.S. interests (including here at home, as the bombing

of the World Trade Center in New York reflects)--

This is 1993. It is interesting. It was June 30, just about this time--

international drug organizations continue on a vast scale to

produce illegal drugs and smuggle them into the U.S.; and

U.S. economic interests are under constant challenge.

To the extent that the end of the Cold War allows a

reduction of U.S. resources devoted to intelligence

capabilities focused on military capabilities of countries on

the territory of the former Soviet Union, the U.S. should

reallocate the gained resources to strengthen intelligence

capabilities to deal with growing risks to America's

interests. The U.S. should make such resources available for

strengthened intelligence capabilities focused on the

problems with which the U.S. Government must deal in the

coming decades, including proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction, terrorism, international narcotics trafficking,

and the illegal transfer of U.S. high technology.

I shall not read further because I will put it in the Record.

This is not dysfunctional action by legislators; this is legislators looking into the future and seeing much of what is occurring today. I only wish we had the opportunity to advise the 9/11 Commission of this and other contributions by many others in this Chamber at that period of time who were in the service of the Senate and their States. This was not dysfunctional.

In the days ahead, we do need to look at how best to organize the intelligence elements of our national security structure, along with many other components. We must not, however, do anything precipitously.

In the specific area of intelligence, our intelligence services, even with the flaws that have been recently pointed out, are the best in the world, by far. They are not perfect, and their business is, by definition, one of uncertainty--best judgments made with the information that is currently in hand. Any changes we make must be carefully constructed to preserve existing excellence, while improving other functions.

As we consider any changes, we must remember that intelligence is an integral part of military operations. Recent military operations by our forces in Afghanistan and Iraq have been extraordinarily successful, in large part because of excellent intelligence, and because of the close relationship between military operations and intelligence that has been so carefully built over the years. Intelligence is part of a whole Department of Defense, as well as part of a larger intelligence community. Moving defense intelligence functions under the authority of another cabinet-level official could have unintended consequences--we must move with careful deliberation.

I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a quorum.