Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. Madam President, I wish to speak to the amendment that was laid down by Senator Cochran from Mississippi, an amendment to strike language from the…
Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
Madam President, I wish to speak to the amendment that was laid down by Senator Cochran from Mississippi, an amendment to strike language from the bill that is pending before us, language that would inhibit the ability of our commanders on the ground to carry out the message we have asked them to perform in Iraq.
As we are all aware, this security supplemental is designed to provide money for the conduct of our operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. There is a timetable here. The commanders have said they need, by April 15, the beginning part of this funding so they can carry out the missions we have asked them to perform. When I was there about a month ago, this message was given to me over and over when I would say: Is there anything I can do for you: Senator make sure we get the funding without the strings attached when we need that money.
So the President requested this security supplemental appropriations bill. The House has acted. The Senate has the bill before us this week. Madam President, this funding bill will do no good if it has limitations imposed in it that prevent us from carrying out the mission, and the President has already said if language that sets a timetable for the withdrawal of our troops is included, he will be forced to veto the bill. We understand that.
It makes no sense to me that we would go ahead and pass such a bill, knowing the President will veto it, because there would be no way for us to go back and redo it all before the April 15 time, when the troops begin to need this money. Many have suggested that this is actually a slow-bleed strategy on the part of some to put a poison pill in the bill, forcing the President to veto it, knowing it means the troops would not get the money they need when they need it. I would rather like to think that this is a genuine point of view on the part of some of my colleagues who believe we should put strings attached on this funding and somehow that will provide a more clear way for us to achieve our mission. I don't understand it, but I suspect somebody could argue that.
What I would like to do is support Senator Cochran's amendment to simply strike this language from the bill. If the President is able to continue to carry out the Petraeus plan and we have funding to do that, we will know soon enough whether it will enable us to achieve the mission. By the summertime or thereabouts, if it appears this surge is not working, then we will know that as well.
What I cannot understand is why anybody would want to pull the rug out from under the troops just at the time it appears the President's strategy is beginning to work. When I was there, there was already cautious optimism, signs of success of the plan--nobody wants to declare success or victory, of course, but that those elements of success continue to be manifested and be reported on.
I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record, at the conclusion of my remarks, a piece by William Kristol and Frederick Kagan from the Weekly Standard of April 2, 2007, entitled ``Wrong on Timetables.''
Madam President, this piece by William Kristol and Frederick Kagan tries to take the arguments that have been offered by the opposition in favor of a timetable and demonstrate why those arguments are incorrect. The first of the arguments is that the Iraqi Government needs stimulus by us, or a threat by us, that if they don't hurry up and do what they are supposed to do, we are going to pull out. This kind of strings attached, therefore, makes some sense. They point out
the fact that, first of all, the resolution itself that was defeated in this body a week or so ago by a vote of 48 to 50, that resolution, which would have established timetables, was defeated, among other things, because the Iraqis have already gotten the message.
It is not so much about sending a message to them as it is about sending a message to our enemies and to our allies and to our own troops, which says regardless of what you do, we are going to be out by a certain date. The problem with the goals and with the specifics that are supposed to be achieved, the benchmarks, so-called, in the legislation is that it matters not how well the Iraqi Government performs; we are still going to be out by a date certain. So it is not the kind of message we want to send to the Iraqi Government and, clearly, not the kind we want to send to our enemies who simply know they have to just wait us out.
Another argument is that American forces would be able to fight al- Qaida, and we don't need to be involved in the civil war of the Iraqis. It would take a lawyer to figure that out. You are going to have to have a lawyer with every squad on patrol to figure out whether they are fighting al-Qaida or somebody else or what kind of action can be taken. It is very hard to distinguish whom you are fighting when the fighting is going on. Al-Qaida is definitely a problem. What did al-Qaida do? They went over to bomb the Golden Mosque in Samarra, which got the Shiites to decide they had to provide protection with militias, which went over and attacked the Sunnis, who then went over and attacked the Shiites and achieved the objective that al-Qaida wanted: to foment violence among different factions within the country.
Where do you draw the line against fighting al-Qaida and someone else if someone else is doing al-Qaida's bidding? It is a very convoluted proposition. Clearly, you cannot have troops there to fight one specific enemy but not another, especially when they are so difficult to identify.
Finally, some think it is too late, that we have already lost, and we might as well figure out a way to get out. I haven't heard my colleagues talk that way because, under that scenario, you ought to cut off funding today and not wait for the 6 or 8 or 10 months called for under the resolution. As I said, the Senate defeated the virtually identical provision 2 weeks ago. One of the reasons is because our military is making progress. It is finding that, for example, in Sadr City, the mayor of Sadr City essentially invited the Iraqi and coalition forces in without a shot being fired. The forces of Moqtada al-Sadr have either gone underground or disbanded. Al-Sadr himself is believed to have gone to Iran. Prime Minister Maliki has made it clear he is not going to relent against the forces of the Sadr army. He has fired the Deputy Health Minister, one of Sadr's allies. He has turned a deaf ear to the complaints of al-Sadr. He oversaw the cleaning out of the Interior Ministry, which was a stronghold that was corrupting the Iraqi police. He has worked with other coalition leaders to deploy the Iraqi units pursuant to the Baghdad security plan. Interestingly, he has also visited the sheik in Ramadi, which is the capital of Anbar Province and formally the real base of al-Qaida operations, and has gotten cooperation with the tribal leaders in that area to join us in the effort against al-Qaida and other insurgents.
All of this is demonstrating cooperation of the Government in Baghdad, clearly refuting the notion that somehow the American policy has to be to threaten the Iraqis to cooperate with us or else we will leave and the only way to do that is by expressing that through a timetable. Clearly, the Iraqi Government is cooperating, and setting arbitrary deadlines would send exactly the wrong message both to our allies and, of course, to our enemies.
We need to express the view to our allies that we will be there to protect them when the going gets tough. The enemy is not simply going to lie down and allow this plan to continue to work. They will fight back. As somebody said, there are going to be good days and bad days, but our allies need to know that we will be there in the bad days and that we won't set an absolute deadline for getting out.
The other point I made earlier is the services need this supplemental appropriations bill, and that is why it is necessary for us to strike provisions of section 1315, provisions which would deny that funding without the strings that are attached.
To this point, I also alluded to the fact that section 1315 is internally contradictory and self-defeating. As I said, it provides benchmarks for the Iraqi leaders to meet and then says it doesn't matter whether they meet them, we are out of here. The resolution would not send any message that is constructive in any way and certainly is not changing the behavior of the administration.
There are some who might believe they could support section 1315 because it is less restrictive than the House language. Indeed, it is somewhat less restrictive, although essentially a distinction without a difference.
This bill has to go to conference. There has been a great deal of discussion by pundits and others that the more liberal element in the House of Representatives is going to insist upon, at a bare minimum, the language that passed the House of Representatives which they felt was too moderate to begin with. We are likely to get change in a conference that is language the President will have to veto, language which is closer to the House language than the Senate language. I think, therefore, Senators should not be acting under the illusion that we can go ahead and pass this language and make sure that either in conference everything gets taken out or at least this language, rather than the more difficult House language, will be what is sent to the President.
The reality is these are real bullets. This is not something with which to play around. I don't think we can be voting for something just because maybe in the conference committee we can try to make it a little bit better.
Madam President, I wish to get to this point that will, perhaps, put this in perspective. I can't remember another time in history when the United States in the middle of a war has set a deadline and basically told the world: We will be out by this specific date. To state the proposition is to illustrate how odd and destructive a proposition it is. If someone can come to the floor and tell me when this has been done in the past and when it has had a salutary effect on the conflict, I would be very interested and would certainly be willing to listen to how that might have a positive effect here. But even colleagues on the other side of the aisle several months ago expressed themselves on the matter of timetables and deadlines, and they know who they are; they acknowledge this is not the way to fight a war. One thing you cannot do is tell the enemy when you are going to be leaving because it simply allows the enemy to wait you out. Nothing has changed. That fact still remains, and it seems almost inconceivable to me that Members now would be deciding it is now OK to set a deadline and to set timetables.
Some might argue that it is just a goal, it is not a timetable. But the reality is there are both embodied in this section which we seek to strike. The beginning phrase is, ``The President shall commence the phased redeployment of United States forces from Iraq not later than 120 days after the date of enactment of the act.'' That is not a ``maybe,'' it is not an ``if everything goes well'' or ``if everything doesn't go well,'' it is a ``shall commence'' redeployment. The goal is ``with the goal of redeploying by March 31, 2008,'' but the ``shall commence'' is pursuant to that goal. So you have to start it, and then you keep going, and your goal is to get it done by March 31, 2008. The only exception is for the limited purposes of leaving troops behind to protect our infrastructure and coalition personnel, training and equipping Iraqi forces, and conducting targeted counterterrorism operations.
How do you decide how many troops you need to leave behind to conduct targeted counterterrorism operations when virtually everything we are doing in Iraq right now is counterterrorism? How do you decide we are going to be able to cut, say, in half the number of troops and still be able to effectively conduct targeted counterterrorism operations? If you are driving down a street to conduct a targeted counterterrorism operation and somebody begins firing on you, do you have to ask them whether they are a terrorist before you can return fire? Do you turn
to your lawyer sitting in the humvee with you: I want to comply with the law, so can I shoot back or not?
This is ludicrous. We cannot impose these kinds of conditions on our troops in the middle of combat and expect them to perform their mission safely. We send the best trained and best equipped troops into harm's way, and we need to give them the other tool they need to prevail; that is, the ability to carry out their mission as their commanders have defined it for them, not as it is micromanaged by a bunch of lawyers in Washington or Members of the Congress.
So, No. 1, this isn't just a wish that we redeploy. It begins ``shall commence the phased redeployment not later than 120 days after the date of enactment of this act,'' and the goal is to have it all done by March 31 of next year. That is so destructive in the middle of war that I just can't believe my colleagues would actually contemplate doing that or that they can believe putting these kinds of limitations on our troops is a realistic way to fight a war--conducting targeted counterterrorism operations but not returning fire against, what, against somebody defined as an insurgent, maybe? I don't understand it, and I don't know how many lawyers it is going to take to understand it. Our troops on the ground who are in the middle of a conflict certainly are not going to be able to fight and defend themselves under restrictions such as these, which is, I gather, precisely why the President says he will have to veto it.
That gets me to my last point. I can understand why, Madam President, if you felt this was a lost cause, you would want to just say: Let's have a vote to get out and be done with it and not fund the troops. But instead, there are some--and I am not suggesting in the Congress but there are some who have talked about this as a very clever strategy. They say the opponents of the President and the Congress are going to be able to say they voted to support the troops because they voted for a supplemental appropriations bill for that purpose, knowing all along, however, that it is a false exercise because it puts restrictions on the troops fighting the war that they can't possibly live with, so the President has to veto it. But he will get the blame, not them.
Well, that is too clever by half. The American people understand this. I urge, if any of my colleagues are considering supporting this for that reason, that they fail to appreciate that the American people, yes, would like to bring our troops home, they would like to see this conflict ended, but, no, they do not want it to end with an American defeat. They do not want to see us defeated and, most especially, I can't imagine anybody who wants to have our troops continue the war for a limited duration of time under rules which put them in great danger, which is what this would do. So the President has to veto it.
What happens when he vetoes the bill, if this is the form in which we pass it? We are now beyond April 15, the time the troops need the money, and yet Congress has still not acted to provide the security supplemental funding. The Defense Department now has to terminate contracts so they can switch money from this account over to this account and begin a very costly and time-consuming process of trying to make do while Congress makes up its mind, to make sure they can get the money to the troops so they can continue their operations.
Maybe secretly there are some out there who hope all of this will gradually reduce the ability of the troops to perform their mission so that it becomes a proposition where our strategy, even under the best of circumstances, can't succeed. In other words, the Petraeus plan fails because we couldn't get the support to the troops when they needed the support.
I hope that certainly my colleagues in the House and Senate will not buy into that proposition, will not pull the rug out from under our troops just when it appears this plan is showing signs of success. That slow-bleed strategy would not only ensure that we would lose everything we have gained so far, including the prospect of a success, but that our troops would be put in more danger now than they would be either by supporting them or simply by leaving. It would leave them in a middle ground, in the middle of a fire but without the ability to properly defend themselves.
Maybe some believe that would force our hand and just bring them home anyway, acknowledge defeat, and be done with it. I don't think that is what the American people want. If anybody is thinking that is the strategy behind this proposition, I think they are not only misreading American public opinion but do not have the best interests of our troops in mind.
Since that is the rationale behind this resolution, as offered by my colleagues, I am sure that is not the case. But that is why we need to strike this particular section from the bill.
We will talk later about some other items that need to be stricken as well. It is amazing to me, and I won't get into all the pork that is in this bill, but here we have a security supplemental, emergency funding to support the troops, and we decide to lard it up with all manner of items that are not emergencies, have nothing to do with supporting the troops, but because everybody knows this is a must-pass bill, they figure this is a real good opportunity for them to get things in the bill that might otherwise be very difficult to pass in the Congress.
Just a couple ideas: $3.5 million related to guided tours of the U.S. Capitol. I am all for guided tours of the U.S. Capitol, but is this an emergency?
There is $13 million for mine safety research. I am sure mine safety is important to research. Is this an emergency which can't be put in a regular appropriations bill?
We are targeting funding for sugar beets. I presume I like sugar beets--I am not sure--but I don't think it is an emergency for which we need to spend $24 million.
There is another $3 million funding for sugarcane, which I understand goes to one Hawaiian cooperative.
Here is something which would appeal to all the politicians: $100 million for security related to the Republican and Democratic Presidential nominating conventions. Is that next month, Madam President? I have forgotten. Nominating conventions would be in July and August, not of this year but the following year--not exactly an emergency we need to fund in an emergency security supplemental to conduct this war.
Do my colleagues hear what I am saying? Politicians have decided this is a good train to get on board because it has to move, we have to fund the troops. Since it is hard for us to get the Senate and the House to act on these items otherwise, we will just try to attach them to this bill.
We will have other amendments to try to remove these extraneous matters from this funding bill. But what I wanted to talk about today was primarily my concern that if we don't strike this section which has the timetables for withdrawal, then one of two things is going to happen: Either the President vetoes the bill and it then takes us forever to get a clean bill to the President, with the result that the troops don't have the funding they need and the strategy that is currently working becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy for those who say it can't work because they have denied the funds for it to work, or these provisions remain and, of course, it is impossible to conduct operations with these strings attached for our troops. Either way, it is a heck of a way to fight a war. And it illustrates to me that we ought not try to micromanage this conflict from the Halls of Congress. We have plenty of other things that should occupy our time than developing a strategy and the rules of engagement for fighting a war when we have perfectly good people, such as General Petraeus who was unanimously confirmed by this body, to develop a plan and see to it that it is properly executed. We have sent him over to do it. I suggest we give him and his troops the support they need to get the job done.
I would support the amendment of the Senator from Mississippi to strike this section from the bill.
Madam President, I yield the floor.
[From the Weekly Standard, Apr. 2, 2007]
Wrong on Timetables
(By William Kristol and Frederick W. Kagan)
Let's give congressional Democrats the benefit of the
doubt: Assume some of them earnestly think they're doing the
right thing to insist on adding to the supplemental
appropriation for the Iraq war benchmarks and
timetables for withdrawal. Still, their own arguments--taken
at face value--don't hold up.
Democrats in Congress have made three superficially
plausible claims: (1) Benchmarks and timetables will
``incentivize'' the Maliki government to take necessary steps
it would prefer to avoid. (2) We can gradually withdraw over
the next year so as to step out of sectarian conflict in Iraq
while still remaining to fight al Qaeda. (3) Defeat in Iraq
is inevitable, so our primary goal really has to be to get
out of there. But the situation in Iraq is moving rapidly
away from the assumptions underlying these propositions, and
their falseness is easier to show with each passing day.
(1) The Iraqi government will not act responsibly unless
the imminent departure of American forces compels it to do
so. Those who sincerely believe this argument were horrified
by the president's decision in January to increase the
American military presence in Iraq. It has now been more than
ten weeks since that announcement--long enough to judge
whether the Maliki government is more or less likely to
behave well when U.S. support seems robust and reliable.
In fact, since January 11, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki
has permitted U.S. forces to sweep the major Shiite
strongholds in Baghdad, including Sadr City, which he had
ordered American troops away from during operations in 2006.
He has allowed U.S. forces to capture and kill senior leaders
of Moktada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army--terrifying Sadr into fleeing
to Iran. He fired the deputy health minister--one of Sadr's
close allies--and turned a deaf ear to Sadr's complaints. He
oversaw a clearing-out of the Interior Ministry, a Sadrist
stronghold that was corrupting the Iraqi police. He has
worked with coalition leaders deploy all of the Iraqi Army
units required by the Baghdad Security Plan. In perhaps the
most dramatic move of all, Maliki visited Sunni sheikhs in
Ramadi, the capital of Anbar province and formerly the base
of al Qaeda fighters and other Sunni Arab insurgents against
his government. The visit was made possible because Anbar's
sheikhs have turned against al Qaeda and are now reaching out
to the government they had been fighting. Maliki is reaching
back. U.S. strength has given him the confidence to take all
these important steps.
(2) American forces would be able to fight al Qaeda at
least as well, if not better, if they were not also engaged
in a sectarian civil war in Iraq. The idea of separating the
fight against al Qaeda from the sectarian fighting in Iraq is
a delusion. Since early 2004, al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) has
sought to plunge Iraq into sectarian civil war, so as to
critically weaken the government, which is fighting it. AQI
endeavors to clear Shiites out of mixed areas, terrorize
local Sunnis into tolerating and supporting AQI, and thereby
establish safe havens surrounded by innocent people it then
dragoons into the struggle. Now, heartened by the U.S.
commitment to stay, Sunni sheikhs in Anbar have turned on
AQI. In response, AQI has begun to move toward Baghdad and
mixed areas in Diyala, attempting to terrorize the locals and
establish new bases in the resulting chaos. The enemy
understands that chaos is al Qaeda's friend. The notion that
we can pull our troops back into fortresses in a climate of
chaos--but still move selectively against al Qaeda--is
fanciful. There can be no hope of defeating or controlling al
Qaeda in Iraq without controlling the sectarian violence that
it spawns and relies upon.
(3) Isn't it too late? Even if we now have the right
strategy and the right general, can we prevail? If there were
no hope left, if the Iraqis were determined to wage full-
scale civil war, if the Maliki government were weak or
dominated by violent extremists, if Iran really controlled
the Shiites in Iraq--if these things were true, then the new
strategy would have borne no fruit at all. Maliki would have
resisted or remained limp as before. Sadr's forces would have
attacked. Coalition casualties would be up, and so would
sectarian killings. But none of these things has happened.
Sectarian killings are lower. And despite dramatically
increased operations in more exposed settings, so are
American casualties. This does not look like hopelessness.
Hope is not victory, of course. The surge has just begun,
our enemies are adapting, and fighting is likely to intensify
as U.S. and Iraqi forces begin the main clear-and-hold phase.
The Maliki government could falter. But it need not, if we do
not. Unfortunately, four years of setbacks have conditioned
Americans to believe that any progress must be ephemeral. If
the Democrats get their way and Gen. Petraeus is undermined
in Congress, the progress may indeed prove short-lived. But
it's time to stop thinking so hard about how to lose, and to
think instead about how to reinforce and exploit the success
we have begun to achieve. The debate in Washington hasn't
caught up to the realities in Baghdad. Until it does, a
resolute president will need to prevent defeatists in
Congress from losing a winnable war in Iraq.