Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as long as I may speak beyond 10 minutes. Mr. President, I want to talk today about a subject that is…
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as long as I may speak beyond 10 minutes.
Mr. President, I want to talk today about a subject that is very much on our minds--the subject of North Korea and the threat North Korea poses to the entire world because of its development of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, and the fact it is the world's largest proliferator of those kinds of weapons.
Next week, Senator McCain and I will be introducing a bill called the North Korea Democracy Act of 2003. The purpose of this legislation is to establish American policy, from a congressional standpoint, that will help us to move North Korea toward a more democratic regime and forego the development of these weapons of mass destruction and the proliferation of them as well as missiles throughout the world. As we are all very much aware, today, right now, North Korea is ruled by a leader and leaders who have cheated on agreements in the past not to produce these weapons, and has really brought the world to the brink of military conflict, and has removed itself from numerous agreements it had earlier entered into, which have constrained its activities to date.
As a result, the United States is presented with a challenge of what to do in North Korea that has a very short timeline on it, a challenge in which, as one pundit put it, ``the clock is ticking.'' Just as an aside, we know we have to deal with countries such as Iraq as well. Iraq is one of the fronts of the war on terror, and we are all aware of the fact the President has been preparing for the potential for military action should Saddam Hussein not comply with the U.N. resolutions that require him to come clean on his weapons of mass destruction program and to dismantle those weapons.
The President has made it clear that while he is proceeding for those preparations with regard to Iraq, that he also understands the importance of dealing with the problem of North Korea, because North Korea has nuclear weapons already, we believe, and because of its recent actions, it could create more nuclear weapons quite quickly and, from our past understanding of North Korea's policies, could begin to sell those weapons to other countries.
To not put too fine a point on it, think about the prospects of dealing with a Libya or an Algeria or a Syria or a Sudan or a country such as these that bought a nuclear weapon from North Korea. It is a very troubling prospect, indeed. Yet in a matter of months--not years, not some time way down the line, but literally in a matter of a few months under the current program in which it is engaged--North Korea could develop nuclear weapons and sell them to countries such as those I have mentioned. Of course, it could also sell a weapon to a terrorist organization, other than a state that sponsors terror.
This is, indeed, a troubling prospect, and that is why I say the clock is ticking. That is why it is important for the United States to have a very firm policy, a very clear policy for dealing with this and for the Congress to be engaged in the development of that policy; hence, the reason for the introduction of this legislation.
I will set the stage with what this threat is, what the U.S. policy has been, what our current strategy is with respect to dealing with North Korea, and then I will describe in a little more detail the bill about which I am talking.
The President has said that the centerpiece of our policy with respect to North Korea is that it must promptly and verifiably dismantle its nuclear enrichment program. Of what exactly is the President speaking?
In the past, North Korea created a plutonium enrichment facility that produced only 5 megawatts of electricity, so it was clearly not something to produce power for the country of North Korea--in fact, it requires coal to operate--but was for producing fissionable material to put into nuclear weapons.
In 1994, North Korea agreed that it would no longer produce fissionable material from that facility and that it would not produce any other fissionable material. That plant was put into a standby mode, in effect, and the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, was permitted to install devices that would monitor the compliance of that commitment, as well as people who were onsite to verify compliance.
In the interim, North Korea began to develop a uranium enrichment project in deep underground facilities in North Korea. North Korea began this program and only recently 'fessed up to the fact that it had been engaging in this program for a long time.
It, too, is in violation of agreements that North Korea had entered into, including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or the NPT. North Korea today, I believe, announced it was, in fact, withdrawing from the NPT. It had been threatening to do so for some time. At the time it developed this fissionable material, North Korea was a signatory to the
I am happy to yield.
I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record a very well thought-through op-ed piece called ``Don't Rule Out Force,'' penned by Dennis Ross, which appeared in today's Washington Post newspaper.
The reason I do this at this point, Mr. President, Dennis Ross makes the point, and I think eloquently, that the administration should not rule out force; that it ought to make it clear not only to North Korea but to North Korea's neighbors, Russia and China, that, of course, force is always an option; that there have to be some consequences to an absolute refusal of North Korea to agree to abide by the norms all the rest of us abide by, and to abide by the agreements it has entered into.
I hasten to point out neither Dennis Ross nor I are advocating the use of force. He points out, and I reiterate the point, one would hope it would never come to that because the use of force against North Korea is fraught with the perils I discussed before.
But Ross makes the point, and I think it is a valid one, that without consequences to failing to agree to be reasonable, it is unlikely North Korea will be reasonable. And more importantly, without that kind of a potential development, it may well be our allies in the region--the Russians and Chinese--who may also not be willing to put the kind of pressure they can and should against North Korea to cause North Korea to back down.
So that is the reason why this kind of action by the United States should not necessarily be ruled out, even with all of its potential dangers.
The reason I make this point is as follows: Talks can only succeed if we change the circumstances on the ground today. As of right now, talks result in promises by North Korea in exchange for fuel oil or food or whatever to North Korea, and then they violate the agreements and we are left in a position of reacting to their violation. We have to change that dynamic in some way so that North Korea feels some pressure to come to terms with its violations, some pressure to comply with the commitments it has made, some pressure to begin to dismantle its nuclear programs. Without that kind of pressure, without something to lose by refusing to go along in our negotiations or violating the agreements they make, talk alone is not likely to change anything. We have to change the circumstances.
How do we do that? That is where our legislation comes in. This legislation would put into place several circumstances which we believe would cause North Korea to more seriously consider negotiations as a means toward real, peaceful resolution of the dispute and real disarmament of its nuclear facilities. But without these kinds of pressures or conditions or circumstances, they are not likely to do so.
Let me briefly summarize the legislation. The first thing is to recognize what the North Koreans themselves have said, but to make it official: That the agreed framework entered into 9 years ago has failed and is no longer extant and it related to a circumstance North Korea has no longer permitted to exist and, as a result, the subsidization of North Korea called for under the agreement will cease; that they are not going to continue to be supported by the United States under the agreed framework.
The second thing we do is prohibit the United States assistance to North Korea or the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization under the agreed framework. This is designed, among other things, to help deny North Korea the funds, the hard currency it needs, to continuing the development of its nuclear program.
That is the third thing the act would do. It would reinstitute the sanctions that were previously in place and permit the President to invoke new sanctions. In effect, what I have called for is a resolution similar to resolution 611 against Iraq. Same terms, prohibiting exports and imports, as a way of denying hard currency to a country to engage in illicit activity. In the case of North Korea, this is especially important. The biggest source of hard currency for North Korea is the illicit drug trade and the weaponry it sends to other countries.
Where do countries such as Iraq get Scud missiles? North Korea. Where did Pakistan get some of its equipment? North Korea. Where do other countries get weapons of mass destruction? North Korea.
If we impose sanctions that both prohibit the importation and the exportation of these items from North Korea, we can help to impose upon their regime an economic circumstance which might persuade them it is more beneficial to talk and to make promises they intend to keep than to continue on their present course of action.
Another provision of the act would prohibit any nuclear cooperation agreement or type of nuclear interaction with North Korea unless and until the President made several determinations and sent them to the Congress and Congress approved of such an interaction or agreement by congressional action.
We would also encourage the President to obtain multilateral sanctions including the blocking of remittances from ethnic Koreans to North Korea. That's the other source of hard currency, the remittances from North Koreans elsewhere in the world to their relatives in North Korea itself.
But with regard to multilateral activity here, it is interesting to me that probably the most significant pressure that could be put on North Korea to begin complying with its commitments would come from China. China supplies approximately 80 percent of the fuel oil to North Korea. It provides over half of the food and fuel generally to North Korea. It has a long border with North Korea. It clearly would be called upon to help enforce sanctions if they were imposed. And it clearly would suffer, probably more than any other country, from any kind of nuclear explosion on the North Korean peninsula or any other explosion in which poison gases or nerve agents or biological agents of some kind were released from the atmosphere since the wind is prevailing south to north.
China has a great deal to lose from North Korea acquiring a nuclear capability as well. In the first place, I don't think China wants other countries in the region to have nuclear weapons. China has those weapons, but I don't think it wants Japan to acquire those weapons. I don't think it would want South Korea or Taiwan to acquire nuclear weapons. I am not sure it would want the United States to extend its nuclear umbrella to South Korea, for example.
All of those things could happen if North Korea is permitted to develop nuclear weapons. It seems to me, therefore, it is very much in China's interest to quietly, if that is the way they have to do it, but firmly dissuade the North Koreans from progressing with its nuclear development program.
It is especially troublesome that very recently China has continued to supply North Korea with materiel and other assistance for the further development of North Korea's nuclear program. Again, without going into details, we are well aware of what China has been doing. The United States needs to come down very firmly against this kind of export from China to North Korea. Not only do I think we should argue to China what we believe is in China's best interests, but in other ways to exert what other kind of influence we can on China to stop this kind of activity and assist us working with the North Koreans to stop their program.
To some extent, arguments similar to that relate to Russia, although Russia is not as close to North Korea as are the Chinese. But in both cases, both Russia and China could assist us. One of the things our bill urges is the development of those multilateral kinds of agreements and actions that would stop North Korea from furthering its program.
We would also in this act do a variety of things which we think would help to put pressure on North Korea, in terms of democratization and in terms of liberalizing its country in general. For example, granting North Koreans refugee status in the United States, encouraging the executive branch to work with other countries to care for and resettle refugees from North Korea and provide money for that purpose. We would require Radio Free Asia to increase its broadcasting to North Korea to 24 hours a day and authorize whatever money is necessary to do that.
We also believe it is important for Congress to actually take measures, including military reinforcements, if that is called for, and enhanced defense exercises and other steps as determined appropriate to assure the highest level of deterrence against North Korea.
This is important for two reasons. First, there are those who called on us to bring our troops home from South Korea and, frankly, the temptation is great, when South Korean leaders basically talk about not wanting the United States in South Korea anymore, to do precisely that. Why should we have our own troops there when they allegedly do not want us there? Unfortunately, that's a shortsighted way of looking at the problem. If we are to put the pressure on North Korea to make dialog meaningful, the third way I was talking about, to back it up with some potential action, then you do have to have a military presence and demonstrate you mean it when you talk about the North Koreans needing to comply with their agreements. Therefore, it would be the wrong time to either remove our troops or suggest they are not prepared. Thus, the reason our bill calls for enhanced measures to ensure our deterrence in that area.
What these provisions of the bill demonstrate is that there are a lot of alternatives in between just talk which, as I said, is cheap, and military action, which is to be avoided at all costs here because of the consequences of it. There are a lot of things we could be doing in between that. I have described in not very much detail what our bill provides in that regard, to just demonstrate there are a lot of things we could be doing to cut off its supply of hard currency, to isolate it, and to put pressure on North Korea to begin to comply with the agreements it has made in the past.
Some might say this is provocative. Frankly, I don't think it is very provocative. It is certainly not as provocative as having to resort to military force. It seems to me it is also not provocative to let the North Koreans know there are consequences to violating agreements they have made with the rest of the world.
If we are not able to back up these agreements, then why ever have agreements in the first place? Why couldn't any country simply get out of the NPT and say, We didn't really mean it when we signed up? The United Nations charter itself--I have forgotten the exact chapters; I think it is chapters 6 and 7--provides for the imposition of international norms of behavior in cases where the peace of the world is threatened by a particular country. That applies directly to North Korea in this case.
So we have the ability to act as an international group of nations, in addition to unilaterally in the case of the United States. But I would also say to those who say this is dangerous and provocative, that's the same thing people criticized Ronald Reagan for when he talked about the Evil Empire, Russia. It was the pressure the United States put on Russia in the latter stages of the Soviet Union, during which time the President not only built up our military to create a strong deterrence to any military action by the Soviet Union but also began to expand our push for democratization and freedom in Eastern Europe and in the outlying areas of the Soviet empire.
Many think it was the combination of those factors that caused the Soviet Union to break up, the combination of a strong deterrence on our part, the peace-through-strength concept of Ronald Reagan, but also the declaration that it was an evil empire, the assistance to Lech Walesa, the characterization of the country and all of the eastern satellite countries of the Soviet Union as evil and nondemocratic and abusive of human rights, the Jackson-Vanik amendment. Those actions, over time, I believe, had a very salutary effect on the people in the Soviet Union and caused them to eventually conclude they could not confront the democratic nations of the world. As a result, Russia has been the product, fortunately for the people of Russia, of that kind of push.
I do not think you create a more dangerous or provocative situation here. I think in the case of North Korea you begin to lay the groundwork for the North Koreans to become a democratic society that can actually take care of its people and not starve them to death and engage in the human rights abuses it has in the past.
Let me just quote something Ronald Reagan wrote to himself. This is in a book called ``Reagan's War.'' It is talking about the philosophy Reagan had in dealing with the Soviet Union, but I think it is relevant to North Korea as well. In his diary the President wrote the following with respect to a meeting that had been convened, an emergency meeting of the NSC. He jotted these notes to himself about his goal with respect to Poland. He said:
I took a stand that this may be the last chance in our
lifetime to see a change in the Soviet empire's colonial
policy re Eastern Europe. We should take a stand and tell
them unless and until martial law is lifted in Poland, the
prisoners were released and negotiations resumed between
Walesa and the Polish government, we would quarantine the
Soviets and Poland with no trade or communications across
their borders. Also tell our NATO allies and others to join
us in such sanctions or risk an estrangement from us.
Bearing in mind that all know what the result of President Reagan's policies were, I think that is the same philosophy that should animate our policy today toward North Korea. We should not be seen as vacillating. Some have characterized the administration as vacillating.
We should be sure the positions we are taking are clear-cut, firm, and no one can mistake what our intentions are, as the first step. Second, we should adhere to the President's policy of forcing North Korea to promptly and verifiably dismantle its nuclear enrichment program. And third, Congress can play a role in this by enacting legislation of the kind I have described that would not only create the conditions for more democratization in the country by granting refugee status to political refugees, broadcasting into North Korea the message of freedom to its people, but also squeezing economically the military leaders of the country to deny them the hard currency they are currently using to build up this nuclear capability, to prevent them from exporting these weapons of mass destruction to other countries.
Just as a final point, such an export limitation or quarantine as part of the sanctions that could be imposed here would not only deny the economic reward to the North Koreans from the production of this material, but it could result in an interdiction of such material if in fact they are going to try to send it some place else. Remember that shipment from North Korea that was recently intercepted going into Yemen. This kind of sale of weapons of mass destruction by North Korea, therefore, if interdicted, would not only deny the country the hard currency that it uses for its nuclear program but perhaps ultimately more importantly would prevent this kind of equipment from getting into the hands of terrorists or terrorist nations that mean us harm.
This is the approach we believe is appropriate for the United States to take. Neither military action nor just plain talk, but a dialog backed up by firm, positive, constructive actions on the part of the United States would put a lot of pressure on North Korea and would hopefully bring countries such as China and Russia along with us to help us put pressure on North Korea to cause it to come to meaningful agreement with the United States that is verifiable and that would result in peace in the region and the dismantlement of dangerous nuclear weapons they have been building.
We will be introducing this legislation next week. I appreciate the support Senator McCain has provided in putting this legislation together, and I look forward to visiting with my colleagues and getting sponsorship of the legislation with an early commitment to get it passed by this body and sent on to the President.
I yield the floor.