Intelligence Operations
Mr. President, I rise to speak on an issue about which I have spoken a number of times and which I passionately believe needs to be addressed--frankly, it is one that is well past the maturation stage where it should have been…
Mr. President, I rise to speak on an issue about which I have spoken a number of times and which I passionately believe needs to be addressed--frankly, it is one that is well past the maturation stage where it should have been addressed--and that is an independent look at our intelligence operations, particularly as they relate to the pre- Iraqi invasion and how conclusions were drawn, so that can speak to the American people about the facts we had.
It is an issue which I think is essential to the national security of the American people. If we don't learn from our mistakes, we are bound to make those mistakes again. It is high time we have gotten around to it.
In the past few days, the administration and the world have come to understand and acknowledge on a broad basis the colossal intelligence failures that led us to war, a war that may have led to good ends, but the Nation clearly didn't come to those conclusions on the basis of the information we now seem to be discovering.
There is a question about means to an end that I think is pretty simple in the kinds of discussions I think all of us have in the families and in the communities in which we live. I don't think we want to get into a position where means justify ends when they don't relate to them. I just point that out as some of this discussion has evolved.
On January 8, Secretary of State Colin Powell addressed the lack of connection between Iraq and al-Qaida, stating;
I've not seen a smoking gun, concrete evidence about that
connection.
We were told something different.
Then the President, in his latest State of the Union Address, referred only to weapons of mass destruction and related program activities, whatever that is--a far cry from the active nuclear program and stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons warned of in his last State of the Union Message in 2003.
It was last week's testimony from David Kay, the man responsible for the weapons search in Iraq, that finally brought this matter to maturity and captured the attention of the Nation, the administration, and the world, and that has really changed the whole context of this debate and discussion.
Dr. Kay, a man who told us last fall that Iraq's nuclear programs were only at the most rudimentary level, told the Senate Armed Services Committee there was no evidence of stockpiles of chemical or biological weapons.
David Kay has made an important recommendation--one that I think has been obvious for a number of months--that an independent inquiry be established so that the American people, so that the allies of the United States and those who would work with us, so that all of us who are involved in policymaking know we have the facts that allow us to make good decisions so that we are not committing the lives of our men and women in our military to efforts that are based on false premises, whether those are intentional or unintentional.
We need to have the right answers, and that recommendation apparently has now led--some might say forced--the President to announce he will name a panel to look at the intelligence issues related to Iraq.
I welcome the President's reversal on this critical need, and I suspect we will
see a reversal of support for that concept among my colleagues, about which there have been some healthy debates in the last months.
This is about the Nation's national security, make no mistake. We need to understand on a collection basis, on an analysis basis, and, yes, on a use basis, just exactly how we got to the kinds of conclusions we did. The means need to be understood so that we can connect them with the end, so that we don't make the same mistakes again and again.
I have serious concerns, however, at least from early reports about what the details of the President's plan for this commission will be, that the response is inadequate--I think seriously inadequate. This needs to be an independent commission.
How do we get to an independent commission? How do we make certain that the judgments we get are not designed or at least limited to only a mission defined by those we are actually looking at? And second, will that commission be allowed to explore the use of intelligence, or the misuse, if you will?
I haven't seen the details. I don't think any of us have. We are reading press reports. But if they are true, it would give the appearance that we don't want to have a commission that is going to deal with the fundamental crux of a lot of these questions. Quite obviously, if we don't deal with the crux of the questions, then are we going to get results that create credibility with the American people, with this body, with the world, on whom we need to count to do things as we go forward? Are we going to get to those kinds of conclusions?
If that is not the case, then I don't think we are headed in the right direction. I am very afraid we are moving into something that may satisfy a call for a commission to investigate our intelligence, but not yet at the fundamental problems that led us to this particular decision in Iraq, but also can be and may have well been replicated in other areas.
I actually think the President is right to talk about it in a broader context. It is just an issue of, sequentially, which one do we look at first. Even by the inspection on the ground, we are told that 15 percent of the issues haven't been examined on the ground in Iraq. We need to deal with where our men and women are being killed now, as opposed to putting off and putting together all of these various issues.
We have what some people might say is a tactical issue with respect to Iraq and a strategic problem with our intelligence operations in a more general context. Fine, we should look at a broader scope of issues to get to the restructuring of our intelligence operations, but we need to deal with the reality of, how did our intelligence serve us so poorly, how were the conclusions so far off the mark? Was there a problem with collection? Was there a problem with analysis? Or was there a problem in selectivity and use of the intelligence provided?
As I said, it was last summer when I first offered legislation to establish an independent commission. I think we ought to get to a truly bipartisan, independent commission, one that is not unlike what we see with the 9/11 Commission, headed by the former Governor of New Jersey, a Republican, who is doing, in my view, an incredible service to our Nation. It is a diligent, independent, bipartisan approach to find out the facts that led to that tragedy with which all of us live each and every day, whether it is in your local hometown, like it is the case in mine, or whether it is in the broader context of the Nation.
Given the fact that we have had Presidential claims that Iraq had sought to purchase uranium in Africa, which could not be justified or substantiated by intelligence, is enough to ask the question whether intelligence was properly used. It clearly was not, because the President himself has denied that that should have been in the State of the Union.
So how did that intelligence get misused? How did that come about? Similarly, with regard to the aluminum tube issue, on which a whole host of folks have spoken out both publicly, and I have read some things privately, that call into question whether that was ever a viable concept for intelligence to be used as one of the justifications for entering into this conflict.
How can that happen? We need to have certainty and independence in judging how we got to the collection, the analysis, and the use of the intelligence. I think that is important if we are going to go forward with certainty and credibility with regard to our efforts in using our intelligence for proper and effective policy formulation in the years ahead. We need it so we can speak to the world with credibility, and it will not take place, in my view, if we do not have that independent commission.
So I want to reemphasize the point that use of the information is also very important. We have seen time after time, and opinion after opinion, of a number of people, outside of the David Kay remarks, that much of the use has actually been disputed within the intelligence community. I cite in particular an officer from the State Department, Gregg Thielmann--and I will try to get his particular title--who has made the assertion that we are basically operating under faith-based interpretations of a lot of information. He goes back and cites the Nigeria uranium and the use of aluminum tubes, disputes about stockpiles that were reported, and many elements of different perspectives with regard to the intelligence that was available to policymakers.
How did we get such a one-sided view? I think some people would argue it might be misuse. Some may argue it is selectivity. I think we need an independent commission so we can get to the bottom of these. I think we need to understand how the administration could make public statements that contradicted some of the analysis or failed to incorporate the balance that was actually involved in the communities' reports. Why did these reports Congress mandated under the very resolution that granted the President the authority to go to war include some of those unsubstantiated claims I talked about? Were members of the intelligence community pressured to produce analyses that conformed to the administration policies? They even set up an extra body within the Defense Department to derive points of view that would be used in the Defense Department independent of traditional agencies that are involved in the intelligence. Did the administration officials seek to bypass that normal process by cherry-picking?
I think all of these questions are real and they are ones that need to be independently analyzed. There are plenty of outside experts. I think a lot of people have heard about the Carnegie Endowment study that reported last week, and I quote:
Administration officials systematically misrepresented the
threat from Iraq's WMD and ballistic missile programs.
They may not have all of the information. That is why we need a commission to straighten this out and to give us all confidence that we can go forward.
I spoke about Mr. Thielmann, who was the former director of the Office of Strategic Proliferation and Military Affairs in the State Department. He is incredibly offended by the difference between the information he saw and presented to the Secretary of State, as the one who is responsible for collating that, and what he has seen stated in the public. So how did those kinds of differences come to pass? Why are we dealing with such discrepancies?
The commission I proposed would be established by law independent of any executive orders to change its mission, change its role, change its scope. Its members would be selected by the leadership of both parties, balanced, kind of like the 9/11 Commission which I think people would argue as being very independent and is on the right track; receive an independent budget so there would not be issues about how thoroughly they might be able to pursue particular avenues of research; and would be directed to examine every aspect of this critical problem; obviously all elements of the collection, all elements of the analysis, and all elements of use from top to bottom, from our intelligence operatives to the White House.
By the way, in my view, Congress looks to provide the checks and balances that are expected through our constitutional offices.
I think this commission should be thorough and we need an end result
that gives us all confidence that when we make decisions that send 120,000, 130,000 or 150,000 of our men and women into battle that they are fighting a war based on information that was intended to give pure advice as best understood. I do not think the looking back--20/20 hindsight is always better, but looking back, one has to question whether the claims that Saddam Hussein posed a dire and immediate threat to the United States were real. It is important that we have a full examination, particularly when there were other alternatives that would not have necessarily cost American lives, such as continued pursuit of U.N. inspections which were claimed to have been ineffective, further diplomacy pointless, when in fact apparently all of those efforts at U.N. inspections and other things had actually been successful. There has been a huge failure, one that is very real in the lives of the families who have given up their sons and daughters, and I think one that morally requires we have an independent, bipartisan commission that gets to answers independently of any of us who have been involved in the decisionmaking, because if we do not have that I think we are going to always have questions of credibility as we go forward.
So I hope we can work together. I certainly intend to offer either on a stand-alone basis or in an amendment format an additional opportunity to support a truly independent and bipartisan commission that can get to the bottom of something I think is fundamental to the national security of this Nation, and make sure all of our sons and daughters are fighting wars and protecting America with the kind of information that is there for the best interests of us executing our policies, not for the best execution of our political desires.
I yield the floor.
Will the Senator from Missouri be willing to take a question with regard to the Senate Intelligence effort?
First of all, I compliment him. I am quite supportive of the Senate Intelligence Committee doing a total rundown on both the collection and the analysis that led both to the Iraq situation and some of the failures he mentioned with regard to Iran and Libya and different points of view. God knows the Pakistani dissemination of technology we have read about in the newspapers in recent months is a pretty horrific proliferation issue about which I think all of us should be concerned.
But there is this fundamental issue of whether intelligence has been misused and whether we are getting the checks and balances in looking at the collected and analyzed information. Are we looking at the full range of possibilities?
I ask my colleague from Missouri, am I correct that the chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee said that studying the use of the intelligence information was really not part of the efforts the Senate Intelligence Committee would take on in this process? I think the record would be specific. But is that the case or not?
Will the Senator yield?
It seems to me it is absolutely essential we understand how the President of the United States can put those 16 words--which were in absolute conflict with the information that generally was available in the Intelligence Committee, if I read that properly--into the State of the Union Message of 2003 with regard to aluminum tubes and with regard to uranium and then later the whole discussion, particularly Secretary Powell's presentation to the U.N. of the use of aluminum tubes. This was also in very strong contradiction to much of the information that is now available. We could go on, with unmanned aerial vehicles and a whole series of other issues.
So somehow or another there were disputes about the response that one should make with regard to collection and analysis of data. And that gets at the fundamental question of how did we use or misuse the intelligence that was presented. To not come up with an answer that is credible to the American people, credible to policymakers in this body, and credible to our allies and the world community is a failure of leadership on our part. It becomes absolutely essential that any independent commission needs to deal with the use, not just the collection and analysis.
Is that how the Senator from Illinois feels?