Mr. Speaker, I am here tonight with my colleagues to resume the Iraq Watch we have been conducting almost every week on the floor since sometime last spring. I believe it was April that we started speaking every week on the floor about our…
Mr. Speaker, I am here tonight with my colleagues to resume the Iraq Watch we have been conducting almost every week on the floor since sometime last spring. I believe it was April that we started speaking every week on the floor about our concerns about our policies in Iraq, trying to ask questions, trying to seek answers from the administration regarding the policies that we have been pursuing. Also, we have been suggesting changes that we would like to see in those policies. Of course, a lot has happened in Iraq since last spring, since the very impressive and brave work of our military men and women, the impressive victory that they won over Saddam Hussein, a victory no one thought was in doubt, but everyone was happy to see with minimal loss of life. We thought that the military performed with great courage and great skill.
Since that time, of course, it has become clear as the military battle was conducted, the planning for and the actual reconstruction and security of Iraq has been very poor. We have all been disappointed in the difficulties. The continuing casualties have been heartbreaking. The inability to get the American-appointed Governing Council to work effectively to try to bring the Iraqi society together has been disappointing. I think the Bush administration finally understands they need to change their plan for the ultimate creation of a new government and a representative democracy and hopefully a pluralistic society in Iraq.
Recently the administration has announced a change. They will no longer ask that the Governing Council in Iraq be responsible for writing a new constitution and holding new elections before America gives up authority for the reconstruction and the occupation of Iraq.
Instead, Mr. Speaker, we are now putting time limits on our occupation. We have apparently announced that we will give to the Iraqis the responsibility for their reconstruction next summer, although the President has been clear, and I agree with the President that we must continue to keep our forces there to make sure the tyrants and the murderers do not come back if the Iraqi democrats-to-be fail to move forward and secure their country.
The question is what is the best policy for this country? How do we best achieve a stable and secure Iraq, which is a goal all of us share? How do we best achieve the creation of a pluralistic society? How do we best establish a representative government based upon principles of self-government and tolerance and cooperation with the rights of women protected, with sharing of responsibility between the three great ethnic groups in Iraq, the Sunnis, the Shiites and the Kurds? How do we best achieve this in the face of a security threat in Iraq where our troops are not safe, where the guerilla attacks against our troops continue, where there is no Iraqi Army yet ready to step forward to provide for its own security, where the Iraqi police are not yet capable of providing for security domestically? How do we best proceed?
Some fear that the President after holding on to power and not allowing the Iraqi Governing Council or any other group to have any decision-making power, some fear that the President now is moving too quickly to give up power to the Iraqis; and I think it is a very legitimate question because if we leave too early, if we leave a vacuum in any way in Iraq, only bad things can happen, whether Saddam Hussein or his followers attempt to come back, whether a new group of lawless thugs attempt to take over, whether forces from other countries attempt to infiltrate and take over Iraq, none of that would be good. None of that would be good for the Western democracies; none of that would honor the sacrifices that brave young Americans have made, including those who have made the ultimate sacrifice and have died serving their country.
A premature departure from Iraq by this country could lead to a less stable country in Iraq. It could lead to a less stable Middle East. It could allow Iraq to become a haven for terrorists, which is a process, unfortunately, already under way, a haven which did not exist when Saddam Hussein was in power. As murderous a tyrant as he was, he operated in a secular fashion and did not
apparently have relationships with the religious fundamentalists and extremists that form al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. But now with the instability in Iraq, it has become a magnet for those who want to attack Americans and disrupt the search for peace in the Middle East.
It is my view, Mr. Speaker, the way to best achieve our national goals in Iraq is to recognize that while this country is uniquely capable of winning military victories and facing down tyrants and working for the liberation of oppressed people, we are perhaps not best suited for nation-building; that we are probably not using our resources and our skills to our highest potential when we get bogged down in having to administer a country. It is admirable that we are willing to pay for the reconstruction or some of the reconstruction of a nation, and that is a great and wonderful American tradition of rebuilding vanquished foes and those less fortunate. But how do we best achieve this stabilized society, representative government and the creation of a pluralistic society where tolerance and economic freedom and personal liberty can flourish?
I am here tonight to say that I continue to believe that we should turn to our multinational organizations such as the United Nations, NATO, and others, to help us with nation-building in Iraq. I would point out that the United Nations is perhaps uniquely qualified through experience and organization to be responsible for reconstruction and nation-building.
In fact, this is what the United Nations was created to do in 1945. I fear that an almost irrational opposition to the notion and the concept of the United Nations from some on the other side of the aisle is preventing this country from calling upon the United Nations to assume this burden. There are many reasons why I would like to see this happen. It is not only to get out from under the financial burden of reconstructing Iraq on our own. It is partly that; it is also partly to share the responsibility for the reconstruction of Iraq. It is to share the credibility that is needed, to call upon other nations and multilateral organizations like the United Nations to provide the stability and take away from the equation some of the animosity that has wrongfully built up against America, but nonetheless exists in some part of the world.
Frankly, the United Nations is designed to do this kind of work. It is designed to relieve the United States from taking on all of the burden of reconstructing a country and building a new Nation. If we turn to the United Nations, we will still be the senior partner. We pay 25 percent of the bills of the United Nations. We will still have tremendous influence over what happens, but we would be in a position where the responsibility and accountability and the burden of reconstruction would be shared with an organization that is created to do that very thing.
Secondly, I do not believe, Mr. Speaker, that anyone, the United States, the United Nations, or anyone else, will have success in the stabilization of Iraq, not the least of which I would include the Iraqi Governing Council itself, unless we establish security in Iraq, and that has not been done. Again, I think it is asking too much of our American military to become a long-term occupying power, to have our young men and women serving in what, in parts of Iraq, seems to be, literally, a shooting gallery, with 20 or 25 daily attacks on American Forces and our Coalition Forces. We are not in a position to have secured Iraq. We clearly need more troops to do that. Yet, in my view, it should not be America's burden to send more troops.
So I would say that it is by far the best strategy to turn to NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which is a military organization, to provide security in Iraq. NATO, of course, historically never fired a shot, was designed as a defensive alliance to keep the world safe from any hostility from the Soviet Union. In the conflict in Kosovo, the NATO forces were used for the first time out of the traditional confines of Europe, or at least on the southern stretches of Europe, used for the first time in a proactive way to defeat another tyrant, another dictator, Milosevic, in Kosovo. And NATO performed brilliantly and was able to liberate that country from the abuses of that dictator and has also now moved into Afghanistan to take over some of the security functions in that country. I believe that NATO would be the appropriate international organization to provide security in Iraq while we turn to the United Nations to take primary responsibility for the reconstruction of Iraq.
Now, none of this will happen, Mr. Speaker, none of this will happen until the United States is willing to give up some authority in Iraq. We cannot continue to call all of the shots in Iraq and expect our traditional allies to send troops or money or advice or anything else. It is time for us not just to put Iraqis back in charge, because it is not yet clear Iraqis are able to be back in charge, particularly, with the insecure conditions that exist there; but it is time for us, in concert with our traditional allies, in concert with international organizations that we created at the end of the Second World War, that we established for the very purpose of Nation-building. Nation-building was not a phrase then, it is a newer phrase, but the concept is exactly why NATO was established, and, particularly, why the United Nations was established. It is time for us to use our diplomatic skill to give up the necessary authority and responsibility, to share the obligations with these two international organizations, so that we can more quickly and more effectively and more safely stabilize Iraq, establish a pluralistic society, and move them towards self-government.
Now, Mr. Speaker, I would like to turn to my colleague, the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Delahunt), one of the senior members of the House Committee on International Relations and a founding member of Iraq Watch, my good friend.
Mr. Speaker, the gentleman refers to the latest plan as the French plan. The New York Times on Sunday, in looking at the plan that they characterize as throwing the problem to the Iraqis, called it the ``hot potato plan.'' French, hot potato french fries perhaps, whatever.
Mr. Speaker, may I interrupt the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Delahunt) again?
There was additional polling information made available over the weekend from a European pollster, I do not know the name, saying that a majority of citizens in virtually every European country except, I believe, Italy, view the United States as the most likely country to start a war or to create instability. Now, I reject that view completely. We are the peacemakers and we are not the war makers; but I wanted to emphasize the gentleman's point that something has gone wrong with the way we are viewed by our friends around the world, let alone how we are viewed by our enemies. I am not so concerned about how the enemies look at us, but when the Western European democracies have a negative view of our President and our country, a negative view that I do not share, but that they have come to that conclusion, something is dramatically wrong.
Mr. Speaker, would the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Delahunt) mind if we bring our colleague into the conversation?
Mr. Speaker, I agree with the gentleman. The problem is not with our troops. It is with the policymakers and our planners here in Washington.
I referred earlier to the New York Times article this Sunday. They entitled it ``Iraq Goes Sour.'' And I take issue, actually, with one of the claims they make here. They blame the intelligence agencies for the failures to understand what was actually happening in Iraq. The editorial said, for example, the Central Intelligence Agency we now realize had no idea what was going on inside Iraq. They continue, the CIA's estimate regarding weapons of
mass destruction were basically worst-case scenarios of what the Hussein regime might have been up to in the interim, in 1998 when inspections were cut off.
They continue, that was apparently a mistake, if an understandable one. The reality I think is different. I think that while the intelligence agencies clearly did not get it right, they were telling the policymakers last fall before Congress voted on whether or not to authorize the war, they were telling the White House that there was great uncertainty about what Hussein had and what he did not have. We know that now. We did not know it then.
This past Spring, 6 months after we voted, and after the war was fought and won, at least according to the President's proclamation on May 1, at least the military's battle was won, if not the guerilla battle. The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence made available to rank and file members 18 or 20 boxes of intelligence information, most notably the Defense Intelligence Agency report of September 2002. And then the great summary report the national intelligence estimate of October of 2002. And I have read the executive summaries of those documents. It is very long, and I spent a couple of hours reading it. It would take days to read all of those boxes, but those summaries which are still classified are replete with uncertainties, with the agencies saying, well, we believe he has got this. We believe he has got that but we are not sure. He had this amount of weapons in the past and we are not quite sure where they are today.
They have made the case, as the Vice President has said, that Hussein was trying to do certain things, but they were full of uncertainty. And my objection is none of that uncertainty was communicated to Congress and to the American people. The President and all of his people, and I want to give an example in a second, told us with complete clarity and certainty that Hussein had these weapons. We knew where they were. We knew how much they weighed. We knew everything about them. We were going to get them and we could not trust him for another moment. And it is my view that it is not the intelligence agencies that failed, but the politicians.
Mr. Speaker, let me introduce our colleague who has been waiting patiently. The gentleman from Washington (Mr. McDermott).
Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for his comments.
I believe our hour is up. I thank all of my colleagues for taking part in Iraq Watch tonight, and we will be back next week.